A KIND OF PROHIBITION:
Alcohol Administration in Pre-Computer Ontario, Canada 1927-1975

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Introduction

This thesis describes in detail the development of a vast bureaucracy of surveillance by provincial authorities around alcohol control, and concerns itself with the categories employed in a vast social sorting operation of drinkers undertaken from 1927 into the 1970s when the system was finally discontinued. In short, at issue are the contact points where categories are flush with material technologies. This is a history lesson in surveillance, the theoretical relevance of which for today lies precisely in the extraordinary transformations it made possible in terms of social identity construction and control. The social sorts accomplished by the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), working in conjunction with three levels of government agencies and police forces, could transform the most private interests into public matters, in the process recategorizing individuals and redefining their material possessions and property. Beyond technology is, then, the power that accrues to those and their cohorts who use the categorization of such personal information for varied and politically motivated purposes of social control. In short, the concern expressed here is with an all-too-contemporary history – “list” making – and its social consequences. To use the ominous words of Edwin Black (2001: 92) in his study of the informational equivalent of blitzkrieg, that is, the speed-processing of data by Hollerith machines, when “lists were everywhere” the politics of race became diabolical.

In his work *IBM and the Holocaust* Black correctly points out that “[m]ankind barely noticed when the concept of massively organized information quietly emerged to
become a means of social control, a weapon of war, and a roadmap for destruction” (Ibid:7). To this day only modest contributions have been made to the theorization of the social impact of sorting and tabulating technologies on targeted populations, while too little attention has been paid to the vital social moment when these technologies were adopted and put to work by businesses and governments around the world. In this way the field of surveillance research is somewhat troubled, as in-depth, original historical research has been overlooked. The ever increasing development of ‘new’ technologies has, thus far, effectively displaced historical analysis and further fragmented knowledge. It is the general purpose of this research to allow for historical analysis to play a more active role in the development and validation of theory within the field, while also contributing to knowledge by reviewing and explaining the historical development of these technologies. More specifically, this research was conducted in order to investigate the development and impact of sorting and tabulating technologies along with their subsequent categories on Canadian populations with a specific focus on the First Nations and others defined as “Indians” either through law or cultural categorization.

The birth of the LCBO occurred in a very particular social moment in Ontario history. Its conception, development, need to instill social control, and thus need for surveillance technologies came as the complex result of the mixture of political conservatism, temperance and business that constituted the hegemonic politics of the time. It is important to understand that temperance played a crucial role in the moral socialscape of 1920's Ontario. The province had just entered prohibition as a result of the war effort and although not all people felt that liquor should remain illegal, liquor
was presented as a social ill, and the liquor trade as the exploitation of the poor and weak willed people of the province. The province had also elected a conservative government on the promise of balancing the budget - and for whom liquor taxation was considered a necessary means to that end. What resulted was an LCBO created by a business focused conservative party, that relied upon the knowledge and abilities of the business elite for the so-called proper running of the liquor trade, not to mention the ability to launch an extensive promotional campaign to create and maintain support for this means of balancing the provincial budget. As it will become apparent these initial themes of temperance morality and the Board's social duty were forged into the bureaucratic policies and processes of the LCBO shaping its interactions and relationships with both individual actors and social groups. The first chapter of this thesis seeks to flesh out these pertinent elements of the 1920's Ontario social landscape in order to better understand the roots, origins and purposes of the tools and methods of surveillance and social control explained in the later chapters of this thesis.

The second and third chapters of this thesis focus on the actual technologies employed by the LCBO in order to fulfill the social role given to it by the government. Because of the strength of the temperance vote the key word that the government wanted to be associated with the Board was 'control'. In numerous speeches given by the government of the province the Board's role was defined plainly as to "know exactly who is drinking and how much and what disposition is being made of it" (Ferguson.1926). One can see clearly here the centrality of surveillance within the Board's role. Initially the Board relied upon a liquor permit book - a passport-like document that had to be purchased annually - and kept detailed records on both the
permit holder and the purchases s/he made, as the means by which it gazed into the lives of permit holders. The Board, by making permittees aware of the penetration and permanence of this gaze, used it as a means of regulating behavior.

Chapter two investigates the permit books and their impact on individuals by drawing on Foucault's (1977) literature on the Panopticon. These books were designed to allow not only a means of creating a constant and all-seeing gaze into the permit holder’s liquor use, but also to instill in the holder of the permit a need for self-discipline and control of “unwanted” behaviors. In this way LCBO policy, technologies and expectations of the result of employing this cluster of strategies mirrored exactly the type of social dynamics explained by Foucault; specifically that subjected individuals would fall into a pattern of self-discipline and conformity. The permit books and subsequent technologies were in addition directed towards LCBO employees. The books themselves were stamped by employees that used unique traceable stamps and purchases required paperwork that effectively made visible all of the internal workings of local LCBO outlets to head office in Toronto. What was of interest was the extent to which LCBO board members at head office had faith in the regulatory power of this type of surveillance as well as its effectiveness in the detection and prosecution of deviant vendors. It was in this oppressive climate that vendors developed a resistant occupational tactics of evasion.

Chapter three turns its focus towards the technologies that were employed behind the scenes, those that remained hidden from the public and even remained little known outside of the board members of Head Office. It was central to the LCBO's mandate to ensure that no individuals deemed "unfit" to drink were ever served in its stores. What
this meant for the province was a massive social sorting program designed at identifying who could and could not employ self-control – that is, demonstrate sufficient self-control through the panoptic social forces of the liquor permit book. Initially this meant that the LCBO simply needed to cancel individual permits and ensure that no further purchases could be made by, for example, acquiring another permit. Persons with cancelled permits had their names and likenesses placed on the “cancelled list”.

With the opening of Standard hotels and other establishments licensed to sell liquor in 1934 the Board soon realized that liquor permit books afforded an incomplete means of control, as canceling a permit no longer necessarily meant that the individual could no longer purchase liquor legally. So the Board's regulatory mechanisms pushed outwards, forming bonds with police, Indian Affairs, city relief offices and non-governmental organizations in order to ensure that those deemed unworthy of "the permit privilege" would be unable to purchase liquor within the province. The new list, based on the interdiction laws of the late 1800's, would be much more invasive, require much in terms of more surveillance resources, as now individuals could no longer “opt out” of LCBO classification, surveillance and regulation by simply not buying a liquor permit. What was of critical interest for this thesis was the employment of this “interdiction list” and what this list meant for the individuals and groups that were subject to this classification system.

A thorough review of surviving physical documents as well as the LCBO’s internal communications revealed a complex system of classification designed to reduce LCBO contact with individuals who posed an unacceptable level of risk as far as alcohol was concerned. What was obvious from the LCBO’s internal documents and
communications was it had specific targets in its sights, and that targeted individuals as well as groups were dealt with diligently - or else - vendors themselves would be put under investigation, fired or even prosecuted under provincial law. The interdiction program was aimed at those who could not afford to buy liquor without impoverishing their families, those who drank to excess, those who were defined as "Indians" under federal law, and those who were receiving aid or social assistance from their municipalities. Though specific types of individuals were specifically mentioned within provincial law the Board also sought to use the powers of the interdiction list to control unwanted behaviors such as vagrancy, sexual promiscuity in women, the social drinking behaviors of the working class and the actions of certain racially defined groups. The most noteworthy of these latter were the First Nations peoples, as LCBO Head Office warnings about serving "Indian looking" individuals were constantly sent to vendors; indeed, this topic was granted its own section within the LCBO vendor handbook.

The findings of chapter three also support the work of Gandy (1993) and his concept of the panoptic sort, as well as other social sorting literature, in that the limitation of risk is a key initiator of social sorts and administrative surveillance models.

Chapter four reviews the remaining LCBO Interdiction files in order to investigate whether the LCBO policy of interdiction, reviewed in chapter three, was consistent with the implementation of the interdiction program on the ground. To do this a linear regression was performed in order to determine the statistical predictors of being added to the interdiction list. The interdiction files remain at the Archives of Ontario and include a vast array of personal information regarding both the individual facing interdiction and the circumstances surrounding the investigation and interdiction ruling.
These files are incredibly detailed and include personal information as to where the individual lived, who had made the request, why the individual was investigated, the results of a formal investigation into the individual’s drinking, police records and finally whether or not the individual was interdicted. This detailed information allowed for a multifaceted investigation, reviewing the individual details for predictors of interdiction.

As was predicted from reviewing the LCBO’s internal documents and policies, race, class and gender all were significant predictors of interdiction, though the regression also pointed to institutional relations with the police, city relief officers and Indian Affairs, as well as revealing which reasons for interdiction were pursued with the most diligence. This analysis also added detail to the LCBO’s interdiction investigation programs and the social relations that resulted in individuals seeking to have others interdicted. The research showed that applications were made overwhelmingly by women, who were in most cases seeking to have their husbands interdicted. A further finding was that women’s applications were less likely to result in interdiction, that the most successful applications came from governmental institutions such as the police, and that the region in which the individual under investigation lived also impacted interdiction. Further, from this material one can also see the internalized morality of the temperance movement through Board action in regards to who was ultimately selected for interdiction. As policies, regulations, and internal documents show and, as the regression also shows, the interdiction list was used to enforce the morality of the temperance movement. From running simple frequencies one can see that it was the poor, women, “Indians” and those defined by the Board as having a “weaker” moral character that were the targets of interdiction. While chapter four lays out and explains
some of the relationships between the LCBO and targeted individuals, chapters five and six deal, in much greater detail, with the social relations surrounding the targeted First Nations peoples as well as further investigating the particular relationship that existed between women and the LCBO.

Although it was known prior to this research that today LCBO outlets in remote parts of the province are flash points for racism and prejudice, what was unknown was the extensive role that interdiction classification played in the development of the current stereotypes surrounding alcohol and the First Nations peoples. The details of this relationship, culled from LCBO policy, circulars and internal documents, were very rich and showed the overtly racist stance that the LCBO took towards First Nations’ drinking. Board policy was primarily designed to insulate itself from prosecution for serving “Indians” as was stipulated in both the federal Indian Act and Ontario’s Liquor Control Act, however, Board policy relied on local knowledge and prototypical classification as its means of determining who was in fact an “Indian”. The Board also informed vendors that all “Indians” were a priori on the interdiction list. In addition to this the Board did not rely on legal definitions of race and, instead, accepted the enfranchisement card as sole proof of non-Indian status. This formalized and quasi-legal relationship impacted the identity and the classification of “Indians” for all First Nations peoples, as it limited who was classified as an “Indian”, created concepts about “Indians” such that they were prone to abuse alcohol and spending their money foolishly on liquor. Also since only those who held enfranchisement cards, and not their children (since they were ineligible to obtain their own cards) were allowed access to liquor, only a very particular person of First Nations lineage was “rewarded” with “white” rights.
Effectively, an enfranchisement card meant that one had given up one's First Nations lineage and entered white society.

Chapter five also pursues the impact of prototypical classification, a type of classification that relies on the conceptual closeness of individuals to known social categories, that is, on what is called category tightness. First Nations peoples were conceptualized as a priori interdicted and this was the means of controlling their access to liquor; but, defining who was an “Indian” was a matter of extreme difficulty for the LCBO. LCBO policy ultimately took the easiest route: denying all “Indian”-looking individuals access to alcohol and only if an applicant pressed the issue would the vendor look into the lineage of the individual in question. This policy forced vendors to rely on prototypical classification, that is deciding if an individual was conceptually linked to the “Indian” stereotype to determine the race of the applicant.

The LCBO's reliance upon prototypical classification allowed the category to be affixed with equal ease to individuals of non-First Nations lineage, and forced individuals labeled as "Indians" into socially deviant acts such as drinking in public places, consuming alcohol and alternative substances in dangerous ways (criminalizing these behaviours). Ultimately the LCBO unified the previously independent categories of interdicted person and “Indian” as they were both “known” to have the same stereotypical traits. Soon after use of the interdiction list became widespread, circa 1934, it became known as the “Indian list” and deviant drinking patterns became incorporated into the “Indian” prototype. This chapter reviews the complex relationship between the First Nations and LCBO policies of classification through the theoretical work of Bowker and Star (2000:62) on “convergence” and “tightness” while also incorporating

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the concept of prototypical classification from Lakoff (1987) and Taylor (1995) in explicating how the interdiction classification affixed itself with such tightness to the peoples of the First Nations.

Chapter six describes the relationship between women and the interdiction list. This chapter details the significant role that gender played in predictions of interdiction, and explains the relationship that women had with the LCBO's list-making activities. Women almost exclusively constituted all applications made by individuals to have someone investigated for interdiction, and though the interdiction of women themselves was a rare event, it held significantly more severe consequences for the women involved. This chapter returns again to the data provided by the investigation into the interdiction files of the LCBO.

From the outset of this research it was obvious that many women sought to control the drinking habits of their husbands by invoking the regulatory powers of the LCBO. The reason most often provided by women was abuse or overindulgence, and in these files are found detailed explanations of violence against women. But the files also show that women sought Board power out of spite, as a means of controlling non-liquor related acts, and even as a means to reward desired behaviours. When the regulatory powers of interdiction were directed at women a very different set of social relations emerged. Unlike the peoples of the First Nations, "white" women were allowed legally to drink, however, the LCBO's concept of proper womanhood, gained though the temperance movement of the 1900's, could not properly conceptualize the kind of female drinkers who appeared with the end of prohibition. The LCBO understood that liquor was a means of destroying a woman's virtue, and set themselves against this norm.
by strictly controlling the behaviour of women who came to their attention. Listed individuals were subjected to heightened surveillance and forced into social relationships and actions that labeled them as "drunks" and in need of control.

Requests to investigate women for interdiction most often came from the police. Secondly, spouses sought interdiction for their wives as a means to bring them under some sort of control. The files hold records of paper correspondence between women targeted for interdiction and the LCBO. From these letters may be observed a decisive change in an individual's relationship to the interdiction label. Almost all subjected individuals began with a very defiant position against their new classification and what it entailed, those who were repeatedly interdicted soon adopted the label as part of their identity as well as the need to be externally controlled by the LCBO.

From the research presented in this thesis several themes emerge, though the most dominant elements are related to categorization and its ability to impact both individual and social identity. External to the individual we can see that LCBO categorization lead to convergence, or the adoption of categorical traits, by both individuals and groups through the alteration of social relations caused by the classification itself. In this case the LCBO classification dictated social action, both in the form of the labeling process of interdiction as well as in the criminalization of acts that were legal for others. First Nations were forced into dangerous drinking behaviours; the observance of these reinforced the label of problem drinker and the further tightened the classification. This bureaucratic inscription of identity is presented in detail in the pages of this thesis. While each chapter investigates these themes through fairly independent means, their constitutive force as far as categorical convergence is
concerned remains.

The bulk of the data presented in this work was drawn from archival material in the form of the LCBO’s internal circulars. The LCBO circulars were the means by which head office contacted local stores and they contained detailed instructions as to how LCBO policy should be carried out on the ground. The LCBO required that all vendors, and in some cases all employees, sign and return a form showing they had read and understood the contents of each and every circular. The historical period of research, for the most part, precedes the proliferation of the telephone so circulars contained *all* instructions from head office and were invaluable in understanding Board policy, vendor responsibilities and concepts behind LCBO action. The circulars were numbered numerically and are cited within this text with the circular number as well as the date of issue. LCBO circulars 1-5000 can be found at the Archives of Ontario in the RG-41-3 series.

Data that appears in the subsequent chapters regarding the Interdiction List, the information regarding listed individuals as well personal correspondence with the LCBO, were collected under a research agreement #2004-071 with the Archives of Ontario under the Freedom of Information Act. As per the agreement no material was presented in this text that would allow for the identification of any particular individual who was interdicted or whose private information was within the interdiction files. The interdiction records can be found at the Archives of Ontario in the RG-36-13 series.

What this thesis, in its entirety, seeks to portray are the tools, methods and procedures of surveillance implemented by the LCBO from 1927-1976 to control access to alcohol by the people of Ontario and the consequences of this for targeted
populations, in hopes of developing a better historical and theoretical understanding of surveillance technologies and their implementation.
Chapter 1

Temperance Morality, Business and Surveillance at the Birth of the LCBO

We are handing the problem over to a business administration of capable men, who will have within their authority the entire administration of this problem, and their judgment will not be subject to review either by a court of this land or the government of this province.
- Provincial Premier Howard Ferguson, on the formation of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in 1927

The province of Ontario and the Dominion of Canada where both very interested in the prospect of government controlled liquor sale. The issue appeared in Ontario on the voting card as early as 1893, and even though the repeal of prohibition faced repeated defeats, in public referendums and plebiscites, both the federal and provincial governments continued to poll their citizens almost continuously into the early 1900s. Federal votes were conducted in the province of Ontario in 1898 and 1920, while votes held by the provincial government occurred in 1893, 1902, 1919 and 1924. In Ontario the results of each vote were the same - support for prohibition and the continuance of the popular Canada and Ontario Temperance Acts restricting the sale of liquor in the province.

However, the Ontario Plebiscite of 1924 was interpreted differently by the Ontario government. The government argued that a marked change had occurred in the sentiment toward temperance in the province. Premier Howard Ferguson stated that “the repeated votes upon the issue of temperance indicate a marked falling off in the sentiment of support of the Ontario Temperance Act” which then, he added, justified the government’s already drafted plans of creating a commission for the controlled sale of
liquor in Ontario (Ferguson 1926:6). But the 1924 vote and resulting formation of the LCBO were not without controversy. Tremendous increases in registered voters for the 1924 referendum, as well as questionable actions within Queen's Park surrounding the Liquor Control Act legislation, seriously called into question the "significant shift" in public morality that was the government's justification for the implementation of liquor sales. These matters are of importance to this text because by shedding light on the troubled birth of the LCBO one can obtain a much deeper understanding of the forces behind Board policy and the social forces that gave rise to their implementation of an elaborate administrative surveillance system to monitor and control the consumption of alcohol in Ontario, based on of point-of-purchase technologies as well as vast social sorting techniques.

The 1924 Plebiscite

Ontario was called to vote on the issue of prohibition again by Ontario's Conservative Ferguson Government in 1924, only four years after the unsuccessful federal vote of 1920 and very soon after the general election of 1923. The plebiscite consisted of two questions. The first was "Are you in favour of the continuance of the Ontario Temperance Act?" and the second "Are you in favour of the sale as a beverage of beer and spirituous liquor in sealed packages under Government control?" (Legislative Assembly of Ontario 1925). The Ferguson government was strongly for the sale of liquor, as they saw in it a key way of achieving one of their election promises of balancing the budget. The government seems to have phrased the questions on the basis
of those questions that did well in the 1919 referendum. The official results of the referendum gave those who were in favour of the continuance of the Ontario Temperance Act a slim victory of 33,915, or about two per cent of the total vote (See figure 1-1 below).

**Figure 1-1. The Official Results of the Plebiscite of 1924**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ballot Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1. Are you in favour of the continuance of the Ontario Temperance Act?</td>
<td>585,676 (51.4%)</td>
<td>551,761 (48.6%)</td>
<td>33915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Are you in favour of the sale as a beverage of beer and spirituous liquor in sealed packages under Government control?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The plebiscite, however, was widely criticized over the number of names that appeared on the voter's list and some went so far as to suggest that the ballot had included the votes of "absents and dead men against" prohibition (Constituent. 1924). In one instance 37,000 had registered to vote in the town of Kitchener, which had a population of only 38,691 people (The Globe. *Avalanche of Names in Plebiscite Vote* Amazed Windsor. Oct. 6th 1924).

Due to the proximity of the 1923 general election a fairly accurate analysis of the voter's list can be made. Although the overall numbers suggest only a slight increase of 221,579 voters representing 11.71% of the total vote, individual districts saw tremendous changes in their voter's lists (Legislative Assembly of Ontario. 1925). Thirty separate districts that had previously supported prohibition in the 1919 referendum saw a decline in their number of registered voters when compared to the 1923 general election. This decline, over a one year period, resulted in a total decline of prohibition, or "dry",...
supporting districts of 15,682 or 8.3% of the total vote. Of the remaining districts many saw increases in the thousands. The most notable being Toronto North East which saw an increase of 26,152 or 33%, and Russell, 7,601 or 39.42%, both of which had voted against prohibition in the 1919 referendum and again in the 1924 referendum. Of the top ten districts that saw the largest decrease in registered voters between 1923 provincial election and the 1924 plebiscite 9 voted "dry" or for prohibition, while the top ten districts that saw the greatest increases all voted "wet" or for government sale of liquor (see table below).

Figure 1-2. Largest Changes in Registered Voters Between 1923 and 1924 and How they Voted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Change in Registered voters 1923-1924</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Change in Registered voters 1923-1924</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Niagra Falls</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>-1,296 (-7%)</td>
<td>1 Toronto N.E.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>26,152 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Brant N.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-927 (-8%)</td>
<td>2 Toronto N.W.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>15,163 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Hastings N.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-911 (-9%)</td>
<td>3 York E.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>14,787 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Grey S.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-804 (-6%)</td>
<td>4 York W.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>14,270 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Essex S.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-691 (-5%)</td>
<td>5 Windsor</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>10,668 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Oxford S.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-630 (-5%)</td>
<td>6 Toronto S.W.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>9,984 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Lambton E.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-601 (-6%)</td>
<td>7 Russell</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>7,601 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Simcoe W.</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-594 (-5%)</td>
<td>8 Ottawa W.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>6,325 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Leeds</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-588 (-6%)</td>
<td>9 Parkdale</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>5,986 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Prince Edward</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>-558 (-5%)</td>
<td>10 Hamilton E.</td>
<td>Wet</td>
<td>5,392 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the 1924 plebiscite over 1,891,000 individuals were registered to vote, representing 100.2% of the adult population in Ontario as reported by the census (Statistics Canada as reported in Pophem and Schmit. 1958). The Government, as well as
those supporting liquor sales, argued that the marked increases in voters could be attributed to tax dodgers who had previously avoided being placed on the voter’s lists who now, in light of being able to vote on the possibility of legalizing alcohol sales, were willing to register, pay taxes and vote (The Globe. Avalanche of Names in Plebiscite Vote Amazed Windsor. Oct. 6th 1924). This is however unlikely due to the fact that votes on the legalization of liquor had occurred in Ontario in 1902, 1919 and 1920 before the plebiscite of 1924 (see Figure 1-3 below).

Figure 1-3. Results of the Plebiscites and Referendums on Liquor in Ontario 1902-1924

NB - Although the 1919 vote displayed spectacular support for prohibition in Ontario it too was plagued by criticism for voter registration. One can gain confidence as to the approximate level of 60% for prohibition and 40% for government sale from the 1902 and 1920 votes due to the consistency of registered voters, ballots cast and the continuity of the “wet” vote when compared with 1919 and the “dry” vote when compared with 1924.

Government Control, Anyway (Regardless)

When the legislation for liquor control was originally put forward in 1926 liquor
sale was considered by Ontario’s highly temperate population as an economic exploitation of the poor and weak moraled people of the province. Political cartoons and temperance warning posters often showed liquor being exchanged for death or blood and liquor vendors as vultures preying on the working class.

Figure 1-4. Temperance Cartoon “Watching for Prey” 1915

After losing the vote on government control of alcohol sales in the plebiscite of 1924, the Ferguson government continued to press the issue. They argued that since a significant change in opinion had been shown since the 1919 referendum, public opinion in the province was moving inevitably towards the endorsement of government control of liquor sales and distribution (Ibid:6). In 1926, before the general election, the Ferguson government had already fully planned the format which government control would take and was already hinting at the specific nature of how liquor sales would be

conducted in Ontario (Ibid:18).

In creating the LCBO the Ferguson government argued that it would be "handing the problem over to a business administration of capable men," giving these men authority over "the entire administration of the problem" and not having them "subject to review either by a court of th[e] land or the government of th[e] province" (Ibid:4).

The complete Liquor Control Act was officially read before the house on March 9th 1927 to much public criticism. Other than the simple fact that the LCA allowed for the sale of liquor, arguments against the bill focussed on the unchecked powers awarded to the Board (The Globe. Wide Powers Given Control Board by New Liquor Bill. March 10th 1927). Section 25 (2) stipulated that

every action, order or decision of the Board as to any matter or thing in respect of which any power, authority or discretion is conferred on the Board under this Act shall be final and shall not be questioned, reviewed or restrained by injunction, prohibition or mandamus or other process or proceeding in any court or be removed by certiorari or otherwise in court” (Liquor Control Act S.O.1927. c.70 s.25.2).

Many feared that these unchecked powers would lead to serious and widespread abuses, especially since the LCBO was to act under the direct authority of the provincial government.

The government, however, openly discussed the reasons for the Board’s absolute powers, citing the need for strong policing powers and extensive business knowledge as safeguards against the abuse of liquor and political corruption (Ferguson.1926). Pressure against the bill came from organizations ranging from the Christian Women’s
Temperance Union to the National Brewer's Association. Ferguson responded by promising that the bill would be discussed at length in parliament and that the government was open to "sensible arguments" from all sides (The Globe. *Nuns Continue to Fight Against Liquor Store.* March 11th 1927; Ferguson.1927:4).

Upon the second reading, however, the openness and willingness of the government drastically changed. During the ensuing debates W.E. Raney, leader of the Progressive Party, argued that a Board with such immense powers should not exist under the government, and the Liquor Control Board should act autonomously like the newly formed board that regulated Ontario's electricity (Globe. *Liquor Control Bill Passed by Committee with Few Revisions.* March 25th 1927). Raney argued (correctly) that this proposed Board could be used as a political tool if it remained under the control of the government, but even under this tremendous political pressure the Ferguson government would not budge and the bill narrowly passed its second reading. Facing dissent even from within his own party Ferguson ordered the third and final reading to occur without warning at 10pm on March 30th 1927, and due to the sudden nature of the vote only a "handful of members" were present (The Globe. *Liquor Bill Gets Reading Without Opposition.* March 30th 1927).

TEMPERANCE MORALITY AND THE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD OF ONTARIO

Needless to say, in 1926 the Liquor Control Act (LCA) was not popular legislation and even after the bill was made law the Ferguson government remained in an almost constant battle of propaganda with temperance groups on issues of the ills of
liquor and the effectiveness of the provincial system of control. Public sentiment surrounding liquor sales was portrayed in the press such that “if the Government expected to be returned at the next and succeeding elections” they could not permit it to be shown that revenue had come “from the ruination of families or creating drunkards” (Willison. 1924). To this end the government sale system was forced to be firmly centred around the concept of strict liquor control and temperate morality.

From its onset the LCBO sold itself as the answer to the problems of bootlegging and excessive consumption; it even went so far as to portray itself as an anti-drinking organization. The Board expressed strongly to its workers that they had the “success of the law in their hands” and that they were to be active in “preventing discredit falling upon the store system through immoderation or other wrongdoing by permit holders” (LCBO Circular 497, 382.1928; LCBO Instructions to Vendors Regarding the Issuing Permits. 1928:5). The biggest fear was that “such cases may be featured in the press and be seized as opportunity for criticism of the Liquor Control Act, vendors and issuers” (LCBO Circular 1292.1931).

Even the strategic placing of LCBO outlets around the province was highly scrutinized and based on temperance values. Not only were stores far from churches and schools but they were also “confined to points where they may be found necessary to check petty bootlegging and better social conditions” (LCBO Annual Report 1928-1929.

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1 LCBO Circulars as well as the various Vendor handbooks were received through either a Freedom of Information Act request to the LCBO or from the Archives of Ontario RG-41-3 Administrative Records of the General Manager of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario 1927-1986 or the RG-36 series.
The Board was resolute in its temperate and moral mission, and explained to their workers that:

Vendors and Permit Clerks must realize that the object of the act is twofold. On the one hand, to stop the activities of the bootlegger and transfer as much as possible his enormous gains to the people of the province. On the other hand, a matter of as great, if not indeed greater, importance, to regulate and, as much as possible control the use of liquor, to prevent sales where they ought to be prevented and thereby improve social conditions to the fullest extent possible. Officers will please realize that profits in their stores are subsidiary to public service and that proper public service demands the most careful security and control of purchases. The worst offence a Permit Clerk can be guilty of is allowing indiscriminate sales which can only give rise to abuses" (LCBO 382.1928).

The LCBO continuously affirmed to its employees that "the key word is not 'sale' but 'control'" and that it was essential to remember that sales and profits are secondary considerations, that the primary one is control; that volume of sales and profits may actually in some stores indicate laxity toward abuses of the permit privilege, and that satisfactory service in a store is best proved by prevalence of good social conditions in the surrounding community, absence of drunkenness and disorderliness, and freedom of complaints of neglected wives and families (LCBO Circular 497.1928).
The LCBO also knew that it was highly vulnerable to criticism and sought to limit dissenting voices by tightly controlling the public release of information. Employees at the LCBO were repeatedly reminded by Head Office "that no information must be given out to the public, concerning the affairs of the Board" (LCBO Circular 245.1927) and "all officers and employees of the Liquor Control Board" were further cautioned "against giving information to the public, newspaper representatives etc, relative to any matter whatsoever pertaining to the affairs of the stores, breweries or brewery warehouses" (LCBO Circular 432.1928). To do so would be in violation of "Sections 76, 92, 101 and 103 of the Liquor Control Act" resulting in dismissal and possible incarceration (LCBO Circular 245.1927). Newspapers were noticeably upset by the LCBO's lack of openness and reported retorts from vendors stating that any information they were given from Head Office was "for [their] own information and for none else" (The Ottawa Citizen. *Officials Silent on Liquor Law Details.* June 3rd 1927).

The functioning of the LCBO was in fact so secretive that access was even denied to the provincial government until an official inquiry was launched in 1934. To the surprise of the Inquiry the LCBO kept no "record of any of its operations, resolutions or decisions at its official meetings" and their chief secretary, under oath, stated repeatedly that he was not invited to Board meetings or asked to make or keep any such records (Ross.1936:3).

In order to fill the role of "capable men" the Province drew from the business elite such men as Harry Sheppard, the former chairman of the board of IBM Canada, Sir Henry Drayton, a former federal railways minister, R. D. Waugh, a former League of Nations commissioner, among others (Heron.2003:278). What this meant for the LCBO
was the incorporation of state of the art tabulating and sorting machines as well as the savvy of public relation initiatives, advanced business practices and, of course, corporate connections.

*Moral Control Through Surveillance*

In the early years the Board understood that it needed to play a vital role in convincing a skeptical public that profit making through the sale of liquor could come without the exploitation of the poor and weak. To this end Ferguson boasted that the Board would always know “exactly who is buying and how much, and what disposition is being made of it” (Ferguson 1927:3). When faced with Ferguson’s tremendous task of individualized liquor control in Ontario, the LCBO’s business administration of “capable men” turned to forms of control that were known to them, namely, the “standardization, monitoring, record keeping and statistical analysis” that were “the cornerstones of bureaucratic surveillance and control of the labour process” in the private sector (Gandy 1993:86).

The LCBO’s control method was based on two needs. First, it needed to discover and deny privilege to those individuals who lacked the self-discipline necessary for “responsible” drinking. These individuals posed an incredible risk to the Board by showing the public consequences of exploitation and addiction; and second, it needed to maintain panoptic control over those individuals who did maintain a sufficient degree of self-discipline. One can perhaps simplify the social function of the LCBO’s surveillance and control policies as risk avoidance and the creation of docile bodies - Foucault's
concept of individuals living in a state of "habituated anticipatory conformity"
(Foucault. 1977; Norris and Armstrong. 1999:6).

From the first purchases in 1927 forward, the LCBO developed an elaborate
Head Office bureaucracy with up-to-the-minute proto-computer systems employing
sophisticated administrative surveillance of point-of-purchase consumption of alcohol
that makes today's computerized gathering of personal information from consumers
look amateurish. From 1927-1962 the LCBO limited those who were legally allowed to
drink by requiring a permit to purchase liquor. These permits required an application to
the Liquor Board which would then grant or deny requests based on "fitness" to drink
and "character" (LCA. 1927. s.37.4. and s.44). The permit book resembled a passport in
size and shape and was individually identifiable through a unique six-digit number. The
pages inside consisted of a small section of personal information, including name,
address and employment, and another for records of purchases, including the date, liquor
type, volume and cost. This tracking of every Ontarian's liquor purchases allowed the
LCBO to live up to Ferguson's original mandate of "knowing exactly who is buying and
how much."

Between 1929 and 1933 these permits, along with investigations by the LCBO
and Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), allowed the LCBO to generate over 154,000
detailed files on Ontario residents that included financial, employment and family data.
This data was used to gauge the "fitness" of drinkers and also shared with other state and
police institutions. The LCBO even had the controversial right to grant police search
warrants and the ability to convert private property such as homes or places of business
into public spaces under the Liquor Control Act. By 1946 the LCBO's job of tracking

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sales and permit holders became so large and complex that it started to rely on the punch
card tabulation machines of IBM and other companies in order to process results.

Conclusion

The LCBO was made from a historical mixture of political necessity, corporate
methods of social control and unquestionable legal power. As this data shows the LCBO
cannot be simply understood as a business administration for the sale of liquor, but must
be conceptualized as an institution entrusted with a very serious moral mandate and
social control function based on the morality and prejudices of the temperance
movement. It is important to keep this point in mind when reading the remainder of this
text as the themes of strict liquor control, the fanatical presentation of good social
conditions, and the shadow of the temperance movement can be seen in all Board policy
and action. The LCBO became a switching point, an early generator of and distributor of
specialized data for social control organizations such as the police agencies and welfare
services (see Ericson and Haggerty. 1997).
Chapter 2
Self-Control: The LCBO and Panopticism

*Of all kinds of control, the best is self-control.*
-LCBO Circular 497, October 10th 1928

In a circular on the topic of controlling abuses of liquor privileges sent to all vendors at both the LCBO stores and brewery warehouses, the Board emphasised that “of all kinds of control, the best is self-control” (LCBO Circular 49.1928). With this in mind Board policy focussed on allowing individual users to see the ills of their ways so that they could change their own behaviour. This was conceptualized as achievable, for those capable of self-control, through heavy surveillance of individual purchases and consumption. The Board argued that technologies that made visible drinking behaviour were necessary in order “to directly bring home to those purchasing liquor the amount of money they are spending on luxuries, possibly to the expense of real necessities”, thus allowing individuals the chance to control themselves with only minimal external force (LCBO Fourth Annual Report 1929-1930.1930:9).

Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon in *Discipline and Punish* is directly relevant for this study (1977). From his brother’s works on Russian industrial discipline, Bentham developed the concept of the Panopticon as a prison for a new age (Los.2004:15). Arguably more humane than the prisons of the time, the Panopticon brought prisoners out of darkness and obscurity into visibility and light. The proposed Panopticon would consist of a ring-shaped structure with cells arranged so that they would have large windows on both the exterior and interior of the building. On the exterior wall the first window would create backlighting for the cell, while the window on the interior wall would allow for viewing the prisoner and the cell’s entire contents.
At the centre of the ring-like structure would be an inspection tower where the guard, or guardian of the prison, would be able to view all the prisoners within their cells. The windows and lighting would play a crucial role in the building by allowing the prisoner to be seen by the central tower at all times. This ever present gaze, Bentham argued, would be the only regulatory tool needed since the prisoner would be constantly aware that the guardian may be watching and, having internalized his gaze, cease contemplating unacceptable acts. Bentham also believed strongly that the prisoner must be unable to detect when he was under the eye of the guardian. Knowing, Bentham felt, would limit the “correction” of behaviour to when the prisoner knew he was under surveillance; so, to this end, Bentham conceived of an elaborate mixture of blinds, tunnels and lighting fixtures that would allow for the prisoner to be always seen without ever being able to verify the guardian's presence (Bentham in Foucault 1977:200-201).

Bentham took this concept one step further when he speculated about the necessity of the guardian at all. Once it was established that a guardian was watching, then any person occupying the tower, regardless of position or education, could play the necessary role. He even went as far as to explain that the regulatory effect of the guardian’s gaze could even be accomplished through a system of moving shadows. Like the ghosts that Bentham had feared in his own life, only the perception of the existence of the guardian mattered, and not the reality (Himmelfarb. 1966). Regardless of the actual or possible existence of an observing guardian, his role of generating a reforming gaze could be obtained through the mere possibility of his presence within the inspection tower.

Unlike Bentham, Foucault did not see the Panopticon necessarily as a physical structure. Foucault envisioned the Panopticon as more than simply a physical structure.
He understood it as a structure of social relations designed to alter human behaviour through the perception of constant surveillance. Panoptic social organization, he argued, “thanks to its mechanisms of observation, gains in efficiency and ability to penetrate into men's behaviour” (Foucault. 1977:204), forcing them into a form of self-discipline through which “the individual is carefully fabricated” to fit within the moral and legal rules of the society (Ibid:217). In the end, Foucault argues, this form of power succeeds to produce what he calls “docile bodies”, that is, individuals living in a state of “habituated anticipatory conformity” (Norris and Armstrong. 1999:6).

In the case of the LCBO, surveillance mechanisms embedded within the purchase process were used to instil the necessary characteristics of Panopticism (Foucault. 1977:195-228) for both the permit holding public and the LCBO staff. The purchase process involved three main pieces of disciplinary technology: the individual liquor permit book, the purchase form and the vendor stamp. When a permit holder, or permittee, wanted to purchase liquor from a Board store all three of these technologies came into play. First, a purchase form would be filled out containing the type of liquor requested, amount of liquor requested, the date and the individual's permit book number (LCA. 1927.s.32.1,s.32.2). Then the individual's permit book would be checked to see that purchases had not reached an excessive level. If the level was deemed acceptable by the vendor, then the new purchase would be added to the individual liquor permit book, the purchase form would be signed by the purchaser and finally both would be stamped by the LCBO vendor (LCBO Vendor Instructions, 1927:3). Since each of these technologies were embedded within all legal liquor interactions, and all were individually numbered, they acted as surveillance tools applied to both liquor permittees and LCBO store staff.
Liquor Permits

"The major effect of the Panopticon," Foucault (1977: 201) argued, was "to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power". For individual liquor users the Permit Book would play a central role in creating the conscious state of "permanent visibility" needed to induce self-discipline. The Liquor Permit Books were introduced by the LCBO in Ontario in 1927 under the conditions of the Liquor Control Act. The permit book resembled a passport in size and shape and was individually and geographically identifiable through a unique six digit number. The pages inside consisted of a small section related to the individual, including name, address and employment, and another for records of purchases. The liquor permit books were required to purchase liquor for home consumption and, upon purchase, the date, liquor type, volume and cost were recorded, allowing for surveillance and classification of all users along these parameters.

FIGURE 2-1. Liquor Permit Book 1927-1958
The Liquor Permit Books were acquired by application if one was twenty-one years of age, a resident of Ontario for one month or more (visitors applied under another category), and of "good" character; specifically, one could not be an "Indian" already disqualified through the LCBO's own sorts, "by an order of cancellation or interdiction" (LCA.1927. s.37.4.,s.44,s.95-1; LCBO Manual of Instructions to Vendors.1952:20). Appslicants were then required to obtain a permit application form, fill it out and have an individual appointed by the Board verify their identity and character (Liquor Control Act. S.O. s.37.2; LCBO Form 85; Instructions to Vendors.1927). Two copies of the permit were created through the application process, one was sent to the Permit Department of the LCBO, to be known as "second copies", and the other was given to the customer, to be presented upon each purchase (Sec.66. Regulations of the LCBO, 1927). A fee of two dollars was required. The Liquor Permit Book was valid for twelve months, from November 1st of one year to October 31st of the next. After this time the permit had to be replaced and another two dollars paid to the LCBO.

Since each purchase required the permittee's Liquor Permit Book to be scrupulously reviewed for "over consumption," "missspending of income," previous LCBO disciplinary action and more generally any "abuse of the permit privilege" by the local vendor, surveillance and review were core factors of purchasing alcohol (LCBO Circular 333, April 18th 1928; LCBO Manual of Instructions to Vendors.1952:44-45; LCBO Vendors' Instructions.1927:1). Not only could the data within the permit books be reviewed by the Board, individuals were made aware that they might also be inspected upon request by police officers, courts, aid organizations or municipalities without a warrant (Regulations of the LCBO. s.101.1927). In some cases, Liquor Permit
Books acted as evidence of character in criminal cases and civil proceedings leading to convictions and imprisonment (LCBO Circular 1952.1938; LCBO Circular 3621.1945; Thompson v Thompson. 1933). 1 In this sense the technology of the liquor Permit Book acts analogically as a kind of backlighting that in both historical and contemporary terms of reference makes individual users visible. If this wasn't enough to instill self-discipline, the Board also issued disciplinary letters under a wide variety of conditions to inform permittees that their liquor use was under "investigation" and that they were to take this into consideration when exercising their purchase privilege (LCBO Warning Letter. 1969). These letters underlined that a lack of self-control had been observed and as a result the level of individual surveillance had been intensified.

Other Permit Books

Like Panoptic cells the LCBO arranged its permit system so that no liquor consumption escaped its gaze or existed outside its exercise of power. Liquor Permit Books also existed for the specified categories of “Visitors,” “Physicians,” “Druggists,” “Dentists and Veterinary Surgeons,” “Manufacturers,” “Mechanics and Scientifics,” “Ministers of the Gospel,” and “Hospitals.” Each category had its own regulations regarding the possession and purchase of liquor, though like the individual permit books, all had to record the amount of alcohol purchased and in some cases to whom the alcohol was administered (Liquor Control Act S.O.1927. s.56-60).

As Foucault (1977:199) noted, panoptic “authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode, that of binary division and branding.” For the LCBO the Permit Book was initially a means of classifying the legal liquor-using population, since it was needed for purchasing liquor legally, but it was also developed to categorize populations that would have reduced access to liquor. When a permittee’s drinking behaviour became suspect or “in the case of those who really require the closest supervision,” the local vendor affixed to the user’s liquor permit a “Regional Stamp” (LCBO Circular 829.1929). This Regional Stamp would then make the permittee’s liquor permit only valid in a single store. This was done so that the vendor would be in a position of “knowing all about [the permittee] and their circumstances,” thus increasing the visibility of the subject and the intensity of the instructional gaze. Vendors were instructed by Head Office to use the Regional Stamp liberally, “to stamp all permits under suspicion, but as yet uncollected, so as to make such permits good only...where the permittee is known” (Ibid), thus rendering visible and fixing in
geographic space the user’s opportunities for contact with the LCBO.

Those who were deemed in need of “limited consumption” as well as those refused liquor outright were also included in the stamped category (LCBO 941.1930). If a vendor felt that a permittee was over-consuming liquor they were to stamp the permit with the Regional Stamp and “write on the permit the quantity of beer [or liquor] per week to which he considers such permittee should be restricted” (Ibid). Refusals were also included in the “stamped” category. A permittee could be refused and classified as regionally stamped for either attempting to purchase liquor while intoxicated or if the vendor felt that the permittee had made “excessive purchases or an unreasonable amount of money [was] being spent” (LCBO 403.1928). Further, page thirteen of the Liquor Permit Book would be marked by vendors with red capital letter “R”s in each column of the purchase section, and like the criminal masks once proposed by Bentham (1995), it made their deviancy plain for all to see. Not only would the labeled individuals become more self aware of their classification, Bentham argued that:

with regard to the spectators, the salutary impression, instead of being weakened, will be heightened, by this imagery. The scene of devotion will be decorated by – why mince the word? – by a masquerade: a masquerade, indeed, but of what kind? Not a gay and dangerous, but a serious, affecting, and instructive one (Ibid:100).

The imposed classification of the Regional Stamp making permittees limited to one store where they were “known,” and making the vendor personally responsible for the permittee’s “purchases of liquors,” exposed them to a locus of disciplinary oversight on both parameters (LCBO Circular 829.1929). These restrictions were even passed from old to new permits unless the permittee could “be trusted now to apply self
control” (LCBO Circular 1167.1930).

Permit books ultimately made visible the purchases of all individuals not only to the LCBO but also to any family member, friend, acquaintance or familiar that happened to be standing nearby in the LCBO store line. The legitimate administrative reach of the Permit Book through warning letters, regional stamps or symbolic markings also suffered from illegitimate spillage. LCBO circulars contain several accounts of how the exposure of purchase data of certain “respectable individuals” had lead to public humiliation and angry letters to Head Office (LCBO Circular 759.1929; LCBO Circular 3833.1947). In a case in 1929 it was reported that the questioning of an individual’s spending habits had resulted in “tittering” and “sneering” by the vendor and other permittees (LCBO Circular 759.1929). Though the Board felt that the humiliation caused by the limitation of an individual’s purchases was inevitable, it reminded its vendors that “certain law-abiding citizens are very unnecessarily humiliated in front of the public when questioned about the amount of purchases on their permit” and that “frequently fine, worthy men apart from a weakness for liquor are among those limited and we want those men not to be slighted on entering a store” (LCBO Circular 3833.1947; LCBO Circular 759.1929).

Administrative technologies inducing self-discipline may be further studied in the orders of permit cancellation and prohibition issued by the LCBO. From 1927-1962, the historical period that the individual liquor permit was in place, 5.9% of all individuals that wrote the Board to cancel a permit privilege requested to cancel their own. (This percentage would increase to 7.9% if one includes letters written on official
police letterhead or signed as witnessed by police officers). In terms of real numbers, personal requests for cancellation statistically would have accounted for over 46,000 individual prohibition orders between 1927 and 1962. These personal requests often cited that liquor was affecting their financial resources or that they lacked personal control, mirroring exactly the Board’s moral concern and often even the language. One vendor described the docility of permittees in these encounters:

Usually a liquor addict realizes his failing and does not resent kindly, well-placed words. Many have visited my office and whilst I am frank with them, they appreciate kindly intent and usually leave promising to exercise self control and thanking me (LCBO Circular 497.1928).

Many drinkers did not conform to this ideal of politeness. The LCBO circulars are riddled with accounts of methods used by permittees to disrupt power relations. Most of these revolved around attempts to disrupt the state of permanent visibility either by manipulating the disciplinary technologies or attempting to control their surveillance record through the use of other’s permits or stamps (LCBO Circular 194.1927; LCBO Circular 519. 1928; LCBO Circular 3621.1945). These acts, the LCBO argued,

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3 Calculated from the total number of recipients of Orders of Cancellation and Prohibition from 1927-1962 as published in the Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1962 in accordance statistics on the percentage of orders derived through letters to the Board (Lang and Mc Neely, 1963) and with statistics generated through a personal analysis of the letters to the Board found in the Interdiction List of the Liquor Licence Board. RG-36-13 at the Archives of Ontario.
reinforced its intrusive surveillance and called for more vigilance in its staff in their attempts at "thwarting trickery of the kind described" (LCBO Circular 666.1929). The data collected by the LCBO through the liquor permit had very real consequences for its users. Not only was this data used in criminal and civil cases, but it was also used internally at the LCBO in order to categorise and control users (LCBO Circular 1952.1938, LCBO Circular 3621.1945).

**Permit Cards**

Beginning in 1958 the LCBO altered their permits by removing the section for recording purchases. By this time the speed and accuracy of the Board’s IBM tabulating and sorting technology had finally allowed for the physical separation of the individual from the collected database without a decline in the vividness of surveillance. The new Liquor Permit Card (see FIGURE 2-3) acted like contemporary documentary tokens, in that they were a means of connecting individuals and their purchases to the relevant databases (Rule, McAdam, Stearns and Uglow 1983:222).

**FIGURE 2-3. Liquor Permit Card 1957-1962**

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This separation allowed the Board to eliminate its costly permit books and remove from sight their surveillance and classification methods. However, the consequence was that the LCBO’s ability to produce a constant sense of surveillance was removed and the concept of the individual’s self-disciplining role was eliminated from official policy. The separation also ushered in new social relations surrounding the document as the sophistication of the token/database relationship led to social control methods along more contemporary consumer formats such as age of majority cards, and smart ID cards (Lyon 2001; Gandy 1987). In 1962 the permit system was abandoned and the LCBO relied solely on their “Purchase Form” to review purchases and consumption until it too was abandoned when stores became self-serve and liquor appeared on the shelves.

*Purchase Form and Vendor Stamp*

From 1927 until the late 1970’s a permittee when purchasing liquor filled in a “Purchase Order Form”. This form contained a formal declaration of a request for liquor and was signed by the permit holder; it included the type of liquor requested, amounts, the date and the individual’s permit book number. These forms were reviewed by store vendors or permit endorsers along with the Liquor Permit, and if approved, the order would then be filled. The original purchase order forms were filed at LCBO Head Office in Toronto. In the early years purchase order forms were individually reviewed by hand for purchase anomalies, requiring in 1932 over 200 employees to undertake this detailed scrutiny (LCBO Vendors’ Instructions 1927:14; LCBO Circular 851.1929; Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1933).
The purchase order form served the main purpose of tracking consumption of particular liquor types but it also made possible the individual surveillance of vendors at the local level (LCBO Vendors' Instructions.1927:1-2). The original purchase order forms were filled out by staff at the Liquor Control Board stores, signed by the permittee, and then stamped "ENDORSED" with an individually numbered stamp, traceable to the local employee who filled the order. The Board issued individualized stamps to all staff and kept detailed records of who was "operating each stamp" as a means of vendor identification (LCBO Circular 557.1928). This they deemed necessary because individual stamps were the only means of identifying those involved in sale "irregularities" and therefore in need of disciplinary action (Ibid).
The need for the conscious and permanent visibility of liquor consumption made
the misuse of vendor's stamps or the mislabeling of Liquor Permits “the most
reprehensible practice” in the eyes of the Board and it was one of the few instances that
merited “immediate dismissal” (LCBO Vendors’ Instructions. 1927:1-2; LCBO Circular
333.1928). Like permit holders who “abused their permit privilege”, individual vendors
were subjected to disciplinary action and in some cases incarcerated based on the data
collected through the purchase order forms (LCBO Circular 625.1929; LCBO Circular
653.1929; Rex V. Brown. 1930, 55 C.C.C. 29). Even though purchase order forms were
no longer sent to Head Office after 1934, they remained on file at the local store with the
idea that they could be reviewed at any time by one of the Board’s many inspectors
(LCBO Circular 1594.1934). The permit forms finally went out of use in the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s when the LCBO stores became self-serve operations. Henceforth, "the
moral" interests of the LCBO would be threefold: underage drinking, drinking and
driving, and the effect of alcohol on pregnancy.

Conclusion

For the Board, the panoptic powers of the permit book, vendor stamps and
purchase forms were highly successful means of achieving its social mandate of liquor
control and the moral mandate of enforcing temperance values.

Though this form of liquor control was removed in the late 1970's and early
1980's the concept behind the permit system of control has experienced a resurgence
within the LCBO in recent years with the development of its own high technology BYID
card as well as data mining point-of-purchase information like “Air
Miles" (LCBO, 2006). Information Technology employed in this way is presented as a means of public good and safety. It is the tried and true route for the Board, and others assuming its role, to achieve the monumental task presented to it in 1927: to be in a position of "knowing exactly who is buying and how much".
Chapter 3
A Kind of Prohibition Part 1: Social Sorting in Ontario

_Those who can ‘take liquor’ decently shall have it, and that others shall not have it—so as far as it goes, this is a kind of prohibition too._ In the Ferguson Government’s Papers Concerning the Temperance Question in Ontario. F8 MU 1029. The Archives of Ontario. Toronto

Oscar Gandy (1993:17) in his work _The Panoptic Sort_ argues that social sorts act as “primarily a defensive technology” designed to reduce risk through the identification and removal of “sure losers” from the general population. For the LCBO this meant the sorting out of people whose potential for intemperance posed too great a risk to their organization. During the early years the LCBO was hanging by a thread, the temperance movement was politically strong and the Board needed to show that state liquor control worked. The Board expressed strongly to its workers that they had the “success of the law in their hands” and that they were active in “preventing discredit falling upon the store system through immoderation or other wrongdoing by permit holders” (LCBO Circular 497, 382.1928; LCBO Instructions to Vendors Regarding the Issuing Permits. 1928:5). This, coupled with intensive surveillance technologies, resulted in a system of pre-elimination for individuals deemed by the Board to be lacking the necessary self-control needed to be trusted with the privilege of drinking liquor. Individuals, for reasons such as income, race or reputation, were determined by the Board to be simply lacking the moral control necessary to combat the evils of drink and thus, according to the Board’s mandate, needed to be identified and eliminated from the drinking population (Willison 1924; Ferguson 1926). To this end the Board engaged in an extensive province-wide social sort to identify, assess and classify individuals based on their perceived risk of intemperance. Those who were seen as too great a risk, were
not given the chance to "create prejudice against the law" and were kept from acquiring liquor by being listed on the "drunk" or "Interdicted" list (LCBO Circular 497.1928).

**Punch Cards and Hollerith Technology**

Complex sorts in pre-computer age circa 1927 were undertaken with Hollerith sorting and tabulating machines. Hollerith machines were cutting edge technology in the 1920's and accepted as a "prove[n] way of economically producing facts and figures vital to operating" a business (Railway Review 1926:354). The punch card and sorter were invented by Herman Hollerith as a means of having "a machine for doing the purely mechanical work of tabulating population and similar statistics" and "to count people like they had never been counted before" (Alterman 1969:5; Black 2001:24). This technology was first used in 1886 in Baltimore to generate public health statistics, though it is perhaps better known for its tabulation of the 1890 United States census or its sorting and subjugation of targeted populations in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe (Norberg 1990:761; Black 2001). This technology was unique in that it was designed to "identify the victims" but it also provided data that could "project and rationalize the benefits of their destruction, organize their persecution, and even audit [its own] efficiency" (Black 2001:8). The LCBO incorporated this technology primarily to identify and track users, and as the technology delivered more vivid descriptions of populations it used its statistical analysis to socially justify the pre-elimination of potentially dangerous populations (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959. 1959). Although the Tabulating Machine Company (soon to become IBM), under the gaze of Hollerith, was the first to patent punch card technology, many companies developed
variations on Hollerith’s original design. By 1925 punch card technology had been standardized around a 12 row, 80 column design which remained unaltered until punch cards ceased being mass-produced (see Figure 3-1 below).

FIGURE 3-1. Standardised 80 Column Punch Card

These standardized cards allowed for both numeric and alphabetic data to be stored and sorted. Sorting of the cards themselves was conducted by feeding the card into a sorting machine whose key components consisted of a brush, or card reader, and a mechanism to direct the card into one of the 13 pockets of the card sorting machine.

FIGURE 3-2. How the Sorter Sorts Punch Cards

The sorter pockets were arranged 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 11, 12 and R, with the thirteenth or “R” pocket being for unreadable or reject cards. As the card passed through the machine a brush was used to detect the position punched in the card. When the brush

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passed over the punched hole it completed a circuit that forced the card upward along a metal path that lead to the corresponding pocket. The alphabetic information required two punched holes in a single column, with two passes through the sorting machine. On the second pass pockets 9-1 were turned off allowing the machine to read only the punched positions in either the 0, 11 or 12 position. This second pass finalized the alphabetical ordering of the punch cards. The IBM 80 sorter of 1925 could sort and tabulate between 250-2000 cards per minute (IBM 1961:28).

From 1927 to 1964 the LCBO used punch card technology at its Head Office. The Board relied on both Dominion Loose Leaf Company Limited and Remington Rand’s Kardex Visible division for tabulation services from 1927-1943, but in 1944 changed exclusively to IBM Hollerith tabulating machines to record purchases, tabulate consumption and sort individual permittees and keep detailed records of all permit users (Annual Report of the LCBO1944-1945).
The IBM 83700 contained the permittee's address, permit number, the store and vendor from whom the permit was purchased but most importantly it included a punched section for the individual's name. This punched section would allow for simple classification of individuals as well as allow for the expedient generation of lists - the LCBO's most valuable tool in controlling liquor sales. Like most of IBM's clients the LCBO's punch cards would "be sent to the service bureau of the International Business Machines to be punched" and then returned to the Board's Permit Department "for machine sorting" (LCBO Circular 3940.1948). The Board extensively sorted and tabulated products and users and reported more positive findings in their annual reports to the Ontario government.

The Board used IBM punch cards, like the one shown above, to play the role of the secondary permit that was held at head office. These secondary permits provided information that allowed the Board to keep tabs on problem users so that previous restrictions such as "Limited Consumption" (described in chapter 2) would be retained by the permittee should they attempt to receive a new permit (LCBO Circular 859.1929). The Permit Department of the LCBO was quite adamant about the "Second Copies" as they were its sole means of tracking and classifying users (LCBO Circulars 226, 873, 1439, 1442, 1534, 1636, 3442, 3940. 1927-1948). The Board separated permits by geographical location and used their second copy punch cards as a means of generating the LCBO's many lists, counting permit types and conducting statistical analysis aimed at eliminating problem users from those eligible to purchase liquor.

In 1944 the Board spent over $141,000 implementing its new IBM technology and by 1952 split their tabulation and IBM rental costs so that each could pass under 2% of the LCBO's gross profit (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1944-1945.1945; see Figure 8.
One can see from the increased use of tabulation machines and the vast operational costs that the LCBO paid, the central role and scope that these technologies played. By 1970 the Board had paid IBM over $764,000 for equipment rental, $1,083,00 in tabulation costs, $1,061,000 in permit costs, $190,000 for computerization making a grand total of $3,099,300 dollars spent on surveillance technologies over 26 years. The role of IBM in the development of sorting and tabulating technologies at the LCBO after 1944 was substantial. But not only IBM technology was introduced, executive personnel were also sourced from Big Blue. Harry Sheppard became chief commissioner of the LCBO in 1963 after stepping down from his position as chairman of the board of IBM Canada. Sheppard immediately initiated a program of computerization of the Board
when he took his position at the LCBO - trading up from punch cards to PCs starting in 1963. After the infusion of IBM technology into the LCBO, statistical sorting became central to the identification and investigation of risk populations as well as the key technology used for the generation of the Board’s most powerful social control tool - the “drunk” lists.

Classification of “Problem Users” and the LCBO Lists

At first, LCBO regulations pre-selected three main groups for exclusion: the First Nations and Inuit peoples defined as “Indians” under the Indian Act, minors, and interdicted individuals, (those to whom alcohol was barred due to judicial action). But with increased knowledge gathered through the permit books, purchase forms, statistical analysis and investigations, the “drunk list” quickly expanded.

As part of its temperance morality mandate the Board instructed its vendors to watch out for those who “abused liquor,” “those who from the amount of their purchases and from their standing and circumstances are likely to be supplying bootleggers,” and those whose financial standing “is such that the sales must be followed by a diminution of the comforts of life in the family”, so that they could be barred from liquor use (LCBO Circular 1766,1936; Liquor Control Act 1927 S.O. c.70 s.257). Initially, the Board relied on the older “Interdiction List,” a remnant of British black listing laws that eliminated drunkenness by circulating the name and likeness of listed individuals. By 1928 this method was considered too cumbersome a tool for social control given the magnitude of the task at hand. The justice system was simply not fast enough to process the LCBO’s average of 38,486 investigations per year (Annual Report of the LCBO
1929-1933). Placing someone on the Interdicted List was a lengthy process; one was sentenced by a judge in open court, and few judges opted to include interdiction in sentences. Between 1927 and 1976 only 23 judges actually chose to interdict offenders, and only 6 of them did so more than once in their careers (RG-36-13 Interdiction Records of the LLBO\(^1\)). To bypass this time consuming process the Board initiated what it called the “Cancellation List” to quickly and definitively deal with its problem users (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1928.1928).

Individuals listed on the Cancellation List had no conceptual or legal distinction from those who were formally interdicted by a judge. Their names and likenesses were sent to all vendors, police, and after 1934 to standard hotels, on the very same lists as those who were legally interdicted. These lists were updated through letters for each individual added to the list and fully replaced monthly by the Board. As more vivid data on permit holders was collected by the LCBO, it became apparent that the Cancellation List was a limited means of keeping problem drinking populations from receiving permits and the “drunk” list was expanded yet again (LCBO Circular 904,1930).

The “Prohibited List” was formally developed in 1929 to replace the Cancellation List because the Board decided to track and pre-eliminate those individuals who where reportedly receiving "relief" from municipalities (Annual Report of the LCBO 1928-1929. 1929:3). Permit cancellation was not an acceptable solution since intemperate actions had already occurred and the validity of the law already damaged. Through surveillance and analysis the Board sought means of predicting which

\(^1\) Interdiction legislation moved under the control of the LLBO in 1976, which is why Interdiction orders and supporting documents that were the property of the LCBO are currently archived under the title Interdiction Records of the LLBO in the RG-36-13 series. Data in this paper was restricted to LCBO files dating from 1927-1976.
individuals would prove intemperate and pre-eliminate these “dangerous” persons. The LCBO was sent lists of relief recipients through the offices of charity organizations, municipalities, as well as from the general public, and then conducted their own investigations into whether or not these individuals had been issued a liquor permit or warranted the privilege of having one. Ultimately, the Board used this new list, gathered through file matching, to exclude drinkers for a wide variety of reasons under what were called “preventative cancellations,” arguing that, based on data they had collected, revoking some peoples’ permits had become an inevitability (LCBO Circular 904, 1930). By 1933, over 150,000 people had been investigated by the Board and over 10,000 were placed on the Prohibited List.

FIGURE 3-5. The LCBO’s Interdiction / Prohibited List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>DATE OF ORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORTHERN DISTRICT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSNABURGH BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSNABURGH BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSNABURGH BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
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<td>OSNABURGH BAND</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSNABURGH BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAC SEUL BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LAC SEUL BAND</td>
<td>30/11/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONT'D
Although the Board sent out complete lists to its stores, it listed individuals by district. Historically, the rural regions of the province were thought to be sites of heavy drinking by those with weaker morals. As one temperance official argued to Premier Ferguson, this was attributable to the fact that such populations “were made up by Jews, foreigners...Roman Catholics” and of course, though left unsaid, “Indians” (Oliver 1975:163). The Northern district saw higher rates of interdiction and was overrepresented on the Interdiction List (The Interdiction List of the Liquor Licence Board RG-36-13). To the LCBO these northern populations posed a great risk, and it was often cited that the Interdiction / Prohibition List was of great importance especially in the Northern district (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959, 1959; Annual Report of the LCBO 1972-1973.1973).

FIGURE 3-6. Additions to Monthly Lists

Pursuant to the provisions of the Liquor Control Act and the Regulations, you are hereby prohibited to sell, serve or otherwise supply intoxicating liquor to the above named, for a period of TWELVE MONTHS FROM THE ABOVE DATE.

Liquor Control Board of Ontario.

Chief Commissioner.

Copy to Details In: Armstrong (1), Beamsville (1), Milton (1), Longue (1)

Chief Inspector, R. E. Ewart, O.P.P.
R. G. Leggatt, Inspector No. 3, LL, SI

Placed as above
Monthly lists were also supplemented with additional names through a standard form distributed from Head Office. At the top, the affected establishments were listed, while at the bottom copies of this list updates were recorded as sent to the LCBO’s local hotel inspector, the local standard hotels, legions, LCBO stores and the Chief Inspector of the Ontario Provincial Police. With this list came official copies of the order of interdiction or prohibition as well as a form detailing the restricted individual’s age, appearance, employment, marital status, previous police history and preference, or weakness, in alcohol (See LCBO Individual Record Form below). In later years these forms were also supplemented with a picture of the listed individual.

FIGURE 3-7. LCBO Individual Record Form

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This detailed "individual record" gave local vendors a better chance of identifying permit abusers - a problem primarily in larger centers where vendors may not know each customer personally (LCBO 829.1929). These forms were initially filled by the LCBO's inspectors or those investigating an individual for interdiction, and were designed to positively identify listed individuals. Over the years the form was altered slightly, yet the information it contained remained the same until the enforcement department of the LCBO was absorbed by the LLBO in 1976.

Individual files were also kept on listed individuals and contained detailed information gathered through LCBO investigations. Data within these files came from a wide variety of sources including letters and interviews with relatives, doctors, priests and neighbours as well as judges orders, photos, police, hospital and court records. Some files even contained confidential personal information like medical records or records of participation in Alcoholics Anonymous programs. These files were kept at Head Office and allocated Investigation and Classification Cards that allowed readers to quickly identify the materials and previous action taken by aid of a prohibited persons classification system.
The Board had eight possible classifications; Full Board Order 1 year (FBO), Full Board Order Until Further Notice (FN), Limited (HC and LA), Premise Declared Public Place (PP and HCPP) and Judge’s Order of Interdiction (J). Each of these classifications had different implications for the user with a wide range of severity. “Board Order” meant orders of prohibition, or orders to have individuals added to the prohibited list. Most orders of prohibition listed someone for the period of one year, though the Board could place the order until further notice at its own discretion. The Board also had two less consequential forms of classification: “partial orders” or “limited permits” that stipulated either no home consumption (HC) or no drinking in
licensed establishments such as standard hotels or authorities such as Union or Legion Halls (LA). In instances where the Board had seized liquor from a private residence, it could add to the order a stipulation that converted the individual's private property into a public place under the Liquor Control Act (R.S.O. 1927 17 Geo. V. c.257.s.42.(2)). On the LCBO's investigation and classification card this appeared as “PP" for a simple conversion and “HCPP" for the conversion of a residence.

Under section 42.2(2) of the Liquor Control Act an individual on the prohibited list could have their private residence converted into a public place, and the LCBO tracked this as well (SO 1927 c.70.s.42.(2)). The section stipulates that a residence, defined as “any building or part of a building or tent where a person resides,” can be converted into a public place, defined as “any place building or convenience to which the public has, or is permitted to have, access” (Ibid). These orders were designed to eliminate the need for the police or LCBO investigators to obtain a search warrant for a converted premise and also made it illegal for anyone to consume liquor on the premises. Conversion was limited to those who underwent a legal process, starting with their conviction for any breach of the Liquor Control Act within the residence where there was “liquor kept therein” or “removed therefrom” (Ibid). Between 1939 and 1947 over 3,400 residences in Ontario were converted to public property and although this remained a part of law from 1927 until the late 1960's, the Board only published data from 1939-1947.

The conversion of a residence to a public place would last a stipulated period, usually one year from the date of the conviction, unless removed by the Board. The residence, regardless of ownership, would remain a public place, even if the convicted person moved, until the Board was “satisfied of a bona fide change in ownership or
occupation of such premise” (Ibid). Individuals on the Prohibited list would receive a supplementary postscript to their order stating “P.S. This action is taken pursuant to your conviction under section 43-1, L.C.A., and your premises having been declared a public place, rendering it illegal for anyone to hold a permit or keep or have possession of beverage liquor therein for [the stipulated period]” (LCBO Interdiction Order. RG-36-13).

Analysis of Prohibited Lists

Individuals classified under the rubric of “Prohibitory Orders” - recipients of full or partial Board orders - were of particular importance to the maintenance of morality as they held the statistical key to predicting the intemperate actions of future potential liquor users and thus were the subject of complex analysis by LCBO Head Office. Throughout the 30's 40's and 50's the LCBO's various lists served as the exclusive means of keeping permanent "tabs" on all "problem" cases (LCBO Circular 1167, 1930).

Gandy (1993:74) points out how lists and list matching are of vital importance to organizations seeking to avoid risk because of their value in predicting which individuals will be “engaged in activities related to waste, fraud and abuse of resources”. In the case of the LCBO, the goal of predicting who would engage in acts of intemperance lead to a complex system of analysis that sought to target and label “risky” populations. Externally, the LCBO ran list matching processes with city relief officials, aid organizations and several levels of police; while internally the Board relied on a system of list matching that included geographical location, interdiction or order type, reason for interdiction (including race), as well as previous disciplinary action to identify potentially intemperate drinkers (see LCBO form L-44). An internal
communication explained that these matches played a key role in the sorting and predictive capabilities of the Board (LCBO Circular 1167, 1930).

FIGURE 3-9. LCBO L-44 Analysis of Prohibitory Orders.

Geographical Location

The LCBO's numbering of permit books, stores, listed individuals, standard hotels and authority holders allowed for a detailed geographical analysis of the province. Although it was possible, through the Board’s various numbered systems, to track any individual, store or locality, most of its geographical statistical analysis involved separating the province into eight regions: Toronto (A), Eastern (B), Hamilton (C), Niagara Falls (D), Northern Ontario (E), Western Ontario No.1 (F), Western Ontario No.2 (G) and Windsor District (H). The Board used these regions to analyze data on consumption as well as on listed individuals. Each section of the L44 form is separated by geographical region allowing for the assessment of category-specific risk. Statistically, the Northern district was where the interdiction list served the greatest use.
and conversely posed the greatest risk (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959, 1959; Annual Report of the LCBO 1972-1973, 1973). From an analysis of the final remaining complete interdiction lists, the northern region is greatly over-represented as well as almost exclusively made up of First Nations peoples, showing the type of risk associated with the north (Interdiction Lists, 1927-1975). Region could, then, collapse racially defined pre-elimination into a georacial profile.

Past Disciplinary Action

FIGURE 3-10. LCBO L-44 Prior Cancellations and Premise Declared a Public Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premises Declared Public Place</th>
<th>Prior Cancellations</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A B C D E F G H</td>
<td>A B C D E F G H</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Past disciplinary action was a heavily weighted risk factor. Specific technologies such as the Investigation and Classification Card tracked past disciplinary action while list matching identified risk populations. Of those individuals investigated for interdiction 61% had previous disciplinary action while 29% had previously been formally interdicted (Interdiction Records of the LLBO, RG-36-13). Heavy drinkers posed a serious threat as they were the physical manifestations of the “exploitation” of the liquor trade (Spence, 1926). Vendors were continuously reminded that “the real addict should not have a permit at all” and they were to identify those habitual drinkers who “abused the liquor privilege” (LCBO 497, 1928; LCBO Vendor Instructions, 1927).

2 The complete Interdiction list from 1927-1975 and the final distributed complete copy of the prohibited list exist within the Archives of Ontario RG-36-13 series.
The Board also list-matched those who had their private property converted to public space due to convictions under the Liquor Control Act.

**Reason for Interdiction**

FIGURE 3-11. LCBO L-44 Breaches of the Liquor Control Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Number</th>
<th>B. L. C. A.</th>
<th>B. L. C. A.</th>
<th>B. L. C. A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sec. 87 (1)</td>
<td>Sec. 105 (a)</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Board tracked persons who were convicted under the Liquor Control Act and placed them within three sub-categories: those who sold liquor; those who permitted drunkenness; and a general category. The Board, keeping within their temperance mandate, specifically tracked persons found to be selling liquor within the province. Such individuals would have been convicted under section 87(1) of the Liquor Control Act (R.S.O. 1937. V Geo. VI. c.294) and also in most cases would have had their private residence converted to public property. The Board also specifically tracked anyone who had permitted “drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises of which he is the owner, tenant or occupant” in order to identify and control populations who promoted intemperance (R.S.O. 1937. V Geo. VI. c.294 s.105(a)). The remaining individuals tracked due to their convictions under the Liquor Control Act fell under the heading of “General” and posed less of a risk, though they made up 32% of all tracked Liquor Control Act convictions (Tabulated from Lang and McNeely.1963).

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The alleged risk to the Board presented by so-called “Indians” was more than just a historical remnant dating from the 1700s when French Bishops preached against the sale of alcohol to First Nations (Riddle. 1931). Allowing "Indians" to obtain liquor was in violation of two pieces of legislation - the Indian Act and the Liquor Control Act - and would result in criminal conviction as well as public disdain. During the years that liquor was barred from “Indians” a number of LCBO vendors were subject to prosecution under this legislation (Rex v. Brown. 1930; Rex v. Webb. 1943). These racist laws rested on the established legal precedent that “Indians” were “particularly susceptible to, and likely injured by, the use of intoxicants” (Ibid). Though these laws would ultimately be found to have “caused inequality before the law” and were struck down, this racist perception of “weakness” nonetheless played a significant role in LCBO risk assessment (Rex v. Martin. 1917; Supreme Court of Canada. 1970).³

From 1927 until First Nations acquired the legal right to drink in Canada in the mid 1950’s, it was LCBO procedure to categorically reject all applicants that appeared to be of “Indian blood”(LCBO Circular 750.1929; LCBO Instructions’ to Vendors.1927). If these rejected individuals pressed their application by arguing that they were not in fact Indians, the onus was on the applicant to produce documented evidence signed by

either the local Indian agent or the Deputy Attendant General of Indian Affairs to prove the contrary. The circulars then stated that if the applicant had such evidence or held a card of enfranchisement, then s/he would be dealt with like any other applicant (LCBO 1923, 1937). However, these individuals, even with evidence of “white” (assimilated) status, were not granted access to liquor, as the Board explained “that any person may be refused the privilege of purchasing liquor, if such person is considered by the vendor as being unfit to possess liquor by reason of his financial standing, the probability of his purchasing for resale; or his general behaviour as the result of drinking intoxicants” (Ibid). If any doubt remained in the mind of the vendors as to how to interpret that statement, the circular continues: “therefore, a person of part-Indian blood, living in, say, an urban community, could be refused for such reason” (Ibid).

The LCBO relied on one key technology to determine non-inclusion within the “Indian” category: the enfranchisement card. These “card certificates of enfranchisement” were, under the Indian Act, distributed to those “Indians” who by choice, marriage, education or employment were “ipso facto...enfranchised under this Act” (Indian Act. 1876 s. 86). The cards were “bluish in colour, with rounded corners, about 4" x 5" and bore the coat-of-arms at the head of same and was signed by the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs” and vendors were informed that the “only Indians who are entitled to purchase or have permits are those in possession of the usual blue form or letter from the Indian Agent and signed by him, stating that he is no longer an Indian” (LCBO Circular 1292.1931; LCBO Circular 3863.1947)

The LCBO focussed upon these cards rather than upon the Indian Affairs formal lists because they were granted exclusively to individuals. Although the spouse and children of a card holder were considered "white" under the law, cards were only issued
to the particular individuals who had undergone the legal process of enfranchisement. This resulted in cases where fathers who had been enfranchised could purchase liquor legally, while their children and subsequent generations could not. Since these children were already “white” they could not receive enfranchisement cards, and so were suspended between the legal and LCBO racial boundaries of classification.

By choosing this card as their technology of classification, the Board limited permit holders of “Indian blood” to those individuals who had forfeited their rights and “Indian” identity. Under law, an individual may not be an “Indian” yet the LCBO cited the “follow[ing] the Indian mode of life” provision of the “Non-treaty Indian” classification as a justification for maintaining “Indian looking” people on their interdiction / Indian list.

Minors, those under the age of 21 who managed to purchase a permit or had been convicted under the *Liquor Control Act*, were also tracked by the LCBO. Given that a key element of temperance arguments was that the liquor trade prayed on the innocent, minors posed a great risk to the LCBO. The LCBO was adamant about maintaining an anti-youth appearance and it went so far as to threaten permittees with permit cancellation if they provided minors with empty bottles (LCBO 881.1929). Minors themselves posed little problem to the LCBO until after the Second World War during which liquor had been legally provided to them overseas by the government and then provided illegally by their fellow officers upon their return to Canada. After the war the Board tracked these cases more diligently and there was a large increase in the number of convictions of minors by the Ontario Provincial Police for liquor related offenses (Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police 1945-1955). From the 1940's to the 1950's the number of minors convicted for drinking had more than tripled and by 1959
over 1,000 individuals per year were convicted and tracked (Ibid).

"Indians and Minors" were traditionally tracked separately by the LCBO as can be seen from the separate numbers of 4 and 5 allocated to each category respectively on the LCBO’s Analysis of prohibitory orders form L-44 (see figure 3-12 above). While these were separate categories they do appear together on the L-44 form. Two reasons come to mind to explain this conjunction: first, that "Indians" have within the Canadian legal tradition been treated as conceptual minors when it came to alcohol legislation; and secondly, because in the post-war years both Indians and Minors posed a logistically similar threat to intemperance as they both had legally obtained liquor in Europe during the WWII and were likely to be served at either the Legion Halls or by fellow officers. Underage drinkers, of course, had no recourse to civil rights complaints, unlike the "vocal Native organizations" cited by Heron (2003: 319) who often spoke but were not heard (i.e., First Nations servicemen received prejudicial treatment with regard to accessing veteran’s benefits, an issue that finally reached the national political stage in 2005). In this regard the LCBO reminded its vendors that even though “an unenfranchised Indian is, or has been, a member of the Armed Forces does not alter his status as an Indian. He is still prohibited” (LCBO Circular 3940, 1948).

FIGURE 3-13. LCBO L-44 “Best Interests” / Board Decision

Finally, the remainder of tracked individuals were listed based on data mined from the LCBO’s various surveillance technologies. Exclusive sorting revealed the need to
expand the "drunk" list to include those who in all likelihood would "abuse the permit privilege" (LCBO 904, 1930). In 1930 the Board started to issue what it called "preventative cancellations" (LCBO 904, 1930.) These were "intended to prevent some unsuitable party obtaining a permit" and what the Board argued would be the inevitable "collection and forwarding of his permit" (Ibid). In the order delivered to an individual it was explained that: "this notice is sent as a preventative of your exercise of the permit privilege, because of non-confidence in your proper observance of the law" (Ibid).

Though none of these individuals had actually committed acts that would have them placed on the prohibited list, they were nonetheless added by the Board because, through its surveillance technologies, their intemperance had become a 'predictable' part of a future already over. This has a science fictional feel about it and is akin to the theory of precrime (arrest of would-be criminals) imagined by Philip K. Dick (1956) in *Minority Report*, right down to the punch cards containing the prophesies of the precogs divining the future. Less dramatically, however, is the fact that advanced surveillance has as a core goal the mastery of time. As Bill Bogard has observed (1996: 34), the "essential temporal orientation" of surveillance under the sign of simulation is the future-past, a future already mastered. The absolute reduction of uncertainty means that the temporal spectrum of past-present-future may be manipulated based on "the social context of [its] utilization," (Castells 2000:492) in this case the risks attributed to a racialized Other about which non-confidence was produced a priori to evidence to the contrary.

The listing of these individuals can be understood as the direct result of the Board's statistical analysis and sorting technologies. As sorting technology was embraced in the mid 1940's there was also a marked increase in the number of
individuals statistically pre-eliminated on the grounds that the Board felt it was in "the best interests of all involved" (LCBO Interdiction Order; Annual Reports of the LCBO 1935-1951 see figure 3-14 below).

FIGURE 3-14. Reasons Provided for Interdiction by the LCBO 1935-1950

As one can see from the graph above, until 1944 "Board Decision" played either an equal or lesser role in regards to interdicting individuals. From 1944, the year that the Board started incorporating IBM punch cards into their permit system, to 1951, the year that the Board stopped publishing their interdiction numbers, the number of individuals eliminated based on the Board's predictive technologies, or "best interests," increased a startling 144%, resulting in over 2,000 listings annually. Ultimately 19,302 listings were made under the "Board Decision" classification between 1944-1951, making it by far the most common means for listing after 1944 (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1935-
1951). This is not, then, a matter of small numbers.

Conclusion

The Province of Ontario was not alone in requiring drinkers to purchase a permit in order to acquire alcohol. There were exceptions, as Craig Heron notes in his study Booze (2003: 280), but even exceptional provinces had powerful liquor control boards that set limits on purchasing alcohol and where and when and by whom it could be consumed. The choice of Ontario is not anomalous.

Advances in sorting technology emboldened the LCBO to reconceptualize relations between Head Office and individual consumers. While pre-Hollerith LCBO surveillance required a string of subjective human assessments from the local vendor to the local police or liquor inspector, and then Head Office, tabulation and statistical analysis required only data collection, sharing and computation. One byproduct was a severe reduction in the possible points of entry for empathy toward the predicaments of alcohol consumers and, more importantly, points of resistance within the LCBO by individual agents themselves subject to close observation and therefore with little latitude to act upon local knowledge and exercise discretion. It is not unusual for surveillance technologies to change the character of occupational knowledge (de-humanization toward automation) and the directionality of critical attention to the prospective (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 58). Mariana Valverde (2003: 203) refers to the hybrid and fuzzy “epistemology” (knowledge practices) of vendors and judges in relation to questions of Indianness as they bear upon access to alcohol. However, Valverde shows little interest in the technologies of social sorting which radically
changed the character of such “epistemological” labour from intuition and a mixed bag of so-called “facts” to a sweeping pre-eliminative projection. It is by paying closer attention to the Hollerith-generated sorts that understanding will be enriched of the LCBO’s attempt to control “epistemology” through modeling made possible by new technology.

The implementation of social sorting technologies also had a serious impact on category membership as statistical predictors such as income, in the case of the LCBO interdiction classification, rendered the categories of "wealthy" and "drunkard" mutually exclusive, while the boundaries of previously separate categories such as "Indian" and "interdicted" became blurred. This can be understood as a product of the blunt rationality of categorization; technological sorting tools are only as sophisticated as their pre-programmed assumptions and limited input data. To be sure, this study remains in the pre-electronic era before point-of-purchase technologies came of age as networked databases. The permits, purchase forms and lists are near precursors to today's scanners, barcodes, loyalty cards and computerized customer profiling.

Moreover, the role that the justification for interdiction played in LCBO categorization shifted alongside new technologies. Originally, drunkenness, bootlegging and misspending were in themselves the only criteria for interdiction but as soon as the strategy of pre-elimination was adopted, the original justifications for interdiction took a backseat to statistical predictors justified on the ground of “best interests” by a paternalistic and technologically aggressive LCBO.

The geo-racial social sorting and categorization of statistically determined populations by the LCBO suggests a much larger relationship between Hollerith sorting
technologies and morally bankrupt social action.
Chapter 4
A Kind of Prohibition Part II: Targets of the LCBO’s Interdiction List

Between 1927 and 1975 the Liquor Control Board of Ontario listed over 79,000 individuals, altering not only their ability to purchase liquor but also their property rights, exposure to surveillance mechanisms, and social relations within their communities. As argued previously, interdiction orders required detailed investigations that delved deep into social and private lives collecting information which the Board described as the “intimate details which outside of the family itself, can be only be known to the clergyman and the social worker” (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1928). Upon the completion of an investigation, the LCBO’s permit department would make the ultimate decision about the fitness of the investigated individual and severity of the action to be taken.

In analysing the surviving LCBO interdiction files at the Archives of Ontario, one again finds the shadow of the temperance movement and an uneven application of Board powers across the province. What is shown is a system of control highly dependent upon gender, race, provincial region and class that actively supported not only the Board’s own temperance concepts of morality but also reinforced other systems of institutional control. It is the purpose of this chapter to discover, through statistical analysis of the remaining interdiction records, the predictors of board disciplinary action and flesh out the targets of the interdiction list.
**Data Collection**

Data for this chapter was gathered from all LCBO files in the RG-36-13 series at the Archives of Ontario. These files contain the original letters that requested an investigation of someone by the LCBO as well as all the resulting orders, police reports, and other miscellaneous records (medical or sanitarium). The series consists of 13 metres of text and includes lists of all individuals interdicted through judges' orders and a representative sample of LCBO files of prohibition, interdiction and those under surveillance. In all, the series contains the complete files of almost 500 individuals listed by the LCBO who were investigated between 1946 and 1976. The series is named, however, after the Liquor Licensing Board because interdiction records were transferred to the LLBO in 1976 following an alteration to the interdiction procedures within the *Liquor Control Act*.

Investigations were initiated by the Board if it felt that an individual was abusing a permit privilege or if the Board was contacted and requested to investigate someone in particular. When an investigation began a file was opened on the person in question. Within these files were at the very least a letter from the individual that applied to the Board to initiate an investigation, the investigation report and a resulting letter from the Board to the individual under investigation regarding its conclusions. Most files were also supplemented by letters from policing organizations concerning the individual’s criminal history though some held letters from a wide variety of sources including non-governmental aid organizations, Alcoholics Anonymous, church officials, doctors and,

---

1 "All inactive files were discarded in the mid-fifties" and only a representative sample was kept after the interdiction records were transferred to the Archives of Ontario by the LLBO (Lang and McNeely.1962:8; Archives of Ontario Search Aid.2003).
in more recent files, lawyers.

For this research files were reviewed, ordered by date, and then allocated a representative number as to respect the privacy of those who were the targets of LCBO investigations. No information is included within this text which would enable anyone that was listed to be identified as was stipulated in the research agreement with the Archives of Ontario. In order to analyse these LCBO files, data was collected from them on the age, sex, geographical location, involvement of external agencies as well as data regarding the applicant initiating the LCBO investigations, their relationship to the person under investigation and the reason provided by the applicant to justify the investigation. In a few cases multiple reasons were provided by the applicant; in these cases the researcher selected the predominant reason. In the very few cases where multiple reasons were provided and no further explanation was presented by the applicant, then the researcher selected the first listed reason within the applicant’s letter.

Linear Regression

The data was analysed to discover which factors played a significant role in determining the severity of Board Action. The LCBO could respond to requests for interdiction in one of five ways: take no action, issue a warning letter, issue a partial board order limiting either home or public consumption, file an order of interdiction (or “full board order”) for a period of one year, or finally file an order of interdiction for an indefinite period. Each possibility denotes a uniform increase in the severity of Board action and thus allows for an analysis by means of an linear regression.

A linear regression presupposes that a multitude of factors play partial roles in
determining the ultimate outcome, in this case the severity of Board action. The model is often simplified into the following equation:

\[ Y_i = B_0 + B_1 x_1 + B_2 x_2 + \ldots B_p x_p + E_i \]

Within this equation \( Y \) represents the outcome variable (the severity of Board Action) and is explicable through the predictor variables. For this analysis, the dependant variables were collected from the interdiction files and included gender, race, who applied to initiate the investigation, the reason provided by the applicant, persons interviewed during the investigation, job training of the individual under investigation and, finally, which region of the province the individual lived in. These collected factors were then recoded into the predictor variables (appearing as \( X_1, X_2, \ldots X_p \)) and through the analysis were given fitted values or parameter estimates (appearing as \( B_0, B_1, B_2, \ldots B_p \)) that denote the impact of the given variable; \( E \) is the error or model deviation; and \( i = 1, 2, \ldots n \) for \( n \) observations.

The results of the analysis yielded a \( B \) score, or parameter estimates, for each tested predictor variable. This score, in significant cases, denotes to what extent the particular factor impacts the severity of Board action on the five point scale of possible Board action. The analysis also yields a \( R^2 \) score, or the percentage of the final result that can be explained by the measured factors. In this case the analysis provided a substantial \( R^2 \) score of 0.585, meaning that the final model can explain almost 60% of the severity of the Board's response. Significant relationships were found in almost all of the measured factors and the complete results are as follows.
Race

Within the remaining interdiction files few cases specifically denoted race. Investigators commented on race in approximately 6% of the interdiction files, singling out both “Indians” and “Negroes.” The racial classification of “Indian” proved significant, increasing the severity of Board action by a score of 0.306. As argued previously, the drinking of “Indians” was perceived as a serious threat by the Board and significant resources were committed to keep individuals with this social/legal classification from purchasing alcohol. “Indians” could not purchase alcohol legally until 1954 within Ontario and once able to do so were interdicted to a disproportionate degree. Although the impact of the “Indian” classification has been touched on briefly in previous chapters, it is reviewed in detail in chapter 5.

Gender

Gender played a significant role in the first level of the regression model, albeit specific relationships determined by gender no doubt drew significance away from this variable. Gender discrimination ultimately impacted the severity of Board action by 0.178, making women more likely than their male counterparts to be listed by the Board.
**Figure 4-1. Targets of Interdiction by Gender and Relationship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicant</th>
<th>Female Predominance %</th>
<th>Male Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>34.2 %</td>
<td>Wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>16.2 %</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>14.7 %</td>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO, Board</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
<td>Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>8.8 %</td>
<td>Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>LCBO, Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO, Investigator</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
<td>Brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>Daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>Sister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Administrator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Nations' Band</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB- Totals may be above 100% due to multiple applicants for a single application.

Far more men were the targets of Board investigations and interdiction than women, accounting for over 80% of all remaining interdiction files. The targeting of men by the interdiction list can be understood not only through the fact that they constituted a larger percentage of the drinking population but also because of the gender dimension of the temperance movement and its morality concerning the financial impact of male drinking on the home (Heron.2003:232-233).
Investigations into the actions of men by the LCBO more often resulted in milder penalties of warning letters and limited consumption than those concerning women. While the bulk of investigations into both genders ended in the subject's being listing, the percentage of successful listings of women was still higher than that of men by 9.6%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCBO Response</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Action</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary Action</td>
<td>98.5 %</td>
<td>89.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Letter</td>
<td>7.4 %</td>
<td>9.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Consumption</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
<td>2.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed</td>
<td>89.7 %</td>
<td>78.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The role that gender played in interdiction is also strongly expressed by the "applicant" factor of this analysis. The impact of the interdiction list on women is reviewed in chapter 6.
Applicants

Outcomes were strongly influenced by the source of applicants. The prevailing logic was that applications would be submitted by close family members and the judiciary, though in reality anyone could contact the Board and request an investigation. Applications came from two main sources: Institutions - such as branches of the Criminal Justice System including the police or judges, hospitals or mental institutions, or from individuals. Lang and McNeely (1962), authors who had gained access to the complete list before it was mostly destroyed, found that 18% of the applications came from institutions while 31% came from individual sources.

Figure 4-4. Analysis of Applicants to the Board for Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Convictions</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved Driving</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunk Driving</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Family 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other LCA</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplying Minors</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Police 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permitting Drunkeness</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Welfare Agency 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Courts 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liquor Control Act 28%


Lang and McNeely found that the majority of LCBO listings were the result of automatic Board action due to convictions involving alcohol. This was the norm until
the 1940's when the Board started to "use greater discretion" regarding listing individuals (Lang and McNeely 1963:5). From the annual reports of the LCBO one can see that convictions played the dominant role in interdiction until 1943 when "Board decision," or decisions made by the LCBO based on their own investigations, took over the lead role of how individuals were interdicted in Ontario (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1934-1953). These automatic listings were generally absent from the remaining interdiction files, perhaps due to the changes in Board policy at that time, forcing investigations of these individuals.

Institutional Applications

Institutional applications enjoyed a higher percentage of success at having individuals listed than individual requests by a margin of 26.74%. Applications came from a wide variety of sources including police, judges, Aid Organizations, municipalities and from Bands. The figure below shows all institutional sources and the percentage that each represented within the remaining Interdiction files of the LCBO within the Archives of Ontario’s RG-36 series.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>LCBO Vendors</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges / Criminal Court</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>Municipal Government</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO Internal Analysis</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>First Nations Bands</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Organizations</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Alcoholics Anonymous</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the institutional group judicial action stands out as the most influential of Board action. An application made by a Judge increased the Board response score

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greater than any other measured variable, impacting the final score by 1.491 on the five point scale of possible outcomes. Under the Act Judges’ orders entailed an indefinite interdiction for the ordered individual. But since the LCBO was literally above the law, in a few cases it overturned such orders, though this only accounted for a handful of individual cases from 1927-1975 (Liquor Control Act S.O.1927. c.70 s.25.2; Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1975).

The roles played by other institutions were not found to be significant when other factors were taken into account. The role of the police for example did not play a significant role at the level of the application but did so at the level of the Board’s interviews during an investigation.

*Individual Applications*

In the case of individual applications, the disciplinary power of the LCBO was mostly activated by women. Over 80% of requests came from women, the bulk of whom were wives (48%) who sought to have their husbands added to the LCBO’s “drunk list.” Mothers were the second largest classification making up 25% of the total requests by individuals followed finally by the highest male category of fathers at 10%. The graph below shows the breakdown of individual requests by gender and by classification.
The linear regression analysis yielded significant results for applications made by sons, wives, mothers, daughters and husbands. All significant individual applicant categories impacted the severity of Board action negatively - that is they reduced the severity of Board action. The relationship with the largest impact was sons (-1.223), while wives (-0.697), mothers (-0.568) and husbands (-0.445) all moved the score in the negative direction. This is understandable considering the fact that institutions were granted greater status by the Board and also because of the Board’s general suspicion towards individuals. The difference in B scores, or the impact on the final Board action, depicts the social status of various relationships within the family. Husbands scored the lowest negative score, making their applications more likely to result in interdiction than any other individual category. Interestingly mothers came second, followed by daughters, wives and then finally sons; thus lending institutional power to the role of the dominant male figure in the household as well as supporting the enduring influence of mothers over children.

Individuals that applied to have themselves interdicted were dealt with differently by the Board. For these cases the regression analysis demonstrated a significant relationship with a positive B score of .391. When an individual applied to
have themselves listed the Board automatically issued a one year interdiction order as long as the investigator was satisfied that the letter had in fact been sent by the person listed in the application. They accounted for almost 10% of all cases while a significant portion of these letters were typed on police letterhead and signed as witnessed by constables. Due to the close relationships between the LCBO and OPP it is very likely that police officers used their knowledge of LCBO procedures especially "self application" to quickly list individuals they felt were in need of "extra attention" while not being required to undergo a complete formal investigation (LCBO Circular 557.1928).

**Reason For Application**

A vast number of reasons were provided by applicants as to why an individual should be investigated, though few offered significant relationships when statistically analysed. This was perhaps due to the role that police and financial interviews (to be reviewed later in this chapter) had on the final score, drawing significance away from the reasons provided in the applications. Under the Liquor Control Act interdiction was used in very specific cases where an individual "by excessive drinking of liquor, misspends, wastes, or lessens his estate, or injures his health, or interrupts the peace and happiness of his family," but the Board also reserved the right to have an individual listed "for any cause which it deems sufficient with or without any hearing" (Liquor Control Act. S.O. 1927 c.70 s.95(1); s.43(1)).

Interestingly the wording of the reasons why an individual should be investigated by the Board were fairly constant within the applications. The reasons provided and their
predominance within the remaining interdiction files were as follows.

Figure 4-7. Reasons Cited Within Interdiction Applications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason Provided</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Reason Provided</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Reason Provided</td>
<td>27.15%</td>
<td>Neglecting Children</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overindulgence</td>
<td>21.98%</td>
<td>Health, Physical</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>13.58%</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misspending</td>
<td>9.05%</td>
<td>Advised by an Official</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Mental</td>
<td>5.60%</td>
<td>Family Problems</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>3.88%</td>
<td>Minor (Under 21)</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linear regression found one reason to be significant: health. Health positively impacted the Board action making the individual more likely to be interdicted. Health had a B score of .387 and was cited in 8.18% of all cases. These cases included both physical health problems and the mental problems created by drinking, including everything from an addictive sickness model as professed by Alcoholics Anonymous to more conventional physical deterioration such as liver disease. Most cases that cited health provided evidence of fairly extreme health problems due to liquor consumption and often would be supplemented by a doctor’s report or interview.

*Interviews*

Interviews were conducted by LCBO investigators to determine an individual’s fitness to drink. According to early Board instructions investigations consisted of “such particulars as it is possible to obtain as to the character and standing of the permittee” (Annual Reports of the LCBO 1927-1928, 1928:13). Interdiction records reveal that the LCBO’s directions were interpreted quite liberally in this regard and data
was collected on a wide variety of subjects from multiple sources and resulted in very
detailed personal records.

In most cases the LCBO relied upon the police for their main source of data
collection but the complete list of interview sources and their predominance reveals the
extent and scope of the LCBO's investigative arm (see figure below).

Figure 4-8. Interview Subjects and Their Predominance Within the LCBO’s
Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Subject</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Interview Subject</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicant</td>
<td>100.00 %</td>
<td>LCBO Vendor</td>
<td>6.03 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>56.25 %</td>
<td>Finances, Employer</td>
<td>5.38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Records</td>
<td>37.28 %</td>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>1.29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances, Banking</td>
<td>23.06 %</td>
<td>Alcohols Anonymous</td>
<td>1.07 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>12.28 %</td>
<td>License Holders</td>
<td>0.43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services (Welfare,</td>
<td>7.11 %</td>
<td>Educator</td>
<td>0.21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Services)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO Investigator</td>
<td>6.89 %</td>
<td>Church Officials</td>
<td>0.21 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB- Only those who voiced either a positive or negative recommendation in regards to having the
individual under investigation are represented in the table above.

In nearly all interviews contained within the investigator’s reports personal
information was passed on to the LCBO as well as the interview subject’s
recommendation for Board action. This allowed for an analysis that accounted not only
for the presence of a particular interview source but also the impact of either favourable
or unfavourable reports from the interview subjects. The linear regression shows that
significant relationships existed for the Police, LCBO vendors, LCBO investigators and
also Finances, a composite of both employer interviews and banking information.
Police

Interviews with police contained information primarily relating to previous criminal acts or investigations. Often the Board would receive an individual’s full criminal history to add to their own interdiction files. Police interviews appeared in 56.25% of the interdiction files and ultimately impacted the Board’s action score positively by .684. Policing liquor use and abuse was a major focus of the Ontario Provincial Police and they shared a very close relationship with the LCBO. From its inception, the LCBO thanked the OPP regularly: “thanks and appreciation of the Board are hereby tendered to the Provincial and Municipal Police Officers throughout the province for their hearty co-operation” (Annual Report of the Liquor Control Board. 1928-1929. 1929). The OPP also thanked the LCBO in its annual reports. Not only did these two institutions share their investigation information, the OPP conducted interdiction investigations in remote areas of the province and used the regulatory powers of the Board to conduct warrantless investigations - under the Liquor Control Act the LCBO was not bound by law and could write their own regulations concerning liquor raids and investigations (Liquor Control Act. S.O. 1927. c.70 s.108). An LCBO circular directed to the OPP, dated 1929, states:

"there is being forwarded to you under special cover a number of pocket cases containing document of Authority signed by the Minister to search under the provisions contained in section 108 of the Liquor Control Act which is to be given to officers recommended by you in your district. This authority is only to be used in cases of necessity and at times when a general search warrant signed by a police Magistrate cannot be secured"
owing to inconvenience on the part of the officer (OPP Nov. 6th 1929).

Police searches under the liquor laws soared in this time period, accounting for 8 times the number of warrants obtained through the regulations of the criminal code in 1930.

Figure 4-9. OPP Search Warrants 1930-1950

The Liquor Control Act also allowed for the conversion of private spaces into public spaces (S.O. 1927 c.70 s.105(a)). The Board had the power to decide if a particular residence or business should be converted. In converted premises liquor could not be possessed or consumed and other rights, such as the need for a warrant to conduct a legal search, were lost. The implications of this regulation were potentially devastating to communities as the conversion of property was linked to both individual and building, with lingering effects.
Finances

Interviews related to finances included records from both employers and bankers. In most cases LCBO inspectors gathered their information from employment data and extrapolated how much income could be directed to liquor purchases without negatively affecting the home. Reports on finances often included job position, employer, house ownership and spending on essentials such as groceries and children's clothing. A representative negative report involving an employer interview stated: Mr. ___ is employed at Chrysler Canada Ltd. On [date] he arrived at work in an intoxicated condition. For this, he received a three day suspension from work and was advised by the company to attend Alcoholics Anonymous. On [date] he took a five-week leave of absence from work due to illness. During that time he became intoxicated almost every day. He spent $30.00 a day on liquor for himself and friends, and the family is beginning to suffer financially (#147).

Over 28 percent of the remaining interdiction files contained financial information that was more extensive than simply job descriptions and negative financial information positively impacted the Board Action score by .205.

LCBO Vendor

LCBO investigators rarely contacted LCBO vendors for an interview, perhaps due to the fact that purchase records were available through an inspection of an individual’s permit book or through an analysis of the original purchase records (see chapters 2 and 3). When vendors were interviewed their input was significant. Vendors
commented on purchase information, if they had applied any restrictions on the permit or had rejected any purchases due to intoxication or unacceptable in-store behaviour. Vendor interviews were present in 6.03% of the interdiction files and impacted the Board action score positively by .663.

**LCBO Investigator**

LCBO investigators themselves did not decide if an individual would be listed. Reports from their investigations were directed to the LCBO Permit Department at Head Office in Toronto where the final decision was made. Though it is arguable that all of the collected interviews were impacted by how they appeared in the reports, investigators’ opinions were only exclusively present in 6.89% of cases. When the investigators themselves expressed their opinions this had the second largest positive impact on Board scores, influencing the final result by 0.883.

**Job Training / Job Position**

The job training / job position held by the individual under investigation was also reviewed yet no particular job offered significant results. However, the types of jobs that were not represented within the interdiction files should be noted (see figure 4-10 below).
Figure 4-10. Job Training / Job Positions of Individuals Under Investigation by the LCBO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>22.28 %</td>
<td>Street Cleaner</td>
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<tr>
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From this data one can see very strongly defined class lines with a vast overrepresentation of the working class and unemployed. By the late 1800's drinking had been established in Canada as the centre of working class social life outside the home and "the right to drink with other men became a major component [of] class identity" (Heron.2003:11). From the inception of the LCBO, liquor control had a specific class target.

It was understood, within temperance circles, that the "poor man" had little to no disposable income and thus his purchases of liquor must come at the expense of his family. With this in mind intemperance was perceived as a problem of the working class and the Board sought to control liquor consumption by this population. LCBO stores specifically decided not to remain open after 5 pm as to remove temptation for the
working man. As *The Globe* reported on the LCBO’s opening day, “those most disappointed in Hamilton tonight were the many working men who came hot from their benches ‘to get some good beer.’ As said many of them were turned away” (*The Globe. They Line Up Quickly to get Their Liquor Once Stores are Open. June 2nd 1927*). The LCBO explained sale restrictions by stating that “the greater majority of these cases are poor people, whose families can ill afford the loss” (*Annual Reports of the LCBO. 1927-1928. 1928:13*). The LCBO engaged in social control by ensuring that the closing time of its outlets corresponded with the end of the working day, leaving little or no latitude for access by workers.

As the Canadian liquor historian Creg Heron (2003:232) observes, “workers resented the imputation that there was no difference between the drunkard and the man who wanted to refresh himself at the end of the working day with a glass of beer.” The classist element of the temperance movement was not lost on the working class. Working people experienced a “direct attempt to take away the pleasures of the worker more than that of the leisured and privileged class” (Ibid.230). Street protests and riots ensured that the LCBO extended its hours within the first weeks of opening and establishments licenced to sell liquor by the glass returned to the province by 1934 (*The Globe. Store Hours Stretched. June 6th 1927*). The LCBO nonetheless continued to target the working class. As one LCBO circular explained “At no time was it the intention that the general public should be limited in their purchasing from our stores...if people are law-abiding and financially able, I see no reason why they should not be granted the privilege of buying what they wish” (*LCBO circular 3833.1947*).

Temperance morality also tied alcohol consumption to commercial production, and as a result, the health of the economy. In a radio address directed
at drinkers on December 16th, 1942 the Prime Minister of Canada underlined that:

There can be little doubt that absence from work, and inefficient work, are frequently due to intemperance. At a time when every moment counts, absenteeism among workers in essential war industries may occasion heavy loss. In this highly mechanized age, the absence of a single key man may slow up industrial processes for a large number of workers (Mackenzie King. 1942)

Some within the labour movement saw liquor legislation as solely a means of bringing “greater profits to the manufacturer, the financier and the capitalist generally” and that “legislation as to what one eats or drinks is the earmark of a servile state and therefore in antagonism to working class interests” (Benson. 1974:274).

Region

The linear regression showed that the region in which the person under investigation lived played a significant role in predicting the severity of Board action. Although the LCBO used eight regions (Toronto, Eastern, Hamilton, Niagara Falls, Northern Ontario, Western Ontario No.1, Western Ontario No.2 and Windsor) to breakdown the province, no accurate maps of these regions exist within the interdiction files. For this research the province was divided by first letter of the postal code of the individual under investigation (see Figure 4-13 below).
The LCBO itself commented on several occasions as to how important and effective the interdiction list was in rural and northern regions of the province, and an analysis of the distribution of interdicted individuals across these regions strongly supports this statement (Annual Report of the LCBO 1958-1959, 1959; Annual Report of the LCBO 1972-1973, 1973).

The linear regression discovered significant relationships for both region M - Toronto, and Region P - Northern Ontario.
Region P

Region P, or the northern region of Ontario, saw the highest rates of interdiction and was disproportionally represented within the interdiction list. While region P made up 31% of those investigated the linear regression found a significant relationship with a B score 1.18 higher than that of region M. The north was seen by LCBO Head Office as containing “clientele of the lowest type - Indians and Bushmen” who were in need of strict control (LLBO minutes, January 9th 1958). Historically, the north had voted in favour of legalizing liquor sales and on opening day of the LCBO, made national news for the sheer amount of liquor purchased in one day. *The Globe* reported that on the Board’s opening day stores in the northern towns of Fort William and Port Arthur sold liquor to more than 2,500 people - enough to “quench a $15,000 thirst” (*The Globe. They Line Up Quickly to get Their Liquor Once Stores are Open. June 2nd 1927*). This would not have sat well with the LCBO’s policy of strictly controlling liquor sales.

For this reason the expansion of LCBO stores into northern communities was slow and “confined to points where they may be found necessary to check petty bootlegging and better social conditions” (Annual Report of the LCBO. 1928-1929.1929:14) What the reduced number of northern outlets did, in combination with the remoteness of northern communities, was create a social situation in which individuals in remote areas who wanted to drink would need to travel long distances to obtain liquor. The influx of drinkers into the north’s small communities proved unwelcome. It also proved to be a flashpoint for racism as those in search of alcohol were defined as “Indians” by locals, even though this racial classification was not firmly connected to actual lineage. In region P especially, these populations were thought to
tarnish the record of the LCBO as they publicly displayed the negative aspects of the liquor trade. The interdiction list was used to control these populations, and was cited as a successful way of “at least removing these people from the city streets” (Kenora Minor News. Welfare Minister to Visit Region. July 7th 1974). In this way interdiction served as a blunt instrument of social control, as one officer put it: “it is highly improbable that putting this man on the prohibited list will do him any good but it will give Mrs. _ some protection by being able to call police when this man appears” (#119).

Region M

The linear regression showed that those within region M or the Toronto area were less likely to face interdiction than those of other regions, impacting the final outcome score by -0.318. Statistically region M accounted for 10% of the remaining interdiction files and 21% of the Lang and McNeely 1962 sample. The reduced chances of the individuals of region M of being listed by the LCBO can be explained by the facts that Toronto held less strongly to temperant values and that listing was a less effective tool against illegal drinking due to the anonymity of city life.

Individuals from region M rarely sought to activate the disciplinary powers of the Board by applying for interdiction investigations. The comparatively diminished role that letters from individuals played within Region M is interesting as it gives strength to the argument that Board action was ultimately more strongly tied to public opinion and not the control of “drunken” behaviour. Toronto also had voted “wet” fairly substantially in the plebiscite of 1924 showing that liquor consumption was less of a moral issue as opposed to other regions, such as region K (Ottawa) and region L (south-western Ontario).
Conclusion

From the linear regression and subsequent analysis one can safely conclude that the LCBO’s interdiction list was directed at certain populations and the Board’s disciplinary power was more easily activated by particular institutions and individuals. Again we can see how the Board’s devotion to temperance morality and ideals shifted their disciplinary power against women, the First Nations, the working class and those within the northern region of the province.

After the interdiction list was relocated to the Liquor Licensing Board of Ontario in 1975, the process of interdiction became more formalized and the number of listed individuals dropped considerably. Henceforth, the interdiction list played a much smaller role in controlling liquor consumption in Ontario over the years though the remaining interdiction records at the Archives of Ontario contain active files from as late as the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Although this type of control system is no longer used in the case of alcohol it has found new life within the province’s casinos, allowing individuals to again be “interdicted” from the vice of gambling.
### Multiple Regression Modeling Results for LCBO Interdiction

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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.01*</td>
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- **Note:** P-values are not shown in the table.
Chapter 5

From Indigenous to Indigent: First Nations Legal Classifications and the “Drunken Indian” Prototype

We were the first settlers on this continent. Then, the whites came and made us Indians.
- Indian Councillor, Sarnia Indian Reserve, Sept. 23rd 1953

The only Indians who are entitled to purchase or have permits are those in possession of the usual blue form or letter from the Indian Agent and signed by him, stating that he is no longer an Indian. - LCBÖ circ. 3863, August 9th 1947

Canada’s First Peoples have a broad range of responses to alcohol - from complete abstinence, to controlled use under many conditions and problem drinking. But the belief that “Indians” are prone to alcohol abuse persists within Canadian culture, even though explanations of alcoholism based on the concepts of race and ethnicity have been widely disproved and rejected (Trimble and Beauvais. 2001:3). In this chapter the focus will be on the classification of “Indian,” itself nothing more than a legal construction, and the “drunken Indian” stereotype as primarily an effect of Canadian bureaucratic (administrative, legal) classification and provincial liquor law enforcement.

Classifications play an active role in constituting society. In their collaborative work on medical classifications, Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) touch on the concept of “convergence” to explain this phenomenon. Star et al. define convergence as “the double process by which information artifacts and social worlds are fitted to each other and come together” or in other words, as the effect “of changing the world so that the system’s depiction of reality becomes true” (Ibid; Bowker and Star.2000:49). The authors further explain that “a given information artifact” such as “a classification
system, a database, an interface, and so forth" can be understood as "constitutive of [the] social world," in that it acts as a shared informational hub upon which classifications can adhere themselves to reality and therefore impact real situations (Star et al. in press). Key to understanding convergence is the concept of "tightness": the closer the hub is tied to reality the more "tightness" the classification has, or the tighter the restrictive elements regarding the defining characteristics of the classification are to the social element identified and depicted by the classification. While convergence is the necessary result of classification, tightness depicts the extent to which that classification will dictate social action.

Although the work of Star et al remains for the most part limited to medical classifications, Canadian liquor legal history provides an excellent opportunity to investigate concrete examples of convergence and develop theory about the factors that influence the tightness of legal classifications. In this historical case study the Canadian "Indian" legal classification is investigated and it is shown how current racial stereotypes regarding alcohol and the First Nations in Ontario can be traced back to classification policy and the LCBO's zeal to control both liquor sales and public opinion.

*Canadian Legal Classifications and the First Nations*

Central to Canadian "Indian" policy is, and always has been, classification - who is considered an "Indian" and who is not. In Canada race definition was a legal necessity
for two main reasons: first, the peoples of the First Nations were not granted the rights and freedoms of British citizens under the law and second, laws surrounding treaties, reserves and land use required legal means for differentiating the First Nations peoples from the colonizing Europeans. A new legal category of "Indian" was created to meet this need. It is important to remember that Canadian racial history is dissimilar to that of the United States. The infamous "drop of blood" method of classification of African American racial status in the United States was much too broad to apply to the Canadian First Nations due to governmental treaty obligations. Consequently a much narrower classification method was developed.

The term "Indian" was first applied as a legal classification in 1850 in _An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada_ (S.C. 1850, c. 42, 13&14 Vic., s. 5.). It was explained that "the following classes of persons are and shall be considered as Indians":

First. - All persons of Indian blood, reputed to belong to the particular Body or Tribe of Indians interested in such lands, and their descendants. Secondly. - All persons intermarried with any such Indians and residing amongst them, and the descendants of all such persons. Thirdly. - All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents on either side were or are Indians of such Body of Tribe, or entitled to be considered as such: And Fourthly. - All persons adopted in infancy by any such Indians, and residing in the Village or upon the lands of such Tribe or Body of Indians, and their descendants (Ibid).
Under Canadian law "Indian" legal classification relied upon patriarchal and patriarchal concepts of race, as it still does today, but also incorporated specific social elements such as adoption and later what was described as "the Indian mode of life" (Indian Act. 1876). From 1850 forward, the classification of "Indian" changed along with acts of parliament. "Indians" occupied a separate and mutually exclusive classification from others within Canadian society - a fact perhaps best illustrated in the Indian Act of 1876, where it reads that the legal classification of a "person" is "an individual other than an Indian" (s.10). Ultimately the Indian Act of 1876 would divide individuals into three separate categories. "Indians," "non-treaty Indians" and "People," all with varying levels of rights under the law. One key difference between the "Indian" classifications and others in Canada has been legal access and possession of alcohol. Though Canada did briefly pass though a period of prohibition, "Indian" and "non-treaty Indian" legal classifications have been, for the most part, different than the liquor histories for non-"Indian" classifications.

First Nations Liquor History and Canadian Law

The first "Canadian" law that prohibited the sale, trade, giving or bartering of alcohol to "Indians" specifically identified the Moravian Indians, in An Act to Prevent the Sale of Spirituous Liquors and Strong Waters in the Tract Occupied by the Moravian Indians on the River Thames, in the Western District of 1801 (Geo.III c.14). At the time the Moravian Nation was heavy inundated with missionaries who perceived alcohol as
their chief adversary, and it was through their actions that liquor was criminalized (Smart.1996:5). Many missionary writers told very graphic tales of “Indian” liquor abuse during this period; similar arguments targeted the acts of fur traders and settlers, bringing into question the actual extent of real “alcohol abuse” engaged in by the First Nations peoples of this time (MacAndrew and Edgerton.1969:109).

The second law passed in the provinces of Canada was *An Act to Prevent the Sale of Spirituous Liquor to Indians*. It was written in 1835 in response to the petitions of “the Indians residing at the Grand River, Credit, Muncey and other places in this Province” so that “the prayer of their petitions should be granted” regarding “the sale of, barter, exchange or gift, of any distilled Spirituous Liquors by any person or persons whatsoever to any Indian man, woman or child” (1835.5 William c.9). The law focused on the act of trading liquor with the First Nations peoples of Upper Canada itself, and sought to protect them from unscrupulous traders by imposing harsh punishment on those engaged in such trade. Nowhere does it appear, interestingly enough, that liquor is illegal for Native peoples to possess and/or use. Also the Act was to be temporary, only lasting five years, so that if needed it could be changed or amended. In 1840 an act was passed to amend and make permanent the 1835 law. Entitled, *An Act to prevent the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors to Indians* (3 Victoria c.13) it merely altered the wording of the 1835 act.

Ten years later in 1850, the *Act for the Protection of Indians in Upper Canada from Imposition, and the Property Occupied by or Enjoyed by Them from Trespass or Injury of Which* was passed, specifying that “it shall not be lawful for any person to sell,
barter, exchange or give to any Indian, man, woman or child within this province, any kind of spirituous liquors in any manner or way, or to cause or procure the same to be done for any purpose whatsoever.” Although a strikingly similar act was passed for Lower Canada in the very same year called *An Act for the better protection of the lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada* no prohibition of alcohol was put in place for the First Nations Peoples of Lower Canada. This difference in law is important in so far as it supports the premise that the legal prohibition of alcohol was, during this period, for the protection of the First Nations from unscrupulous traders since by this time, the First Nations of Lower Canada relied more on farming than on trade when compared with their counterparts in Upper Canada (Smart. 1996:1-14; Heron.2003:134-135).

*An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of Indians* was passed only seven years later in 1857, offering enfranchisement\(^1\) to “Indians” for the first time in history. Since it was illegal for the “Indians” of Upper Canada to obtain liquor the enfranchisement option offered them a legal solution. Finally in 1876 all laws concerning “Indians” in Canada were consolidated within the first *Indian Act*. Under this consolidated act it was made a criminal offence to “sell, barter, or give any intoxicant” to a “male or female, who is reputed to belong to a particular band, or who follows the Indian mode of life, or any child of such person”(s.79). It also for the first time

\(^1\) “Enfranchisement was the voluntary or involuntary loss of Indian status.” Individuals who were enfranchised gained “certain benefits, which varied over time according to changes in the Indian Act. Early major benefits were full Canadian citizenship and ownership of a parcel of reserve land. A later benefit was the one-time payment of the individual’s shares of band funds and annuities.” *Researching Your Aboriginal Ancestry at Library and Archives Canada*. Canadian Genealogy Center. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/genealogy/022-607.002.01.01.18-e.html
criminalized possession of alcohol for "Indians." This specifically removed drinking rights from all members of the "Indian" and "Non-Treaty Indian" classifications in Canada regardless of their past or present reliance on trade, or their desire to live under prohibition for the first time in Canadian history.

To control liquor sales to "Indians" the government relied upon its existing liquor licensing legislation framework, a relic of the old British Black List law called "Interdiction."

*Interdiction and the "Indian List"

The term "interdiction" first presented itself in Canadian Law in the *Liquor Licencing Act* of 1883, though its origins can be traced back to the much earlier Black List of English common law (Lang and McNeely, 1963:2). The law involved the formal legal classification of an individual as having a drinking problem and legally barred these individuals from the possession or purchase of liquor. Like "Indians," "interdicted" individuals occupied a distinct legal classification under Canadian law with reduced rights in relation to alcohol sales, possession and the frequenting of licenced establishments. Under the *Liquor Licencing Act* of 1883 an interdicted individual was not allowed to consume liquor for a period stipulated by the judge's order and their name and likeness were circulated to local taverns and saloons (45 and 46 Vic. c.30).

After the 1876 change to the "Indian" classification, making it illegal to purchase or possess liquor, all "Indians" and all "non-treaty Indians" were considered to be on
this list and were dealt with accordingly. That is, they were conceptualized by lawmakers, enforcers and liquor establishment owners as listed, regardless of whether they had been legally found to be abusing liquor. These previously independent categories of “Indian” and “Interdicted” now had identical legal classifications with regard to liquor, and as a result caused serious repercussions to the perception and conceptualization of First Nations and drinking in Canada. Although no “Indians” were formally listed on the interdiction list, it was understood that all “Indians” were conceptually considered on the list for liquor control purposes.

The first impact of the unification of classification was that the interdiction list very quickly became known as the “Indian list” in Ontario popular parlance. But perhaps more seriously “Indians” were now socially understood as drunks and thus saw an increase in the stereotypical traits attached to them (Heron.2003:135; Valverde.2003:193-222). Now being an “Indian” meant that you legally had a “particular susceptibility” to, and were likely injured by, the use of intoxicants among other things, as was established by important court cases in Canadian law (Rex v. Martin.1917; Valverde.2003:195). Here one can see the beginnings of Star’s convergence concept.

By 1876 First Nations peoples’ new classification as “Indian”/“Interdicted” began to impact their reality as they now faced new social situations in which their classification status dictated social action and cultural perceptions. This new legal classification came with a significant amount of tightness due to the powers of the judicial system; albeit the initial adoption of the “drunken Indian” stereotype was
gradual (Heron. 2003:135). It wasn’t until the formation of the provincial liquor control boards, after the period of prohibition had passed, that the tightness reached levels where systemic classification depicted, mirrored and constructed reality.

*The LCBO and “Indian”/“Interdiction” Classification Convergence*

When prohibition ended in Ontario in 1927 the LCBO was charged with the sale and control of liquor in the province. At the time the population held to strongly temperate values and so fear of the electorate agitating against the LCBO dictated early policy and action, forcing the Board to profess temperate values and strictly control access to liquor. The government explained to the people that under its system of stores “those who can ‘take liquor’ decently shall have it, and that others shall not have it” (Willison. 1924). “Others” specifically included all individuals within the “Indian,” “Non-Treaty Indian” and “Interdicted” legal classifications, as was specified in section 44 of Ontario’s *Liquor Control Act* of 1927 (7 Geo.V c.70). The Board’s fear of serving “Indians” was twofold. First and foremost the Board feared that any “such cases may be featured in the press and be seized as opportunity for criticism of the Liquor Control Act, vendors and issuers” (LCBO Circular1292.1931). Secondly the Board feared criminal prosecution under the *Indian Act* or Ontario’s new *Liquor Control Act*, both of which specifically criminalized liquor sale to, and purchase or possession for, “Indians” and other interdicted persons in Canada (Indian Act. 1876; Liquor Control Act. 7 Geo.V c.70).
To achieve this selective "kind of prohibition", a vast legal social sort fell on the shoulders of the LCBO, its vendors and to a lesser extent the criminal justice system (Willison. 1924). On the ground, LCBO vendors were required to assess and classify liquor permit applicants along lines of legal classifications of "Indianness." Owing to the difficulty of the task of classifying First Nations peoples based on their official legal status, the Board ultimately relied on "prototypical" and not legal signifiers of race when classifying "Indian"/ "Interdicted" people (LCBO Circular 1292.1931). It was through this zealous act of classification enforcement that the tightness between the "Indian"/"Interdiction" classification and reality was achieved.

Prototype theory explains that classification is accomplished through a process whereby one learns a stereotype or "prototype", and then "extends this picture by metaphor and analogy when trying to decide if any given thing" fits within a classification: "we call up a best example, and then see if there is a reasonable direct or metaphorical thread that takes us from the example to the object under consideration" (Bowker and Star. 2000:62; Lakoff. 1987; Taylor. 1995). Since the LCBO could not rely on lineage as the determining factor of "Indianness," due to the lengthy process of contacting Indian Affairs to consult official lists, they relied upon the "Indian" or "Indian mode of life" prototype as their primary means of classification. The prototype was of course also greatly influenced by the conjoining of the "Indian" and "Interdiction" classifications by liquor control officials as well as the racist discourses of the early 20th century and is a key concept in understanding the tightness that was ultimately achieved between classification and reality. Unlike all others on the
“Indian”/“Interdicted” list, First Nations peoples were not sorted due to negative or intemperate activity, but due to possession of the now prototypical characteristics of the “Indian race,” that is drunkenness. In a circular on Board policy in regards to “Indians” the LCBO explained that:

in view of the technical difficulty of deciding whether an Indian may come under the prohibitions of the Indian Act, whether he is a non-treaty Indian, or whether he may have become enfranchised and occupying the status of a white man, vendors, permit issuers and all others concerned are instructed to refuse all applications for permits by persons of Indian Blood” (LCBO Circular 1292, 1931. emphasis in original).

As a cautionary tale the LCBO noted within their circulars a court case of 1930 involving an LCBO vendor who was charged for serving an “Indian” (Ibid). In this case the court ruled that the individual served by an LCBO vendor “was obviously an Indian by appearance” and that since the vendor had “made no effort to inquire into” what the court called “the suspicious circumstances” of the purchaser’s “nationality” the vendor was to be charged under the Indian Act (Rex v. Brown C.C.C.29). In this case the vendor was convicted and sentenced even though the guilty verdict required evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of “positive knowledge on the part of the accused as to the nationality of the purchaser” and no evidence of classification beyond the appearance of the alleged “Indian” was presented (Ibid). In its final remarks the court did not cite the need of the vendor to consult the Indian Registry or the local Indian agent, but found that an individual’s nearness to the “Indian” prototype was “obviously”
enough for racial classification.

These instructions forced the LCBO Vendors to incorporate classification, not on established legal status but, on the stereotyped or prototypical concept of race, relying specifically on “the Indian mode of life” element (which now included drunkenness) of the “non-treaty Indian” classification to justify the inclusion of racist elements within the Board’s liquor permit assessment process (Indian Act. 1876. s, LCBO Circular 1936.1937). This effectively drew validity away from registration or lineage as a depiction of race and emphasised the stereotypes and prejudices that were developed by the conjoined “Indian”/“Interdiction” list. LCBO reliance upon prototypical classification was its their primary means expediting the convergence of alcoholic elements of the “Indian”/“Interdiction” classification, with “Indian” identity and reality.

Since LCBO classification methodology was unbound to the reality of official “Indian” legal status, a positive feedback loop of classification and prototype formation was created within the Board. Fuelled by a situation where, through official Board policy, only those who embody the prototype were classified (since classification methods relied on prototypical elements), and the actions of those who were classified were interpreted through the classification (reinforcing prototypical elements of the category), it allowed convergence to run almost without restriction, ever tightening classified people’s actions and the perceptions of those actions within systemically defined roles - not simply blurring the lines between classification and reality but destroying them. As an “Indian” of Kenora noted:

I have been placed in jail here in Kenora when I was sober. And I was
jailed for one week. My charge was being drunk on the streets. I hadn't had a drink. (Kenora. ONT 92-10-28 73:98).

This remark tells us that it is not liquor that makes drunkenness but “Indianness.” In another case a judge explained that distinguishing between an “Indian” and a drunk required an expert eye (Richards v. Cote. 1962):

as to his manner of walking we have only the last witness for the crown, who only knew [the “Indian”] for three months, and I don’t think he is in a position to judge. We do know, I think, that Indians - I have seen at Kamsack very often - are not particularly soldierly in their bearing (Ibid).

Even gait could be attached to the prototype and help smooth the convergence fit between category and reality.

_The Impact of Convergence_

The concept of convergence due to the conjoining of categories lying at the centre of alcohol’s association with the First Nations peoples is also supported by research regarding First Nations oral history (Chanteloup.2002). Chanteloup found that in First Nations oral history the “drunken Indian” stereotype “is more about the state of disharmony created through unequal reciprocity by the unethical person and less about (our) understanding of the Aboriginal as alcoholic”(Ibid:155). The problem is more of an issue of colonial classification and identity than of substance addiction. Chanteloup also writes how First Nations Alcoholic Anonymous groups differ from traditional
anglo-Canadian groups in that they employ the concept of redeveloping a First Nations identity that predated alcohol so that the individual could be free of alcohol's link to their cultural and personal identity (Ibid: 185). Chanteloup's investigation is limited to what he considers to be the "myths of the Drunken Indian." Nonetheless, his research provides substantial support for the impact of classification and convergence on First Nations peoples.

First hand accounts and First Nations historical texts describe how the "Indian"/"Interdiction" classification was detrimental to First Nations communities across the province. As the historian Maracle writes:

the law didn’t stop or prevent Indians from drinking, but it did change the way they drank - for the worse. Since Indians were forbidden to buy liquor, they frequently resorted to drinking other far more dangerous intoxicants. More ominously, Indians also had to guzzle their beer, wine or liquor as quickly as possible to keep from being arrested.”

(Maracle.1993.44-45)

Maracle’s findings could be widely confirmed. In 1953, when the Ontario Legislature ordered an investigation into the “liquor problem”, a committee of government representatives visited bands across the province and heard much of the negative impact that classification had had on the First Nations peoples. Chief Peltier of the Fort William First Nations explained First Nations drinking behaviour in this way:

now Indians will drink anything - canned heat, shoe polish, alcohol - or whatever they can get their hands on from the bootleggers. The Indian is
always watching out for the police, so he will down whatever he has as quickly as he can (1953:474).

A man from Sioux Lookout explained that the source of “Indian” drinking behaviours was the law itself (1953:522). He argued that after First Nations prohibition was put in place:

‘Fire water’ has been coming in ever since, and we are not able to stop it.

Would [First Nations people] not feel better if they could go in the front door like men rather than creep like thieves to get liquor from bootleggers? They go to a bootlegger and pay $5 and $10 for home brew, poisonous stuff. A few drinks of it will make you crazy, but you have held the Indians down so that they have to do that (Ibid).

Prohibition on the reserves also forced drinking into public spaces thus increasing the visibility of First Nations consumption and the cultural association of alcoholic behaviour with “Indians.” This was especially visible in regional centres of northern and rural areas that experienced an influx of people from smaller, remote communities (see Jacobson 1974).

In 1934 the “Indian”/“Interdiction” list mode of controlling “drunkards” in Ontario again became the key technology of controlling liquor consumption. From 1927 to this point those who had “abused” their permit privilege simply had their liquor permits cancelled leaving interdiction for only the most hard core and those so ordered by a judge. But since liquor started to be served in standard hotels and licenced establishments in 1934, cancellations ceased to be a sufficient means of controlling
liquor consumption. At this point the LCBO turned to the “Indian”/“Interdiction” list to fill the need of restricting alcohol consumption, increasing the number of listed individuals from 6 in 1933-1934 to over 1,600 by 1935-1936, moving the list from the legal realm into the mainstream of popular culture (Annual Reports of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario 1933-1936). From this period forward “Indians” saw a dramatic increase in their convictions for “drunkenness” both under the Indian Act and the Liquor Control Act (see table 5-1 below).

Figure 5-1. Convictions of “Indians” for Drunkenness* in Ontario 1881-1955

![Convictions of Drunkenness Under the Indian Act](image)


In 1951 legislation within the Indian Act changed allowing the provinces to determine whether or not to give “Indians” the right to drink. In 1954 Ontario decided to
do so, though the "Indian"/"Interdiction" list remained a powerful force as, like "drunkards" who had regained their drinking rights, "Indians" would have to "show the Federal Government that [they] were capable of taking a few drinks and be law-abiding" before they were given full drinking privileges and the right "to have beer and liquor on the reserves" (Robson quoted in Cole.1953:560). "Indians" now were legally considered to be under a partial Board order, having the right to drink in licenced premises but not the right to purchase liquor from LCBO stores.

As First Nations leaders from across the province had predicted, their new rights had not solved the problems of differential classification and many of their people quickly found themselves formally listed by the LCBO (1953). As Chief Adams of the Sarnia Indian Reserve explained:

if we took the privileges that you suggest, I could go to the beverage room and have a few drinks. Then if I came home to the reserve drunk, the RCMP would throw me in jail. It just looks like a trap to me. If we wanted a glass of beer, and could take it home, that would be better. With the present set-up, liquor is an awful detriment to the Indian. It is not a fair thing. (1953:543).

First Nations peoples were overrepresented on both the Interdicted List and in Interdiction related convictions from 1954 until its demise (Interdiction Records of the LLBO RG-36-13; Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police.1927-1970). Before 1949 interdiction related convictions were literally 0 in Ontario, but they increased substantially to over 800 individuals by the late 1960's and "coincidentally" appeared
alongside the right to purchase alcohol acquired by First Nations.

FIGURE 5-2. Interdiction Related Convictions Reported by the Ontario Provincial Police 1927-1970

NB: First Nations were granted the legal right to drink in public restaurants and bars under 1951 legislation, while the right to drink in their private residences came later and required Bands to apply to the LCBO for "wet" status. This began in 1954 and by 1957 many had done so. By 1962 most had applied (LCBO General Correspondence. 1954-1962).

The conjoining of the "Indian" and "drunkard" prototypes was so strong that racial aspects of "Indians" attached themselves to non-"Indian" drunks. The Interdiction list was conceptualized culturally as exclusively containing the names of First Nations peoples and it soon came to be known as the "Indian List." Some "white" people thought that they couldn't possibly be put on the drunk list nor even be alcoholics simply because they were Caucasian (Interdiction List of the LLBO RG-36-13).

A listed person was also conceptually an "Indian." Individuals added to the list saw the same loss of legal rights as the First Nations. Under the Liquor Control Act their
homes and private property could be “reservationized” by means of conversion into a public place, thus no longer requiring police search warrants nor allowing the possession of alcohol within them.

By the 1970's, when formal criteria were applied to the interdiction process, we can see that convergence had played out its course.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter was to investigate two separate issues - the first being the validity of theories of convergence and classification, and the second to understand the social history behind the LCBO and the classification of First Nations peoples in Ontario.

Some authors like Westermeyer (1996:112) claim that “any single history or description of drinking practices” of the First Nations people is severely limited due to the variation in cultures and histories of the First Nations, and thus “cannot apply to every group.” The shared “Indian” classification and legal history discussed in this chapter, I believe, effectively circumvents Westermeyer’s argument, as classification and LCBO interdiction policy were not constructed or co-constructed with the highly diverse First Nations cultures of Ontario. Since these laws were imposed, and in the case of the LCBO imposed with great care to be consistent, then the shared experience of classification, as expressed in First Nation’s oral histories, is generalizable to the First Nations of Ontario and arguably to the other areas of Canada where liquor control
boards with similar mandates and disciplinary powers were to be found. My approach is
to detail the imposition of a constructed identity on First Nations that did not interest
itself in diversity or difference, but acted before the facts through categorization and
classification. In effect, the LCBO created the problems it then sought to define and
discipline.
Chapter 6
Liquor and the Moral Regulation of Women: The LCBO and the Interdiction List from 1927-1975

In chapter 4 I suggested that being a woman significantly impacted how individuals were dealt with by the LCBO. In order to understand this I turn once again to the Board's moral mandate to instil temperance morality across the province. Popular culture in the early 1900's presented women's relationships with alcohol in one of three ways: as either "angelic," since passive and virtuous women of temperance never took a drink; as the subjects of poverty and violence at the hands of alcoholic husbands; or as alcoholics themselves prone to violence, sexuality and uncontrollable behaviour.

Figure 6-1. Women’s Relationships with Liquor as Presented in Popular Culture

Popular representations of women’s relationships with alcohol show an interesting commonality in that all women seem to require a strong authoritarian Liquor Control Board to protect them from the dangers of liquor.
In reality women’s relationships with alcohol were much more complex than these simple prototypes suggest, though many of Ontario women were either active members or supporters of the temperance political movement if not the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) itself. In 1842 one in ten citizens were members of a temperance society in Upper Canada and the WCTU itself boasted over 10,000 members in the early 1900’s (Whisky.2004). As late as 1919 the WCTU was active in organizing a 15,000 person march of temperance supporters, bringing petitions signed by over 825,500 people to Toronto in order to pressure the provincial government to adopt the Ontario Temperance Act and embrace prohibition (Ibid).

When prohibition ended in Ontario in 1927 the LCBO was well aware of these prohibitionist arguments and presented the interdiction list (see chapter 3 and 4) as the key tool that would protect wives and families from the poverty, violence and uncontrollable behaviour associated with alcohol addiction (Ferguson. 1926;Willison.1924 also see chapter 1). The Board informed its workers that they were to ensure that if an individual “by excessive drinking of liquor, misspends, wastes, or lessens his estate, or injures his health, or interrupts the peace and happiness of his family” he would be identified and his consumption controlled (Liquor Control Act. S.O.1927 c.70 s.95(1)). Once the interdiction list was in place, many women sought to activate the disciplinary powers of the board to control drinking as well as other undesirable behaviours. This chapter will, through an examination of the LCBO’s interdiction files dating
from 1946-1976, explain how and why women sought to activate the bureaucratic power of the LCBO, how and why women were themselves the subjects of LCBO bureaucratic power, and finally the impact on identity that being a member of the “drunk list” placed on women in Ontario.

Women Listing Others

Woman applicants accounted for nearly 80% of the letters sent by individuals to the LCBO requesting interdiction investigations into particular individuals. This was more applications than any other group. Most of these letters came from women seeking to have their husbands listed, though letters were also sent by women in a variety of different relationships (see figure 6-2 below).

Figure 6-2. Female Applicants to Have Others Listed by the LCBO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicant</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother-in-law</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women did not play a significant role in the listing of other women. Only 35% of requests for women to be listed came from other women, while women made up over 85% of requests made to have men listed. Although women were by far the main source of all individual requests made to the Board, rates of
success for these requests were, however, another matter entirely. Figure 6-3 (below) gives, as a percentage, the outcomes of requests made to the LCBO to have individuals listed. These results are separated by gender and show which gender was ordered to be investigated by whom.

Figure 6-3. Results of Individual Requests, Sorted by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women Requested by Men</th>
<th>Men Requested by Men*</th>
<th>Both Genders Requested by Men*</th>
<th>Women Requested by Women*</th>
<th>Men Requested by Women</th>
<th>Both Genders Requested by Women*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominance %</td>
<td>4.69 %</td>
<td>15.49 %</td>
<td>20.19 %</td>
<td>1.87 %</td>
<td>77.94 %</td>
<td>79.80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Action</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>5.55 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>23.68 %</td>
<td>11.84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary Action</td>
<td>90 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>95 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>76.32 %</td>
<td>88.16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Letter</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>66.67 %</td>
<td>17.76 %</td>
<td>42.22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Public</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
<td>0.33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Private</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>1.32 %</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed</td>
<td>70 %</td>
<td>88 %</td>
<td>79 %</td>
<td>33.33 %</td>
<td>56.58 %</td>
<td>44.49 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Tabulated from all LCBO records in RG-36-13 at the Archives of Ontario. Requests made in accordance with official institutions, such as the police, were not included. * Not including "self" applications.

When applications to have an individual listed came from men the individual was much more likely to be listed by the LCBO. While almost 81% of individual requests made by men resulted in listing, only 56% of requests made by women were successful. Though women were less likely than their male counterparts to be listed, they were 25% less likely to be listed if the request had come from a woman than from a man. A woman was also 32% less likely to have successfully listed a man as opposed to applications made by men. In over 23% of cases where a woman applied for a person to be listed no action was
taken by the Board, while this number was much lower - just over 5% for men. Another matter of note is that the only case where listing was not the most likely outcome was when a woman requested another woman be listed. In these cases women were twice as likely to simply receive warning letters from the LCBO.

*Reasons Provided By Women*

Almost all letters to the board applying for an individual to be investigated contained a reason. Surprisingly, the reasons provided were very similar and could be easily categorised in virtually all cases. These classifications were “overindulgence”, “misspending”, “abuse”, “violence”, “control” or “none” (if no reason was provided within the application). An investigation into the files in which women were the applicants yielded the following predominance of reasons as well as the following outcomes of Board responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Provided by Women</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Most Common Relationship</th>
<th>Board Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overindulgence</td>
<td>Misspending</td>
<td>Abuse / Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominance %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Common Relationship</td>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>Wife, Mother</td>
<td>Wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Response</td>
<td>No Action</td>
<td>Warning Letter</td>
<td>Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.7 %</td>
<td>12.9 %</td>
<td>48.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1 %</td>
<td>27.8 %</td>
<td>72.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.0 %</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
<td>60.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.7 %</td>
<td>28.6 %</td>
<td>35.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2 %</td>
<td>30.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Overindulgence**

Overindulgence was most often cited as the reason why women requested to have people listed, making up 25% of all applications. The bulk of these requests were made by wives, though mothers were a close second. Of these cases 48% resulted in listing while 38% were dismissed by the LCBO.

Overindulgence was the reason that had the lowest success rate for women and their "overly temperate" or "nagging" nature was cited in many of the investigations that followed upon these requests.

It can be seen throughout the Interdiction files that in some investigations conducted by the police or the LCBO's own investigators, women's requests for having an individual listed were either not taken seriously or the women's opinions were devalued by investigators. The main explanations given to disregard the request were that the woman involved was either emotional or presented overly temperate values. One LCBO investigator explained of the individual being investigated that "his mother is quite temperamental and it has been ascertained that she wrote a letter to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario requesting renewal of the Prohibitory Order mentioned above while in a fit of temper" and so she needn't be taken seriously (#352). In another case, an investigator cited a husband's intemperate actions as caused by his wife "putting undo stress on him and his business" and having "deprived [him] of sexual intercourse" for a period of "six weeks" arguing that the investigation should be dropped (#166). In yet another case a woman that applied for her husband to be
listed because he was physically abusive when he drank, lead the police investigator to report that:

as stated in Mrs. _’s letter he does get abusive when drinking and I have been to the residence on 2 occasions during the past year [to investigate abuse cases], but Mrs. _ does not help much as she is a teetotaller [a member of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union] and is strictly against drink of any kind” (#271).

In both of these cases the investigators opted not to recommend listing.

Abuse and Violence

All women who contacted the LCBO to have someone listed specifically for “abuse” were wives trying to have their husbands put on the list. Of these, 65% were ultimately successful, while 30% of those under investigation were awarded a warning letter or received no disciplinary action at all. To add to this 7% of all applications made by women cited “violence” as the reason for their request. Again wives made the most requests though some mothers also attempted to have people listed under this classification. Of the cases brought forward by women that cited violence, over 90% were directed towards men. Within these files 44% were listed while 55% were the recipients of a warning letter or no disciplinary action at all. If one were to combine the abuse and violence files they would account for over 21% of all applications by women.
LCBO policy also indirectly contributed to this violence and abuse by strictly adhering to the regulation of informing individuals that they were the subject of investigations and exposing the name of their accuser. In all "abuse" and almost all "violence" cases this would have been the abusive husbands of the wives who had contacted the LCBO. Of all investigations that ended before the LCBO could rule on them, 36% were halted by an applicant who did not want to be identified after they discovered that their identity would be revealed to the person under investigation. In cases where the applicant wished to remain anonymous the LCBO would issue a standard response explaining how anyone under investigation had a right to know who had accused them and that "the source of the complaint will not remain confidential." Although it was against official Board policy, at times investigators would side with abused women and advise LCBO head office not to report the name of the applicant whom had requested the investigation. However this was definitely not the norm; neither was there any evidence that the Board respected the investigators' wishes. No notation was made in these case files that suggested how the Board had reacted to sympathetic investigators or if they had disclosed the personal information of the applicant.

These case files also include some of the outcomes following the discovery by husbands that it was their wives who had applied for an

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1 "Investigation Procedures For An Order of Interdiction." *Interdiction*
investigation. In one case an investigator writes that when the husband found out “he was very angry and stated that if he was placed on the prohibited list he would make his wife leave home”(#246). Threats of violence and death were not uncommon for an investigator to report and it is safe to say that this LCBO policy put the women involved at greater risk.

**Misspending**

Misspending was the third most common reason provided by women seeking to have someone listed. It made up 14% of all applications made by women and was ultimately one of the most successful reasons a woman could use to have an individual listed. These requests were mostly made by wives, though mothers were a very close second. Within LCBO documents it is quite often emphasized that “liquor must not be sold” to those whose financial standing “is such that the sales must be followed by a diminution of the comforts of life in the family,” and finances as well as employment were intensely tracked through its permit system (LCBO Circular 1766,1936). Female applicants requesting interdiction orders for “misspending” often communicated the desperateness of their situation to the LCBO and most investigations supported their claims. As one investigator reported:

Mrs. ___ also showed the writer some 18 pints and a great number of empty beer cartons in the cellar, and she asked if it would be

---

*Files of the LLBO, RG-36-13 Series. Archives of Ontario: Toronto.*
possible to have this collection returned to the local Brewers Retail Store here in [city] and get the money in order to maintain the home and keep her three teenage boys, her husband has no job, as the last two he led he was discharged for drunkenness (#347).

Since these situations specifically depicted an element of the LCBO's moral mandate, it is not surprising that over 88% of individuals reported by women for "misspending" were awarded disciplinary action by the Board, and 72% were listed.

*Control and No Reason*

Of the reasons that have been listed under "control" the most common were "family problems" and "goes crazy," though statements depicting a desire to control non-drinking behaviours were the defining characteristic of this category. The attempt by women to use the disciplinary power of the Board as a means to restrict non-drinking related behaviour, as a punishment and even for retribution, can be seen predominately in these cases. The most obvious example was a case that cited the reason "out of line" for her son to be listed. More generally investigators reported relationships like the following:

Mr. ___ was late in arriving at a pre-arranged meeting place, thus causing [the applicant] to stand for some time on a street corner.
while waiting for him. Finally, when he arrived, it was evident that he had been drinking and his mother attributed this fact as the cause of his late arrival (#352).

Some cases even provided evidence of women's past success in using the interdiction list to control behaviour. In one extreme example a mother had her son put on and taken off the Interdiction list 25 times in a 3 year period, citing his compliance when she wanted him removed and his disobedience when she wanted him re-listed (#183). After the 25th application the LCBO informed the mother that they were not "to be used whimsically" but only to control abuses of the permit privilege (ibid). Cases that fell under this "other" category were the least successful of all reasons supplied by applicants. Over 46% did not result in any Board action while 23% received warning letters and just over 30% were listed.

In 10% of applications made by women no reason was supplied to the LCBO at all. They simply wrote things like "please add my [relation] ____ to the interdiction list." These requests ultimately lead to the listing of just over 33% of the individuals investigated, making it one of the least successful strategies.

The Moral Regulation of Women

Far fewer women were listed by the LCBO than men, making up less than 15% of the total cases. The reasons given for listing women were considerably different than those for men. The files of women listed by the
LCBO depict how the Board used its regulations as a tool to structure women’s relationships and identity in an attempt to construct and maintain the positive image of virtuous women of temperance in the province.

The LCBO’s attitude towards female drinkers was the same as the temperate public opinion of the time: “good” women were against drink of any kind and that “a female in a public drinking establishment was probably a prostitute” and definitely of inferior moral character (Heron.2003:289). To protect the morality of both men and women, women were only legally allowed to drink publicly within designated “ladies and escorts” areas of licenced drinking establishments - an area that was legally regulated differently than men’s sections and required to be separate as well as having its own separate entrances and washrooms (Ibid:294). Women were allowed to drink within these specifically defined legal and cultural spaces, but they could only do so under the protection of their “escorts.” As Heron writes, “the authorities who regulated public drinking did not lose their suspicions about [these woman’s] shady morality” either (Ibid:289).

Ensuring that these drinking regulations were being upheld the Board required a team of inspectors that roamed the province investigating licenced establishments and LCBO stores, scrutinising everything from the size of drinking glasses, the adherence to building regulations and of course the content and morality of the clientele. Liquor inspectors for the LCBO (and later the LLBO) had mandates almost exclusively devoted to morality, most importantly
controlling the perception of drinking. Women drinking in standard hotels had to step lightly around the liquor inspectors and be sure that they did not stray far from their escorts, lest they were caught talking to an unmarried man. The ultimate faux pas, however, was leaving the “ladies and escorts” room and entering the male side of drinking establishments. As one inspector described this terrible act: she “neglected her children by staying out all night and spending her time in the married men’s room of the [drinking establishment]” (#47). This woman was promptly listed by the Board.

Figure 6–4. Temperance Poster Depicting the Neglect of Children

Women could also drink within their homes, yet even there drinkers were the subject of gossip and held by the LCBO to different standards of proper drinking when compared with their male counterparts. *The Globe* reported on women purchasers as if they were spectacles for public consumption. Several articles were critical of women who “wheeled baby carriages” when making their purchases or asserting their right to drink (*The Globe*. *They Line Up Quickly to*}
Women's physical features and the conditions of their homes were also commented on in official investigation documents of the LCBO, and statements such as "she had not bothered to do the laundry or clean up" or "I was shown the refrigerator which had an ample supply of food also the cupboards were well stocked, the home was neat and tidy and nicely furnished" were commonplace (#164; #178). What was of greater importance, however, were elements of sexual deviance in their lives. The presence of men, other than husbands, in the women's lives were of great importance to investigators. In one police report to the LCBO an officer felt it pertinent to wonder whether a woman should have the right to drink if she was visiting a married man’s hotel room, even though the man "seems very friendly with her husband" and was reportedly a family friend (#64). In other cases sexual promiscuity was shown to be sufficient grounds for listing. As one investigator reported: "Mrs. _ is guilty of associating with another man and the younger members of the family are aware of their mother's conduct" (#283). The children, the investigator concludes, "are better off with a father who drinks in moderation than a mother whose conduct is questionable" (Ibid).

Applications to Have Women Listed

Applications to have women listed came from a wide variety of sources,
but the bulk had institutional sources.

Figure 6-5. Applicants to Have Women Listed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Applicant</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
<th>Applicant</th>
<th>Predominance %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>34.2 %</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>16.2 %</td>
<td>LCBO, Investigator</td>
<td>2.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>14.7 %</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO, Board</td>
<td>13.2 %</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>8.8 %</td>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>1.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB - Totals may be above 100% due to multiple applicants within a single application.

Police

Police conducted most of the liquor investigations for the LCBO in the regions of the province that did not have regular Board investigators. This is perhaps why police requests to the LCBO in most cases held the key words and concepts that were written into the Liquor Control Act concerning who should be listed. In 100% of police requests the women involved were the recipients of disciplinary action and over 95% were listed. The police were so successful in listing individuals that the Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police thanked the LCBO for its “cooperation” from 1928-1959 (Annual Reports of the Ontario Provincial Police, 1928-1959). Most police requests against women were due to “violence” (24%), while “neglect of children” and “overindulgence” were close behind at just under 20% each.
Judges

Judges, under the regulations of the Liquor Control Act, could order individuals to be listed by the Board as part of their sentences (S.O. 1927. c. 70 s.98(1)). Judges orders were usually “full orders”, meaning the listed individual would be unable to purchase or consume liquor legally, and were indefinite in length. Since judges could order the listing of individuals, these were rarely investigated. The LCBO did, however, have within its power the right to overturn judges orders but this occurred in only a minute number of cases and no LCBO records exist of any judges orders against women being overturned.

Individuals

Individual requests made up approximately 32% of all requests made to the board for female additions to the interdiction list. Most individual requests to have women listed came from the women themselves, asking for their own names to be added to the list. When an applicant requested themselves to be added to the list only a minimal investigation was conducted by the LCBO and the individual was often listed without question. While some women did this of their own accord most requested to be listed out of fear that they would be forced by their listed husbands to illegally obtain liquor for them. This was undoubtedly a matter of self-defence. In the remainder of the self-directed requests made by
women, about 2% appeared typed on official police letterhead and were signed as witnessed by police officers.

Institutions were much more successful in listing women than were individuals. While the successful percentage of individuals listed by other individuals was approximately 65%, institutions could boast a near perfect 98% (see Figure 6-5 below).

Figure 6-6. Results of Individuals’ and Institutions’ Requests to Have Women Listed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board Response</th>
<th>Institutional Applicants</th>
<th>Individual Applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Judge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Action</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary Action</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Letter</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed</td>
<td>95 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NB: Modes includes data from all cases, not simply those listed above.

Reasons Provided

Of all reasons provided to have women listed, the most common was “overindulgence.” Still, no reason was provided at all in 33% of women’s files. Of all the reasons provided, again the issues consistent with temperance morality proved the most effective.
Figure 6-7. Reasons Provided Within Applications to have Women Listed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons Provided</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Overindulgence</th>
<th>Husband on List</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Neglect of Children</th>
<th>Misspending</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominance %</td>
<td>30.8 %</td>
<td>21.6 %</td>
<td>17.7 %</td>
<td>8.9 %</td>
<td>7.3 %</td>
<td>4.8 %</td>
<td>8.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Common Relationship</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Self, Police</td>
<td>Mother, Husband</td>
<td>Daughter, Police</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Response</td>
<td>Disciplinary Action</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>85.7 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listing</td>
<td>95.2 %</td>
<td>89 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>80 %</td>
<td>85.7 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>83.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None

Of all requests to have women listed by the LCBO 30.8% were not accompanied by a reason. Almost half of these requests were the result of judges' orders. Technically, judges orders did not need a reason to have someone listed but since judges required proof in open court of intemperance in order to file for an order of interdiction one can extrapolate that these women had been charged under the criminal code or under the Liquor Control Act and received the order as part of their sentence. The other half of requests that did not cite a reason came from internal investigations conducted by the Board itself, initiated by local liquor vendors, LCBO investigators or the Permit Department at Head office (see chapters 2 and 3). The small remainder of applications made without a reason given were submitted by husbands, fathers, the police and the women themselves. Of these requests 100% ultimately resulted in disciplinary action of
some kind, while 95% of women requested without any reason were added to the list.

Husband On List

17.7% of requests for listing women were precipitated by the intemperate acts of their husbands. Police explained these listings as a necessary precautionary measure because it was understood that husbands would often force their wives to illegally obtain liquor for them. As one inspector explained: “if he plans to send Mrs. _ out to purchase beer, it won’t work this time because Mrs. _ has requested that her name be placed on the order also”(#335). No records exist of any man being listed by the Board because he might purchase liquor for his wife. Although most women accepted listing willingly others felt that it was an unwarranted curtailing of their rights. When women were listed because of their husbands there was no notation on the list that indicated that they had been listed due to their husbands’ behaviour and they were no different legally or conceptually from those listed for convictions under the criminal code or Liquor Control Act.

Neglect of Children

Compared to their male counterparts, women were requested to be listed almost 14 times more often for “neglecting their children.” Legally allowed to
drink or enter the “ladies and escorts” room at standard hotels, women with children who drank publicly were still seen as highly suspect since they were obviously disregarding their primary role as family caregivers. Even in cases where women had arranged for someone to watch their children the Board disapproved and had women listed since they were neglecting their duties as mothers. One such report stated:

Mr. _ coming home from drinking all afternoon found that his wife was out with the children. She returned in a semi drunk condition and her husband became angry and assaulted her. It was determined that Mrs. _ had...left the children alone while she was drinking. [The Police] would kindly ask that a Board Order be issued against Mrs._. (#109)

Although this particular case was extreme, the role of women as homemakers and caretakers of the family’s children is clear in all of the cases where women were listed for “neglecting children” and “misspending” family income. From the above example one can see the implied role of women as primary caregivers since blame fell on the mother who abandoned her children for drink and not the husband, who had been “drinking all afternoon” (Ibid). In the case of women “neglecting children,” almost 86% were ultimately listed by the LCBO.
Control

Just over 8.9% of the cases could be categorised under the central theme of “control.” The specific reasons provided in the requests were “not obeying orders”, “fighting with [husband]”, “neglecting house chores”, “up to her old tricks” and “leaving [her husband]”. Out of these “leaving her husband” was the most common, and it was documented by the police or Board investigations that many of these cases were the result of women fleeing abusive situations. Of all the interdiction files against women those that cited reasons of “control” most clearly display the alignment of LCBO powers with other institutions and individuals toward the goal of regulating female behaviour. These files were initiated mostly due to applications from mothers but husbands were a close second. In one case police were investigating a woman for being listed because of “leaving her husband” and were completely confused about why she would want to leave her home when her husband was intoxicated - even though they “had received several phone calls from Mrs. stating that her husband is out getting drunk and will beat her up when he gets home” (#206).

Violence

“Violence” accounted for approximately 10% of all requests to have women listed by the LCBO. Requests that cited violence mostly came from city
and provincial police but some were also the result of judges' orders. Of the women investigated due to requests that cited violence all were the recipients of some type of LCBO disciplinary action while approximately 83% were officially listed.

Overindulgence

Overindulgence was cited approximately 21.6% of the time as the reason behind the applications to have women added to the LCBO's list. During the period of study all individual consumption of liquor was tracked by the LCBO through passport type documents called liquor permits (see chapter 2). Police had the right under the Liquor Control Act to demand to see these permits, without a warrant, in order to review purchases for evidence of excessive drinking. The bulk of the requests for listing women for overindulgence came from the police. All overindulgence cases resulted in disciplinary action from the LCBO and almost 89% of these women were listed by the Board.

Misspending

As with their male counterparts women's misspending of their income was considered a very serious allegation by the LCBO. As argued previously, controlling misspending was one of the Board's mandates and in 100% of the
cases where women were investigated for "misspending" they were ultimately listed. This made misspending the reason with the highest success rate for listing women.

*Impact of LCBO Listing on Identity*

The impact of being listed was globally significant. As Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) have reported, institutional classifications impact both how one is perceived and treated by others as well as self-perception. Generally, the impact of the interdiction classification on individuals was the same: shifts of compliance towards their given classification, ultimately resulting in self-identification and self-discipline through the interdiction list. The following excerpts are from the interdiction case files of a listed woman who almost perfectly personified the social relations that were present within the files of interdicted women: she had an abusive husband; she was listed repeatedly on moral grounds; but most importantly, there is a clear shift from defiance to compliance and then to self-discipline that is consistent to some extent with all files of women listed by the LCBO. Let's look more closely at this example and the subsequent shift in her reported behaviour as she comes into contact with the LCBO's Interdiction list.

"SK" was first requested to be listed by her mother at the age of 22. Despite the fact that no reason was provided in her mother’s application, the
LCBO listed her with their most severe disciplinary tool - an indefinite Full Board Order. Here we can see both how SK was presented as the dangerous “uncontrolled” woman drinker from temperance stereotypes and how the Board lent its power to authority figures within families to control unwanted behaviour.

The Board’s subsequent investigation discovered that SK “certainly abuses her privileges and is not in a position to hold a job and must be quite a strain on her parents.” Like most individuals facing their first interdiction order, SK responded defiantly stating:

On receiving your letter this 29th day of July [year] stating that I am on the black list, I would like to know the reasons given and by whom I was put on. If it is some of those supposed to be first class proprietors that not only think they own the beverage room but the whole town. She had better be checked up on, because the laws of the Liquor Control Board do not say a lady can be behind the bar of a beverage room and can not wander through the men’s beverage room. The only reason I can figure given as to me being put on the list is spite and if this is a law then there should be lots of new laws passed because it is only ‘pick and choose’ in [City] or there should be a lot before me to go on this list. I remain. Mrs. [SK]

Surprisingly, the Board responded that their “sources are confidential,” since as argued previously even in cases of extreme abuse the Board told women that
their names could not be kept from their abusers. SK had been listed based on the findings of a Board investigation and that the matter was considered closed, but she responded again:

On receiving your letter of Dec 2nd stating that the order made against me on July 29th [year] I would like to thank you for your trouble and as I am quite sure who is behind the so called inquiries you received, there should be a lot more orders made against some of the others that are far worse than me. It is too bad there is pick and choose from a person that has no room to talk.

The proprietor of our two hotels uphold women who have their children run the streets hungry, at least mine are fed and looked after when I go out. Of course those supposed to be high class people are liked better than us supposed lower. Seeing the town is getting so strict there should be more checkups made. Of course spite holds only so long and its plain to see that money talks.

Thinking of you again from your letter, I remain - Mrs. [SK]

To appease her, the Board reduced SK’s full order to that of a partial order, limiting her to home consumption only. In this way her case is fairly unique as it was quite rare for the Board to change an order once one was made. SK contacted the Board again three years later, seeking to have her order removed.

The resulting investigation reported the following:
Mrs. [SK] has a considerable amount of liquor shipped in for home consumption but has avoided criticism since she has been denied beverage room privileges. She neglects her children by staying out all night and spending her time in a married man’s room in the hotel. This particular married man has a wife and three children but he is at present spending much of his time at the home of Mrs [SK], although he seems very friendly with the woman’s husband. Mrs [hotel owner], who controls the two beverage rooms in [city] will not allow Mrs [SK] in the beverage room even if she is off the list. Her behaviour was so bad before and she neglected her home and child (she now has two children) so much that she was a common topic for gossip and criticism. I feel that this woman has not changed and to save her children from further neglect, I recommend that she still be barred from drinking rooms.

At this point SK carried within her file the prototypical element of the “dangerous woman drinker,” of being “uncontrollable,” and now other elements of the prototype became attached to her. Within this report SK was then found to be sexually promiscuous as well as neglecting her children. One might attribute the prototype’s influence for the further element of neglecting her children but “her behaviour was so bad before and she neglected her home and child” suggests a reinterpretation of past events through a newly applied label. For
many women a second investigation presented far more historical cases of child abuse, overindulgence or other unacceptable behaviours. In this case SK was listed for a period of one year.

Within two years SK was under investigation again. This time her investigation came at the request of her husband. Within the application her husband explained that she needed to be interdicted again because she was not “obeying orders.” Here we can see how Board power lent itself to the reinforcement of dominant gender roles, and how SK’s identity as a free woman is called into question. SK was listed for a period of one year after an investigation based on the testimony of her husband and doctor. To this SK responded:

In regards to your registered letter I received dated 1st of September I would like to ask a little information in regards to it. I would like to ask who sent the prohibition against me and for what reason. I was cut off for 24 hours on June 9th for that evening as far as I knew, and now going on four months later I get a letter prohibiting me for one year and I haven’t entered the beer parlour since and have received a bit by mail before June 9th. Nothing had been mentioned to me since. Please register my return letter as I do not think it was very clear that this is of course a small town. Thanking you kindly. Mrs [SK]
From her response a clear change in behaviour is notable. First she does not deny the validity of the Board’s process as she has in previous letters. Secondly she no longer denies that she should be listed, but does however argue for a reduced amount of time on the list. Finally, though she still wants to confront whomever placed her on the list, she asks the Board to reply to her in a more private way noting the impact of the negative stigma of the Board’s investigations and interdiction orders. As this is her $3^{rd}$ interdiction the number of interviews that the Board investigator would have conducted throughout her community regarding her drinking and subsequent “neglecting of her children” and “sexual deviance” undoubtedly spread these aspects of her classification throughout the community, regardless of whether they were true or not. The impact of this investigation process seems to have been substantial as it is noted in both SK’s request for greater discretion by the Board and in the previous investigator’s report of public gossip and criticism.

The Board responded with a short note saying “that the action in question was taken because of an official report received” also informing her that “it was believed to be in the best interests of your family.” SK responded again:

As I inquired here about myself I was told to write for information. This does not seem to be right according to the Liquor Control Board Laws. I was cut off on June $14^{th}$ [year] and haven’t entered a beverage room since and now I receive a letter stating my year of blacklistment starts on September $1^{st}$ [year]
three and a half months after. I cannot see why my year was not
started from June 14\textsuperscript{th} [year] when I was cut off for a reason I yet
do not know, and by whom was it sent? I wrote before and
received no answer after receiving my year’s enlistment. They
told me to write as they also can not see why my year hadn’t
started when I was cut off June 14\textsuperscript{th} not 3 \half months after. Hoping
this explains me clearly. I remain [SK]

The Board responded that “this action\[interdiction\] was taken pursuant to
medical advice received as well as the findings of our own investigation and this
could not be accomplished earlier to enable us to issue the order before the above
mentioned date.” Interestingly SK’s points about dates of action and
investigation are valid but she does not, as she did in previous years, continue to
fight the Board on this matter. Here one can see that her resistance to the Board’s
power is beginning to decrease noticeably.

Within a year SK again came to the attention of the LCBO. In a police report
investigating her husband the police reported:

Investigation revealed that Mr. [K] had come home from drinking
all evening in a local beverage room, and had found his wife had
also spent the better part of the evening drinking at home and had
not bothered to do the laundry or clean the house up. He became
very angry and as a result assaulted her, and chased the children
out of the house. Dirty laundry was strewn across the floor. Mrs.
[K] contacted the writer and requested that she be placed on the Interdicted List. She advised that she couldn’t control her drinking and felt that the only way that she could do so was to be ‘cut off’ but also requested that her husband [Mr. K], as before, not be placed on the Interdicted List as the problems they were having at home were all her fault as a result of her excessive drinking.

By this point SK has started to internalize elements of prototypical elements of the “dangerous female drinker” as well as adopting the Board’s belief in relationships of servitude and temperance implied by their disciplinary action.

This pattern of self devaluation and reliance upon institutional and family relationships to dictate “proper” behaviours can be found throughout women’s interdiction files. From this period forward she ceases to question being listed or bargaining with the Board for her own rights. SK self-identifies as an individual who should be listed both because of her drinking and her “unacceptable” behaviour.

Her husband’s interdiction records offer an interesting supplement to SK’s case. He was investigated repeatedly for instances of abuse yet his actions were repeatedly explained through her intemperance. As one police report stated:

[SK]’s face, on the left side was badly bruised, apparently from being assaulted by her husband. Complaints [of abuse] from this residence are being received at the rate of two calls per week.

This detachment and [the city] detachment have also received
several phone calls from [SK] stating that her husband is out
getting drunk and will beat her up when he gets home.

In this case the police initiated an interdiction investigation even though the
Board received a letter from SK seeking to have her husband removed from the
list. The conversion of her behaviour is striking. She writes: “I have asked on
behalf of my husband Mr.[K], that he shouldn’t be on the list owing to my fault.
Why should one be condemned on account of one who is wrong all the time?
Please look into this immediately. I remain. Mrs. [SK].” After receiving two
more similarly written letters the LCBO conducted another investigation into her
husband’s drinking reporting that:

Mr. [K] was also contacted and faithfully promised that he could
fully control his drinking habits. He also stated that the reason he
had previously drank so much was due to the fact that his wife
drank heavily and neglected her family. Due to the fact that his
wife no longer drinks and is taking a more a more active part
towards her family he feels that he would like to enjoy an
occasional drink.

Remarkably the investigator agrees that Mr. K’s drinking and abuse were due to
SK’s behaviour. It would seem that SK’s classification is so dominant it is
constitutive of all the problems within the family.

Over some 10 years SK requested listing for herself on four separate
occasions and was listed by her husband twice on the grounds that she was
uncontrollable when she drank. SK’s final report to the LCBO strongly depicts internalized elements of her classification as well as her need for her desire to be controlled by an authoritative body. This makes her convergence with the “dangerous woman drinker” stereotype complete both within public perception and her personal concept of self. She writes:

I am writing to request I be placed on the interdicted list full order. I am 53 years old and have two boys 12 and 14 still at home. I feel that I am drinking to excess and I am endangering my marriage and home. If you see fit to grant my request, I feel it would be of great benefit to me. Yours truly. [SK]. Witness.

[Police Officer] Detachment Commander, [city] Detachment

Conclusion

Women’s relationships with the interdiction list were quite complex. In some cases interdiction was undoubtedly a tool used by women to achieve some measure or share of power. The prejudices surrounding women’s allegedly temperate nature, the fact that applicants were not to remain anonymous and investigator sympathy towards men limited this assumption of power to few cases. When the disciplinary powers of the Board were turned towards women the results were detrimental, as SK’s case showed, and women suffered from the effects of convergence with the prevailing “dangerous woman drinker” stereotype. Although not all women were affected by the interdiction process in
the manner of SK, this obvious change in identity and attitude can definitely be seen throughout the interdiction files concerning women and can be attributed to the interdiction process itself.

The fact that by and large women could not shield themselves from their abusers and the Board acted arbitrarily when it came to providing women with the names of those who initiated investigation in of them, clearly exposed them to real dangers and proved beyond any doubt that the bureaucracy of administrative surveillance was steeped in sexism – a sexism that was integrated into the “disciplinary hierarchy” of the Board as to allowable “discretionary behaviour” (Dandeker. 1990:196).
Conclusion

The main conclusion of this thesis points to the relationship between LCBO policy (including surveillance, social sorting and mass categorization), identity construction and categorical convergence for both individuals and social groups. Although these elements did not act independently, and most likely were mutually reinforcing, the former points to constraints upon social action through, the performance of labeled acts, while the latter expresses the impact of externally enforced categories, through classification tightness, on both the members of the targeted groups and society. The LCBO's ability to produce such effects can be traced to the extent and scope of its social influence as well as the availability of liquor in Canadian society, but as the evidence has shown the nature of the actual technologies used directed, to a remarkable extent, the very particular manner in which the LCBO impacted society in the province.

As was shown in this thesis the LCBO's mix of a bureaucratic social structure and reliance upon punch card technologies lead to the adoption of very rigid social categories – individuals either fell into one slot or another, either the hole was punched or it was not. These bureaucratic social categories, developed and supported by internal policy as well as external social forces, were the means by which all social interaction with the Board, and ultimately alcohol, were dictated. Though these categories were developed by and large by the adoption of the temperance morality and prejudices of early 1900's Ontario, as described in chapters 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, their rigidity over time suggests an independence from public morality after their initial establishment.
Because of this categorical rigidity the First Nations peoples, women, the poor, people of the northern region of the province and the working classes were met with a massive monolithic response to their drinking by Head Office, local vendors, and through categorical tightness, the general public, based on the fixed categories to which these social groups were restricted. With regard to identity construction and projection, this had massive individual and cultural consequences for anyone deviating from the Board’s categorical pigeon hole that dictated their “proper” relationship with liquor.

In the later chapters of this thesis it was shown that LCBO categorization had serious personal implications for individuals. Most individuals interacting with the LCBO met with panoptic surveillance. As the Board stated, it was the best form of control, for those capable of self-control. As argued by Foucault (1977) and others, panoptic surveillance lends itself to the integration of desired behaviour into the subjected individual’s identity through the processes of self-discipline and conformity (also see Norris and Armstrong, 1999). What was of interest in this study of the LCBO was the complexity of the systems involved as well as the faith invested in them by LCBO policy makers, and thus Ontario’s business elite. The belief, in other words, in the regulatory powers of this type of surveillance and the impact the Board felt it could have on specific drinking populations. Regardless of this, purchasing and carrying a liquor permit can be understood as the LCBO’s first steps into directing individual activity through technology and policy.

As discussed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, the LCBO’s more serious classifications, directed at problem or high risk users, increased dramatically limitations on individual action and forced certain classified individuals to engage in “alcoholic” labeled acts by leaving them no recourse in substance or place. The modification of their legal status
gave them limited access to critical social spaces often used to secure employment, organize union activity, or socialize with colleagues (Heron, 2003:232). The LCBO was a key actor in the imposition of severe constraints on such persons. In some cases classification even meant the conversion of one's residence from a private to public place, thus removing the requirement of warrants or court orders for police to enter and search (Liquor Control Act. R.S.O. 1927 17 Geo. V. c.257.s.42.(2)). What these strict provisions meant was that classified individuals who wanted to drink illegally were forced into dangerous behaviours including drinking as quickly as possible so as to avoid detection, drinking in public places such as parks and streets (since they could not do so in their homes or in hotels), imbibing alternative substances and obtaining dubious liquor illegally from bootleggers - often at exorbitant prices (Maracle, 1993:44-45). But it didn't end there. These acts were themselves defined both publicly (stereotypically) and categorically as “alcoholic” behaviours and provided means by which individuals and groups were continuously (re)categorized as “alcoholic” by the Board and within society.

Figure C-1. Classification Positive Feedback Loop
When making decisions about interdiction cases, past disciplinary action was a risk factor weighed heavily by the LCBO. Of those individuals investigated for interdiction, 61% had previous disciplinary action while 29% had already been formally interdicted (Interdiction Records of the LLBO. RG 36-13). Here again we can see how previous classification impacted Board perception and thus encouraged the feedback loop of classification convergence.

From the material presented in chapters 4 and 5 it is evident that classification not only shaped how an individual’s actions were perceived, in almost all cases reinforcing statistically generated stereotypical traits of interdicted individuals, thus increasing the impact of classification, and so on; but, over time, the tightness of the classification increased as surveillance technologies helped to construct, both individually through analysis of data, and culturally through the instilling and normalizing of its own social categories, the very situations that they were designed to control.

As argued in chapter 3, for those other than “Indians” interdiction lasted a period of one year. Those who were listed repeatedly, or whose interdiction was automatically renewed annually under the guise of “preventative cancellations,” were repeatedly subjected to the Board’s labeling process. The labeling process unfolded with a listed individual receiving a letter by registered mail outlining the reasons for their interdiction, as well as an explanation of their reduced rights. Similar letters were distributed to local drinking establishments and the local and provincial police forces. Many listed individuals reported that Board letters aroused attention, gossip and effectively spread and reinforced how they were labeled within the community. This
was especially the case in small and rural towns. Generally, the repeated interdiction classification of individuals resulted in reluctant shifts of compliance, in terms of self-identification and self-discipline, towards their given classification.

As discussed in chapter 5 the LCBO’s “Indian” classification was unique in that it was the only category that did not rely on previously observed intemperate acts to determine an individual’s fitness to drink. In other words, such a determination was not based on facts or acts. “Indian” classification was based solely on an individual’s proximity to the prototype of the “Indian” drinker. In this sense, Caucasians could be “Indians” but not vice versa (logically, an "Indian" could not be a non-interdicted Caucasian). Unlike all others on the “Indian”/“Interdicted” list (or commonly, the “drunk list”), listed persons were not sorted due to negative or intemperate activity, but due to possession of the now prototypical characteristics of the “Indian race” and drunkenness.

Since LCBO classification methodology was not bound to the reality of official “Indian” legal status under Canada’s Indian Act (1876), the positive feedback loop of classification not only led to convergence but also promoted prototype formation and development. Fueled by a situation where, through official Board policy, only those who embodied the prototype were classified (since classification methods relied on prototypical elements), and the actions of those who were classified were interpreted through the classification (reinforcing prototypical elements of the category), convergence ran almost without restriction, ever-tightening classified people’s actions and perceptions of those actions within systemically defined roles. The lines between classification and reality were in this manner destroyed. Reality was eventually force-fit to conceptuality.
Although this project is historical, and specific to pre-computer Ontario, the conclusions presented here should not for this reason be considered limited in their application. Conclusions found here present serious concerns around the types of surveillance, social sorts and classification technologies that have proliferated in recent years. Questions as to the possible impacts of sorting and classification performed everyday by credit card companies, the federal government of Canada or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security need not be answered with mere speculation, as historical projects like this one investigate, explicate and document in detail the social consequences of categorical constructions of "risk" populations.

From this study we can take away a much better understanding of how surveillance, classification and social sorting technologies impact individuals and their concepts of identity. While it is accepted that surveillance and social sorting impact life chances and opportunities (Gandy.1993; Los.2004; Lyon.1994) this thesis sought to better understand how and to what extent this occurs. From this research one can definitively state that surveillance, classification and social sorting play an active role in the formation of individual and group identity through its bureaucratic inscription and circulation; that social sorting technologies were significantly advanced in the pre-computer era to be a formative part of everyday social understanding; that the method of classification, in particular prototypical classification, can impact the level and extent of convergence for both individuals and social groups; that panoptic surveillance was understood as an effective control of behaviour by the Ontario business elite of the late 1920's and that legally supported bureaucratic racial/racist policy coupled with surveillance, classification and social sorting technologies can greatly impact the widespread perception and life chances of large populations.
Work Cited

References to all archival sources of LCBO and select Provincial documents are given in the body of the essay and notes.


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