

LAKEHEAD UNIVERSITY

**THIS LITTLE PIGGY GOES TO MARKET:  
THE ONTARIO HOG PRODUCERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
CONTROLLED MARKETING**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY

ROB ROMBOUTS

THUNDER BAY, ONTARIO  
AUGUST 2007



Library and  
Archives Canada

Published Heritage  
Branch

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque et  
Archives Canada

Direction du  
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file* *Votre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-42173-4*  
*Our file* *Notre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-42173-4*

**NOTICE:**

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

**AVIS:**

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

---

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

  
**Canada**

## Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . .	2
List of Abbreviations . . . . .	4
Introduction . . . . .	5
Chapter One	
Historiography . . . . .	14
Chapter Two	
Building the Farmers' Movement. . . . .	22
Chapter Three	
Towards Control of Marketing. . . . .	52
Chapter Four	
Developing the Hog Board. . . . .	74
Chapter Five	
This Little Piggy Goes to Court . . . . .	96
Conclusion	
The Lasting Impact of the Hog Producers. . . . .	113
Bibliography. . . . .	120

## Acknowledgments

A substantial amount of time and energy went into developing this thesis, and it did not all come from me. In this process, I have relied on a number of people for support and guidance.

I would initially like to thank the countless farmers who worked hard to improve their situation, and the situations of their fellow farmers, by organizing pools, co-operatives and marketing organizations, or even by continuing to till the land, after all hope seemed lost. Their hard work and dedication inspired this study.

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Ernie Epp, for his guidance in this project. His experience and knowledge of Canadian history served as an invaluable resource as I embarked on this adventure.

Likewise, I must thank Dr. Kristin Burnett and Dr. Catherine Wilson who served as reviewers for my thesis. Their suggestions helped make my arguments stronger and allowed me to develop a clearer focus.

Thanks to the faculty and staff of Lakehead's history department, especially Ada Blanshard, who made sure my thesis got to me when it needed to, Dr. Bruce Strang and Professor Victor Smith for encouraging me to pursue the master's degree, and Dr. Ron Harpelle for helping resolve the difficulties that arose during the process.

Bruce Dodds, president of the Ontario Farmers' Union History Project, was the person responsible for setting me on this track when I contacted him, way back in September 2005. I had various ideas for research before that point, but my conversations with Bruce sent me in this direction, and I thank him for that.

I owe the staff of the Ontario Pork Producers a note of thanks, especially Susan Bentham and Brooke Hutchison, for providing me with archival material from their corporate records.

The staff at the University of Guelph Archives helped as I spent countless hours going through letters and news clippings, gathering information about those involved in developing the hog producers' boards.

Special thanks to Kevin Jackson for giving me a place to stay, and a ride into school everyday, while I was researching in Guelph. The research would have been much more difficult, and more expensive, if I had not enjoyed his hospitality.

Thanks to my friends and colleagues in the History Department at Lakehead University who provided much needed reprieve from my work, even if they did not think I was getting enough done.

I would not have been able to complete this project if I had not received funding through Lakehead University and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship fund, so I send my appreciation to the appropriate bodies.

Most of all, I would like to thank those people closest to me. My family, especially my parents, said they would support me in whatever I decided to do in my life, and they did not waver in that support.

And of course, I would like to thank my fiancé, Jennifer Cudmore. Before I started writing, I told her I would probably talk her ear off about hogs and hog marketing. Through it all, she listened to me talk and provided a sounding board for ideas, and even helped me collect resources at the eleventh hour.

Thank you to all who made this possible.

## List of Abbreviations

CCF	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CPR	Canadian Pacific Railway
CWB	Canadian Wheat Board
COPACO	First Co-operative Packers of Ontario
FAME	Farmer's Allied Meat Enterprises
GGGC	Grain Growers' Grain Company
HPA	Hog Producers' Association
MGGA	Manitoba Grain Growers' Association
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
MPP	Member of Provincial Parliament
NDP	New Democratic Party
ODA	Ontario Department of Agriculture
OFA	Ontario Federation of Agriculture
OHPA	Ontario Hog Producers Association
OHPMB	Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board
OHPC	Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative
SCEC	Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, Limited
TGGA	Territorial Grain Growers' Association
UFA	United Farmers of Alberta
UFCC	United Farmers' Co-operative Company Limited
UFC (SS)	United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section)
UFM	United Farmers of Manitoba
UFO	United Farmers of Ontario
UGG	United Grain Growers Limited

ULS United Livestock Sales Limited

## Introduction

Imagine being a wheat farmer, working against unpredictable forces to produce grain for the commercial market. You wonder if the weather will co-operate to provide you with good planting, growing and harvesting conditions, and enable you to pay enough to the bank to ensure that it will not foreclose on your account and force you to lose everything. You take your grain to the elevator, located many miles away, to accept whatever price the grain company will pay you. Or imagine being a hog farmer, dealing with similarly harsh conditions, unsure as to whether your herd may be wiped out by disease and fearful the domestic or international market may turn against your product. As you send your hogs to market, you, and thousands of farmers like you, are forced to accept the price offered by the few meat-packing companies that dominate the market. These are the very problems Canadian farmers faced throughout much of their history. What options did farmers have? Urban workers could unionize and negotiate with management, but with what management were farmers to negotiate? And how would you bring all the farmers together around one goal, if they, unlike factory workers, did not congregate daily in one place? Canadian farmers experimented with several different methods of dealing with these problems, from becoming actively involved in politics to establishing voluntary co-operatives and finally, through lobbying the federal and provincial governments to create compulsory marketing boards, akin to workers unions. Some of these attempts were successful, while others resulted in failure and disappointment for farmers.



Between 1960 and 1965, thousands of Ontario farmers invested money in the Farmers' Allied Meat Enterprises, with some farmers staking their entire life savings on the project. Farmers' Allied Meat Enterprises, or FAME as those in Ontario came to know it, was an attempt by hog farmers to build a co-operative meat packing plant in Ontario. These adventurous and industrious farmers hoped to break into the meat packing industry, viewed as a sure-fire way to make a profit. In so doing, the farmers hoped to increase the price corporate meat packers paid for the hogs produced by Ontario farmers. The establishment of FAME was one more attempt by Canadian farmers to improve their position in society, a position which they felt had been weakening since the late nineteenth century, when the Canadian economy began to move towards a more commercial and industrial focus. As the relative size of the farm population and the importance of agriculture in Canada began to decline, farmers turned to various methods of organization in order to maintain or improve their position in a changing society.

The earliest agricultural organizations defending the rights of farmers originated in the United States and entered Ontario in the 1870s. In the 1880s, home-grown agricultural organizations interested in reducing tariffs which were seen as harmful to Canadian agriculture developed on the Prairies.<sup>1</sup> Over the next century, Canadian agricultural organizations took a number of forms, including social groups, political parties, commercial co-operatives and marketing organizations. While most farmers' groups focused on affecting government policy, others strictly forbade any sort of political activity. Some farm organizations believed direct political pressure was necessary and tried to elect representatives, with the high point of this direct political

---

<sup>1</sup> Vernon C. Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy, The Historical Pattern* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 259-262.

activity occurring in the early 1920s. The first half of the 1920s saw the rise of farmer groups across the country: a Farmer-Labour government was elected in Ontario in 1919 and The United Farmers of Alberta in 1921 was elected in Alberta. The National Progressive Party achieved success on the federal scene in the 1921 general election. Farm organizations experimented with various commercial enterprises as well. The early Order of the Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange, focused on direct purchasing in bulk from manufacturers which lowered the prices farmers paid for their goods. Numerous farm organizations attempted to form co-operatives or similar companies. However, most of these commercial endeavours failed, with notable exceptions being the United Grain Growers Limited and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company.

Another major focus for farmers' organizations centred on attempts by farmers to increase the price of their products by controlling the marketing of their products. Once again, this took many forms. Voluntary marketing co-operatives were organized by fruit growers as early as 1913 in the Okanagan Valley, British Columbia.<sup>2</sup> The three prairie wheat pools formed by 1924, sold their wheat through the Canadian Co-operative Wheat Pools Limited. Membership in the pools was based on voluntary involvement and the membership drives met with great success. While pool members opposed the idea of mandatory involvement in the pool, pressure to create a compulsory pool remained.<sup>3</sup>

The financial failure of the wheat pools and their subsequent take-over by the federal government in the early 1930s was clear evidence for many that such

---

<sup>2</sup> W.M. Drummond, 'The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards', 246 in *The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings*, eds John J. Deutsch, Burton S. Keirstead, Kari Levitt and Robert M. Will (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), 246-256.

<sup>3</sup> Garry Lawrence Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984), 42. At various times, through 1927-1929, members of the wheat pool rejected the idea of compulsory pooling, 77.

organizations could only be successful if involvement was compulsory. If membership was allowed on a voluntary nature, farmers could sell outside of the pool or marketing organization if better prices were offered elsewhere, which would in turn eliminate the possible bargaining advantages created by pooling products. In 1935, the Bennett government created the Canadian Wheat Board as a replacement for the Wheat Pools. On 27 September 1943, Ottawa ordered an end to the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, thus giving the Wheat Board a monopoly of grain sales.<sup>4</sup> These developments significantly changed the methods through which farm organizations could operate. Other federal legislation showed that this protection was not just available for wheat farmers. The *Natural Products Marketing Act*, passed by Parliament in 1934, allowed the development of marketing schemes for specific agricultural products, if the main market of these products was outside the province of their production.<sup>5</sup> The federal government was careful to limit the authority of this act so it did not impose on provincial control over natural resources. After the passage of this act, producers of various agricultural commodities across the country created marketing boards for their products. When the Supreme Court of Canada declared the *Natural Products Marketing Act ultra vires* in 1936, or beyond the authority of the Federal Parliament, provincial governments enacted their own marketing legislation to save the marketing schemes farmers had created. In Ontario, this took the form of the *Ontario Farm Products Control Act*, passed in 1937, later amended and renamed the *Farm Products Marketing Act* in 1946. This legislation allowed the creation of monopolistic marketing organizations controlled by producers, intended to counteract the monopolistic practices of food processors and retailing organizations that

---

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 151.

many farmers viewed as a far too common occurrence in the supposed “free-market”. To opponents of the act, the *Farm Products Marketing Act* “represented a major retreat from the principles of free-market economics.”<sup>6</sup>

Ontario hog producers first began to organize under the *Farm Products Marketing Act* in 1941. The Ontario Hog Producers Association (OHPA) organized in order to maintain the rights and economic position of hog producers during the war.<sup>7</sup> The organization of the OHPA led to the development of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (OHPMB), the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative (OHPC), and the Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises (FAME). These projects were all part of an ambitious plan for hog farmers to control where their products were sold, be it in open-yards or directly to processors, and to achieve some control over the market and the prices they received for their goods. The OHPMB was the first example of ‘single desk selling’ of livestock in Ontario, or one organization controlling and co-ordinating the sale of a particular type of good. The OHPMB was thus the first example in Ontario of commodity producers working together to set the price of their goods.

As the first of its type, the development of the OHPMB reflected the many problems inherent in organizing that type of marketing board, as it moved from being a voluntary to a compulsory organization.<sup>8</sup> The individuals who organized the OHPMB faced considerable resistance from the government. For example, in October 1955 Ontario’s Conservative Premier, Leslie Frost, asked the Supreme Court of Ontario to rule

---

<sup>5</sup> T.G. Norris, W.C. Hopper and R.A. Mack, ‘The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,’ *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1, no. 3 (August 1935): 466.

<sup>6</sup> K.J. Rea, *The Prosperous Years: The Economic History of Ontario, 1939-1975* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 139.

<sup>7</sup> Wilfred L. Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops: A History of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board* (London, ON: Phelps Publishing Co, 1977), 3.

<sup>8</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 140.

on the validity of the *Farm Products Control Act*, with the court eventually ruling the act valid.<sup>9</sup> The fact that the OHPMB organized livestock producers presented problems of its own. While grain growers could potentially pool their crop and hold it from market, livestock producers would have to sell their animals when they were ready for market or risk seeing the quality of the animals deteriorate. The OHPMB also met with considerable opposition from the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board, the private packing companies, and groups of dissident hog producers.<sup>10</sup> It was due to the hard work of devoted individuals that the hog producers persevered and were successful. The establishment of the OHPMB enabled producers of other commodities to create their own marketing boards. The establishment of the single-desk changed farm organizations forever because the marketing legislation seriously affected attempts to create co-operatives. Co-operatives were significantly weakened, as members could no longer ensure their livestock would arrive at the co-operative owned packing plant, and the supply of products to the plants became threatened, as displayed by the eventual failure of FAME and other meat-packing plants, including the First Co-operative Packers of Barrie, or COPACO.

By the 1960s, it was clear co-operatives were not successful in their attempts to affect farm prices because of their voluntary nature.<sup>11</sup> Compulsory marketing schemes became the primary hope for farmers in the battle to improve their situation in society. Marketing boards differed significantly from previous attempts at agricultural organization because the boards focused strictly on economics, controlling market supply, and did not attempt to influence political parties. The marketing boards were not

---

<sup>9</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 91.

<sup>10</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 140.

political bodies, like the Grange, but nor were they voluntary organizations. Instead, marketing boards relied on the provincial governments to enforce compulsory participation. Farm leaders realized the non-agrarian population demographically outnumbered them. Since they could not rely on the political good-will of the entire Canadian population, or the voluntary involvement of the farm population, farm leaders believed compulsory involvement was necessary in order to maintain their position in society and the economy. Farmers needed to work together to achieve their goals. Since past events had shown that farmers would not always come together, the leaders of the farm movements relied on the authority granted to them by the law to enforce unity among producers.

Currently, the Harper Conservative government is questioning the monopoly selling power of the Canadian Wheat Board. Western farmers recently voted to end the Board's monopoly power over barley and then Federal Agriculture Minister Chuck Strahl further stated that monopoly control over wheat will be put to plebiscite in the near future. The Ontario Pork Producers are facing renewed challenges from many of their producer members, who are calling for the dismantling of the Marketing Board while other members are calling for an extension of the board's powers. Meanwhile, a group of Ontario livestock growers hope to create a better situation for farm families and struggle to continue operation of their co-operative meat packing plant. These are just a few of the situations currently facing farmers' organizations, which are all too reminiscent of difficulties faced by farmers and their organizations in the past. In light of the challenges facing farmers now, an investigation of the history of these compulsory marketing boards is very important.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 146.

This study begins with an examination of early attitudes towards agriculture. As the socio-economic make-up of the nation changed, and as the government's attitude towards farming shifted, so too did the methods the farmers used to organize. Before studying the Ontario hog producers groups the paper examines the organizational efforts of Canadian farmers preceding the development of marketing boards. This includes a look at organizational work that occurred in Ontario and in the Prairie provinces, from the establishment of farmers' grain companies, and various political movements and farmers' political parties, such as the Progressives and the United Farmers, the wheat pools, and the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board in 1935. The chapter then examines other forms of farm organizations, with some recognition of different co-operative and agricultural movements during the inter-war years. Successive chapters focus on the development of the Ontario Hog Producers Association and the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board, and consider the legal ramifications of central selling. The final chapter examines the FAME story and the state of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Boards until 1965, with a look at the position of other marketing boards in Ontario.

As the position of the farmer within Canadian society changed, so did the efforts of Canadian farmers to maintain their position in the economy. From voluntary organizations to government-enforced compulsory boards, farmers experimented with various kinds of organizations. While there was often opposition to agricultural organizations, strong leadership, such as that in the hog producers' movement, brought farmers together to work for common goal and create organizations that improve the situation of all farmers. The leaders of these organizations often saw the world as being

opposed to farmers, and this view encouraged the development of further organizations based on poorly thought out ideals and models. The failure of these organizations and the view of the public towards these organizations often ended up undermining the strength and unity of the farmers' movements. The challenges faced by the Hog Producers Association were reflective of the challenges faced by numerous farm organizations, as detractors from within and without challenged them. Still, the leaders continued the struggle to ensure that they would improve society for themselves, their peers, and future generations of farmers.

The development of marketing boards marked a significant change in the agricultural landscape. No longer did organizations have to rely upon individual farmers to volunteer. Farmers, like workers, could be compelled to join unions, bringing together all individuals of a particular interest to fight for a common good. Farmers, like workers, had to fight large corporate interests in order to achieve a fair value for their labour. While not all farmers were interested in maintaining membership, proponents of marketing boards successfully faced serious legal challenges. The work of the Hog Producers in Ontario set the limits other marketing boards operated under. The Hog Producers helped dispel the notion that livestock producers could not be organized like other farmers. The Hog Producers of Ontario were also the first to establish a central selling agency, a step that played a major role in the development of supply management groups. Farmers are often characterized as being opposed to organized labour and conservative in nature, but the story of farmers' co-operatives and the hog producers' associations suggests otherwise.



## Chapter One: Historiography

There is an extensive body of literature regarding the place of agriculture in Canadian history. The subjects of these works vary. Some examine farming as one of the 'staples' of the early Canadian economy, others focus on agriculture's role in the development of the nation and industry, and others investigate the place of specific groups in Canada's agricultural economy and the strategies such people employed to address their concerns. This thesis speaks to several themes in the historiography of agriculture. First, although agricultural production was and continues to be a major force in the economy, there is a vast body of work which focuses on the decline of agriculture, particularly in Ontario, during the twentieth century. Secondly, historians have paid a great deal of attention to the many experiments farmers have performed in regards to political participation. Indeed, there are numerous histories which examine farmer forays into the political arena. And finally, historians have effectively traced the development of agricultural co-operatives and marketing agencies, focusing on what inspired farmers to take co-operative action, and examining how successful these endeavours were. This study builds on such works by looking at the post World War Two period, the use of marketing boards, and shifting attention from the wheat economy of the Prairie West to mixed-agriculture in Ontario.

Few people regard agriculture as an important industry in Ontario. Indeed, popular perception places the Prairie Provinces at the centre of Canadian agriculture, and thus, much of the literature about agriculture in Canada has focused on the West. Nevertheless, agriculture has played a significant role in Ontario's development and many histories address the importance of farming in the province during the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries. In his survey history, *Ontario Since 1867*, Joseph Schull offers a classic account of how historians view the state of agriculture in Ontario. Schull suggests farming was important during the early period of Ontario history, particularly because farming drew immigrants to the region and encouraged sustained settlement. However, farming was later overshadowed during the interwar period by the growth of other industries such as mining and manufacturing.<sup>1</sup> A condition Schull argues persisted into the post-War period. W.R. Young suggests this numerical decline was occurring as early as the 1910s and caused considerable concern for the farm population in an earlier era.<sup>2</sup> Marvin McInnis and Douglas McCalla argue that even though Ontario was industrializing, and farmers became outnumbered by urban dwellers, agriculture remained an important part of the provincial economy.<sup>3</sup> Schull's view is supported by the research of other academics, such as W.M. Drummond and Lloyd Reeds, whose works look at the post-war era.<sup>4</sup> Drummond and Reeds suggest Ontario's rural population declined after the Second World War due to the availability of better paying jobs in urban

---

<sup>1</sup> Joseph Schull, *Ontario Since 1867*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> W.R. Young, 'Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19,' *Canadian Historical Review* 53, no. 3 (September 1972), 289-320.

<sup>3</sup> Douglas McCalla, *Planting the Province: The Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); R. Marvin McInnis, *Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture – 1815-1930*, (Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1992).

<sup>4</sup> W.M. Drummond, 'The Impact of the Post-War Industrial Expansion on Ontario's Agriculture,' *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 24, no. 1 (Feb 1958) 84-92; Lloyd G. Reeds, 'Agricultural Regions of Southern Ontario 1880 and 1951,' *Economic Geography* 34, no. 3 (July 1959): 219-27; Ian M. Drummond, with Peter George, Kris Inwood, Peter W. Sinclair and Tom Traves, *Progress Without Planning: The Economic of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); William L. Marr, 'The Wheat Economy in Reverse: Ontario's Wheat Production, 1887-1917,' *The Canadian Journal of Economics* 14, no. 1 (February 1981): K.J. Rea, *The Prosperous Years: The Economic History of Ontario, 1939-1975* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); G. Elmore Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, Volume 2, (Toronto: Saunders, 1970); Escott Reid, 'The Effect of the Depression on Canadian Politics, 1929-32,' *The American Political Science Review* 27 no. 3 (June 1933); 455-465. J.W. Watson, 'Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 37, no. 3 (September 1947) 145-54; Dennis H. Wrong, 'Ontario Provincial Elections, 1934-55: A Preliminary Survey of Voting,' *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 23, no. 3 (Aug 1957): 395-403; Wrong, 'The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada,' *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (Summer, 1957) 252-64.

areas, and a more general shift in Ontario's economy away from primary industries, such as farming, to manufacturing.

The decline of agriculture, in economic and demographic terms, in Ontario is a popular theme among historians, but it is not entirely accurate. While the relative economic position of agriculture declined in the face of industrial expansion, a significant portion of the province's population continued to rely on agriculture for employment in the post-war era. Agriculture remained a valuable enough industry in Ontario's economy that farmers were able to force governments to create and maintain marketing boards. This study builds on the foundation of earlier works by re-examining agriculture's declining position in Ontario and considering actions taken by hog producers to address their precarious economic situation. Unlike many of the works dealing with agriculture in Ontario, this study goes beyond the Second World War, and argues agriculture remained an important industry in Ontario. Farmers played a major role in changing provincial laws, inspiring action among other Canadian farmers, and did not seek to acquire political power for themselves. While other histories argue agriculture's importance in the Ontario economy deteriorated, in the face of industrialization, this works suggests otherwise.

Canadian farmers experimented with direct political action many times during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Farmers across Ontario elected representatives of farmer's movements, with mixed results. Historians note the political participation of farmers met with limited success. Scholars such as Charles Johnston and Margaret Kechnie suggest internal divisions seriously undermined the grassroots support

of the farmers' government, especially the Drury Farmer-Labour government in Ontario.<sup>5</sup> Their works argue the United Farmers lacked political experience, thus dooming Drury's government to failure. Historians also suggest farmers' participation in politics seriously eroded the social, educational, and economic elements of the entire farm movement in Ontario because the attention of farmers was drawn away from those issues unique to agriculture. These histories reflect the general pattern established by academics investigating the foray of farmers into politics across Canada.<sup>6</sup> This pattern, however, places too much responsibility on the elected representatives and ignores other factors which undermined the farmer-politicians.

This work accepts the idea that political inexperience caused difficulties for farm governments, that the political decisions made by elected representatives damaged farmers' organizations, and farmers' political power was short-lived because public support for farmers quickly evaporated when they did not use their power "effectively." However, this study does not place the failure of the political movement squarely on the elected officials. It looks at other factors that played an important role in weakening the political position of farmers. Demographics played a significant part in the downfall of the Drury government. Even if the Drury government had possessed political experience,

---

<sup>5</sup> Charles M. Johnston, *E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Margaret Kechnie, 'The United Farm Women of Ontario: Developing a Political Consciousness,' *Ontario History* 77, no. 4 (December 1985): 267-80.

<sup>6</sup> James E. Boyle, 'The Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,' *The American Economic Review* 8, no. 3 (September 1918): 505-21; William Irvine, *The Farmer in Politics* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); John A. Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); S.M. Lipset, 'The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,' *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 13, no. 3 (August 1947): 410-28; William Lewis Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); R.S. Pennefather, 'The Orange Order and the United Farmers of Ontario 1919-1923,' *Ontario History* 69, no. 3 (1977): 169-84; Bradford James Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy: The United Farmers and Farm Women of Alberta, 1909-1921* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Paul F. Sharp, *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948); Brian

it would have faced difficulty in maintaining power due to the precarious balance of seats in the legislature. Even by the 1920s, the growing urban population nearly outnumbered the rural population in the province and farmers could not expect to elect enough representatives to form a majority government. This work rejects the idea that the lack of success experienced by farmers in politics destroyed the groups' movement. Rather, farmers were inspired by their failure in politics to investigate other avenues to improve their situation within society and the economy. This work recounts some of the techniques used by farmers, such as co-operative agencies and marketing boards.

Farmers' movements took on many forms outside of the political arena, including the formation of social groups, experimenting with commodity pools, voluntary co-operative organizations, and the establishment of government supported marketing boards. A significant body of literature looks at the development of Canadian agricultural organizations. However, most of these works, including the work of Garry Lawrence Fairbairn, focus on specific boards and organizations in western Canada.<sup>7</sup> Fairbairn looks at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, one of the longest surviving agricultural co-operatives. One of the conclusions Fairbairn draws is that Pools failed to survive, largely because of their voluntary nature. Many of the other academics writing about specific marketing groups agree with Fairbairn's thesis. Additionally, the vast majority of this literature concentrates on Western organizations, especially wheat pools and the Canadian Wheat Board.<sup>8</sup> Those works which look at co-operatives that do not focus on wheat tend to be

---

Tennyson, 'The Ontario General Election of 1919: The Beginnings of Agrarian Revolt,' *Journal of Canadian Studies* 4, no. 1 (1969): 26-36.

<sup>7</sup> Garry Lawrence Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984).

<sup>8</sup> Walter P. Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada* (Ottawa: Graphics Publishers Limited, 1927); ; Robert Irwin, "'The Better Sense of the Farm Population": The Partridge Plan and Grain Marketing in Saskatchewan,' *Prairie Forum* 18 no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-52; Harald S. Patton, *Grain Growers'*

written by supporters and former members of the organizations in question. For example, Wilfred Bishop, secretary for the Ontario hog producers, wrote the groups' official history.<sup>9</sup>

Other historians examine the development of marketing boards as a revolutionary idea or moment in time.<sup>10</sup> Ian MacPherson investigates why farmers abandoned co-operatives and turned towards government mandated marketing boards. He argues the acceptance of marketing boards represented a recognition by farmers that they could not transform the economic structures which produced their problems, but had to work within the established system. MacPherson also suggests the development of marketing boards was inevitable because co-operatives failed to maintain their membership.<sup>11</sup> By

---

*Coöperation in Western Canada*, (reprint of 1928 edi. New York: AMS Press, 1969); Patton, 'The Market Influence of the Canadian Wheat Pool,' *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 24, no. 165 (March 1929): 210-18; Patton, 'The Canadian Grain Pool,' *Pacific Affairs* 3, no. 2 (February 1930): 165-80; Patton, 'Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,' *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 3, no. 2 (May 1937): 218-33.

<sup>9</sup> Wilfred L. Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops: A History of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board* (London, ON: Phelps Publishing Co, 1977).

<sup>10</sup> Kerry Badgley, "'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well": Co-operatives and the State in Ontario, 1914 to 1930,' *Canadian Papers in Rural History* 10 (1996): 165-90; Ian M. Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in the White Dominions, with Special Reference to Australia and Canada', in *Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965*, ed D.C.M. Platt and Guido Di Tella (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 194-206; W.M. Drummond, 'The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,' *The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings*, eds. John J. Deutsch, Burton S. Keirstead, Kari Levitt and Robert M. Will (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965): 246-56; Christopher Green, 'Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada: An Economic and Legal Analysis,' *The University of Toronto Law Journal* 33, no. 4 (Autumn, 1983), 407-33; Grace H. Larsen and Henry E. Erdman, 'Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion,' *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 49, no. 2 (September, 1962): 242-68; Mathew O. Tobriner, 'Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade,' *Columbia Law Review* 27, no.7 (Nov 1927): 827-36.

<sup>11</sup> Ian MacPherson, *The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies, 1900-1955* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association Books, 1979); 'An Authoritative Voice: The Reorientation of the Canadian Farmers' Movement, 1935 to 1945,' *Historical Papers* (1979): 164-81; *Each for All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada, 1900-45* (Ottawa: Carleton, 1979); *Building and Protecting the Co-operative Movement: A Brief History of the Co-operative Union of Canada 1909-1984* (Ottawa: Co-operative Union of Canada, 1984); "'Better Tractors for Less Money": The Establishment of Canadian Co-operative Implements Limited,' *Manitoba History* 13, no. 2 (1987): 2-11; 'Missionaries of Rural Development: The Fieldman of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1925-1965,' *Agricultural History* 60, no. 2 (1986): 73-96; 'Creating Stability Amid Degrees of Marginality: Divisions in the Struggle for Orderly Marketing in British Columbia, 1900-1940,' in *Canadian Papers in Rural History*, ed. Donald H. Akenson (Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1990): 309-334; 'Some Fortune and a Little Fame: Co-operatives as Ladders for Upward Mobility in the Canadian West,' *Journal of the West* 43, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 36-43.

examining the decline of co-operatives and the development of stronger boards this work builds on the position established by MacPherson.

This study differs from conventional farming scholarship because it moves away from the geographical focus on the west and wheat to look at co-operatives and marketing boards in Ontario. By drawing connections between the movements in Ontario, the Canadian West, and the rest of the world my work places the actions of Ontario hog producers within a transnational framework. In addition, my research looks at the role of livestock co-operatives in the post-World War Two period, a subject which has not received a great deal of attention. The diversification of the agricultural economy in Ontario has gone relatively unexamined. Hog producers, like the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board, established single-desk selling in Ontario. Farmers rejected co-operatives in favour of marketing boards because government mandated marketing boards clearly wielded more power, making co-operatives nearly unworkable. My work draws heavily upon the work and collected papers of Wilfred Bishop and strives to place it in context with developments in the wider agricultural movement.

This thesis contributes to the history of agriculture in several particular ways. It examines the decline of the rural population in Ontario, the political and economic actions farmers adopted following the shift in Ontario's economy, and the efforts of farmers to retain their economic and social position. By exploring the changing methods employed by farmers this study places the group within broader developments in the economy. This thesis is a significant addition to the study of Canadian agriculture because it provides a much-needed look into the position of Ontario's farming industry after the Second World War. By rejecting the notion that agriculture is of minimal

importance in Ontario, this study shows that even as the total number of farmers declined, they developed strong organizations to protect themselves, and called upon the government to create marketing boards.



## Chapter Two: Building the Farmers' Movement

Farming has represented many different things in Canadian history. Governments used agriculture in the process of nation building, to encourage settlement and to create a physical claim to the land. For many, agriculture was a way of life, allowing them to live off the land and scratch out an existence dependant on no one. By the mid to late nineteenth century, agriculture moved beyond the level of subsistence farming and became a major economic force. As part of a major industry, farmers were concerned with their role in the nation and organized political pressure groups to deal with their changing economic circumstances. These groups were largely ineffective, as farmers found they had little influence on the political direction of the country. As Canada expanded west, the Dominion government encouraged agricultural development of the prairies. During the first few decades of the twentieth century, the farm population and the economic strength of agriculture increased substantially. However, prairie farmers felt that they were not receiving their fair share of the national wealth and that large eastern corporations continued to control agricultural prices. Inspired by these feelings, prairie farmers organized in a variety of ways: from developing their own co-operative companies to forming political parties or lobby groups. As agriculture became a major factor in the Canadian economy, the farmers achieved influence in government policy-making, an unprecedented power for the farmers. The lessons learned from these organization experiments would serve Ontario's hog farmers in the era after the Second World War, as they attempted to develop their organizations.

Before Confederation, state support for agriculture under the French and later the British regime often took the form of agricultural societies which provided information on farming in the North American climate. Much of the support for agriculture took the form of granting free land to settlers. The various colonial and provincial governments did not see agriculture as important in its own right, but instead viewed agriculture as a way of supporting other economic endeavours such as the fur trade. Agriculture provided wheat for settlement in Lower Canada and more than half of the population in the region were employed in agriculture.<sup>1</sup> After Confederation, the position of Canadian farmers changed. As the fur trade ended, the new staples of the Canadian economy became timber and wheat. The Dominion government used agriculture as a way to advance its geographical boundaries. In 1871, agriculture was the major extractive industry in Ontario, but this did not mean that agriculture was the major focus of Ontario or Canada's economy.<sup>2</sup> The government encouraged the wheat trade in order to help manufacturing and capital interests, because farmers were a convenient market for the manufactured goods of Canadian industry. Farmers also required banking services and loans to establish themselves. Many people moved from urban dwellings to farms and the process of "farm making" provided an important market for manufacturing interests.<sup>3</sup>

The Dominion government focused on encouraging more individuals to farm in Canada. Drawing on the experience of the United States, Canadian leaders felt the nation could achieve prosperity through immigration and agricultural settlement.<sup>4</sup> Government

---

<sup>1</sup> McInnis and McCalla provide extensive information on this topic in their works.

<sup>2</sup> Drummond et al, *Progress Without Planning*, 21.

<sup>3</sup> Gordon Darroch, 'Class in nineteenth century, central Canada,' in *Class, Gender and Region: Essays in Canadian Historical Sociology*, ed Gregory S. Kealey (St Johns: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1988), 55; McInnis, *Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture*, 104.

<sup>4</sup> Fowke, *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*, 10.

propaganda produced between 1873 and 1883 intended to encourage immigration emphasized Ontario's role as a wheat-growing and wheat-exporting province.<sup>5</sup> Other propaganda encouraged immigration to the Canadian West, touting the fertility of the soil and targeting immigrants from both the United States and Europe.<sup>6</sup> Early Canadian Ministers of Agriculture concentrated their efforts on encouraging immigration in the hopes that more immigration would improve the agricultural capacity of the province. The focus on agriculture was successful as, between 1851 and 1881, immigration to Ontario's rural regions was greater than it was to Ontario's cities.<sup>7</sup> By the 1870s, agriculture was a major force within the Canadian economy, and the farmers, once separated and distant, were becoming concerned with the political and social situation of the country. In the years immediately following Confederation, Ontario farmers were the lead producers of agricultural goods in Canada. As late as 1891, nearly 53 per cent of Canadian wheat production took place in Ontario.<sup>8</sup> The 1871 Ontario census shows that the agricultural class made up 49 per cent of the province's work force, a figure that did not include the wives or children of farmers.<sup>9</sup> By 1891, this figure had increased slightly to 52 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

As the number and importance of farmers increased, Canadian farmers began organizing into groups free of government interference. As the position of farmers in the economy and society changed, educational organizations connected to the government no longer met the needs of farmers and new organizations run by farmers met with success.

---

<sup>5</sup> Porritt, 'Canada's National Grain Route,' 346.

<sup>6</sup> Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 12.

<sup>7</sup> J.W. Watson, 'Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,' 149.

<sup>8</sup> Marr, 'The Wheat Economy in Reverse,' 136.

<sup>9</sup> Drummond et al, *Progress Without Planning*, 5-6.

<sup>10</sup> Watson, 'Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario,' 150.

The first of these organizations, one which defined all later farm organizations, was the Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange, which came to Canada from the United States in 1872.<sup>11</sup> The Grange initially entered Canada through Quebec, with the first Ontario local organized in 1874 and the first in Manitoba organized in 1876. By 1879, there were over 31,000 members of the Canadian Grange, with 26,000 in Ontario alone, organized into 766 local granges.<sup>12</sup> The Grange operated as a secret society like the Freemasons, but the group allowed only farmers to be members.<sup>13</sup> The Grange, like earlier farmers' groups, encouraged instruction in the art and science of husbandry, the diversification of crops, and ways to make farmlands more self-sustaining. The Grange also hoped to bring producers and consumers closer together.

The organization strictly forbade involvement in politics. Locals could not support candidates, but the Grange encouraged the education of political candidates regarding the needs of farmers. The Grange proposed a number of policies that both provincial and Dominion governments eventually accepted.<sup>14</sup> It was however, difficult for the Grange to remain completely uninvolved in politics and many members campaigned as Independents rather than as representatives of the Grange Order.<sup>15</sup> Since Grange leaders felt farmers were exploited by corporations and middlemen and wanted to assist farmers in avoiding debt, the Grange experimented with commercial endeavours.

---

<sup>11</sup> Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, 259; Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 61; Johnston, *E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist*, 13; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 18; Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 13; Wood also provides a history of the Granges' development in the United States, 22-29; Rawlins suggests that the National Grange of the United States played a major role in almost every change that had occurred to improve agriculture in the United States since its inception, 127.

<sup>12</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 18-20; Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 60.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>14</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 14; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 14; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 82; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 20; Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 45-46;

The group established a number of co-operative stores. The Grange Wholesale Supply Company, established in 1879 and based in Toronto, focused on direct purchasing in bulk from manufacturers.<sup>16</sup> The Grange was also responsible for bringing the co-operative movement to the Prairies. The Grange's encouragement of co-operative purchasing included providing goods for independent buying clubs and establishing co-operative retail stores. The Grange also encouraged the establishment of independent farmers' elevators.<sup>17</sup>

The foray of the Grange into co-operative business ventures paralleled the entrance of farmers into the commercial-capitalist economy, or their efforts to catch up with this economy.<sup>18</sup> Before the commercial-capitalist economy developed, and before farmers were involved in such an economy, there would not have been a need for any commercial organization. Farmers existed at a largely subsistence level, often supplying all they needed, trading their surpluses with other farmers and small artisans. As farmers integrated into the wider economy, their needs increased and their production became more specialized. Increasingly, farmers relied on other larger companies to produce the necessary goods. The farmers' interest in the Grange reflected the desire of farmers to co-operate with each other, in order to meet their shared needs and requirements in a changing world.

The ambitions of the Grange eventually caused the decline in its membership and farmer support. While the group was centrally organized, the expansion of the Grange into commercial enterprises created weakness in the order and aroused opposition from

---

<sup>15</sup> Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 64.

<sup>16</sup> Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, 259; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 14; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 22; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 26.

<sup>17</sup> MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies, 1900-1955,' 3.

people outside of the farm population, including the popular media.<sup>19</sup> Entering into business ventures, many poorly organized, proved to be an area of weakness for the Grange, and when some of the co-operative ventures failed, the popularity of the group declined.<sup>20</sup> The rise of department stores in large towns and cities also significantly weakened the retail co-operatives of the Grange.<sup>21</sup> Some people involved in the Grange suggested it declined due to the unattractive nature of the Grange as a secret society and the fact that the Grange was no longer the only organization educating farmers.<sup>22</sup>

While the fortunes of the Grange were rising and falling, another organization, the Patrons of Industry, entered Canada from the United States. The Patrons of Industry first organized in Port Huron, Michigan in 1887. The first Canadian lodge appeared in Mandaumin, Ontario, near Sarnia in 1889, with lodges quickly following in Lambton, Kent, and Middlesex counties. A separate Canadian organization of the Patrons of Industry formed in February 1891.<sup>23</sup> This organization had many of the same objectives as the Grange, and existed as an independent group for farmers, free from government control. However, the Patrons of Industry varied significantly from the Grange in its support of a strong role for the state, advocating direct group action in politics and an alliance with organized labour.<sup>24</sup> The Patrons of Industry also created a commercial farm organization, establishing co-operatives such as the Binder Twine Company in 1892. Prices of binder twine fell immediately after the establishment of the company, gaining

---

<sup>18</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 14.

<sup>19</sup> Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 63.

<sup>20</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 52.

<sup>21</sup> Schull, *Ontario Since 1867*, 135.

<sup>22</sup> Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 63; Good also suggested that the organization may have been undermined by individuals attempting to use the organization to gain personal power or gain.

<sup>23</sup> Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 110-12; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 82; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 14; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 33.

<sup>24</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 13.; Wood, *History of the Farmers' Movement*, 120.

credit for the company.<sup>25</sup> In the West, the Patrons dealt in agricultural implements, binder twine, and other supplies farmers needed. The Patrons also acted, to a limited extent, as a selling agency for farmers' grain and produce.<sup>26</sup>

The Patrons worked in a variety of ways to publicize the concerns of the agrarian population to the wider society. The Patrons' efforts to advocate for farmers' interests led to the establishment of the *Canada Farmer's Sun*, which became the newspaper for agrarian interests in Ontario.<sup>27</sup> Established in London, Ontario in 1891, the *Farmer's Sun* played an important role in the development of many Ontario farmers' movements, including the Patrons.<sup>28</sup> Publication of the *Farmer's Sun* continued under that name until it was renamed the *Weekly Sun* in 1933.<sup>29</sup> To serve the farmers of the West, the Patrons published the *Patrons' Advocate*, out of Rapid City, Manitoba, in 1891.<sup>30</sup> The Patrons also acted as a political outlet for farmers' frustrations. In a provincial by-election in 1894, a candidate of the Patrons of Industry won the Ontario riding of North Bruce. The following 1894 Ontario General Election saw sixteen Patrons' members elected to the Ontario Legislature.<sup>31</sup>

Farmers supported the Patrons as representatives to address their concerns regarding the changing economy. By this time, the rural vote in Ontario was losing ground to the urban vote. While the rural population still represented nearly 57 per cent of the population, this percentage was dropping quickly.<sup>32</sup> Some politicians, including Ontario Conservative Leader James Pliny Whitney, viewed the Patrons of Industry as a

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 126.

<sup>27</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 16.

<sup>28</sup> Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 65.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>30</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 35.

<sup>31</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 83.

tool of the Liberals.<sup>33</sup> The long held powers of the Liberal party relied largely on the continued support of the farmers. In order to maintain power, Liberal Premier Oliver Mowat hoped to bring the Patrons into the Liberal camp.<sup>34</sup>

The Patrons represented an effort by the farm population to capitalize on the rural vote while it was still significant in the province. The Patrons took a number of rather progressive political stances, including the enfranchisement of women, the abolition of the Senate, tariff reductions on necessary items, and opposition to the CPR monopoly of the grain elevator companies in the West.<sup>35</sup> The Patrons' alliance with organized labour reflected the belief that political oppression by the 'non-producing' rich was responsible for the economic problems of farmers and workers.<sup>36</sup> Despite such 'radical' positions, the Patrons lost a great deal of support because many of these progressive stances did not form the Patrons' official platform. This change in policy upset many of its members.<sup>37</sup> In the provincial legislature, the Patrons did not take a strong stance on issues and few of their motions were considered. Instead, the group engaged in 'sniping operations', making personal attacks, and criticizing other government policy without suggesting viable alternatives, which many voters considered to be a poor use of power.<sup>38</sup>

At its peak in 1895, the Patrons of Industry counted nearly 55,000 members in Canada, with the vast majority of its membership in Ontario and Quebec. The failure of Patrons' MLAs to exercise their political power led to the decline of the Patrons. Like the

---

<sup>32</sup> Schull, *Ontario Since 1867*, 134.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>34</sup> Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 135.

<sup>35</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 35-36; Wilson, *Beyond the Harvest*, 241; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 114.

<sup>36</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 15; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 35

<sup>37</sup> Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 117.



Grange, the Patrons fast popularity was followed by a massive decline in support. Although a number of Patrons contested the 1896 federal general election, voters elected only four Patrons' representatives.<sup>39</sup> By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Patrons had lost their last two seats in the legislature and much of their membership.<sup>40</sup> The political failure of the Patrons discouraged farmers from becoming involved in direct politics.<sup>41</sup> It also undermined the entire Patrons movement, and was responsible for the meteoric decline in membership, respect and interest in the organization.<sup>42</sup> The greatest success of the Patron's project lay in the binder twine company, and was emblematic of the potential of co-operative action.<sup>43</sup>

The Grange and the Patrons of Industry reflected the first major development in agricultural organizing. The Grange and Patrons represented the first of many strategies adopted by Canadian farmers and their organizations to meet the changing economic situation faced by the agrarian population.<sup>44</sup> Farmers joined the Patrons of Industry because they wanted to take an active role in the marketing of their products. Even though the group failed, the intent and interest remained.<sup>45</sup> By 1900, the Grange and the Patrons of Industry had all but disappeared in Canada. In Ontario, the focus of organizing became Farmers' Institutes, which were government-sponsored groups similar

---

<sup>38</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 37; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 142.

<sup>39</sup> Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 68.

<sup>40</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 83.

<sup>41</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 53.

<sup>42</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 83; Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 69; MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies,' 4.

<sup>43</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 15.

<sup>44</sup> MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice: The Reorientation of the Canadian Farmers' Movement, 1935 to 1945', 164-65.

<sup>45</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 10.

to the earlier Farmers' Clubs.<sup>46</sup> Following the collapse of the Patrons of Industry the farmers' movement in Ontario nearly disappeared and thus, was the low point of farmers' movements in Ontario.<sup>47</sup>

### *The Shift from East to West*

While farmers' organizations in Ontario suffered through this nadir, the Canadian West witnessed the development of a strong agrarian movement. Through the last two decades of the nineteenth century, as the Dominion government's efforts to build up the West were realized: the centre of Canada's wheat area shifted from Ontario to the prairies.<sup>48</sup> Manitoba first exported wheat in 1884. The territorial areas, later known as Saskatchewan and Alberta, began exporting wheat in 1892 and 1898 respectively.<sup>49</sup> Even before the territories began exporting wheat, it was apparent that the Prairies had great agricultural potential.<sup>50</sup>

As the wheat economy expanded in the West, agriculture in Ontario continued to diversify. This process had already been underway for quite some time in the province, and as a result of agricultural fairs and the settlement of people from different nationalities livestock rearing, dairying, and market gardening grew in importance.<sup>51</sup> Since prices provided by livestock were more predictable than those provided by wheat, Ontario farmers turned to rearing livestock.<sup>52</sup> As late as 1891, Ontario still contributed nearly 53 per cent of Canadian wheat production. By 1921 this had dropped to just under

---

<sup>46</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 48-49.

<sup>47</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 41; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 147.

<sup>48</sup> McInnis, *Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture*, 113.

<sup>49</sup> Porritt, 'Canada's National Grain Route,' 348-49.

<sup>50</sup> In 1887, the first wheat boom year for the Prairies, Manitoba exported 3,876,000 bushels of wheat. 1887 also saw the organization of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange; *Ibid.*, 350.

<sup>51</sup> McCalla, *Planting the Province*, 88; Reeds, 'Agricultural Regions of Southern Ontario,' 221.

<sup>52</sup> Marr, 'The Wheat Economy in Reverse,' 138.

5 per cent, and farms in Saskatchewan and Alberta provided just over 78 per cent of Canada's wheat.<sup>53</sup> This shift in agricultural production led to the establishment of agricultural organizations in Manitoba throughout the 1890s, including the Farmers' Alliance, the Patrons of Industry and a Farmers' Union in the 1880s. However, significant organization was not achieved on the Prairies until the twentieth century.<sup>54</sup>

As agriculture developed in Western Canada, farmers once again faced the monopoly control of wheat shipping exercised by elevator companies and railways. Prairie wheat farmers felt that the elevator companies were guilty of under-grading, under-weighting, and over-docking wheat shipments.<sup>55</sup> Farmers also believed grain elevators worked together to ensure prices paid to farmers remained low.<sup>56</sup> With a growing farm population and the development of the wheat economy in the West, it was difficult for governments to ignore the worries of farmers. Several members of the Liberal government expressed concerns regarding the monopoly situation. The Minister of Railways and Canals was questioned about existing agreements between elevator companies and the Canadian Pacific Railway, whereby the Railway would only accept grain from elevator companies and not farmers, thus allowing a monopoly.<sup>57</sup> Other MPs questioned the protection provided to industry, including the tariff protection on

---

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>54</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 26; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 124-25.

<sup>55</sup> Under-grading involved telling farmers that their wheat was a lower grade than it actually was and selling the wheat at a higher grade. Under-weighting involved tampering with the scales to show less wheat than was actually present. Over-docking involved telling the farmer that more grain was lost during transport than actually was.

<sup>56</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 2; *Grain Growers Record*, 2; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 45.

<sup>57</sup> On 11 February 1898, Mr R.L. Richardson MP for Lisgar, and member of the Liberal Party, asked the Minister of Railways and Canals Andrew George Blair, this and also questioned whether such a deal would be contrary to the *General Railway Act*. Minister Blair responded that he was not aware of any such agreement but agreed that it would be contrary to section 246 of the Railway Act. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 11 February 1898, 439.

agricultural implements.<sup>58</sup> Such actions had little impact because these questions were often attempts to attack the government on agricultural issues in order to gain support for their own party.

There were, however, some concessions made by the government to respond to the complaints of farmers. In 1898, Liberal James M. Douglas, M.P. for East Assiniboia, introduced a bill in the House of Commons regarding the transportation of grain in Manitoba and the Northwest Territories and, in 1899 the Laurier Liberal government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate grain marketing in the West. Douglas believed this motion was necessary because many farmers had come to question the state of the grain trade. He further suggested that secret arrangements between the big elevator companies and the CP Railway had cost farmers and the smaller grain dealers of Manitoba nearly \$1,000,000 in one year.<sup>59</sup> The Royal Commission found that a complete and unregulated monopoly did exist in the Canadian grain trade, and in 1900 the Dominion Parliament passed the *Manitoba Grain Act* to regulate the trade.<sup>60</sup> This Act created the position of Warehouse Commissioner, to oversee and supervise the grain trade.<sup>61</sup> In order to break the monopoly of the elevator companies, the Act also forced the railway to allow farmers to use loading platforms as opposed to elevators.<sup>62</sup> The Royal Commission, the *Manitoba Grain Act*, and the subsequent actions by the Dominion

---

<sup>58</sup> 30 March 1898, Mr. N.F. Davin MP for West Assiniboia, of the Liberal-Conservative party motioned for agricultural implements to be added to the free list. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 30 March 1898, 2825-26, 3170. While stating that this was for the sake of the people of the North West Territories, it seems Davin was attempting to use the motion to attack the government more than as a means to support the farmers, citing previous promises made by the Liberals that they failed to follow through on.

<sup>59</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, February, March 1898, 450, 2059-60, 2081.

<sup>60</sup> Boyle, 'Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,' 507-8; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 3; MacGibbon, 'Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,' 227.

<sup>61</sup> Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, 245.

government reflected the growing importance of agriculture.<sup>63</sup> While this reflected the importance of agriculture in the Canadian economy, Fowke suggests the Dominion government established the Royal Commission to ensure agriculture would continue to expand and the national policy would come to full fruition.<sup>64</sup> Whatever the reasons for the appointment of the commission, the end of the nineteenth century was a period when the Dominion government, under pressure from farmers, worked to assist agriculture against corporate interests.

While the Dominion government provided some protection current political farmers were not entirely willing to trust their prosperity to the solicitude of other parties. Prairie farmers were dissatisfied with the failure of the railway companies to adhere to the *Manitoba Grain Act*, and a group organized to force the Canadian Pacific Railway to provide loading platforms for wheat.<sup>65</sup> On 18 December 1901, a group of farmers met at Indian Head, Northwest Territories, to organize the Territorial Grain Growers' Association (TGGA). W.R. Motherwell was elected Chair. In what became known as the 'Sintaluta Test Case' the TGGA took the CPR to court for violating the *Manitoba Grain Act* by favouring elevator companies when distributing rail cars. The TGGA won and railway companies were forced to follow government regulations. The success of the 'Sintaluta Test Case' brought much attention to the farmers' cause and showed, if they acted together, farmers could have real power.<sup>66</sup> Following the Sintaluta Test Case,

---

<sup>62</sup> Boyle, 'Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,' 508.

<sup>63</sup> Between 1899 and 1939, the Dominion government appointed seven commissions to investigate the western grain trade and the Prairie provinces also appointed numerous commissions, with Saskatchewan investigating agricultural problems over twenty times between 1905 and 1945; see Fowke, 'Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy,' 166-67.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 167-68.

<sup>65</sup> Lipset, 'The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,' 410.

<sup>66</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 48.

membership in the TGGA boomed, and led to the organization of the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association (MGGA), in 1903, with J.W. Scallion as President.<sup>67</sup>

As most of the early farmers on the Prairies came from Ontario or the United States, many of the early leaders of the Prairie farm movement brought experience from other farmers' movements, such as the Grange, to the Prairies.<sup>68</sup> The TGGA initially focused on lobbying and educational activities, with the intention of being non-partisan, non-political, and non-trading, but the members became increasingly concerned about how the major grain companies and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange controlled the sale of Prairie grain.

The farmers' movement in Alberta did not develop in as unified a manner as the organizations elsewhere on the Prairies. Due to the mixed agriculture that dominated Alberta, the Territorial Grain Growers' Association did not take hold in Alberta as strongly as it did on the rest of the Prairies.<sup>69</sup> A number of farmers' organizations sought the support of Alberta's farmers, but by 1908 one farmers group, with the official title of the United Farmers of Alberta – Our Motto Equity, had become dominant.<sup>70</sup> The new group co-ordinated with other Grain Growers' Associations, ensuring that while the UFA defended the rights of all Albertan farmers and not just grain growers, the UFA was part

---

<sup>67</sup> Boyle, 'Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,' 508; Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, 246; *Grain Growers' Record*, 4; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 46; Wilson, *Beyond the Harvest*, 241.

<sup>68</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers' Coöperation in Western Canada*, 375; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 33.

<sup>69</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 20.

<sup>70</sup> This name was a compromise and reflected the two groups that came together to form the UFA, the Society of Equity and the Alberta Farmers' Association. The Society of Equity, originally the American Society of Equity, could not draw much support due to fear of influence from the US, but the Alberta Farmers' Association, originally a local of the TGGA, was not popular enough to eliminate the Society of Equity. After realizing that it did not benefit farmers for the groups to be fighting, the organizations formed a united group. For more information on the early farmers' movements in Alberta, see Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 115; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 23-24; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 34; and Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 199-200.

of the wider prairie farm movement.<sup>71</sup> Unlike the Grain Growers' Associations, the farm groups in Alberta focused on broader agricultural problems, including efforts to improve hog marketing in Alberta. The Alberta organizations worked together to obtain the appointment of a provincial commission to consider the establishment of a government pork-packing plant and to lessen dependence on the 'packing monopoly.'<sup>72</sup> The Alberta farmers' movement developed more slowly than the Grain Growers' Associations but it ensured the UFA would represent the concerns of all farmers in Alberta, and not just grain growers.

The TGGA was very suspicious of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. As a result, in 1904 the TGGA appointed E.A. Partridge to investigate the workings of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. Partridge had difficulty obtaining any information regarding the grain trade, and advocated farmers form their own grain company in order to reform grain marketing.<sup>73</sup> When Sintaluta area farmers organized the Grain Growers' Grain Company (GGGC) in 1906, they decided that all shareholders would be farmers, no shareholder could hold more than four shares, and no shareholder could have more than one vote.<sup>74</sup> While Partridge requested the Grain Growers' Associations endorse the plans of the Grain Growers' Grain Company, the company was never officially connected to the GGA. Such a relationship would have caused questions and created problems regarding control of the company. Separate organizations allowed both the GGGC and the Associations to act freely without undue interference from the other organization.<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>71</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 37.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 23; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 201.

<sup>73</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 44.

<sup>74</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 5; MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies, 1900-1955', 5; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 45.

<sup>75</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 47.

The company faced some difficulties in its first year but, by September 1906, the GGGC began operations in a one-room office in Winnipeg.<sup>76</sup> The Company handled its first carload of grain on 21 September 1906 and, by the middle of October, the company was handling almost one hundred carloads a week.<sup>77</sup> It appeared the GGGC would be successful, but the development of the company did not progress as smoothly as the farmers hoped.<sup>78</sup> Following the battle to obtain a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, the GGGC had to abandon any plans to offer patronage dividends, effectively destroying any hope of the GGGC's acting as a co-operative.<sup>79</sup> The farmers still hoped to use the GGGC as a commission agent, thereby reducing the rate of profit the private grain marketing companies were making on farmers' products.<sup>80</sup> Despite the difficulties of its first year, the GGGC handled 2,500,000 bushels of grain and made a net profit of \$790.<sup>81</sup> In its second year of operation, the GGGC achieved a profit of \$40,190.<sup>82</sup> While the company was not officially a co-operative, it was a farmers' company and was able to perform the task of educating farmers about the inner workings of the Grain Exchange.

---

<sup>76</sup> The Dominion government initially denied the GGGC a federal charter, but the Manitoba government granted it a provincial charter. As the 1906 crop season approached, the company still did not have a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, nor did they have the money to buy it, despite the stock selling campaign. The farmers from Sintaluta came to the rescue and provided the additional \$1,500 necessary for the purchase of a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, granting the GGGC access to the trading organization. Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 48-49.

<sup>77</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 7; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 49.

<sup>78</sup> Discussions within GGGC circulars about offering patronage dividends suggested the company would be operating as a co-operative, which violated the rules of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The company promptly lost its seat on the exchange. Another co-operative, the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society assisted the GGGC, by purchasing grain directly from the company and the MGGA pressured the Manitoba government to reinstate the GGGC on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The Manitoba government also acted to ensure that the Grain Exchange could not regulate the practice of its members. *Grain Growers' Record*, 8; MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies,' 5; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 52-54.

<sup>79</sup> MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies,' 5; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 55-56.

<sup>80</sup> Lipset, 'The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,' 410.

<sup>81</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 10; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 62.

<sup>82</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 67.



The company continued to operate successfully for a number of years and undertook a variety of other ventures. In 1908, the company established the *Grain Growers Guide*, to serve as an organ for western farmers.<sup>83</sup> In 1909, the Company established its own printing plant to print the *Guide* and to engage in other forms of commercial printing. The new company, Public Press Limited, was self-financing within a reasonable time.<sup>84</sup> Through 1908 and 1909, the GGGC opened an office in Calgary and established a Seed Branch, which included a Seed Improvement Department and an Inspection Department.<sup>85</sup> Through these services, the GGGC aimed to improve the farmers' returns as well as provide them with the necessary education to improve their financial positions. While officially separate from the Grain Growers' Associations and the UFA, the Company provided them with substantial financial support. From 1909 to 1914, the Company provided over \$25,000 for the operation of the three provincial groups and an additional \$60,000 for educational work.<sup>86</sup> The success of the GGGC demonstrated the potential of a strong and unified prairie farmers' movement, creating a solidarity that did not exist in the United States.<sup>87</sup> However, the company's success did not solve all the problems facing farmers. First, while the organizers intended the GGGC to be a farmers' company, the demands of the grain dealers prevented the Company from operating as a co-operative. Additionally, there were individuals who owned shares in the company who were not farmers nor involved in any aspects of grain growing, undermining the claim that the GGGC was solely a farmers' company.<sup>88</sup> Finally, despite

---

<sup>83</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 53.

<sup>84</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation*, 72.

<sup>85</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 10.

<sup>86</sup> Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 35.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>88</sup> MacGibbon, 'Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,' 233.

the presence of the farmers in the Grain Exchange, farmers still faced mistreatment by the elevator companies.

In the winter of 1907-08, concern over the actions of the elevator companies led, in the winter of 1907-08, to the farmers' organizations in all three Prairie Provinces to call for the Dominion Government to operate the terminal and transfer elevators in Canada and for the Provincial governments to operate the line elevators. Following the farmers' requests, the Prairie premiers met in 1908-09, and decided that each province should deal with the request in its own way. The premiers were unwilling to create a government-controlled monopoly.<sup>89</sup>

The actions taken by the provinces varied considerably. In 1909, Manitoba's Conservative government responded to a petition signed by over 10,000 farmers, announcing the government would allow the creation of a system of initial elevators. The government purchased or constructed a number of elevators and placed them under the control of an independent commission. By February 1911, the Commission had purchased 163 elevators and ten more were under construction, paying \$814,710 for all the elevators, a vast overpayment. The opposition in the provincial assembly accused the Roblin Conservative government of not bothering to obtain the elevators at reasonable terms.<sup>90</sup> The opposition also suggested the Conservatives purchased the elevators from their friends, benefiting them financially.<sup>91</sup> The cost of maintaining the public elevator system was also much higher than the revenue, as the public system was only charging for the storage of wheat and was not making any money on the purchasing and selling of

---

<sup>89</sup> Fowke, *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*, 139-40; Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 81-82; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 207-8.

<sup>90</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 89.

<sup>91</sup> MacGibbon, 'Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada,' 242.

street grain. The public system proved disastrous and ended by August 1912.<sup>92</sup> In order to maintain the elevator system, the GGGC agreed to lease the elevators. The GGGC used only 135 of the elevators the Manitoba government had acquired but, established a strong farmer elevator company. Within two years, the elevators had produced a profit of over four thousand dollars.<sup>93</sup> The failure of the Manitoba government created concern among the farmers who had advocated state control of elevators.

The Saskatchewan government used a more reasoned approach, which led to the formation of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, Limited (SCEC). The Saskatchewan government convened a Royal Commission to investigate the elevator industry. The Commission recommended a system of co-operative elevators, which would receive financial aid from the government. The suggestions of the Royal Commission were enacted in March 1911, and the government provided a loan of up to 85 per cent for the cost of building each elevator. The government supported elevator construction in areas where a minimum amount of acreage signed up, and if farmers in the area provided the other 15 per cent of the funds needed. This approach saved both Saskatchewan and Alberta from the problems of state-owned elevators.<sup>94</sup> After it was established, the SCEC undertook an elevator-building campaign, and arranged for the GGGC to act as its selling agent on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.<sup>95</sup> The SCEC and the GGGC also came to an agreement whereby the GGGC would not build an elevator where the Saskatchewan co-operative already had one in operation. This arrangement ensured

---

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 244; Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 87-90; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 211.

<sup>93</sup> Fowke, *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*, 141; *Grain Growers' Record*, 16; Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 95.

<sup>94</sup> Boyle, 'Agrarian Movement in the Northwest,' 509; Fowke, 'Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy,' 171; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 213.

<sup>95</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 107-8.

that the two farmers' companies would not compete with each other and explained why the GGGC had a limited presence in Saskatchewan.<sup>96</sup> Soon after the creation of the SCEC, the United Farmers of Alberta petitioned the Alberta government to establish the Alberta Farmers' Co-operative Elevator Company, along the same lines as the SCEC.<sup>97</sup> All three companies were soon making profits and expanding their capacity.<sup>98</sup> Through the first decade of operation these elevator companies talked of amalgamating. By the end of 1917, the GGGC and the Alberta company formed the United Grain Growers Limited.<sup>99</sup>

By the end of the First World War, the United Grain Growers and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company had become the two largest companies operating on the Winnipeg Exchange, handling 20 to 25 per cent of all western Canadian grain and controlling nearly 40 per cent of the terminal elevator capacity at the Lakehead.<sup>100</sup> The ideas of co-operation were not limited to the grain growers, and many other producers viewed the success of the Grain Growers' companies with envy. Livestock producers urged the Alberta Co-operative and the GGGC to enter the livestock selling business, and these companies organized over forty livestock shipping co-operatives.<sup>101</sup> Farmers were very interested in supporting these co-operative enterprises. Farmers felt they could both save money initially and earn money through co-operative

---

<sup>96</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 15.

<sup>97</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 142; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 221.

<sup>98</sup> The SCEC showed a profit of \$52,461 in its first year and by the end of its second year of operation, the number of elevators had increased from 46 to 137; Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation*, 110. The Alberta company was able to make \$565,000 in profits during its four years of independent operation; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 222. By 1912, the three co-operative companies owned over 20 per cent of the elevators in all the Prairie Provinces; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada* 41. In June 1913, the GGGC purchased a terminal elevator at Fort William, equipped for cleaning and conditioning grain, and later built an elevator at Port Arthur, with a capacity of 300,000 bushels, after fire destroyed the Fort William terminal; *Grain Growers' Record*, 16-17.

<sup>99</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 25; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 508.

enterprises. However, some farmers criticized companies such as the UGG for being too commercial and corporate in nature.<sup>102</sup>

### ***The Renewal in Ontario***

As the number of farmers in Canada increased and their importance in the national economy grew, they began to work together to demand more recognition from the Dominion and provincial governments, and play a more active in ensuring that the companies they created were able to protect the financial well-being of all farmers. While farmers increased their power and influence on the Prairies, the Ontario farmers noticed their economic and social position was declining. Just as men formerly active in Ontario and in the United States had created the Western Canadian farmers movements, the success of the Grain Growers Associations inspired farmers in Ontario to renew their stagnant farmers' movement.

After a trip to western Canada, J.J. Morrison a farmer from Ontario was inspired to create an organization like the Grain Growers Associations.<sup>103</sup> Many people concerned about the farm movement realized it would be difficult to create a united organization similar to that of the Prairies. Ontario farmers did not concentrate on one agricultural product like Western producers.<sup>104</sup> Morrison met with other concerned individuals and, by March 1914, created two new organizations to represent Ontario farmers; the United Farmers of Ontario (UFO) and the United Farmers' Co-operative Company Limited

---

<sup>100</sup> Patton, 'The Canadian Grain Pool,' 167.

<sup>101</sup> MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies,' 6.

<sup>102</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 144-45.

<sup>103</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 39; Kechnie, 'The United Farm Women of Ontario,' 268; Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 60; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 274.

<sup>104</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 40.

(UFCC).<sup>105</sup> The UFO was focused on the concerns of Ontario farmers, specifically rural depopulation.<sup>106</sup> By 1911, rural people were a minority in Ontario, and the proportion of rural to urban population was steadily decreasing.<sup>107</sup> A common concern for many rural people was the belief that the urban and business classes dominated the economy, at the expense of the rural population.<sup>108</sup> The UFCC was to do business in the interests of the farmers, according to co-operative principles, and reverse the economic decline farmers were experiencing.<sup>109</sup> The Ontario farmers intended the UFCC to work for UFO members in the same way grain companies did for grain growers. In order to ensure good connections between the two groups, J.J. Morrison acted as secretary-treasurer of both the UFO and the UFCC.<sup>110</sup> A number of co-operatives, of various forms, had existed in Ontario before the farmers created the UFCC and the new organization was to act as an umbrella organization for the different co-operatives.<sup>111</sup>

While connected through Morrison, the UFO and the UFCC developed on vastly divergent paths. The UFCC had a rough start, and the original directors were required to purchase additional stock in order to keep the company operating.<sup>112</sup> Morrison attempted to capture the spirit of discontent in the farm community to create support for the UFCC. He also hoped to use the UFO as a lobbying tool to improve the farmers' economic

---

<sup>105</sup> In October 1913, Morrison, E.C. Drury, Colonel J.Z. Frazer and W.C. Good met to discuss the future of the farmers' movement, with Morrison expressing his hope that the remnants of the Grange could come together with the government-sponsored farmers' clubs to create a new organization; see Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 72-73.

<sup>106</sup> The 1921 census shows that Ontario's rural population had decreased by 100,000 between 1891 and 1911 whereas in the same years, the urban population had increased by over 500,000; Tennyson, 'The Ontario General Election of 1919,' 27.

<sup>107</sup> In 1901, the rural to urban ratio was 57:43, by 1911 it was 48:52 and by 1921 it was 42:58; see Schull, *Ontario Since 1867*, 187.

<sup>108</sup> MacDonald, *The Happy Warrior*, 233; Tennyson, 'The Ontario General Election of 1919,' 28.

<sup>109</sup> Kechnie, 'The United Farm Women of Ontario,' 268.

<sup>110</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 42.

<sup>111</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 166.

<sup>112</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 42.

situation in the province.<sup>113</sup> Many farmers supported the co-operative idea in order to maximize their economic returns and strengthen the farmers' cause.<sup>114</sup> In 1915, the UFCC achieved some success and opened a selling company at the Toronto stockyards, allowing farmers to circumvent the livestock shipping monopoly to some extent.<sup>115</sup>

While the company was meeting with commercial success, there were problems. Differences in personality and management style caused considerable difficulties for the company. Morrison's attempts through 1915 to increase his role in the UFCC and to centralize control of the company concerned both E.C. Drury and W.C. Good, two other individuals who had helped create the UFO and the UFCC. However, Morrison's popularity among the membership enabled him to maintain his position.<sup>116</sup> In 1917, differences of opinion between Morrison and the new general manager, T.P. Loblaw, caused more problems. Loblaw pursued a more aggressive policy for the UFCC, including establishing a central warehouse and consolidating control of the member co-operatives. Morrison was opposed to this plan and forced Loblaw to resign.<sup>117</sup> The UFCC experimented with different forms of co-operatives, including consumer co-operatives and selling co-operatives, organized and controlled through contract. The Wanstead Farmers Club of Lambton Country experimented with selling hogs and required farmers to sign all of their hogs over to the club. Those farmers that did not give the UFCC exclusive rights to sell their hogs were not allowed to ship anything through the club.<sup>118</sup> Some local clubs moved away from requiring all members to sell by contract

---

<sup>113</sup> Kechnie, 'The United Farm Women of Ontario,' 274.

<sup>114</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 177.

<sup>115</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 75

<sup>116</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 45-47.

<sup>117</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 82-83; Loblaw later went on to found the successful chain of grocery stores bearing his name.

<sup>118</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 175.

and even allowed non-members to buy from the co-operative, but this removed the incentive to become a club member.<sup>119</sup> The UFCC continued to expand during the 1920s, although the company faced financial difficulty caused by poor management and the depression of the early 1920s forced many stores to close.<sup>120</sup> By 1925, the UFCC's goal was obtaining the maximum return for the farmers' dollar. The UFCC was no longer interested in the values of co-operation within the community. The abandonment of a co-operative philosophy caused many members to withdraw their support from the company.<sup>121</sup> The UFCC continued to operate, however, and undertook a number of different ventures including petroleum distribution, a co-operative insurance agency, and an apartment complex. It became the United Co-operative of Ontario in 1948. By this point, the UFCC established numerous co-operative ventures, including creameries and feed and fertilizer plants.<sup>122</sup> The variety of ventures the UFCC/UCO undertook shows that, while it still supported co-operative ventures, it had moved away from primary support of the farm population.

The UFCC and other co-operative business ventures involved attempts by the farm population to challenge the governing business class that they saw as concerned principally with the urban population. Farmers hoped to use their new found financial power to change society. The quick growth of co-operatives provided evidence that Canadian farmers were able to accomplish considerable feats if they worked together, but the proliferation of co-operatives undermined the position of co-operative leaders as they

---

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 176.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 177; Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 236-38; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 246.

<sup>121</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 179-80.

<sup>122</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 247; The UCO helped establish the Co-operators Insurance Agency, and in the 1960s, even sponsored the founding of Twin Pines Apartments Ltd, an agency instrumental in providing low cost apartment dwellings for senior citizens in a number of Ontario centres.



had too much to deal with.<sup>123</sup> Many local co-operatives also tended to purchase buildings or establish businesses that were ill-suited to their localities and proved poor financial investments.<sup>124</sup> The co-operative mentality played a large role in the moulding of Canadian agriculture but, during the First World War, a newfound desire to use their political power to change society filled the farm population.

### *The Farmers Enter Politics*

While the UFCC had a bumpy career it continued to operate into the 1940s. In contrast, the UFO's life is best described as a quick rise and equally swift decline. The development of the UFO reflected the political protest that came to define the Canadian farmers' movement before, during, and after the First World War. The UFO was born out of a desire to re-form the Ontario farmers' movement. By February 1915, not even a year after its inception, the UFO had nearly two thousand members spread over thirty-four local clubs. The immediate concern of the UFO was the war effort, and how the war affected the position of farmers. Many members were worried urban factories and military service were drawing young farm men away from the countryside, further reducing the farm population.<sup>125</sup> As the war effort continued, farmers became concerned about the possibility of conscription, especially the farm population. Farmers had long been concerned about the decline rural populations and felt conscription of the farm population would only further exasperate their inability to produce goods needed for the war effort, and to make a living.<sup>126</sup> Across the country, farmers were conscious of their political power. Through the Canadian Council of Agriculture, farmers acted together to

---

<sup>123</sup> MacPherson, 'The Co-operative Movements on the Prairies,' 7.

<sup>124</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 179.

<sup>125</sup> Wood, History of the Farmer's Movement, 276.

influence the political scene.<sup>127</sup> This action included several mass meetings held in Ottawa to show how strong and united farmers were. The Canadian Council of Agriculture also developed a Farmers' Platform in 1916. The platform acted as a guide for farmers in deciding which candidates they should vote for and lobby. It was described as the "New National Policy" and was designed to challenge the National Policy that had dominated Canadian politics since 1879, with its support of high manufacturing tariffs. The platform called for direct legislation, nationalization of communication tools, female suffrage, direct tax on unimproved land and natural resources, and a sharply graduated income tax.<sup>128</sup>

Disputes over how to deal with the political system divided the farmers' movement. Some in the movement, such as Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, felt farmers should work within existing political parties. While others, such as T.A. Crerar of Manitoba, felt farmers should develop their own political group.<sup>129</sup> In 1918, farmers became extremely upset with the Borden-led Unionist government when it reneged on its promise not to conscript farmers' sons, a promise the Unionist government had made in order to gain the farmers vote.<sup>130</sup> Canadian farmers viewed this as the final straw and turned against both the Conservative and Liberal parties.

---

<sup>126</sup> W.R. Young, 'Conscription, Rural Depopulation, and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19' provides a detailed account of these concerns.

<sup>127</sup> The council was formed in 1909 to serve as an expression of the political and policy aspirations of farmers, specifically the desire to get rid of the protective tariff. The members in the Canadian Council of Agriculture originally included the Grain Growers' Associations, the UFA, the Grange and the Farmers' Association of Ontario but other groups, including the UFO, the Interprovincial Council of Farm Women and United Farmers organizations from the Maritimes joined it later Fowke, *Canadian Agricultural Policy*, 265; Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 87; Barry Wilson, *Beyond the Harvest*, 242, 298-302.

<sup>128</sup> Schulz, *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*, 63-69; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 116; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 346.

<sup>129</sup> Wilson, *Beyond the Harvest*, 243.

<sup>130</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 81; Good, *Farmer Citizen*, 103; Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 51-52; Schull, *Ontario Since 1867*, 215; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 279.

Precipitated by the Unionist government's broken promise, the 'agrarian revolt' began in Ontario. Following two victories for farm candidates in provincial by-elections, Beniah Bowman of Manitoulin Island and John Widdifield of Ontario County, sixty-four candidates affiliated with, but not officially representing, the UFO stood for election in the 1919 Ontario general election.<sup>131</sup> Ontario's farmers were upset that members of the Legislative Assembly did not represent them, and farmers felt the lack of agrarian values in the Legislature Assembly degraded public morals.<sup>132</sup> The election results surprised all of Canada, as farmer candidates won forty-five seats. Joined by candidates elected by the Independent Labour Party, the farmers formed a minority government under E.C. Drury with 55 members forming the government and 55 sitting in opposition.<sup>133</sup> Emboldened by the formation of the Drury government in Ontario and angered by the Unionist government and the old parties, voters across Canada turned to support farmer candidates.<sup>134</sup> The support for farmer candidates across the country showed that the agrarian movement was not confined to the Prairie West but existed wherever commercial agriculture had taken hold and wherever governments refused to consider the farmers' role in society.<sup>135</sup> With the notable exception of the UFA in Alberta and the

---

<sup>131</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 83; Tennyson, 'The Ontario General Election of 1919,' 34.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 27. Tennyson points out that before the 1919 election, only eighteen members of the 111 member Ontario legislature were farmers, although 70 per cent of the ridings were predominantly rural.

<sup>133</sup> Considerable information is available on this government through Drury's memoirs, *Farmer Premier*, as well as through the biography by Charles Johnston, *E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist*.

<sup>134</sup> Despite only forming in April 1920, the United Farmers of Nova Scotia were able to elect eleven members to the legislature in a July 1920 vote; Rawlyk, 'The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia,' 31-32. In 1921, the UFA formed a majority in the Alberta legislature. Rennie provides detailed information on the UFA's entrance into direct politics and their victory in *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*. The United Farmers of Manitoba won the provincial election in 1920 and farmer candidates would gain substantial support in Saskatchewan in 1923; Tennyson, 'The Ontario General Election of 1919,' 58. The 1921 federal election saw farmer candidates win sixty-five seats, under the banner of the UFA and the Progressives. This represented a large enough victory to ensure the Progressives could qualify as the official opposition; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 206; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 151.

<sup>135</sup> Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 138.

UFM in Manitoba, farmer parties soon lost voter support and the movements fell apart. The farmer candidates were attacked by some as being tools of the Liberal party, and by others as serving specific class interests.<sup>136</sup>

Once in office, the farmer candidates in Ottawa and Toronto proved to be largely ineffective. The rank-and-file often disagreed with the actions of the Members of Parliament.<sup>137</sup> As few of the farmers' candidates had held office before, they did not know how to exercise their power.<sup>138</sup> The Progressives refused to accept the position of Official Opposition. Many farmer MPs did not see themselves as members of a party, but rather as representatives of a new form of government and a transformation of society.<sup>139</sup> Individuals involved with the Progressives, declared the party system was dead and the only way to save society was to create a new system of class government, in which every economic group had representation and took responsibility for their actions.<sup>140</sup> UFA representatives in the Dominion parliament declared that they had not been elected to support or oppose government, but to represent their constituents.<sup>141</sup> As part of the farmer's political philosophy included a rejection of the traditional party system, it was difficult for the Progressives to achieve any sort of unanimity and exercise an effective

---

<sup>136</sup> The UFO in particular was targeted by the Ontario Orange order for being too oppositional to the traditional Protestant British character of Ontario; Pennefather, 'Orange Order and the United Farmers of Ontario,' 171-72; Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement*, 352-54

<sup>137</sup> Mackenzie King attempted to draw some Progressives into his cabinet, but the members of the Progressive movement would not support any sort of coalition; Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 154. In his article, 'The Better Sense of the Farm Population,' Irwin argues that the Prairie farmers' movement was split between those who wanted to overthrow the existing system of politics and the economy and those who wished to fix the existing system, and this split caused considerable difficulty within the farmers' movements.

<sup>138</sup> The Progressives exercised little actual political power and did not draw up any of their own ideas. Sharp, *Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 155-56. Drury's government dealt with numerous problems, and as it only held power through a close balance between the coalition and the opposition force, it was forced to step back in instituting many of the policies from the Farmers' Platform; as shown in Drury's autobiography and in Johnston, *E.C. Drury*.

<sup>139</sup> William Irvine, *The Farmer in Politics*, 86.

<sup>140</sup> W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada*, 150.

balance of power.<sup>142</sup> When the farmer candidates did not use power as the voters had hoped they would, they lost support and many farmers returned to the former parties, with most, but not all, of the Progressives being absorbed into the Liberals.<sup>143</sup> Those MPs that remained independent, 'the Ginger Group' hoped to continue to use their position as a tool for reform.<sup>144</sup>

The Farmer-Labour government in Ontario met with some success, introducing legislation and measures to provide some social safety nets. Drury's government provided allowances to mothers with dependent children and a minimum wage act for women and girls.<sup>145</sup> Drury and his Minister of Highways, Frank Campbell Biggs, improved the road and highway system in the province.<sup>146</sup> To assist farmers, Manning W. Doherty, Minister of Agriculture, established a series of banks, with government guarantees, that provided low interest loans for agricultural purposes.<sup>147</sup> Relations between Drury's government and the UFO became increasingly strained. Drury and Morrison had a public split over Drury's plans to create a People's Party with the farmers' organization as a basis, a policy termed "Broadening Out".<sup>148</sup> Criticism from Morrison and others in the UFO significantly undermined farmer support for the government.<sup>149</sup> While the government was able to maintain its coalition for four years, Drury's government lost the 1923 election, thus marking the end of active political

---

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 152.

<sup>143</sup> Rawlyk, 'The Farmer-Labour Movement and the Failure of Socialism in Nova Scotia,' 36; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 226-27.

<sup>144</sup> Sharp, *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada*, 157. Many members of this Ginger Group would form the embryo for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

<sup>145</sup> Drury, *Farmer Premier*, 108.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>147</sup> Wood, *History of the Farmer's Movement in Canada*, 333.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 283.

<sup>149</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 127-32.

participation for farm organizations in Ontario, and the membership in UFO clubs dropped dramatically.<sup>150</sup> The failure of the Drury government disillusioned Ontario farmers to such an extent that the December 1923 annual meeting of the UFO passed a resolution stating that political activities had seriously eroded the social, educational, and economic features of the Ontario farm movement.<sup>151</sup>

The experience of the farmer in politics reflected a pattern set by the Patrons of Industry. The results of the 1919-1923 Drury government were similar to earlier Patrons' experiments, and farmers concluded that they should not seek political power again. Farmers realized they did not have enough power to challenge the hold the business classes had on government. The rank-and-file of farmers' organizations often viewed attempts to bring others into the Farmer-Labour government as contrary to party goals, and believed that farmer parties would become just as corrupt and unfaithful to its principles as traditional political parties. As it became apparent that the farmer candidates were not able to change "the system", farm organizations began to focus on economic ideas, specifically controlling markets, in order to improve their position in society. The patterns established by these farm organizations would eventually provide the hog farmers of Ontario with a base upon which to build their organization.

---

<sup>150</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 194; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 86.

<sup>151</sup> Johnston, *E.C. Drury*, 208.

### Chapter Three: Towards Control of Marketing

Having failed in politics, farmers turned to economic organizations in an effort to work with the market and to make the market work for them. Across the country, farmers worked to establish marketing boards, such as the Wheat Board, and eventually the Hog Board in Ontario. Farmers felt, if they were united, they would represent a strong economic force and be able to influence the market. During the 1920s, various voluntary and contract commodity pools were formed. These pools lacked the authority to force producers to sell through them, and were unable to achieve enough market power. Despite this, some pools achieved significant success, including the prairie Wheat Pools. In 1927, the government of British Columbia passed marketing legislation that set a pattern for other provinces to follow. A series of legal challenges forced the Dominion Parliament to pass a *Natural Products Marketing Act* in 1934, allowing farmers across the country to create marketing boards. Ontario passed its own marketing legislation, the *Ontario Farm Products Control Act*, in 1940, allowing for the creation of marketing boards in that province. The marketing boards took various forms, with varying degrees of power over commodities.

The success of the Grain Growers' Grain Company and the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company strengthened the Canadian farmers' faith in co-operative activities. Co-operative purchasing groups were widely supported and, while not as popular, co-operative marketing of agricultural goods had been taking place for decades. The major problem for these endeavours was the voluntary nature of the co-operatives. If farmers were not required to sell all of their goods through the co-operative, some producers, thinking they could receive a better price for their goods outside of the co-

operative, would do so. This created a difficulty for the co-operatives; if the manager of the pool did not know the amount of a specific commodity he had to sell, he had difficulty negotiating a price.<sup>1</sup> The co-operative selling groups, working with a number of different commodities were often too diverse and prevented the selling-groups from representing specific producers effectively. Even before 1920, the make-up of selling co-operatives began to change.

The conditions of the First World War introduced Canadian grain farmers to a controlled market. In order to assist the war effort, the Canadian government through an Order-in Council established the Board of Grain Supervisors. The government gave this Board control over Canadian wheat for the 1916 and 1917 wheat crops, and set the price of wheat based on several variables including, the point of origin, the quality of the grain, and the cost of transporting it.<sup>2</sup> While the farmers had no role in creating this organization, the government's wartime control of the wheat market was a major factor in leading farmers to support a more activist state. The price set by the Board of Grain Supervisors, which farmers initially felt was too low, provided predictability and farmers began to ask for set prices for other commodities, such as hogs.<sup>3</sup> After the war ended, in order to combat sharp increases in prices and following a brief period of open trading between 21 July and 31 July 1919 during which the price of wheat shot up, the Unionist government established a Canadian Wheat Board to market the remainder of the 1918

---

<sup>1</sup> Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 175; Larsen and Erdman, 'Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion,' 266.

<sup>2</sup> Fowke, 'Dominion Aids to Wheat Marketing, 1929-39,' 390; Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 169; *Grain Growers' Record*, 24; Patton, *The Canadian Grain Pool*, 168.

<sup>3</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 123.



and 1919 crops. The government's quick action to cap prices did not impress producers, as the government had never worked so fast to prevent price falls.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike the Board of Grain Supervisors, the Wheat Board did not buy at a fixed price but provided initial payment and distributed interim and final payments as the crop was sold. Farmers could deliver wheat at any time and expect to receive the same amount for their wheat, in contrast to selling on the open market, where the appearance of more wheat caused prices to drop. The stability provided by the Wheat Board impressed many farmers.<sup>5</sup> On 18 August 1920, when the government reinstated the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, the price of wheat dropped dramatically, opening at \$2.73 per bushel, then dropping to \$2.07 by 18 November 1920, and falling as low as \$1.11 by November 1921.<sup>6</sup> Believing the reintroduction of the free market, and not other economic factors, had caused wheat prices to drop, farmers looked back longingly on the controlled economy established by the Board of Grain Supervisors and the Wheat Board.<sup>7</sup>

Responding to the demands of prairie farmers, Progressive Members of Parliament called for the re-establishment of the Wheat Board, citing it as an unqualified success.<sup>8</sup> Members of the Conservative opposition, however, warned that in order for the government to provide a wheat board, it would have to establish too much control over

---

<sup>4</sup> Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 1; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 12; Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 171; MacPherson, 'Missionaries of Rural Development,' 74; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada*, 196-7.

<sup>5</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada*, 196-7.

<sup>6</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 13; Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 177; Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 153-5

<sup>7</sup> Patton, *Grain Growers' Cooperation in Western Canada*, 199-200.

<sup>8</sup> On March 15, 1922, Robert Johnson, MP for Moosejaw, (Progressive) stated that the Wheat Board was an unqualified success; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 15 March 1922, 115. On 16 March 1922 Donald Kennedy, MP for West Edmonton (Progressive) also demanded the re-establishment of the wheat board; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 March 1922, 146.

other aspects of the economy, including railway companies.<sup>9</sup> Leader of the Conservative opposition Arthur Meighen warned the re-establishment of a compulsory board would involve the government in a quagmire.<sup>10</sup> Suggestions to establish a voluntary pool met with opposition as some representatives felt that a voluntary pool would not be sufficient to overcome the economic conditions that “have existed during the past three or four hundred years.”<sup>11</sup> Farmer representatives suggested the government take the opportunity presented by the post-war era and recommended it was “...time for us [parliament] to come forward with a scheme that has provided itself satisfactory to the men who grow grain...,” i.e., the compulsory wheat board.<sup>12</sup> As the representative of organized farmers, the Canadian Council of Agriculture called for the re-establishment of the Wheat Board.

In response to these demands, W.L. Mackenzie King’s Liberal government established a special committee to hear testimony for and against the board.<sup>13</sup> The committee eventually recommended the government establish a national wheat marketing agency to sell the 1922 wheat crop. On 19 June 1922, a motion to this effect was tabled in the Dominion Parliament.<sup>14</sup> The resulting bill reflected similar legislation implemented in Australia, and stated it would not come into effect unless it was agreed to by two of the three Prairie Provinces.<sup>15</sup> While the bill was passed in the House of Commons, Manitoba’s Progressive Premier John Bracken did not support the compulsory wheat board. Bracken felt that Manitoba farmers generally received better rates anyway, and the

---

<sup>9</sup> William Maclean, an Independent Conservative representative for York expressed this concern on 14 March 1922, Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 March 1922, 72.

<sup>10</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 June 1922, 2919.

<sup>11</sup> On March 16, 1922, Progressive Arthur John Lewis, MP for Swift Current, expressed these sentiments; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 March 1922, 152.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 June 1922, 2915.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 3174.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 3175, 3382, 3387.

Manitoba legislature defeated the legislation by a vote of 24 to 21. Saskatchewan and Alberta initially supported the legislation but without Manitoba's support, the Premiers of Saskatchewan and Alberta, Liberal Charles Avery Dunning and the UFA's Herbert Greenfield respectively, announced they would not support the plan.<sup>16</sup> The opposition of all three Prairie Provinces forced Members of Parliament to call for the reconstitution of the Wheat Board under Dominion control, to allow the Board to operate under the logical control of one government and to prevent ineffective control by several governments.<sup>17</sup>

### *The Story of the Pools*

The failure of the farmers' political movement led a new group of younger and more radical farmers to challenge the system and call for more orderly marketing. Orderly marketing was understood by those involved in the pool to be the even distribution of selling of wheat, over time, as opposed to dumping most of the wheat crop on the market within a short period. It has since come to be understood as any form of controlled marketing, utilized in order to achieve the best prices for the producers, or efforts to improve the overall quality and demand for a product.<sup>18</sup> Believing the government would not re-establish such a national wheat board, farm leaders began to campaign for their own organization. The Canadian Council of Agriculture began to discuss the idea of a wheat pool, based on pooling ideas popular at the time.<sup>19</sup> Due to the work of Aaron Sapiro, a California lawyer, the organization of selling co-operatives began to change. Sapiro did not necessarily develop new ideas for co-operatives, but

---

<sup>16</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 14-15.

<sup>17</sup> John Baxter, Conservative MP for St. John City and the Counties of St. John and Albert expressed this sentiment in the 1923 parliament; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1923, 2592.

<sup>18</sup> MacPherson, 'Missionaries of Rural Development,' 75; Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 223. MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice,' 166.

<sup>19</sup> Rennie, *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy*, 155.

instead organized pre-existing ideas in an easy to understand manner. He also worked tirelessly to present these ideas to farmers.<sup>20</sup> Sapiro encouraged co-operatives to focus on specific commodities, in the belief that this allowed the co-operatives to meet the differing needs of each commodity group. Such focused co-operatives also allowed the groups to control the supply of products and achieve greater influence on the market conditions that set the price of goods. The belief that co-operatives needed to control a substantial volume of the product led Sapiro to encourage co-operative associations to require contracts with sellers and only do business with farmers who had signed contracts.<sup>21</sup> Contrary to the opinions expressed by others in the agricultural community, Sapiro felt pools could organize any type of commodity.<sup>22</sup> Sapiro also did not think co-operatives should rely on litigation to control goods or members.<sup>23</sup> This belief contradicted the work farm organizers later undertook. Sapiro stressed self-help and self-reliance for farmers, which had been popular among leaders of the pre-World War I co-operative institutions.<sup>24</sup> By 1922 Sapiro had organized over fifty-five co-operatives in nineteen states.<sup>25</sup> Following his successful work in the United States, and due to the desire of various Canadian farm organizations to develop a similar method of marketing wheat, these groups brought Sapiro to Canada. Support for the pool idea began to grow.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 17; Larsen and Erdman, 'Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion,' 251.

<sup>21</sup> Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 116; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 23; Larsen and Erdman, 'Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion,' 247-52.

<sup>22</sup> Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 117.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 120.

<sup>24</sup> MacPherson, 'Missionaries of Rural Development,' 77.

<sup>25</sup> Larsen and Erdman, 'Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion,' 257.

<sup>26</sup> In 1922, Ontario Minister of Agriculture Manning Doherty brought Sapiro to Ontario to help organize dairymen; Badgley, 'Co-operation Pays and Pays Well,' 169. The Farmers Union of Canada, a Saskatchewan based organization invited Aaron Sapiro to address its first convention on 2 July 1923, while the *Calgary Herald* and *Edmonton Journal* pushed for the organization of a speaking tour by Sapiro; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 20-22; Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 21; MacPherson, 'Co-operative Movements on the Prairies,' 9

Support for the pool was premised on the belief that the major problem in the marketing of wheat was the farmers rush to sell their crops as soon as they were harvested. Cash poor farmers needed to pay the bills, especially the bank loans that had piled up through the year.<sup>27</sup> When all the farmers were trying to sell their crop at once, buyers paid less for the grain. If the farmers pooled their crops, sold them bit by bit, and were provided with money through a series of payments, producers would receive more money for their product and not be cash strapped at harvest time.<sup>28</sup> Organizers in Alberta signed up nearly 50 per cent of the province's acreage, so that by 29 October 1923, when the Alberta Pool began operations, it marketed approximately 35,000,000 bushels in one year.<sup>29</sup> In 1924, after some difficulty, but with considerable support from the SCEC, the UGG, and the provincial governments, farmers' organizations in Saskatchewan and Manitoba also organized successful wheat pools.<sup>30</sup> However, Ontario's attempt to organize a pool was not as successful. It began in 1927, but was unable to sell its grain at a high enough price to cover the advance payments to its members. The Ontario wheat pool ended operations by 1931, largely due to the minor importance of wheat in the agricultural economy of the province.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 25.

<sup>28</sup> This was an idea that had been proposed by E.A. Partridge as early as 1907, and which would be utilized by post-1935 version of the Wheat Board; See Irwin, 'The Better Sense of the Farm Population,' 39.

<sup>29</sup> Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 21

<sup>30</sup> The Saskatchewan Co-operative Wheat Producers incorporated under the Saskatchewan Companies Act on 25 August 1923, and launched a campaign to sign up as much wheat acreage as possible, but by 13 September 1923, only 29 per cent of the province's total wheat acreage was signed up through contracts. Efforts in 1924 fared better and by 26 June 1924, 50 per cent of the Saskatchewan crop was signed to the pool, with the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool becoming operational on that day. The Manitoba pool only had contracts for 30 per cent of that province's wheat by 1 April 1924, but the pool organizers decided to operate with the pool anyway; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 27-40; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada*, 220.

<sup>31</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 246; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada*, 254.

The pools in Western Canada joined together and organized a central selling agency, the Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers Ltd., which began operations on 29 July 1924.<sup>32</sup> The success of these pools inspired producers of other agricultural commodities, such as livestock, to consider marketing their commodities along the same lines as the wheat pools.<sup>33</sup> The Saskatchewan Pool expanded quickly and in 1926 purchased the elevator system of the SCEC, which included nearly one-quarter of the terminal elevator capacity at the Lakehead. Relations between the UGG and the Saskatchewan pool suffered. The UGG and the Saskatchewan Pool disagreed over which company should control the elevators in Saskatchewan. The leaders of the Saskatchewan pools also questioned whether the UGG was actually a co-operative. The UGG agreed to work with the Alberta pool to handle the wheat at cost.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the success of the wheat pools, and favourable legal decisions, there was some difficulty in ensuring that farmers adhered to their contracts. The Saskatchewan Pool, while having nearly 72 per cent of the province's wheat on contract, only handled between 56 and 58 per cent of the wheat crop from 1925 to 1928. A 1926 court case against Leon R. Zurowski confirmed the legality of the pool contract and allowed the pool to charge a twenty-five cent penalty for every bushel a contract holder sold outside of the pool. The wheat pools continued to expand and established a coarse grain pool in 1925.<sup>35</sup> While the wheat pools were successful co-operative organizations, a number of farmers, and a number of farmer representatives in Parliament, continued to advocate re-

---

<sup>32</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 42.

<sup>33</sup> *Grain Growers' Record*, 55.

<sup>34</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 67-8; Patton, *Grain Growers Cooperation in Western Canada*, 236-40.

<sup>35</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 68-70.

establishing the Wheat Board.<sup>36</sup> By the time the prairie wheat pools were entering their second five-year contract period in 1928-29, they had a combined membership of 140,000 or approximately three-fifths of the wheat growers in the Prairie provinces.<sup>37</sup> Through these contracts, the wheat pools controlled one-fifth of the wheat on the international market, but the pools did not have influence on the international market proportional to their share of wheat being marketed.<sup>38</sup> Farming conditions across the prairies improved from 1925 to 1929 however, and the pools were able to influence the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, bringing their prices into line with those on the world market. In Parliament, various MPs lauded the pools for the success that the western farmers achieved through the 1920s.<sup>39</sup>

Although less than two-thirds of all wheat farmers signed contracts, the pools were still able to benefit both their members and non-member farmers.<sup>40</sup> This situation caused tension and, after the establishment of the wheat pool, organizers launched a campaign to achieve legislation giving the pools the power to market all wheat. This campaign, inspired by Sapiro's 1927 visit to Saskatchewan and led by the United Farmers

---

<sup>36</sup> Alfred Speakman, MP for Red Deer, of the United Farmers of Alberta suggested this but Meighen suggested that such action was unnecessary as the pools were already working to protect farmers; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1925, 980. Members of the Progressive Party, including Oliver Gould, MP for Assiniboia, discussed the benefits of that party's platform, including re-establishment of the Wheat Board; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1925, 2378.

<sup>37</sup> Patton, 'The Market Influence of the Canadian Wheat Pool,' 211.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 212; MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice,' 166.

<sup>39</sup> A great number of MPs expressed these sentiments and used the wheat pools to celebrate co-operative ideals and the hard work and faith of farmers, including Liberal Frederick Gershaw MP of Medicine Hat, Progressive Donald Kennedy, MP for Peace River, Liberal George Spence, MP for Maple Creek and Liberal Thomas Donnelly, MP for Willow Bunch; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1926, 368, 532, 2679, 3197. Liberal William Bock, MP for Maple Creek, went so far as to suggest that, while farmers faced many problems due to weather and other factors, the situation would have been much worse if it had not been for the wheat pool. Bock also suggested that while the wheat pool increased prices received for wheat by the farmers, it did not increase the cost of bread for the consumers. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 1928, 173.

<sup>40</sup> MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice,' 165; Patton, 'The Market Influence of the Canadian Wheat Pool,' 213.

of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) (UFC (SS)), sought legislation to force every farmer to deliver wheat to the pool. However, the campaign did not have the support of every pool member.<sup>41</sup> Contemporary commentators argued the idea of compulsory pooling poised a real danger to the pools because it threatened to tear the organizations apart. As a result, some pool members and leaders supported it, while others did not.<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, the compulsory pooling campaign received support from many farm organizations, and it became the focus of farmers to such an extent that most farmers were not interested in political involvement. Farmers feared political involvement would divide the 100 per cent campaign. They also feared that too close a connection to one particular party might discredit the farmers' goals.<sup>43</sup> Early in 1931, legislation from Conservative Premier Anderson of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Legislature provided hope for the compulsory pooling campaign, but a court decision declared the legislation to be *ultra vires*, as it would reduce inter-provincial trade, thus destroying the dreams of the UFC (SS) and others regarding compulsory pooling. Further appeals by the UFC (SS) to the Saskatchewan government failed, and the campaign for compulsory pooling died in July 1931.<sup>44</sup> This failure highlighted the fact that marketing legislation at the time exceeded the constitutional powers of the provincial governments.

---

<sup>41</sup> While the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) supported the idea of compulsory pooling, delegates to several consecutive annual pool meetings rejected the idea, with the 1929 meeting voting against compulsion 120 to 25; Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 76-77

<sup>42</sup> Patton, 'The Canadian Grain Pool,' 178.

<sup>43</sup> Davisson, *Pooling Wheat In Canada*, 233; Griezic, 'Introduction,' in Wood, xv; Hoffman, 'The Entry of the United Farmers of Canada, Saskatchewan Section in Politics,' 101-2; Wilson, *Beyond the Harvest*, 244.

<sup>44</sup> On 30 December 1930, Premier Anderson promised compulsory legislation if the majority of the farmers in the province supported the plan, and the Referendum and Grain Marketing Bill was given royal assent to on 11 March 1931. By 27 April 1931 the bill had been brought before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and four judges handed down separate written judgments declaring the legislation to be beyond the power of the provincial Legislature; Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 241-42.



The system of offering initial payments, while useful in providing financial stability for the farmer, caused significant financial hardships for the pools when the Great Depression descended upon Canada. The wheat pools, like so many other businesses, were gripped in the economic downturn. In 1929, the pools offered members high initial payments in order to ensure their continued support for the pools. These high initial payments proved to be excessive as wheat prices dropped dramatically. When pools sold the crop, they lost nearly \$75 million.<sup>45</sup> As the Depression deepened, a fierce debate arose in the Dominion Parliament about whether the wheat pools, by withholding wheat from the market, were causing the financial difficulties of the West.<sup>46</sup> Others felt the wheat pools were the only thing standing between farmers and complete financial ruin.<sup>47</sup> As prices continued to drop, the pool leaders realized the organization could not operate under such low price conditions. The pool released its members from their contracts in June 1931 and the pool continued on a voluntary basis.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Fairbairn, *From Prairie Roots*, 93

<sup>46</sup> On 24 February 1930, Leader of the Conservative Opposition R.B. Bennett suggested this, blaming the government for continuing to support the wheat pool which led to many farmers losing money; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 24 February 1930, 20. On the same day, Progressive Robert Gardnier, MP for Acadia, Alberta doubted the government's optimism and the statements of the pools regarding the quality of their wheat. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 24 February 1930, 49. On 14 May 1930 Liberal Alfred Bourgeois, MP for Kent, New Brunswick, stated that, by withholding the export of wheat, the pools hurt not only the farmers, but also the railway system; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 May 1930, 2106-7.

<sup>47</sup> On 14 May 1930 Kennedy of the UFA, MP for Peace River stated that only co-operation could put agriculture on a stable basis and even expressed hope that the government would support a livestock pool similar to the wheat pool. Kennedy suggested that Denmark provided example of how co-operation could move farmers from a state of near poverty to a state of financial independence and that the wheat pool, far from causing the conditions in the west, prevented them from being worse; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 14 May 1930, 2084. J.S. Woodsworth, Labour MP for Winnipeg North Centre, argued that there were many factors causing the drop in wheat prices, and that the wheat pool was the only thing standing between farmers and complete ruin; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 18 September 1930, 400; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 March 1931, 74.

<sup>48</sup> Patton, 'Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,' 222-23.

In order to save prairie farmers and the pools from financial ruin, the Bennett Conservative government replaced the Wheat Pools with a federal stabilization organization in 1931. The Dominion government took control of the wheat held by the pool and settled the claims of the banks against the Wheat Pool.<sup>49</sup> The pools did not shut down and die as they continued to operate the co-operative elevator companies.<sup>50</sup> Following the liquidation of wheat stocks, the Dominion government revealed wheat pools had overpaid farmers more than twenty-two million dollars for the 1928 and 1929 crops. With the failure of the wheat pools, it appeared the idea of a pool based on non-compulsory involvement was dead, and pool officials renewed the campaign for re-establishment of the national wheat board.<sup>51</sup> In 1932, Conservative Minister of Agriculture Robert Weir suggested, in order to keep the price of agricultural products higher than the world price, the government should adopt a natural products marketing act.<sup>52</sup> Farmers continued to urge the Bennett government to establish a national wheat board, an appeal to which the Bennett government assented in July 1935 when a non-compulsory Canadian Wheat Board was established.<sup>53</sup> The Conservative government created the Board not as a co-operative, but as an arm of the government designed to dispose of the wheat stocks the co-operative wheat pools had built up.<sup>54</sup> The Bennett government yielded to the campaign for a national Wheat Board because it faced a

---

<sup>49</sup> Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 181; *Grain Growers Record*, 37.

<sup>50</sup> Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 196.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 251-2.

<sup>52</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 10 May 1932, 2795.

<sup>53</sup> Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 262. The federal government did not introduce the wheat board's monopoly control until 1943, and it was not intended to prevent a drop in wheat prices, but instead was in answer to the war, as the federal government hoped to ensure the availability of wheat supplies and prevent a sharp increase in prices. Between its creation and the granting of monopoly powers, the board continued to exist as an alternative for farmers to selling their wheat on the open market. *Ibid.*, 181, 276.

<sup>54</sup> Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,' 202

general election and a new party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.<sup>55</sup> Farmers flocked to the Wheat Board and the Board handled approximately 70 per cent of the marketed wheat in 1935. After the first year of operation, however, the Canadian Wheat Board announced it would only take deliveries from farmers if the price of wheat fell below ninety cents per bushel. Despite the difficulties and turbulence of the Great Depression, for every year but 1934-35, Canada maintained its position as the world's leading exporter of wheat.<sup>56</sup> By the beginning of the Great Depression, it was clear a non-compulsory pool was ineffective and, while the government stepped in to help the producers, this was largely due to the importance of the wheat crop to the Canadian economy, even in the depths of the Great Depression. After the pool experiment collapsed, prairie farmers looked to stronger organizations.

### *Developing Marketing Boards*

Farmers in other parts of Canada and other countries, however, had realized the weaknesses of co-operatives earlier and worked to develop producer boards. They recognized the need to control the entire crop of a commodity. In Britain, the government supported marketing boards such as the Empire Marketing Board. The Empire Marketing Board was created in 1924 to help the farmers and re-establish agriculture in Britain, through spending money on advertising and research into ways of increasing the British market for goods produced in the Commonwealth.<sup>57</sup> Unlike previous attempts by government to support agriculture, this board focused on increasing the market share not just increasing production. While Canadian farmers relied on

---

<sup>55</sup> Fowke, 'The National Policy and the Wheat Economy,' 263.

<sup>56</sup> Patton, 'Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War,' 218, 224-26.

<sup>57</sup> Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,' 195-96.

producer co-operatives, in Britain control and marketing boards were substituted.<sup>58</sup>

Australia was the first Dominion to pass laws authorizing producer marketing boards, in the form of the *Queensland Wheat Pool Act* of 1920 and the *Queensland Primary Producers Act* of 1922. The essential feature of these acts was that, when the majority of the producers of a particular commodity wanted to sell their products collectively, the law compelled the minority to join in a common sales policy.<sup>59</sup> These acts represented a major change in agricultural organization, as the proportion of individual producers signing up did not determine the strength of farmers' economic organizations.

Canadian attempts to establish marketing legislation and boards originated in British Columbia. Dairy and fruit producers developed co-operatives to control production, purchase supplies, and lobby governments. One co-operative, organizing the fruit farmers in the Okanagan Valley, developed a selling organization in 1913 and began to require its members to sign contracts in 1923. In its first year, the co-operative controlled 85 per cent of the fruit crop in the Okanagan Valley and was able to obtain better prices for their fruit. Like the wheat pools, the co-operatives benefited both members and non-members, because non-members received the same benefits without potential sacrifice or cost.<sup>60</sup> As this became apparent, members began to break their contracts with the co-op. In response, co-operative leaders began lobbying for marketing legislation.<sup>61</sup> Dairy farmers and fruit growers accumulated enough social and political

---

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>59</sup> Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products – The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Marketing, 19 May 1959, 5; History Objectives Marketing Methods of the OHPA, Marketing Board and Co-operatives plus some observations on the economics of Ontario's Hog Industry; Information Department, OFA, January 1958 Archival and Special Collections, University of Guelph Library, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1956-68.

<sup>60</sup> Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products – The Role of Co-operatives in Canadian Food Marketing, May 1959, 61.

<sup>61</sup> W.M. Drummond, 'The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,' 247.

support to force the provincial government to introduce legislation providing for orderly marketing boards.<sup>62</sup> In 1927, the BC Legislative Assembly passed the *Produce and Marketing Act*, allowing the establishment of a committee to regulate the time and place of marketing, the quantity and quality of a marketed product, to set prices, and to collect a levy to cover the operating costs of the committee.<sup>63</sup>

The passing of BC's marketing legislation was a major step forward for farmer's co-operatives, but it did not last. In 1931, the Supreme Court of Canada declared the legislation invalid, stating it exceeded provincial power as it interfered with inter-provincial trade.<sup>64</sup> To be effective, Canadian marketing boards would need to influence, not just their province, but also inter-provincial trade. Constitutionally, provincial governments did not have the authority to grant this power.<sup>65</sup> After the Supreme Court declared the BC legislation *ultra vires*, farmers across the country began to advocate for marketing boards and the creation of a national marketing programme. While farmers preferred provincial boards, they recognized the Dominion Parliament would have to pass enabling legislation.<sup>66</sup>

As early as 1932, the Bennett government discussed the passage of marketing legislation to increase the price of agricultural products. Two 1932 court cases suggested the Dominion government might be able to create a country-wide framework for producer marketing boards, and these cases initiated the discussion to establish such

---

<sup>62</sup> MacPherson, 'Some Fortune and a Little Fame,' 40.

<sup>63</sup> W.M. Drummond, 'The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,' 247.

<sup>64</sup> Norris, Hopper and Mack, 'The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,' 466; W.M Drummond, 'The Role of Agricultural Marketing Boards,' 247.

<sup>65</sup> Ian Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in White Dominions,' 201.

<sup>66</sup> Barber, Conservative MP for the Fraser Valley expressed these concerns in January 1934, stating that the break down of co-operative marketing in BC was causing problems for the fruit and dairy industry. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 29 January 1934, 16.

legislation.<sup>67</sup> While the Bennett government stated it supported such legislation, other MPs worried it would only cause more problems for farmers because it would further clog the wheels of marketing.<sup>68</sup> The first motion presented by the Conservatives supporting the establishment of a marketing board appeared in 1933.<sup>69</sup> Even with this bill on the table, MPs continued to advocate for the re-creation of the Wheat Board.<sup>70</sup> Farmers saw progress in 1934 when the Bennett government passed the *Natural Products Marketing Act*, which authorized marketing schemes, but only if the principal market of the natural product was located outside the province of production.<sup>71</sup> With the passage of this bill, Canada joined thirty-seven other nations that had passed legislation designed to allow collective bargaining by primary producers.<sup>72</sup>

When the Conservative government presented the bill in Parliament, members from across the country expressed their concerns, stating it would produce too many over-lapping boards, and the boards would limit the freedom of producers, including implementing production caps.<sup>73</sup> Others, while supporting the idea of a wheat board, feared marketing boards would not be as successful as the pools had been and questioned the necessity or advisability of one hundred per cent control, stating this control would not have saved the wheat pools.<sup>74</sup> Much of the Liberal opposition was likely a political strategy designed to oppose the current government, and not necessarily premised on the belief that the marketing legislation would lead to the downfall of society. Agriculture

---

<sup>67</sup> Ian Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in White Dominions,' 202.

<sup>68</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 18 May 1932, 3048-49.

<sup>69</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, October 1932 – May 1933, 1553.

<sup>70</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 26 February 1934, 930.

<sup>71</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 26 March 1934, 1813; Norris et al, 'The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,' 466.

<sup>72</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 145.

<sup>73</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 April 1934, 2206, 2210.

<sup>74</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 April 1934, 2265.

Minister Weir advised Parliament he had received assurances from several provinces of their desire to pass concurrent legislation. A number of farm groups across the country also supported Weir.<sup>75</sup> Several court challenges followed the passage of the act, which gave the Dominion Marketing Board and its local boards the authority, through marketing schemes, to protect the products of one province against the products of another province.<sup>76</sup>

Following these court decisions, a number of new marketing boards appeared, representing a variety of commodity producers in different regions of Canada.<sup>77</sup> The majority of these schemes focused on produce such as vegetables, although there was consideration of establishing marketing boards to regulate the marketing of cattle, sheep, and swine in the three Prairie Provinces, and to regulate the marketing of cattle exported from Canada.<sup>78</sup> The Royal Commission on Price Spreads supported the idea of controlled marketing in 1935, to undo the significant damage done to the primary producer by the Depression. The Commission concluded "...the primary producer has borne the brunt of

---

<sup>75</sup> Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 April 1934, 2253-55.

<sup>76</sup> Norris et al, 'The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934,' 472.

<sup>77</sup> Included in the schemes that were developed within a year of the Natural Products Marketing Act were: the British Columbia Tree Fruit Scheme, coming into affect on 28 August 1934; the Fruit Export Marketing Scheme, 8 September 1934, specifically concerned with improving the market for Canadian fruit in the United Kingdom; the British Columbia Red Cedar Shingle Export Scheme, 16 October 1934, focused on regulating exports of red shingles produced in BC to the US so each producer could obtain a fair share of the export trade; British Columbia Dry Salt Herring and Dry Salt Salmon Scheme, 22 October 1934, giving power to regulate time and place of marketing, to create a pool, and to require licenses for all packers and shippers, with the hope of raising prices, stabilizing the market and increasing marketing for products in Asia; Ontario Flue-cured Tobacco Scheme, 26 October 1934, which wanted to ensure more adequate returns to the producers; Eastern Canada Potato Marketing Scheme, 18 January 1935, which aimed to remove inferior potatoes on the market, improving the market for Eastern Canadian potatoes; Western Ontario Dry Bean Marketing Scheme, 1 February 1935, focused on discontinuing sales on consignment, planned a marketing agency designated by a local board and focused on increasing consumption of dry beans in domestic and foreign markets; British Columbia Coast Vegetable Marketing Scheme, 4 March 1935, to regulate marketing of specific types of vegetables products on the British Columbia coast and the Canada Jam Marketing Scheme, 10 April 1935, which intended to stabilize jam prices and improve the quality of the product. Ibid., 476-78.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 479.

the depression” stating that the prices of primary products had dropped so far so as to prevent primary producers from maintaining a reasonable standard of living.<sup>79</sup>

When Mackenzie King’s Liberals won the 1935 General Election, many farmers were unsure as to whether the marketing legislation would survive, since King’s Liberals did not have a clear agricultural policy.<sup>80</sup> As Mackenzie King and the Liberals had strongly opposed the establishment of marketing boards and attempted to block their formation, many farmers were unsure as to how the new government would answer their desires for controlled markets. In 1937, the Privy Council found the *Natural Products Marketing Act* violated section 92(13) of the *British North America Act*, because it interfered with provincial responsibilities for civil and property rights.<sup>81</sup> Following the 1931 setback in British Columbia, “Duff” Pattullo’s Liberal government introduced its own *Natural Products Marketing Act* in 1936, an act which the courts decided was within the authority of the province. Other provinces soon copied this legislation.<sup>82</sup>

Unlike previous organizations, this new movement towards marketing boards was not associated with any semi-secret society or any political cause. The focus was mainly economic and the methods were pragmatic.<sup>83</sup> Provincial governments responded to the need and, despite the earlier setback in British Columbia, worked to improve the position of farmers and the production of farm goods through marketing boards. In 1931, the Ontario government created the Ontario Marketing Board to survey market conditions and make recommendations. This was the first step towards controlling Ontario’s agriculture through marketing acts. In 1934, the Milk Control Board of Ontario was

---

<sup>79</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 143.

<sup>80</sup> MacPherson, ‘An Authoritative Voice,’ 169.

<sup>81</sup> Green, ‘Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada,’ 424.

<sup>82</sup> Ian Drummond, ‘Marketing Boards in the White Dominions,’ 202.



formed to regulate the dairy industry. Later that year, the *Milk Control Act* required licensing of all persons dealing with milk in any form.<sup>84</sup> Early in 1932 in response to the requests of a group of Ontario hog farmers, Conservative Minister of Agriculture Colonel T.L. Kennedy approved a hog improvement program. While it appeared that Kennedy supported some form of organized or controlled marketing, statements in his biography suggest otherwise, stating that market control would lead to regimentation and bureaucracy and be resisted by the farm community.<sup>85</sup> Deductions from the price of each marketed hog were to finance the organization and a number of farmers voiced their support, but the plan was cancelled following the 1934 electoral victory of Mitchell Hepburn's Liberals. Duncan Marshall, the new Agriculture Minister, cancelled the program outright, expressing moral and financial opposition.<sup>86</sup> However, Ontario passed its own marketing legislation, the *Ontario Farm Products Control Act*, in 1937 and, by 1940, marketing boards for milk, cheese, peaches, asparagus, pears, cherries, and tomatoes were established.<sup>87</sup> The various provincial marketing boards provided producer self-government because farmers could make decisions about production and pricing without political interference, at least nominally.<sup>88</sup>

By this time, agriculture's role in the Ontario economy had declined significantly. While agriculture had been among the top industries in Ontario in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the 1930s mining played a much larger role in natural resources employment. The percentage of the population employed in natural resource

---

<sup>83</sup> MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice,' 164

<sup>84</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 18.

<sup>85</sup> Hyman, *Tom Kennedy's Story*, 57.

<sup>86</sup> W.P. Watson, Toronto, Ontario, to Wilfed Bishop, 12 March, 1970 Archival and Special Collections University of Guelph Library, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Correspondence 1969-70.

<sup>87</sup> Drummond, 'Agriculutre,' in *Progress Without Planning*, 49; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 75.

extraction had declined significantly, dropping from 50 per cent in the late nineteenth century to less than 20 per cent by 1940.<sup>89</sup> While up to 1920 the total amount of land in Ontario under cultivation increased, the twentieth century saw an overall decrease in cultivated land.<sup>90</sup> During the 1930s, the number of farmers decreased dramatically. By 1933, the real net income per occupied farm was less than 40 per cent of what it had been in 1929.<sup>91</sup> Through the Depression, the economic position of Ontario farmers slipped, both in real terms and relative to the rest of the province. At this time, more than any other, the farmers of Ontario required marketing legislation that enabled them to unite against the challenges facing the farm population. The decline in Ontario's farm population and number of farms continued into the 1940s, a situation highlighted by the fact that far fewer young people were becoming involved in farming.<sup>92</sup> While the number of farmers decreased, the over-all production levels of Ontario's farms did not decrease largely due to a growth in farm mechanization.

Farmers increased the productivity of their farms while using less labour and land, through mechanization as well as scientific approaches to breeding stock and disease control.<sup>93</sup> Increased mechanization, however, required more capital which led to great financial difficulty for many farmers. There was little room for inefficiency and farmers attempting to make ends meet on small farms found this very hard, if not impossible. To justify spending more on machinery, farmers required additional land or livestock.

---

<sup>88</sup> Drummond, 'Marketing Boards in White Dominions,' 204.

<sup>89</sup> Drummond, 'What People Did,' *Progress Without Planning*, 21.

<sup>90</sup> The high point of cultivated area in Ontario was 1926, when 10.4 million acres were under cultivation; by 1941, this had dropped to 9.1 million acres, but between 1880 and 1940 the province nearly doubled its cultivated land. Drummond, 'Agriculture,' 31.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>92</sup> David A. Hay and G.S. Barsan investigate this trend in more detail in the chapter entitled 'The Western Canadian Farm Sector: Transition and Trends,' in *The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada*, ed. G.S. Barsan and D.A. Hay, 3-22.

Innovations increasingly found their way into the country home too, and living standards improved. Soon these innovations became less of a luxury and more of a necessity. Farmers were no longer concerned with simply maintaining the value of country life, but with maintaining, or better utilizing, their market share. Farmers began to apply the principles of business and industry to agriculture.<sup>94</sup>

As Canada once again went to war, the government called upon farmers to support the war effort. In December 1939, the Dominion government established a Bacon Board, under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Wheat Board, to control the export of meat products to the United Kingdom. The prices set by this board determined the prices received by Canadian producers. In order to support Canada's allies, the Bacon Board, later renamed the Meat Board, provided bacon to Britain at a low price and curtailed supplies to the domestic market to ensure the Canadian supply met British demand. As the production of meat increased, so too did the amount of meat staying in Canada. If farmers sold more meat on the domestic market, the average price paid out to the producers increased.<sup>95</sup> While the regulations of the Bacon/Meat Board provided an example of the governments' willingness to control meat production and marketing, the Board also served as a focal point around which hog farmers, especially those in Ontario, organized.<sup>96</sup> In early spring of 1941, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture encouraged county federations to send delegates to a meeting to discuss the establishment of an organization for pork farmers, with the intention of encouraging increased production. The initial meeting of the hog committee, held on 21 April 1941, discussed whether hog

---

<sup>93</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 134-35.

<sup>94</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 114.

<sup>95</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 15.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

farmers could use the *Farm Products Control Act* to develop a marketing scheme for their product.<sup>97</sup> To this point, no livestock producers had been able to develop a marketing scheme. This date marked the beginning of a new era for the Ontario hog farmer and livestock farmers across Canada.

Farmers across Canada experimented with various methods of marketing their goods, from voluntary pools to government supported marketing boards. Through these experiments, the farmers gained an understanding of the effective methods that they could use, and were legally allowed to use, in order to control the marketing of their products. The various marketing organizations, and the marketing legislation provided by the provincial and Dominion governments, established the ground-work upon which the hog producers of Ontario would develop their own marketing legislation.

---

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 4.

## Chapter Four: Developing the Hog Board

In 1941, the Dominion government controlled the marketing of Canadian hogs in order to ensure the United Kingdom received an adequate supply of good quality meat. This desire caused the government to encourage increased production, and it also led farmers to develop an organization of their own, in order to acquire the best possible prices. As the war ended, Ontario hog farmers grew concerned the government wanted to restore the free market, and they would lose the guaranteed income provided by the Meat Board. Following the Second World War, Ontario hog farmers utilized the powers provided by the *Farm Products Control Act* to establish an association, then a marketing agency, and finally, a co-operative shipping agency. With these organizations, Ontario hog farmers were the first group of farmers to establish an exclusive marketing agency. The Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (OHPMB) was the first producer board established as an exclusive marketing agency in Ontario, opening its office in April 1946. A web of legal and political struggles soon faced the OHPMB.<sup>98</sup> The Board faced many challenges, but it inspired similar boards across the country, making it an interesting case study to investigate the development of controlled agricultural marketing in Canada. An attempt by many of the original founders of the OHPMB to establish a co-operative packing plant reflected, among other things, the degree of control over the market that the OHPMB had established.

While there had been an attempt to develop a hog organization in the 1930s, many in government felt organizing hog producers in Ontario would be too difficult, as they

---

<sup>98</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 140.

were too numerous and widespread.<sup>99</sup> Government officials also felt marketing programmes were not generally suited to the sale of livestock.<sup>100</sup> While grain growers could potentially pool their crop and hold it from market, livestock producers would have to sell their animals when they were ready for market or risk seeing the quality of the animals deteriorate.<sup>101</sup> The 1935 Royal Commission on Price Spreads, known as the Stevens Commission, recognized the difficulty farmers faced in Canada, as there were far too few companies purchasing the goods and dictating the prices offered to producers.<sup>102</sup> The commission expressed specific concern over concentration in the meat-packing industry, where two companies, Canada Packers Limited and Swift Canadian Company Limited, controlled nearly 85 per cent of the industry's production. The Commission reported;

It may be fairly stated, therefore, that these two companies dominate the industry. Their buying and marketing policies affect their smaller competitors and largely determine the operating methods of the industry... The disparity in bargaining power between the farmer and these large packers is obvious...<sup>103</sup>

The strong control of the industry by these few companies had insulated them from the harshest conditions of the Great Depression. When, in 1929, sales of meat fell by 50.9 per cent and the return to producers fell by 56.8 per cent, returns to the packing industry only fell by 24.5 per cent.<sup>104</sup> These companies worked to ensure, even if the prices they paid to the producers dropped, the prices charged to consumers, and profits, remained high.<sup>105</sup> The Commission concluded there was a definite need for the organized marketing of livestock in Canada to enable primary producers to meet the oligopolistic

---

<sup>99</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 1.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>101</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 159.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

power of the packing companies. The Commission suggested creating a Live Stock Board, which would have the power to provide information to producers regarding production, marketing, stocks, and prices. The Commission further suggested the Live Stock Board have the power to deal with disputes between producers and processors and the ability to license and supervise truckers, dealers, and export packers. Finally, the Commission suggested the Board have the power: "To encourage the organization of producers of live stock for regular and orderly marketing."<sup>106</sup>

As early as 1925, it was recognized the quality of Canadian pork could not compare with other countries, especially Denmark; many felt this would change if Canadian producers were educated and improved production.<sup>107</sup> In this light, and with hopes of improving the meat provided to Britain, the Ontario government passed *The Cheese and Hog Subsidy Act* in 1941. This Act allowed the Ontario government to provide subsidies to farmers for hogs sold through regular trade channels.<sup>108</sup> The rate of the subsidies increased as the grade of hogs improved thus, encouraging farmers to produce better quality animals. The government also intended these subsidies to encourage continued production of both cheese and bacon for the war effort, without requiring the British allies to pay too high a price for these goods.<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 172-13.

<sup>107</sup> M.E. Maybee, Conservative MP for Northumberland had expressed this belief in 1925; Debates House of Commons, 4<sup>th</sup> Session, 14<sup>th</sup> Parliament, (1925) Vol 2, 1987. In 1929, Conservative Peter

McGibbon (Muskoka-Ontario) stated that Denmark set the standard for the world, in terms of bacon production; Ibid, 3<sup>rd</sup> Session, 16<sup>th</sup> Parliament (1929) vol 1, 803.

<sup>108</sup> The Cheese and Hog Subsidy Act, 1941, Statutes of Ontario, 1941 Chapter 11 and Regulations Respecting 1. Payment of Subsidies to persons who produce certain grades of hogs in Ontario 2. Payment of subsidies to persons who produce milk in Ontario which is subsequently processed into cheese (Toronto, T.E. Bowman, King's Printer, 1941)

<sup>109</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 9.

While the Ontario Federation of Agriculture initially intended the development of the hog producers association to encourage the production of bacon for the war effort, the desires of many of its members soon changed this. At the time, the majority of milk and cream producers also raised hogs, as they used dairy by-products to provide a cheap and reliable protein supplement for hogs. By this point, producer associations already existed for Concentrated Milk Producers and Whole Milk Producers, so many hog farmers had experience in the area of producer organizations.<sup>110</sup> While it was common for dairy farmers to raise hogs, feeding them with by-products provided from their other industries, by World War Two, large volume feedlots became more common and farmers began to specialize in hog production.<sup>111</sup> With this change, farmers developed a greater sense of solidarity as a group. Added to this new group consciousness was the fact that the average farmer, by 1941, was required to produce food for at least nine others, without additional labour. Producers had come to rely on farm implements, which increased the cost of production, yet farmers did not see any increase in the monies returned to them, especially during wartime.<sup>112</sup> In January 1941, the Ontario Concentrated Milk Producers Association declared its readiness to assist hog producers in organizing their own association and appointed Charles McInnis as their representative.<sup>113</sup> This appointment set the stage for Charles McInnis to play a major role in the future of thousands of Ontario farmers. In March 1941, when hog farmers met in response to the requests of the OFA, they expressed concern the Bacon Board did not include a representative for the

---

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 3; Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 129.

<sup>111</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 130.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 177, 199.

<sup>113</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 4.



producers. The hog farmers realized their lack of organization limited the government's ability or willingness to select a representative to sit on the Bacon Board.<sup>114</sup>

### *The Formation of the OHPA*

On 21 April 1941, the Ontario Federation of Agriculture held a meeting in the Seaway Hotel in Toronto attended by over sixty delegates. The intent of the meeting was to discuss the production and marketing of commercial hogs. The attending delegates passed a motion to organize the Commercial Swine Producers of Ontario. The meeting appointed a committee of individuals who would play a major role in the development of the hog producers' organizations including Charles McInnis, Wifred Bishop, and Charles Milton. The committee also included a member of the 1934 hog committee, Jack Reid of Kent County.<sup>115</sup> Members of numerous other commodity groups, such as the Cheese, Concentrated Milk, and Whole Milk Producers, expressed the desire to assist the hog board in its development.<sup>116</sup> Through the summer of 1941, the committee continued to develop an organizational strategy and a potential marketing scheme. From the beginning, it was clear the committee had high hopes for the organization and would not be a place for farmers to chat about their problems. The committee decided an organization of hog farmers was necessary, but funding such an organization would be difficult. The committee proposed a marketing plan which, when it came into being,

---

<sup>114</sup> Letter from V.S. Milburn, Secretary of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 25 April 1941, Archival and Special Collections University of Guelph Library, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>115</sup> Other members included C.P. McAllister, Walter Galbraith, W. Weber, R. Templer, Harry Hewitt, R.J. Scott, W.A. Amos, A.D. Wilson, Harry Wilson, V.S. Milburn and H. Huffman. Minutes of meeting of the Commercial Hog Producers' Committee of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 2 June 1941, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>116</sup> Letter from V.S. Milburn, Secretary of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 25 April 1941, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

would include a levy of two or five cents per hog, twenty-five per cent of which would go back to the county associations. The group also decided to retain a positive working relationship with the Ontario Federation of Agriculture and, in that light, developed a scheme to present to the OFA and from there the Farm Products Control Board. Drawing upon Jack Reid's experience, the committee decided to use the general principles of the 1934 group. The principles suggested by the OFA also included many of the suggestions made in 1935 by the Royal Commission on Price Spreads regarding the establishment of a Live Stock Board. The sixteen principles of the group, as outlined, focused on a variety of topics, including improving production through education and better disease prevention, improving the quality of Canadian bacon, to maintaining a place in the British market, and increasing domestic consumption of pork, which included reducing importation of vegetable oils and other fat substitutes. The most interesting principles focused on collective action. The group wanted producers to elect representatives to approach the governing bodies and pork packing companies. The committee stated their desire to ensure the producer received compensation for his product, on parity with the things he needed to purchase, while also developing a scheme that would regulate production according to the demands of the market. In total, they hoped their organization would provide leadership to the provincial industry and increase the bargaining power of the producers.<sup>117</sup>

Over the next few months, the committee of farmers travelled across Ontario to raise support for a commodity organization. By autumn of 1941, delegates from counties all over Ontario, except for the provisional county of Haliburton and areas termed "the

---

<sup>117</sup> Minutes of a meeting of the Commercial Hog Producers' Committee of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 2 June 1941, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association

territorial districts”, or Northern Ontario, had come together to organize the Ontario Hog Producers Association (OHPA). The constitution of the OHPA declared that it was designed to “assist the Ontario hog producers to improve the marketing facilities and marketing conditions of hog producers in Ontario.”<sup>118</sup> Throughout 1941 and into early 1942, the committee continued to meet with government representatives to discuss the Ontario Farm Products Control Board and its possible use by the hog farmers of Ontario.<sup>119</sup> In March 1942, a conference with the Minister of Agriculture, Liberal P.M. Dewar, and senior officials of the Department of Agriculture enabled representatives of the Hog Producers Committee to determine that public meetings should test the proposed plan, township by township, to gauge the farmers support for the plan.<sup>120</sup> While the committee clearly desired the creation of a commodity group, some officials were concerned about creating separate commodity organizations, fearing it would lead to confusion around what the Federation of Agriculture did. The representatives felt the commodity groups should remain a part of the OFA, and not act independently.<sup>121</sup>

By late March 1942, members of the committee informed the hog producers of Ontario that the OHPA, subject to the approval of the Farm Products Control Board, would govern the marketing of hogs in Ontario. A number of county hog producer organizations were also developed, either in the form of a separate Hog Producers’

---

Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>118</sup> *A Brief History of “Producer-Marketing” of Hogs in Ontario, 1941 -57, 2.* Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23, Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1941-57.

<sup>119</sup> *Outline of Development of Ontario Hog Producers’ Association*, dated Spring 1945, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Letter from J. Stewart Cooper, Ontario Department of Agriculture Representative, Grey County, to Wilfred Bishop, 10 March 1942. Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

Association or as a hog producers' committee of the county Federation of Agriculture.<sup>122</sup>

This required the establishment of a negotiating committee of farmers and processors to deal with the concerns of the farmers. The committee informed farmers of their plans to grant licenses to dealers and processors to better organize the industry. While the committee was concerned with the current economic situation, it was also clear the committee had the future of the industry in mind;

Among other purposes of less importance, your committee hopes that this proposed organization will bring new confidence in the industry to producers at the present time and so stimulate our contribution to the Empire's war effort. After the war, we hope that through our organization we may prevent hardships to the producers resulting from a very possible over-supplied post-war market.<sup>123</sup>

Farmer support for the plan grew and at the 7 April 1942 Annual Convention of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, the chairman of the hog producer committee, Charles 'Charlie' McInnis, stated the committee had received support from over 2,500 hog producers in Ontario. In more than forty-five meetings held in five counties, only one farmer had expressed opposition. Through seventy Farm Radio Forums, farmers had expressed their opinion on the plan, with the vast majority supporting the ideas.<sup>124</sup> Twenty-five counties gave unanimous support for the plan, whereas six forums had expressed concerns. Those in attendance at two meetings in Huron County felt the hog association should not be a separate association, but work directly through the Federation

---

<sup>122</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 14.

<sup>123</sup> Letter to Hog Producers of Ontario from Wilfred Bishop, 20 March 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>124</sup> Farm Radio Forums were meetings of local community groups, sponsored by the CBC, the Canadian Association for Adult Education, and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. Each week, members of the community would meet to listen to national farm broadcasts. After the broadcast, those attending would discuss questions presented by the broadcasters and the opinions were reported to provincial officers. Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 12.

of Agriculture.<sup>125</sup> With the results of these county meetings before them, the Annual OFA meeting (which was also the first provincial meeting of the Hog Producers), approved, in principle, the constitution and by-laws for a new commodity association and the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Scheme.<sup>126</sup>

Despite farmers' support of the plan, officials from the Department of Agriculture continued to voice the opinion that it would be too difficult to operate a marketing plan that handled the livestock for all of Southern Ontario.<sup>127</sup> The war in Europe also presented other problems for the organizers of the hog producers. In a letter explaining why the organization of the Hog Producers had stalled, Bishop stated; "We have found that federal control over prices and marketing has been such as to make impractical the use of the *Ontario Farm Products Control Act* as a basis for organizing Hog Producers in Ontario."<sup>128</sup> Instead of attempting to implement collective bargaining or a marketing scheme, the OHPA, working with the Ontario Department of Agriculture's Swine Committee, encouraged production. Farmers were encouraged to increase production and the material focused on how this increased farmers' profit while at the same time increasing support for the war effort.<sup>129</sup> The efforts of the farmers and the ODA met with some success and by 1942 hog production increased by nearly 60 per cent over pre-war levels.<sup>130</sup>

---

<sup>125</sup> Report of the Hog Producers' Committee of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture to the Minister and the Ontario Department of Agriculture, 1942

<sup>126</sup> 'Hog Scheme is Approved and Constitution Adopted,' *The Rural Co-operator*, Vol 6, No 8, 14 April 1942.

<sup>127</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 14.

<sup>128</sup> Letter from W.L. Bishop to D.J. MacDonald, 7 December 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>129</sup> 'Save the Little Pigs', Ontario Department of Agriculture, December 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>130</sup> Letter from P.E. Light, of the Bacon Board, to Wilfred Bishop, 10 July 1942, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

Throughout this period, and into early 1943, there was some confusion as to the power and position of the Hog Producers Association. As late as early 1943, Wilfred Bishop still signed his letters as Field Secretary of the Hog Producer Section of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, without asserting a separate role for the Hog Producers Association.<sup>131</sup> In April 1943, however, the OFA recognized the OHPA as a separate organization and granted the organization membership.<sup>132</sup> In the early years of the OHPA, confusion remained regarding the proper role of the organization. As the federal government continued to control marketing during the war, planning for producer controlled markets was moot. The OHPA was still interested in improving the prices hog farmers received and, with this concern in mind, continued to question the lack of farmer representation on the government's Bacon Board. The OHPA argued the lack of farmer representation did not follow democratic principles and, in fact, seriously hampered the war effort. In a letter to Prime Minister King, the secretary of the OHPA suggested that if the Bacon Board did not have farmer representation and called for more hogs to be sent to Britain, the price paid to producers would fall, as export prices were controlled and therefore below domestic prices. A decrease in money to producers would result in fewer hogs raised, and there would be less support for the war effort.<sup>133</sup>

The motions presented at the 1943 annual meeting of the OHPA reflected the numerous concerns of Ontario's hog producers. The accepted motions included requests for purchasers to state the basic price paid for hogs on return slips, along with weight and

---

<sup>131</sup> This can be seen through numerous letters collected in the Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>132</sup> Letter to Bishop from V.S. Milbrun, Secretary of OFA, 19 April 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

<sup>133</sup> Letter to Prime Minister MacKenzie King from Wilfred Bishop, 14 April 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20, Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941-June 1943.

grade. The assembled producers also asked the Bacon Board be composed of representatives from both the producers and packing industry. Despite this motion, farmers, in fact, never achieved representation on the Bacon Board.<sup>134</sup> Another motion asked processors and other individuals in the packing industry to levy one quarter of one per cent of the sale value of each hog producer to help finance the Association. Likewise, the producers passed a motion asking the provincial government to adopt legislation which allowed producers to collect a levy to finance those groups promoting the interests of a particular commodity group.<sup>135</sup> The proposed levy was of major importance, as the numerous county hog associations faced difficulty organizing, and lacked the funds needed to carry out substantial organizational efforts.<sup>136</sup> A representative of the government informed the OHPA that if it wished to deduct levies from hogs, it would have to enter into negotiations with packers and processors, and it suggested the association incorporate before it entered into any such agreement.<sup>137</sup> As it became clear that the war would soon end, farmers grew increasingly concerned about their position following the war.

The OHPA believed, as the war ended, the high war production levels encouraged by the government would result in production far out-stripping domestic demand, and this would lead to a drop in hog prices.<sup>138</sup> The Association lobbied the government to

---

<sup>134</sup> Letter to W.A. Goodfellow, Minister of Agriculture, from Morley Mills, 6 January 1961, Archival and Special Collections, University of Guelph Library, Collection relating chiefly to Ontario Hog Producers' Association; also files on the Hemlock Farm Co-operative, F.A.M.E., C.B.C. farm broadcasts, personal clippings and other matters relating to Morley Mills, 1958-1984

<sup>135</sup> Motions of Annual Meeting of the Ontario Hog Producers Association, April 14, 1943. Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941- June 1943.

<sup>136</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 22.

<sup>137</sup> Letter from Solicitor of Ontario Department of Agriculture to Bishop, 11 May 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence 1941- June 1943.

<sup>138</sup> Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Oxford Hog Producers Association, March 27, 1945. Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 13: Oxford County Hog Producers' Association, Constitution, Minutes.

maintain support for hog farmers and the government listened.<sup>139</sup> James Gardiner, Dominion Minister of Agriculture, contacted the OHPA to inform them the government had re-negotiated its supply contract with Great Britain to ensure producers would at least receive a minimum price for their products.<sup>140</sup> This relationship would last until at least 1947. The OHPA considered asking the government to guarantee a floor price for hogs, but others involved in the co-operative movement cautioned against this, as a floor price might encourage excessive production, further exacerbating the situation.<sup>141</sup> The Ontario Federation of Agriculture also demanded greater intervention from the provincial government, including measures to ensure the survival of price stabilization, collective marketing, planned production, and press for co-operative purchase and sale. The problem faced by farmers was not how to increase input to meet the demands of wartime, but rather decreasing supply to maintain prices.<sup>142</sup> Donald C. MacDonald, Leader of the CCF in Ontario, suggests that only during wartime, when the government implemented orderly marketing, did the farmers actually receive a fair deal.<sup>143</sup>

### *Developing a Marketing Scheme*

As the war ended, and the free market returned, the economic situation of farmers once again slipped into depression. One of the major problems facing the Association was the fact farmers delivered 90 per cent of their hogs directly to processing plants without any price negotiations and were thus, entirely dependent on the offers made by

---

<sup>139</sup> This began as early as 1943, as witnessed by a letter from Bishop to Members of the House of Commons from Rural Ridings, 26 November 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence July 1943- 1944.

<sup>140</sup> Letter to Bishop from James Gardiner, Dominion Minister of Agriculture, 23 October 1943, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence July 1943-1944.

<sup>141</sup> Letter to Bishop from R.J. Scott, President of the United Farmers Co-operative Company Limited, 9 June 1944, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producer Association Correspondence July 1943- 1944.

<sup>142</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 137-38.



buyers. The remaining ten per cent of hogs left on the open market set the open market price for hogs.<sup>144</sup> Farmers developed two schools of thought regarding how to deal with this situation. Some farmers supported building their own packing plants to benefit from some of the profits made in the meat-packing business. This was first attempted by the First Co-operative Packers of Ontario (COPACO) in the 1930s. Other farmers, led by McInnis and the OHPA, felt co-operatives would never give farmers complete control over their livestock products and urged the establishment of a strong marketing board.<sup>145</sup> Fearing the end of controlled marketing, the OHPA ensured they could achieve control over marketing.

By the post-war era, organized Canadian farmers had accepted the existing political system and were working within it, relying on the laws passed by the Canadian parliament and the Ontario Legislative assembly to support their organizations. Farmers seemed to move away from supporting a laissez-faire system, towards schemes for planned production and orderly marketing.<sup>146</sup> After the Second World War, industry in Ontario increased greatly, with a corresponding increase in well-paying jobs and non-farm jobs in general, resulting in the abandonment of farms in some areas and a decline in farm labour generally.<sup>147</sup> As their relative population once again decreased, Ontario farmers abandoned efforts to elect farmer political parties. Unlike farmers on the prairies, who supported the CCF or, in Alberta, the Social Credit, farmers in Ontario essentially

---

<sup>143</sup> MacDonald, *The Happy Warrior*, 233.

<sup>144</sup> History Objectives Marketing Methods of the Ontario Hog Producers Association, Marketing Board and Co-operative plus some observations of the economics of Ontario's Hog Industry; January 1958; Information Department, Ontario Federation of Agriculture.

<sup>145</sup> John R. Phillips, 'What Happened to Fame,' *Canadian Co-operative Digest* 8 No. 4, Winter 1965, 5, Leonard Harman/ United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection, Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises File 2, 1964-1965..

<sup>146</sup> MacPherson, 'An Authoritative Voice,' 180.

<sup>147</sup> Drummond, 'Impact of the Post-War Industrial Expansion on Ontario's Agriculture,' 84.

abandoned organized farmers' parties and largely supported the federal Conservative party.<sup>148</sup> On the provincial level, areas that once supported the UFO switched their support to the Liberals.<sup>149</sup> Despite a merger between the UFO and the CCF, the CCF did not find much support among farmers and instead relied on urban-industrial ridings for support.<sup>150</sup> Only the Conservative party possessed a solid base of dependable constituencies in the rural areas of Ontario.<sup>151</sup> Giving up on electing their own political representatives, farmers decided to work within the system and sought legislation to support their efforts.

Early in 1945, hog farmers circulated a petition requesting a vote for the establishment of a hog marketing scheme and collected over five thousand signatures. Responding to this overwhelming support, Kennedy, Minister of Agriculture in Ontario's Conservative government, announced the Department of Agriculture would supervise a vote regarding the formation of a marketing scheme. The proposed plan included authority for a body of hog producers to negotiate with packers and truckers. The proposal also allowed the OHPA to deduct a levy of two cents per hog, an amount seen as too low by the OHPA, but accepted for the time being.<sup>152</sup> By November 1945, the hog producers had secured draft regulations from the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board. The Hog Producers were required to present these regulations to all hog producers in every county in Southern Ontario for a vote. Districts in Northern Ontario were specifically exempt from the proposed scheme, by reason of geography and

---

<sup>148</sup> Wrong, 'Party Voting in Canada,' 253, 258.

<sup>149</sup> Wrong, 'Ontario Provincial Elections,' 399.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 400.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 402.

<sup>152</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 33.

isolation.<sup>153</sup> As the vote approached, representatives of the OHPA travelled across southern Ontario seeking support for the plan through county meetings.

In these meetings and the process up to this point, Charles McInnis emerged as the “most dynamic and colourful leader on the Ontario farm front.”<sup>154</sup> McInnis had experience in the farmers’ movement, having been involved in the Concentrated Milk Producers Board and having served on the Executive of the Ontario Federation of Agriculture. Described as “a unique personality” and as being “absolutely sincere, totally dedicated, honest, unselfish and eloquent,” McInnis was “wholly devoted to the betterment of the farmer” and “indefatigable”.<sup>155</sup> McInnis had strong views on how to improve the situation for farmers, and was oftentimes intolerant of those who disagreed with him. This led to tension and splits within the OHPA and his opponents viewed him as paranoid.<sup>156</sup> In his steadfast devotion to the cause of the organized farmer, and his suspicion of the motives of the government, corporations and even farmers who disagreed with him, McInnis was reminiscent of the farm leaders who had come before him, like E.A. Partridge, T.A. Crerar and J.J. Morrison. Without the energetic and dominating personality of Charlie McInnis, the OHPA would never have acquired the status and prominence it did, and Ontario would not have developed a compulsory hog marketing system.<sup>157</sup> McInnis fought “fire with fire” and “was certainly the undisputed leader” of the organized hog farmers’ movement.<sup>158</sup> While McInnis’ strong personality

---

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 33; Charley McInnis Walks a Lonely Road, *Monetary Times*, January 1966, 51; MacDonald, *The Happy Warrior*, 237.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.; Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 33.

<sup>157</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 33; Phillips, ‘What Happened to Fame,’ 6.

<sup>158</sup> Phillips, ‘What Happened to Fame,’ 5.

later caused problems for him and the organizations he was involved in, during the 1940s it benefited the Ontario hog farmers.

Following McInnis' "barnstorming" campaign across the province, nearly thirty-two thousand hog producers registered to vote on the hog marketing scheme.<sup>159</sup> Almost thirty thousand people voted yes and only two hundred and five voted no, thus authorizing the establishment of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (OHPMB). Those involved in the hog producers' association viewed the vote as a clear indication "...that the hog producers of Ontario were extremely anxious to break clear of the controls of the trade and enjoy a new economic freedom, by being able collectively to market their hogs."<sup>160</sup> With clear support of the proposed scheme, Ontario's hog producers were given the authority to elect a seven-person board with the power to control the marketing of all hogs in Ontario and regulate their sale in accordance with the *Farm Products Control Act*.<sup>161</sup> While the board experienced some difficulties bringing the scheme into effect, the OHPMB immediately went to work, opening its first office in April 1946.<sup>162</sup> The marketing scheme came into affect on 1 May 1946 under the authority of the seven-member board of Alva Rintoul, W.E. Tummon, Heber McCague, Wilfred Bishop, Norman McLeod, George Johnson and, Clayton Frey. Charlie McInnis was not officially a member of the board but, as President of the OHPA, sat in on meetings.<sup>163</sup> The Board and the Association, while officially separate entities, maintained close ties. The OHPMB provided substantial funds to the OHPA annually, ranging from \$14,000 to

---

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> *A Brief History of 'Producer-Marketing' of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57*, 4-6, Bishop Collection, Box 23 Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1941-57.

<sup>161</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 34.

<sup>162</sup> Minutes of Annual Meeting of the Oxford County HPA, 8 February 1946. Box 13: Oxford County Hog Producers' Association, Constitution, Minutes

<sup>163</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 36.

\$32,000.<sup>164</sup> These funds were provided by the levy on each hog sold. The annual meetings of the OHPA and the local organizations often included resolutions requesting the OHPMB to take specific actions or criticizing the board for actions taken. For example, a 1948 meeting of the Oxford County HPA executive criticized the members of the OHPMB for not following the established precedents of other farm organizations to achieve the best possible price for producers' products.<sup>165</sup>

Throughout the summer of 1946, a negotiating committee of representatives from the OHPMB and the meat-packing firms discussed the problems of the industry. By 1 March 1947, the committee developed rules respecting the sale of hogs and the Farm Products Marketing Boards approved.<sup>166</sup> The packers agreed they would grade all slaughtered hogs according to government standards and the trucking companies agreed to tattoo or mark each hog before leaving the farmer's lot, to ensure each farmer received proper payment for his hogs. These agreements reflected efforts to establish a universal quality program.<sup>167</sup> The changes also reflected efforts to end the under-grading and under-weighing farmers felt was common when selling hogs to packinghouses.<sup>168</sup> In a further effort to improve the quality of hogs, the Ontario legislature passed Bill No. 37 in 1947 to provide subsidies for hog and cheese production, and to assist the British in rebuilding their economy. The subsidy was useful in encouraging continued production as only Ontario hog farmers, among all the Canadian provinces, maintained their 1945

---

<sup>164</sup> Evidenced by the Auditor Reports for the Ontario Hog Producers' Association, in the Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 20 Folder: Ontario Hog Producers Association Meetings, Resolutions, 1947-59.

<sup>165</sup> Minutes of the Oxford County HPA Executive meeting, 6 March 1948, Box 13: Oxford County Hog Producers' Association, Constitution, Minutes.

<sup>166</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 39.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-41

<sup>168</sup> Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 162.

production levels. In his support for the bill, Agriculture Minister Kennedy stated Ontario hog farmers were not receiving everything they should for their hogs.<sup>169</sup>

Following the establishment of the negotiating committee, the OHPMB continued its efforts to improve the situation of Ontario hog farmers. Owing largely to the “old fashioned evangelist” rhetoric of ‘Charlie’ McInnis, the grassroots strength of the association was growing.<sup>170</sup> McInnis spoke out against interests that “exploited farm people,” declaring; “It was our fore bearers who cleared the land and built this country. Why should we be second class citizens?”<sup>171</sup> By 1948, county associations were becoming quite active, checking on local processors to ensure they were adhering to the marketing plan, deducting funds for the association, and paying out adequate prices.<sup>172</sup> The local associations also lobbied the government, to improve the situation of hog farmers and the provincial organizations representing Ontario’s hog farmers. At their 1948 annual meeting, the Oxford County HPA, members went on record to ask that the fees collected by the government on behalf of the local boards be increased to five cents per hog, as the two cent rate collected was inadequate.<sup>173</sup> The OHPMB was not able to change the marketing methods through its negotiating committee meetings. By 1950, the OHPMB and the county associations were discussing the establishment of a central marketing agency to control the sale of hogs.<sup>174</sup>

---

<sup>169</sup> Legislature of Ontario Debates, 3<sup>rd</sup> Session, 23<sup>rd</sup> Legislature, 10 March 1947, 44-45.

<sup>170</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 45.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>173</sup> Minute Book of the Oxford County Hog Producers Association from 1948 to 1961, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 13, 3.

<sup>174</sup> Minute book of the Perth County Hog Producer Association, 1947-1958, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 13, 8.

In 1951, the processors informed the OHPMB they would not negotiate prices anymore, effectively ending the work of the negotiating committee.<sup>175</sup> The negotiating committee had not been successful up to that point, as the OHPMB members stated whenever they mentioned a minimum price, the packer representatives on the committee reacted with hostility.<sup>176</sup> Following the end of price negotiations, the OHPMB immediately set to work to establish a central marketing agency to increase prices.<sup>177</sup> With the help of commission firms operating on the Toronto Stock Yards, the Hog Producers formed a new company, United Livestock Sales Limited (ULS). Under the authority of the *Farm Products Marketing Act*, the ULS began operating as the marketing agency for the OHPMB on 1 February 1953.<sup>178</sup> The ULS set the price for hogs by using the prices paid at other major centres, and publicized the information daily.<sup>179</sup> The ULS immediately met with serious difficulties. Opposition to the ULS came from those processors who extended under-the-table payments to transporters. Such payments often averaged at least \$1.00 per hog shipped.<sup>180</sup> Direct shipping to processors ensured the ULS only controlled ten per cent of the hogs on the market.<sup>181</sup> The ULS informed farmers they had to insist their truckers adhere to directives coming from the company since, in order to obtain the true value of hogs at the public market, the agency had to direct transporters

---

<sup>175</sup> Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products – R-118 - The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Marketing 19 May 1959, 38.

<sup>176</sup> Address from Charles McInnis to Annual Meeting of Ontario Hog Producers Association, 6 March 1957, Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection, Archival and Special Collections University of Guelph Library, File: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative 1948-1958

<sup>177</sup> Minutes of Perth County Hog Producers, 11.

<sup>178</sup> Letter to all Hog killers in the province of Ontario, from the OHPMB Secretary-Treasurer 12 January 1953, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: United Livestock Sales Ltd., 1953-54.

<sup>179</sup> Posting "To Whom it may concern," Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: United Livestock Sales Ltd., 1953-54.

<sup>180</sup> 'A Brief History of 'Producer-Marketing' of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57', 10; Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1941-57.

<sup>181</sup> 'The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Market', 39.

to deliver hogs to the Ontario Stock Yard.<sup>182</sup> Some opposition to the ULS arose from other farm organizations. A meeting held in September 1954 revealed that approximately 500 farmers were opposed to the ULS and had even asked the government to abolish the company.<sup>183</sup> In December 1954, the Ontario Farmers Union presented the OHPMB with its opposition to the ULS, suggesting the OHPMB hold meetings to find out how farmers would like their hogs to be marketed.<sup>184</sup> The objections to the ULS resulted largely from the belief that the OHPMB had given farmers' rights to a private company operating in the interest of its shareholders and not the farmers.<sup>185</sup>

The Ontario Department of Agriculture also weighed in on the situation. As 1954 drew to a close, the Department of Agriculture claimed a mistake had been made in the hog producer regulations and only the Farm Products Marketing Board could appoint a selling agency. The Hog Producers groups objected, arguing the government was in error on this judgement. Recognizing the principle of collective selling was working, and with some encouragement from the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, the Department of Agriculture agreed to the idea of a central selling agency. The Department of Agriculture laid out the terms under which it would be willing to accept the principles of collective selling and the OHPMB's appointment of a selling agency. First among these was that the selling agency should not be a private company, as it would be building up profits

---

<sup>182</sup> "Are We Creating and Maintaining Price by Directing Your Hogs", C.D. Black, General Manager of the United Livestock Sales Limited, 19 August 1953, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: United Livestock Sales Ltd., 1953-54.

<sup>183</sup> John T. Schmidt, 'Town and County,' Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 25 September 1954.

<sup>184</sup> 'Ditch ULS, Farm Union Urges Board,' Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 23 December 1954.

<sup>185</sup> 'A Hog Marketing Protest Meeting at Stratford,' Farmer's Advocate and Canadian Countryman, 9 October 1954.



through a government-delegated monopoly. The government suggested a co-operative be formed to take over the role of the ULS.<sup>186</sup>

In the face of this opposition, the OHPMB and the OHPA sought to reassure farmers of the importance of collective bargaining. Dispensing with the services of the ULS, the OHPMB created the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative (OHPC), to act as the marketing agency for Ontario's hog producers.<sup>187</sup> J.R. Kohler, General Manager of the ULS, was hired to act as General Manager of the Co-operative.<sup>188</sup> This hiring ensured that, while private shareholders no longer controlled the marketing agency, the management remained consistent. While the OHPMB had dispensed with the services of the ULS, it was not because the board was unhappy with the services of the ULS, but because it was responding to public criticism. The OHPC began operating as the selling agency on 30 May 1955. At this point, the boards of the OHPA, OHPMB, and the OHPC consisted of the same individuals.<sup>189</sup> While the different groups were legally separate entities, the overlap in board members ensured the concerns of one organization became the concerns of all the hog producers' organizations. When the OHPC was created, however, there were not many concerns. The OHPMB viewed the progress up to that point as favourable. The Board informed its members and farmers across the province that in the period since a selling agency had been established discrepancies in the prices of hogs between Toronto and Montreal prices had been cut in half, from Toronto's price being \$1.00 to \$1.25 below Montreal's price to its being only fifty cents below. Meanwhile the price gap between Toronto and Winnipeg, had increased. In 1951, the

---

<sup>186</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 88.

<sup>187</sup> 'Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative,' *The Ontario Gazette*, 21 May 1955, 21.

<sup>188</sup> Minutes of meeting of OHPC, 2 May 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

Toronto price was \$1.00 above Winnipeg but, by 1955, Toronto was \$3.50 above Winnipeg.<sup>190</sup>

In less than fifteen years, McInnis and the organized hog producers had made substantial progress. They had developed three provincial-wide organizations. By utilizing the marketing legislation of the province, the organized hog producers had changed the industry from one dominated by packers and processors to an industry in which farmers had significant influence. The establishment of these organizations was significant, yet over the next half decade significant challenges would arise, for the hog producers' organizations.

---

<sup>189</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 89.

<sup>190</sup> Letter to Executive, Presidents and Secretaries of the County HPA and County Federations of Agriculture from N.G. McLeod, Secretary-Treasurer of OHPMB, 2 June 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

## Chapter Five: This Little Piggy Goes to Court

Up to 1955, the Ontario Hog Producers Association, Ontario Hog Producer Marketing Board, and the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative precipitated major changes in the hog industry. They also established a pattern for other sectors of the agricultural industry to follow. As the hog producers created a stronger role for their organization by building a central selling agency and attempting to end processor control, opposition to their plans increased. Between 1955 and 1960, there were constant legal challenges to the organizations or their members, which threatened the existence of the Board. Despite these challenges, the hog producer organizations were able to maintain single-desk selling power, benefiting the producers. While farmers witnessed the rise of the single-desk, they also saw the failure of attempts to establish co-operative meat packing.

The first significant challenge came from Theodore Parker and received ample attention in the media. Parker, Reeve of Ellice Township in Perth County, voiced his opposition to the marketing plan and launched a legal challenge to the authority of the Marketing Board in February 1955.<sup>191</sup> Parker organized several meetings to attack and point out the flaws in the marketing plan. Parker often seemed confused as to the functions of the negotiating committee and the sales agency. Supporters of the hog producer organizations responded strongly to Parker's opposition.<sup>192</sup> By June 1955, the Supreme Court of Ontario informed members of the Board and hog farmers that the court case regarding the legality of the OHPMB and the central selling agency had been

---

<sup>191</sup> Bishop. *Men and Pork Chops*, 94.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

dismissed.<sup>193</sup> The OHPMB viewed the dismissal of the court case as a boost to its position, yet this was just the first of many legal challenges they would face.

As the Board and the Co-operative moved forward with plans to implement central selling, or placing the sale of all hogs under one agency, more legal troubles caused the organizations to hesitate. In October 1955, Conservative Premier Leslie Frost announced he would request the Supreme Court of Canada to rule on the validity of Ontario's marketing legislation. The OHPMB went on record expressing its willingness for the Ontario Hog Producers' Marketing Scheme to be used in this legal review.<sup>194</sup> However, the plans of the OHPC were delayed by this case, and plans to begin a direction program, which would legally require producers and truckers to sell through the agency and not directly to processors, were postponed. The direction program would require truckers to deliver hogs to established co-operative stockyards. The OHPC would then direct truckers where to deliver the hogs, based on the best price achieved through auction. The OHPC felt it could not enforce a direction program if the marketing legislation backing it was under review by the Supreme Court.<sup>195</sup> During the period the legislation was before the courts, the price of hogs dropped from an average of \$28.31 per hundred pounds to an average of \$24.00 per hundred pounds. Charlie McInnis presented this price drop as evidence that marketing legislation benefited farmers.<sup>196</sup>

Despite the pending Supreme Court decision, the OPHC moved ahead and constructed a series of stockyards and assembly points, which operated on a voluntary

---

<sup>193</sup> Letter to Executive, Presidents and Secretaries of the County HPA and County Federations of Agriculture from N.G. McLeod, Secretary-Treasurer of OHPMB, 2 June 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>195</sup> Minutes of OHPC meeting 31 October 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

nature. The Hog Producers intended to use the assembly points as a way to prevent direct shipping; truckers would be required to deliver hogs to these assembly points, located around the province. After the OHPC arranged a sale, the truckers would deliver the hogs to the company that purchased the hogs.<sup>197</sup> The assembly points would also allow the selling agency to distribute hogs from areas of over-production to those of under-production in the province, with the intention of improving the prices paid to farmers.<sup>198</sup> The OHPC continued its construction of stockyards through 1955 and 1956, with new yards generally being built near packing plants. In April 1956, the OHPMB canvassed the opinion of over thirty-four thousand hog producers and announced that 88 per cent of those canvassed voiced their support for the OHPMB's program. Based on this support, the OHPMB began directing hogs on a voluntary basis in the Grey and Bruce counties issuing directional orders, and attempting to forbid processors from taking hogs not bought on the open market.<sup>199</sup> Even with the authority of marketing legislation in question, the OHPC encouraged farmers not to participate in direct shipping. Farmers were told that those who allowed direct shipping were "...just cutting the throats of the farmers that are trying to do something for themselves. If we ever loose [sic] this fight, we will have lost all the ground that we have gained."<sup>200</sup> In June 1956, the meat packers

---

<sup>196</sup> Address by Charles McInnis to the Annual Meeting of the OHPA, 6 March 1957, Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1948-1958.

<sup>197</sup> Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products, 'The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Market', 39.

<sup>198</sup> Minutes of Eight Annual Meeting of Perth County Hog Producers Association, 24 February 1955, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 13: Minute Book of the Perth County Hog Producers Association, 1947-58.

<sup>199</sup> 'A Brief History of "Producer-Marketing" of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,' 21, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan, 1941-57.

<sup>200</sup> Memo to Campaigners of the Bruce County Federation of Agriculture, from W.P. Oswald, Secretary Fieldman of the OFA, October 1956, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

agreed to discontinue paying truckers bonuses to bring hogs to a particular plant.<sup>201</sup> In August 1956, representatives of the Canadian Council of Packers and the Domestic Packers approached the government to complain about the sales methods used by the OHPC. The dispute was brought before the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board in September 1956, with the Meat Packers Council complaining the method of sale used by the OHPC, auction via telephone, was not open and fair and prevented the major packers from having access to the needed proportion of hogs produced in Ontario.<sup>202</sup>

In January 1957, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled the Ontario *Farm Products Marketing Act* and the regulations of the Hog Producers' Marketing Board were legal. Following this announcement, the Board began to move ahead with its assembly yard program again.<sup>203</sup> The decision of the Supreme Court resulted in some amendments to the *Farm Products Marketing Act* and the *Agricultural Products Marketing Act*, which allowed farmers to market their products more effectively and delegated more power to local boards. In July 1957, a new set of hog marketing regulations came into effect, strengthening the legal status of the Ontario scheme. However, opposition to the Marketing Board continued, and the processors and Meat Packers' Council still lobbied the government to end the OHPMB.<sup>204</sup> Responding to pressure from the meat packers and farmers opposed to the marketing board, Conservative Minister of Agriculture W.A. Goodfellow announced in October 1957 the government would hold a plebiscite on the hog plan.<sup>205</sup> A large number of farmers expressed their opposition to another vote as did

---

<sup>201</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 111.

<sup>202</sup> 'A Brief History of "Producer-Marketing" of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,' 23, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan, 1941-57.

<sup>203</sup> 'The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Market', 39.

<sup>204</sup> 'A Brief History of "Producer-Marketing" of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,' 27, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan, 1941-57.

<sup>205</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 114.

the political opposition. Reflecting on the situation years later, Donald C. MacDonald, Leader of the Ontario NDP, stated;

the Tories said farmers had the right to work out their own marketing plan. Hog producers took them at their word and asked that no vote be taken on what sort of plan that should be until they'd had a year's experience with the new system of regional yards. Suddenly the government, pressured by its rural caucus members, who in turn had caved in to the big packers' lobbying, announced that a vote would be held in March (later delayed to July), when only fourteen of the producing counties had been able to set up assembly yards.<sup>206</sup>

G.F. Perkins, Chairman of the Farm Products Marketing Board, told the OHPA that when the farmers voted on the proposed scheme in 1945, it was never the intention hog producers would set up a marketing agency, especially one which established minimum prices.<sup>207</sup> The OHPMB itself did not express opposition to the vote, but its members were determined to ensure the plebiscite would be a victory for the association.<sup>208</sup> The hope was that, once the vote was complete, it would secure the future of the OHPMB.

The campaign period produced a fierce debate. While the OHPMB expected they would need only a simple majority of voters supporting the plan, 51 per cent, the Farm Products Marketing Board decided 66 and 2/3 per cent of voters would have to vote yes in order to maintain the Ontario Hog Producers' Marketing Plan. The list of eligible voters was comprised of producers, with one name representing each farm that produced hogs.<sup>209</sup> Supporters of the plan, including the OHPA and OHPMB, handed out information pamphlets which emphasized the "remarkable spirit of co-operation" that the

---

<sup>206</sup> MacDonald, *The Happy Warrior*, 235.

<sup>207</sup> 'A Brief History of "Producer-Marketing" of Hogs in Ontario, 1941-57,' 28, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan, 1941-57.

<sup>208</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 114.

<sup>209</sup> Package sent out to Ontario hog producers from the Farm Products Marketing Board, re: Ontario Hog Producers' Marketing Plan, 20 June 1958, Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1948-1958.

work of the hog producers represented.<sup>210</sup> Opposition to the plan presented its case as well; “Fronts for those parts of the packing trade who disliked the producer programme possible [sic] ran ads in newspapers. Under the signatures of producers they condemned the present methods of sale.”<sup>211</sup> The Ontario Federation of Agriculture supported the OHPMB in their campaign and articles explaining the marketing board appeared in urban newspapers.<sup>212</sup>

On 25 July 1958 hog producers across Ontario voted on the future of the hog marketing organization. Hog producers were presented with a ballot that read: “Are you in favour of the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Plan?”<sup>213</sup> The results of the plebiscite surprised both the supporters and opponents of the plan. The final tally of the votes showed that more than 37,000, or 68 per cent of those voting, were in favour of the board. This surprised the opponents of the board. The OHPMB and the Co-operative Union of Ontario felt the vote was: “a clear indication of their [producers] support and confidence placed in your organization and in Charlie McInnis himself by the producers of this province.”<sup>214</sup> The county-by-county breakdown of the vote further surprised the supporters of the board. Fifteen counties gave overwhelming support, at over 80 per cent; nineteen counties gave moderate support, from 60 to 80 per cent; and eight counties did not support the board, voting less than 60 per cent in favour. Supporters of the Marketing Board were shocked at the number of Western Ontario counties that voted

---

<sup>210</sup> ‘The Burford Marketing Point,’ March 1958, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 1955-61.

<sup>211</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 115.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> Testimony of Arnold Darroch, Supreme Court of Ontario.

<sup>214</sup> Letter to James Boynton, Secretary of OHPC from George T. Wilkey, Secretary-Treasurer of Co-operative Union of Ontario, 8 August 1958, Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection: Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative 1948-1958.



“no”.<sup>215</sup> The two counties that returned the highest support were areas that did not have compulsory direction. Many believed because the ballot was unclear, a “yes” vote merely supported the status quo. This misunderstanding led to further controversy regarding the vote.<sup>216</sup>

Complaints about irregularities in the vote were made public almost immediately. While the official poll results showed that 79,994 individuals were eligible to vote, only 37,151 or 47 per cent had voted. While 68 per cent of those that voted supported the plan, only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote supported the plan in the end.<sup>217</sup> A group of hog farmers and truckers, calling themselves the ‘Free Enterprise Hog Producers’, took the battle to the Supreme Court of Ontario. The members of the group presented information on problems surrounding the vote. Included in these complaints were stories of placards supporting the “yes” position being present at polling stations.<sup>218</sup> The Supreme Court heard of numerous hog producers whose names were not on the list, and whose concerns regarding the voters list were ignored by both the county clerks and Perkins, Chair of the Farm Products Marketing Board. The court was also told that a number of individuals were assured that, if they voted “yes”, their names would appear on the final voters list. There were also numerous cases of two or more individuals from the same farm operation voting in favour of the plan. The strongest indictment against the validity of the plebiscite was the statement that supporters of the plan, active members in the Hog Producers’ Associations and the Hog Producers’ Co-operative, were involved in

---

<sup>215</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 116.

<sup>216</sup> Testimony in the Supreme Court of Ontario from Arnold Darroch, Peter McDonald, Charles L. Coultis and Ross McTavish and on behalf of all Ontario Hog Producers who voted against the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Plan on July 25<sup>th</sup> 1958 or who were refused a vote vs. The Farm Products Marketing Board and John W. Drennan.

<sup>217</sup> Poll Results of the July 25, 1958 Plebiscite, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1958-68.

preparing the voters list. These groups were accused with ensuring that only the names of individuals who they knew supported the plan appeared on the list.<sup>219</sup>

While the Supreme Court considered the case, the Ontario Court of Appeals declared in January 1959 that the 1957 Hog Marketing Plan was invalid, as it was not simply an amendment of the previous scheme but had been created by new regulations.<sup>220</sup> After considering the evidence, Justice McRuer of the Supreme Court of Ontario declared the July 1958 vote was invalid, which led many in the press to state the hog-marketing program was also null and void.<sup>221</sup> This was another major setback for the organized hog producers, but as the OHPMB had organized under a plan voted upon in 1945, a plan that had been found valid by the Supreme Court of Canada, the hog producers were able to continue their work. The results of the vote and the court case put Ontario's Conservative government and the Marketing Board at odds. The OHPMB believed that the 68 per cent vote had demonstrated farmer support, entitling the Board to the right of some form of self-government. Frost's Conservative government stood its ground that the Farm Products Marketing Board should review all of the actions taken by producer boards.<sup>222</sup> Through 1959 and 1960, tensions ran high. The government, especially Minister Goodfellow and Everett Biggs, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, felt the methods used in selling hogs were not in the long-term interest of orderly marketing. Charlie

---

<sup>218</sup> Testimony of Arnold Darroch, Supreme Court of Ontario.

<sup>219</sup> The testimonies of Arnold Darroch, Peter McDonald, Joseph A Todd, John G. Gillies, Ronald Davies, Charles R. Coultis, Ross McTavish, and Howard Cogburn in the Supreme Court of Ontario contained lists of names of disputed voters and other discrepancies witnessed in the plebiscite.

<sup>220</sup> Secretary's Report for the Annual Meeting of the OHPA and the Semi-Annual Meeting of the Ontario Hog Producers Co-operative, 16 and 17 March 1959, 4, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 20: Ontario Hog Producers Association Meetings, Resolutions, 1947-59.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>222</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 117.

McInnis and Biggs toured the province to explain their respective positions.<sup>223</sup> The editorial page of *The Market Place*, the official organ of the OHPA, accused the government of being influenced by the big packers.<sup>224</sup> In January 1960, Agriculture Minister Goodfellow suggested a new plebiscite be held, in view of the invalidation of the 1958 plebiscite. The Conservative government also introduced Bill 86 in the Ontario legislature, amending marketing board legislation to give the provincial Farm Products Marketing Board more control over the operation of individual boards.<sup>225</sup> “In farm circles, and more particularly in hog producer circles, Bill 86 immediately became a ‘dirty word.’”<sup>226</sup>

The debate in the provincial legislature was fierce. Agriculture Minister Goodfellow suggested the Ontario hog producers had “repeatedly broken faith with the Ontario farm products marketing board.” Donald C MacDonald, Leader of the NDP, argued the government was trying to strip the power of democratically organized and operated marketing boards and place these boards under government trusteeship. MacDonald stated it was the meat packers who had breached the public trust. The packers, MacDonald said, had constantly worked to undermine the marketing schemes and had not accepted the work of the hog producers over the fifteen years they had been organizing the plans.<sup>227</sup> Farquhar Oliver, former leader of the Liberal opposition and a member of the Legislative Assembly originally elected as part of the United Farmers government, stated the government should support the farmers who had voted to create a marketing organization. Oliver made it clear that he was not necessarily supporting the

---

<sup>223</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>225</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 140.

<sup>226</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 122.

cause of Charles McInnis but that the Department of Agriculture was unfairly meddling in the hog producers' association, as the government was telling the producers what they could or could not do.<sup>228</sup> John Wintermeyer, Leader of the Liberal Opposition, stated that Bill 86 gave the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board complete control and denied the producer the right to appoint local boards.<sup>229</sup>

When Bill 86 passed in March 1960, it gave the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Board the power to dictate how commodity marketing boards spent their money. The act allowed the Farm Products Marketing Board, and through it, the government, to declare how farmers' boards could spend their money, including how much they could spend on education and promotional programs. The act allowed the government to prevent commodity boards from giving grants to other groups as well as enabling the state to put boards under trusteeship at any time.<sup>230</sup> Members of the OHPA viewed this as an attack against them, as the OHPMB had supplied substantial monies to the Association for educational purposes. Under the authority granted by Bill 86, the *Farm Products Marketing Act* placed strict restrictions on the hog producers' organizations. Responding to concerns of the meat packers regarding the sales methods of the OHPC, the Farm Products Marketing Board told the hog producers to develop a method of sale that allowed for full competitive bidding.<sup>231</sup> Following the passage of Bill 86, the Ontario government announced it was postponing the suggested plebiscite and a new date was never set. On 31 October 1960, the Ontario Minister of Agriculture announced several

---

<sup>227</sup> Ontario, Legislature, House of Commons, Legislature of Ontario Debates, 1 December 1960, 158-59.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 14 February 1960, 1112-13.

<sup>229</sup> 'Controversy Develops Over New Government Farm Bill,' *The Reformer*, 18 March 1960.

<sup>230</sup> MacDonald, *The Happy Warrior*, 236.

<sup>231</sup> Summary of Experience with the Hog Marketing Scheme in the Province of Ontario, Meat Packers Council of Canada, December 1960, 6, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1958-68.

changes in the hog producers' organization, including changing the method of sales and the method of electing members of the OHPMB.<sup>232</sup> By March 1961, the Board agreed to use a teletype system of sales, allowing open auctions on all the hogs the board sold, while also providing a record of bids presented.<sup>233</sup> Previous to this, auctions had taken place via telephone calls to the OHPMB office. Many packers felt this allowed the board to sell hogs to preferred packers, and not necessarily those that bid the most. This pleased the processors, because it eliminated concerns that hog producers were unfairly selecting which processors received hogs.

### *McInnis Moves On*

The membership of the hog producers' boards also changed significantly. Under the changes introduced by the Farm Products Marketing Board, the practice of electing members at large ended and all board members were henceforth elected to represent specific zones.<sup>234</sup> This was a direct challenge to the role of prominent individuals in the movement, including Charles McInnis who had served the hog producers' organizations from the beginning. Since the organization of the Board, McInnis served as an elected member at large. The elimination of these positions challenged McInnis' involvement in the movement. At the 1961 Annual meeting of the OHPA, OHPMB and the Co-op, a new method of electing representatives was instituted, based on eleven zones in the province. Farmers in each of these zones elected committee members, which, in turn, elected members to the Marketing Board from their zone. The 1961 election resulted in rival slates of candidates nominated for committee positions, with a clear line between

---

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Report on Hog Sales System Developed by the Bell Telephone Company of Canada, 7 March 1961, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 23: Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plans, 1958-68.

<sup>234</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 123.

those who promised to do away with the marketing plan and those who promised to support the old Board.<sup>235</sup> The Board that resulted from this new system included four members of the old Board, four new members who were known supporters of the marketing board system, and three opponents of the marketing plan.<sup>236</sup> New leaders were elected and, for the first time since their formation, the three boards had different directors and leaders. The Farm Products Marketing Board delineated the responsibilities of the three organizations. The OHPC was given authority over selling, the OHPA was in charge of promotion and public relations, and the OHPMB had authority over licensing while also having authority over the other two organizations.<sup>237</sup> Bill 86 significantly changed the make-up of the OHPMB and the OHPC, as well as similar organizations that came later, shifting them from groups controlled by farmers to ones the government could oversee and over-ride, if deemed necessary.

Among the largest and most important changes affecting the hog producers' organizations was the departure of Charles McInnis. McInnis had played a major role in the development of the organizations as President of the OHPA and as a board member on the OHPMB. McInnis' outspoken nature had aroused significant opposition and when he retired from his position in the OHPA, McInnis did so feeling his opponents had forced him out. McInnis explained he left the board with "a feeling of sadness" he could not explain. In a letter to Wilfred Bishop, McInnis expressed his feelings that the Board had fought "a battle against state control," a battle the Board had lost, and that he "experienced the shift from producer control to state control, a situation which will, as the years go by, do untold harm to the farmers of this province (Ontario)." He felt that the

---

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., 129.

new plan proposed by the government was doomed to fail, but he also stated he had not given up hope as there were areas where farmers could still work together.<sup>238</sup>

Bill 86 presented the end of an era. Up to that point, farmers had been inspired to work together through fiery rhetoric and appeals to the common good. Working together, farmers achieved substantial control over their products and were able to significantly influence the monies they received for their products. The hog producers stood united for the rights of farmers. While this had aroused serious opposition, Bill 86 did not end the development of marketing boards. Nor did Bill 86 end the efforts of farmers to unite and change the system they faced.

Following the passage of Bill 86, Charlie McInnis, long-time leader of the organized hog producers in Ontario, began to feel that working under the authority of the government through a local marketing board was a lost cause.<sup>239</sup> McInnis considered other ways to maintain producer control and influence prices. He came to support the establishment of a co-operative meat-packing organization, which would come to be known as the Farmers' Allied Meat Enterprises (FAME). McInnis later explained his efforts to "rationalize hog marketing to protect the growers had long been a thorn in the side of the agricultural establishment." McInnis felt that some members of this agricultural establishment attempted to "ease him into retirement" especially when they had made him the guest of honour at the 1961 Annual meeting of the OHPA, announced his retirement, and presenting him with a gift:

...as the aroma of the event drifted into the McInnis nostrils, the gleam of battle entered his eye. He rose to make the expected thank-you speech, but

---

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>238</sup> Letter from Charles W. McInnis, President to Wilfred L. Bishop, 27 March 1961, Wilfred L. Bishop Collection, Box 16, Folder: FAME 1960-63.

<sup>239</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 127.

instead spelled out in detail and with evangelical fervor [sic] his plans for FAME. Then with a grand gesture he presented his 'retirement' gifts to the new organization 'to serve the best interests of the Canadian livestock producers.'<sup>240</sup>

In his farewell address, McInnis declared that an inadequate proportion of consumer spending was reaching the farm. McInnis also criticized state control of marketing, in place of producer control of marketing, as introduced by Bill 86.<sup>241</sup>

McInnis and other individuals who had been involved in the OHPA since the beginning decided to establish a producer co-operative plant to extend farmer influence and provide competition for major processors. Led by McInnis, nearly 13,000 Ontario farmers invested money in an attempt to create a series of producer-owned processing plants. Hog farmers had expressed their support for such a plant over the years, through a variety of resolutions passed by county Hog Producer Associations.<sup>242</sup> A previous attempt to establish a co-operative plant had been undertaken by a group known as the Hamilton Co-operative Packers, operating from 1951 to 1953.<sup>243</sup> FAME was not officially associated with the OHPMB and while the Hog Producers Association had been the sponsoring body in its early development, after 7 April 1961, it was officially a separate entity.<sup>244</sup> Many of the directors of FAME were previous directors of the OHPMB, yet only Wilfred Bishop served on both boards concurrently.

The organizers of FAME aimed to create a large enough system of packing plants and buy enough livestock, as offered on the open market or by private sales, to raise the

---

<sup>240</sup> 'Charley McInnis Walks a Lonely Road', *Monetary Times*, January 1966, 52-53.

<sup>241</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 130.

<sup>242</sup> Minutes of Eleventh Annual Meeting of Perth County Hog Producers 13 February 1958, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 13: Minute Book of the Perth County Hog Producers Association, 1958-64.

<sup>243</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 58-63.

<sup>244</sup> Brief sent from R.W. Carbert, Directors of Information from the Canadian Federation of Agriculture to Leonard Harman, 7 April 1961, Leonard Harman/United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection, Archival



price of livestock to a stable and sufficient level.<sup>245</sup> FAME was to compete with the growth of large packing corporations, by achieving a vertical integration of production.<sup>246</sup> McInnis told farmers the producers could only get 30 per cent of what the consumers paid for the products. He believed the intermediaries, who took 70 per cent of the profits, were not all necessary and these were where the producers could achieve profits.<sup>247</sup> The plan for FAME included building seven packing plants across the province, and nearly \$2.5 million in shares and debentures were sold for this purpose.<sup>248</sup> By early 1964, however, FAME was unable to secure enough funds to begin construction on any plants and member interest declined. The FAME board felt that a building program had to be started.<sup>249</sup> In July 1964, FAME began to consider the purchase of a meat processing plant in Burlington and on 31 July 1964, the FAME board passed a motion to purchase the plant, at a price not to exceed \$3 million.<sup>250</sup> FAME was not able to obtain the necessary funds, however, and despite several attempts to secure bank loans, lost the packing plant and the \$1,500,000 it had already paid to the previous owner. In December 1964, McInnis resigned as President of FAME.<sup>251</sup>

FAME turned to other agricultural organizations, including the OFA and the United Co-operatives of Ontario, as well as the provincial hog producers' organization,

---

and Special Collections University of Guelph Library, Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 1, 1960-63,

<sup>245</sup> Report of the Commissioner under the Designation FAME Inquiry in respect of the affairs of Farmers' Allied Meat Enterprises, 23.

<sup>246</sup> 'Charles McInnis Sees Co-op market power as the key to a more stable farm economy,' *The Market Place*, May 1961

<sup>247</sup> Letter from Charles McInnis to Mrs. Miller, 19 February 1964, Leonard Harman/United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection: Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 2, 1964-1965.

<sup>248</sup> Report of the Commissioner under the Designation FAME Inquiry in respect of the affairs of Farmers' Allied Meat Enterprises, 28.

<sup>249</sup> Report from A. Service, Director, to Fourth Annual Meeting of FAME, 25 November 1964, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.

<sup>250</sup> Minutes of FAME meeting, 31 July 1964, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.

<sup>251</sup> Minutes of FAME meeting, 3 December 1964.

but the co-operative was unable to achieve the financial support necessary to secure the purchase of the packing plant. In January, upset members of the co-operative requested a provincial government inquiry look into the FAME situation and, at the end of February, Premier John Robarts announced that a full investigation would be undertaken.<sup>252</sup> The report of the Commissioner, released on 19 August 1965, stated that FAME's plans had been doomed from the beginning. He suggested FAME's directors did not have the business experience needed to run the co-operative packing plants, especially considering that the packing plant FAME had purchased was running at a loss for the two years before its sale. The report largely blamed McInnis and the directors who followed his suggestions without question.<sup>253</sup> McInnis, meanwhile, blamed unknown 'sources' for opposition to the plan, sources that spread opposition to FAME around the farming community.<sup>254</sup> McInnis also stated he had been unaware that the Burlington packing plant was losing money.<sup>255</sup> Other members of the FAME board, including Wilfred Bishop, felt a conspiracy existed to steal nearly \$2 million from farmers. Bishop went so far as to contact a private investigator and ask Ontario's Solicitor General to look into the matter.<sup>256</sup>

The most interesting aspect of FAME's organizational effort was that the very same individuals who attempted to establish the co-operative had previously created a system that would prevent FAME from operating as a successful co-operative. Many members of the FAME board had previously fought to provide the Ontario Hog

---

<sup>252</sup> 'Probe of FAME Set by Robarts,' *Globe and Mail*, 3 March 1965.

<sup>253</sup> 'FAME Report Brought Down,' *The Market Place* 10 No. 11 November 1965.

<sup>254</sup> 'Charley McInnis Walks A Lonely Road,' 55.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>256</sup> Letter from Wilfred Bishop to Larry Pennell, Solicitor General, 27 December 1965, Wilfred L Bishop Collection, Box 16: Fame 1964-66.

Producers Marketing Board with exclusive selling authority over hogs. Yet, it was this authority that prevented FAME, and any co-operative seeking to process and sell the products of its members, from doing so, as all hogs were required to be sold through the OHPMB via an open teletype system. The existence of this marketing legislation forced co-operatives to turn away from the traditional co-operative practices of only purchasing from their members.<sup>257</sup> The marketing legislation, in effect, ended the need and the capability of co-operatives to operate. Some supporters of the FAME ideal stated it was marketing boards that would be obsolete. It was suggested, while compulsory marketing was useful and unifying and an educative force for farmers, it would not be necessary when enough livestock was processed in co-operative plants.<sup>258</sup> In the end, the failure of the FAME experiment served two very significant roles. First, Charles McInnis retired to his son's farm, from any public role in the agricultural movement.<sup>259</sup> Secondly, with the loss of a significant amount of members' money, Ontario's farmers were scared away from attempts to establish producer co-operatives and relied instead on marketing boards to influence the industry.

---

<sup>257</sup> Report of the FAME Inquiry, 21.

<sup>258</sup> An Open Letter to Co-operative Leaders in Ontario from R.S. Staples, 16 December 1960, Leonard Harman/ United Co-operatives of Ontario Collection: Farmers Allied Meat Enterprises Co-op Ltd, File 1, 1960-63.

<sup>259</sup> 'Charley McInnis Walks a Lonely Road,' 51.

### **Conclusion: The Lasting Impact of the Hog Producers**

In 1962 and 1963, the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Plan received attention from other Canadian provinces, including representatives from Alberta which considered establishing its own marketing scheme, and the US.<sup>1</sup> After single-desk selling had been achieved, the focus of the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board (later renamed the Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board, and later yet, Ontario Pork) shifted to promotion of pork in order to increase consumption of, and thus demand for, the product. In 1964, hog producers supported the idea of spending up to four million dollars a year to promote pork.<sup>2</sup> In July 1966, the Canadian Swine Council, later named the Canadian Pork Council, was formed with representatives from hog producers all across the country.<sup>3</sup>

As the first marketing board to establish single-desk selling, the OHPMB fought many battles so other organizations would not have to, and many commentators viewed the hog industry as being the most difficult part of Ontario agriculture to bring under collective control.<sup>4</sup> During the 1960s, other marketing boards were established with controls more rigid “than anyone with responsibility in the Hog Organizations had ever imagined in their wildest dreams.”<sup>5</sup> Legal challenges to direction and selling programs, so common from 1955 to 1960, were no longer a concern. The Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board set the pace for other organizations to follow. It was the first marketing plan to involve livestock. The next animal plan did not appear until 1965, when the

---

<sup>1</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 148.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>4</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years*, 140.

<sup>5</sup> Bishop, *Men and Pork Chops*, 147.

Ontario Broiler Chicken Producers' Marketing Plan and the Ontario Turkey Producers' Marketing Plan were created.<sup>6</sup>

Following on the success of the hog producers, Ontario's milk producers established their own marketing board. Numerous producer boards representing different aspects of the dairy industry had existed since the 1930s, and meetings had discussed the idea throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, but the first official meeting of a milk marketing board for all raw milk was not held until August 1965.<sup>7</sup> Conservative Minister of Agriculture Bill Stewart considered calling a vote on the matter, but, perhaps remembering the problems that faced the hog producers, decided, if votes were cast, the community of milk producers would be split and the idea of organizing a board would be hopelessly delayed. Minister Stewart also felt the election of representatives to the board would result in a number of directors being elected who opposed the board, and thus the minister appointed the first board.<sup>8</sup> The development of the Ontario Milk Board was the very opposite of the story of the OHPMB. While the OHPMB had to fight to organize itself and struggled to survive against government opposition, the Milk Board was created largely at the government's behest that such a board should exist. While the Milk Board was opposed by many milk producers, it retained the support of the government, even when it implemented and expanded quota systems, and established a mandatory milk pool in 1968.<sup>9</sup> Milk producers in Ontario had long considered changing the marketing system but no one group or individual took charge, as McInnis did for the hog

---

<sup>6</sup> Reaman, *A History of Agriculture in Ontario*, 201-202.

<sup>7</sup> Biggs, *The Challenge of Achievement*, 29.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 92-96.

producers.<sup>10</sup> Failing this, the government led the charge to develop the Milk Board. Donald C. MacDonald warned the government was taking too strong a role in establishing the Milk Board, and the Board was in danger of being controlled by the government.<sup>11</sup> By 1970, the Milk Board was the sole buyer of all milk marketed in Ontario and the only source for Ontario processors.<sup>12</sup> By 1972, the Milk Marketing Board had withstood a challenge from the Supreme Court of Canada and established supply management for all forms of milk in Ontario.<sup>13</sup>

The development of marketing boards was an important step for Ontario's farmers because it provided them with some influence over the sales of their products. By 1965, nearly 60 per cent of the income of Ontario farmers was derived from the sale of products covered by some kind of marketing scheme.<sup>14</sup> At that time, only producers of beef and some vegetables did not have marketing plans, and 75 per cent of Ontario producers were organized under a local board. The use and development of marketing legislation occurred much faster in Ontario than the rest of Canada.<sup>15</sup>

Not all producers fully accepted the idea of having control over marketing. In the 1990s, pork producers in Ontario debated eliminating the single-desk selling mechanism and ending Ontario Pork's legal authority to act as the sole seller of hogs in the province of Ontario. Some producers suggested the single desk aspect of the marketing board lead to missed marketing opportunities for farmers.<sup>16</sup> In 1996, the marketing board issued a strong recommendation to end single-desk selling. In November 2006, Ontario Pork

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>11</sup> Ontario, Legislature, House of Commons, *Legislature of Ontario Debates*, April 1 1965, 1831.

<sup>12</sup> Biggs, *The Challenge of Achievement*, 103.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>14</sup> Rea, *The Prosperous Years* 139.

<sup>15</sup> Ontario, Legislature, House of Commons, *Legislature of Ontario Debates*, May 27 1965, 3309.

began a consultation process with Ontario producers to determine their feelings towards the board, with debates on the future of the pork producers including all individuals with an interest in hog production, including genetic companies.<sup>17</sup>

In 1957, over 37,000 hog producers voted in the producer plebiscite. This number represented less than half of the hog producers in the province. By 2005, according to the statistics presented by the Ontario Pork Producers, there were only 3,300 pork producers in all of Ontario, marketing 5.48 million hogs.<sup>18</sup> The change represented by these numbers is astounding. In fifty years, the number of hog producers in Ontario decreased by 96 per cent while the number of hogs produced increased. Similar changes can be seen across Canada's agricultural community, with the number of farmers decreasing while production remains at stable levels, or even increases. As the number of farmers decreases, their political influence and importance decreases.

Modern farming is defined by mechanization, relatively low labour input, and high yields. Production is nearly uniform across the country, and indeed around the world, with fewer than thirty crop varieties providing 95 per cent of the world's food intake.<sup>19</sup> Corporate influence and control have strongly affected farmers as part of an industrialized food system. Many farmers exist within the system and are able to survive. Small groups of farmers challenge the system, however, hoping to lead a revolution through a variety of alternatives like the slow food movement, which focuses on local and organic crops, or advocates other uses for crops such as producing bio-diesel or ethanol, in order to find new markets. Other farmers are struggling to protect the systems

---

<sup>16</sup> Don Stoneman, 'The Battle is joined on single-desk selling in Ontario,' *Better Pork* 7, no. 5 (October 2006): 6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 7

<sup>18</sup> Corporate Profile, Ontario Pork Producers' Marketing Board, 2005.

established for their protection, including government stabilization, supply-management boards, and the monopoly powers of the Canadian Wheat Board.

The farmers who developed alternatives are the latest chapter in the history of farmers who challenged the system and struggled to protect their rights and economic situation. Through the late nineteenth and all of the twentieth century, Canadian farmers worked to achieve a better position for themselves. An important part of this battle focused on establishing producer control over prices, or at least providing producers with a means to influence the prices they received. Farmers were, and are, numerous and diverse whereas the potential buyers are few and centralized. As farms became larger, producers required more goods that they could not personally make but had to purchase. With this in mind, farmers could not hold off selling their goods.

Agriculture is an important aspect of any society. The development of agriculture can affect a great number of things. Myths of agrarian-based settlement provide a cultural framework for many societies, and encourage citizens and politicians alike to look longingly at 'simpler' times when the population was closer to the earth. Agriculture had a serious impact on immigration patterns, as populations were encouraged to move to develop farming, such as the Canadian prairies and the U.S. mid-west. Agricultural practices can also have a significant impact on eco-systems, as a single, managed crop replaces native, natural plants. As animal husbandry expands, it can encourage the development and spread of disease. Agriculture was, and remains, an important industry to populations around the world, and the control of agricultural markets is only one of the issues currently facing farmers. In Canada, marketing boards developed as Canadian farmers struggled to maintain their place in society. While the

---

<sup>19</sup> David Hahn, 'Terra Madre 2006,' *The Union Farmer* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 17.



Ontario hog producers provide a good example of the difficulty involved in developing marketing boards, there are many other aspects of Ontario's agricultural history that could be investigated.

Canadian farmers are not strangers to collective action. To meet the difficulties facing them, farmers used a variety of methods. They flirted with political power but failed to achieve enough political strength to change the system. Farmers came together in voluntary organizations and co-operatives to "pool" their products, in the hope that controlling the sale of a greater proportion of the product would give more control to the producer. As these pools relied on voluntary adherence, many farmers viewed membership as a fair-weather arrangement, using the pools when it would benefit them but selling outside of the pools at other times. The achievement of marketing legislation was a major milestone in the advancement of farmers' collective action. Operation and success would not require voluntary action. Instead, the law required producers to follow regulations established by a board developed to represent the producers of the commodity.

Many of these boards merely established negotiating committees to act in the interest of commodity producers. The work of the Ontario Hog Producers' organizations, however, challenged the upper limits of Ontario's marketing legislation, by initially establishing a negotiating agency but eventually achieving single-desk selling, requiring all the hogs produced in Ontario to be sold through the Marketing Board. The level of control achieved by the Ontario Hog Producers Marketing Board met with opposition from processors, the provincial government, and some producers and eventually leading to a significant change in Ontario's marketing legislation that gave more control to the

provincial government and the Department of Agriculture. Changes to the legislation did not end attempts by farmers to organize and the control achieved by the hog producers was limited compared to the power held by later government-created organizations such as the Ontario Milk Marketing Board. While the Hog Producers Marketing Board plan allowed the Board to control when and where producers sold their hogs, the plan established by Ontario's milk producers would establish a quota system, enabling the board to determine how much each farmer could produce and market.

Supply management still causes considerable controversy. Some critiques argue the marketing boards involved in supply management have “economic, constitutional, and administrative law implications which are totally out of proportion to their relative obscurity,” even suggesting that, through supply management, marketing boards interfere with civil liberties and hold sway over Parliament.<sup>20</sup> Advocates of supply-management suggest that only through supply-management have producers been able to gain the upper hand in the battle between producers and processors.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Green, ‘Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada,’ 407.

<sup>21</sup> Wilson, *Farming the System*, 168.

## Bibliography

### Archives

Archival and Special Collections University of Guelph Library  
Co-operative Union of Ontario Collection  
George S. Atkins Collection  
Leonard Harman – United Co-operative of Ontario Collection  
Morley Mills Collection  
R.W. Carbert Collection  
Wilfred L Bishop Collection

### Newspapers/Magazines

*Better Pork*

*Co-op Commentary*

*Globe and Mail*

*Hamilton Spectator*

*Kitchener Waterloo Record*

*London Free Press*

*Market Place*

*Monetary Times*

*Ontario Gazette*

*Reformer*

*Rural Co-operator*

*Union Farmer*

## Published Sources

### Primary Sources

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates.

Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, 1935.

Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads on Food Products, 1959.

Canada, Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products – The Role of Co-operatives in Canadian Food Marketing, 1959.

Canada, Royal Commission on Price Spreads of Food Products – The Role of Marketing Boards in Canadian Food Marketing, 1959.

Ontario, Department of Agriculture, ‘Save the Little Pigs’ December 1942.

Ontario, Legislature, House of Commons, Legislature of Ontario Debates.

Ontario, Report of the Commissioner under the Designation FAME Inquiry in respect of the affairs of Farmers’ Allied Meat Enterprises Co-operatives Limited, 1965.

Ontario, Supreme Court of Ontario, Peter MacDonald, Charles L. Coultis and Ross McTavish and on behalf of all Ontario Hog Producers who voted against the Ontario Hog Producers’ Marketing Plan on July 25<sup>th</sup> 1958 or who were refused a vote vs. The Farm Products Marketing Board and John W. Drennan.

Ontario Pork Producers’ Marketing Board, Corporate Profile, 2005.

### Secondary Sources

#### *Journal Articles*

Badgley, Kerry. “Co-operation Pays and Pays Well: Co-operatives and the State in Ontario, 1914 to 1930.” *Canadian Papers in Rural History* 10 (1996): 165-190.

Booth, J.F. “The Economic Problems of Canadian Agriculture in the War and Post-War Period.” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 8 no. 3 (August 1942): 446-459.

Boyle, James E. “The Agrarian Movement in the Northwest.” *The American Economic Review* 8 no. 3 (September 1918): 505-521.

- Drummond, W.M. "The Impact of the Post-War Industrial Expansion on Ontario's Agriculture." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 24 no. 1 (February 1958): 84-92.
- Fowke, Vernon C. "Dominion Aids to Wheat Marketing, 1929-39." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 6 no. 3 (August 1940): 390-402.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Royal Commissions and Canadian Agricultural Policy." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 14 no. 2 (May 1948): 163-175.
- Green, Christopher. "Agricultural Marketing Boards in Canada: An Economic and Legal Analysis." *The University of Toronto Law Journal* 33 no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 407-433.
- Hirshleifer, David and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. "Future Versus Share Contracting as Means of Diversifying Output Risk." *The Economic Journal* 103 no. 418 (May 1993): 620-638.
- Hoffman, George. "The Entry of the United Farmers of Canada, Saskatchewan Section into Politics: A Reassessment." *Saskatchewan History* 30 no. 1 (1977): 99-109.
- Hope, E.C. "Agriculture's Share of the National Income." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 9 no. 3 (August 1943): 384-393.
- Irwin, Robert. "The Better Sense of the Farm Population: The Partridge Plan and Grain Marketing in Saskatchewan." *Prairie Forum* 18 no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-52.
- Kechnie, Margaret, "The United Farm Women of Ontario: Developing a Political Consciousness." *Ontario History* 77 no. 4 (December 1985): 267-280.
- Larsen, Grace H and Henry E. Erdman. "Aaron Sapiro: Genius of Farm Co-operative Promotion." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 49, no. 2 (September 1962): 242-268.
- Lewis, J.P. "Of Hogs and Men: The Wilfred L. Bishop Collection." *Collections Update* no. 20 (2004): [http://www.lib.uoguelph.ca/resources/archives/collection\\_update/20/WL\\_Bishop/index.html](http://www.lib.uoguelph.ca/resources/archives/collection_update/20/WL_Bishop/index.html)
- Lipset, S.M. "The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 13 no. 3 (August 1947): 410-428.
- MacGibbon, D.A. "Grain Legislation Affecting Western Canada." *The Journal of Political Economy* 20 no. 3 (March 1912): 224-253.

- MacPherson, Ian. "An Authoritative Voice: The Reorientation of the Canadian Farmers' Movement, 1935 to 1945." *Historical Papers* (1979): 164-181.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Missionaries of Rural Development: The Fieldman of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool: 1925-1965" *Agricultural History* 60 no. 2 (1986): 73-96.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Better Tractors for Less Money: The Establishment of Canadian Co-operative Implements Limited." *Manitoba History* 13 no. 2 (1987): 2-11.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Creating Stability Amid Degrees of Marginality: Divisions in the Struggle for Orderly Marketing in British Columbia, 1900-1940." *Canadian Papers in Rural History* Vol. 7 (1990): 309-334.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Some Fortune and a Little Fame: Co-operatives as Ladders for Upward Mobility in the Canadian West." *Journal of the West* 43 no. 2 (Spring 2004): 36-43.
- Marr, William L. "The Wheat Economy in Reverse: Ontario's Wheat Production, 1887-1917." *The Canadian Journal of Economics* 14 no. 1 (February 1981): 136-145.
- Montpetit, Eric and William D. Coleman. "Policy Communities and Policy Divergence in Canada: Agro-Environmental Policy Development in Quebec and Ontario." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 32 no. 4 (December 1999): 691-714.
- Norris, T.G. W.C. Hopper and R.A. Mack. "The Natural Products Marketing Act, 1934." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1 no. 3 (August 1935): 465-481.
- Patton, Harald S. "The Market Influence of the Canadian Wheat Pool." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 24 no. 165 (March 1929): 210-218.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Canadian Grain Pool." *Pacific Affairs* 3 no. 2 (February 1930): 165-180.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Observations on Canadian Wheat Policy Since the World War." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 3 no. 2 (May 1937): 218-233.
- Pennefather, R.S. "The Orange Order and the United Farmers of Ontario 1919-1923." *Ontario History* 69 no. 3 (1977): 169-184.
- Porritt, Edward. "Canada's National Grain Route." *Political Science Quarterly* 33 no. 3 (September 1918): 344-377.
- Reeds, Lloyd G. "Agriculture Regions of Southern Ontario 1880 and 1951." *Economic Geography* 35 no. 3 (July 1959): 219-227.

- Reid, Escott. "The Effect of the Depression on Canadian Politics, 1929-32." *The American Political Science Review* 27 no. 3 (July 1933): 455-465.
- Skogstad, Grace. "The State, Organized Interest and Canadian Agricultural trade Policy: The Impact of Institutions." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25 no. 2 (June 1992): 319-347.
- Tennyson, Brian. "The Ontario General Election of 1919: The Beginnings of Agrarian Revolt." *Journal of Canadian Studies* 4 no. 1 (1969): 26-36.
- Tobriner, Mathew O. "Cooperative Marketing and the Restraint of Trade." *Columbia Law Review* 27 no. 7 (November 1927): 827-836.
- Watson, J.W. "Rural Depopulation in Southwestern Ontario." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 37 no. 3 (September 1947): 145-154.
- Wrong, Dennis H. "The Pattern of Party Voting in Canada" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 no. 2 (Summer, 1957): 252-264.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Ontario Provincial Elections, 1934-55: A Preliminary Survey of Voting." *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 23 no. 3 (August 1957): 395-403.
- Young, W.R. "Conscription, Rural Depopulation and the Farmers of Ontario, 1917-19." *Canadian Historical Review* 53 no.3 (September 1972): 289-320.

#### *Books*

- Basran, G.S. and David A. Hay, Ed. *The Political Economy of Agriculture in Western Canada*. Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988.
- Biggs, Everett. *The Challenge of Achievement: The Ontario Milk Marketing Board's First 25 years of operation – 1956 to 1990*. Mississauga: Ontario Milk Marketing Board, 1990.
- Bishop, Wilfred L. *Men and Pork Chops: A History of the Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board*, London ON: Phelps Publishing Company, 1977.
- Davisson, Walter P. *Pooling Wheat in Canada*. Ottawa: Graphics Publishers Limited: 1927.
- Deutsch, John J., Burton S. Keirstead, Kari Levitt and Robert M. Will. Ed. *The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings*. Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1965.

- Drummond, Ian, Peter George, Kris Inwood, Peter W. Sinclair and Tom Traves. *Progress Without Planning: The Economic of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- Drury, E.C. *Farmer Premiers: Memoirs of the Honourable E.C. Drury*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966.
- Fairbairn, Garry Lawrence. *From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool*. Saskatoon, Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984.
- Fowke, Vernon C. *Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957.
- Good, W.C. *Farmer Citizen: My Fifty Years in the Canadian Farmers' Movement*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1958.
- Heick, W.H. *A Propensity to Protect – Butter, Margarine and the Rise of Urban Culture in Canada*. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1991.
- Hyman, Ralph. *Tom Kennedy's Story*. Toronto: The Globe and Mail, 1960.
- Irvine, William. *The Farmers in Politics*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920.
- Irving, John A. *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.
- Johnston, Charles M. *E.C. Drury: Agrarian Idealist*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.
- Kealey, Gregory S. Ed. *Class, Gender and Region: Essays in Canadian Historical Sociology*. St John's: Committee on Canadian Labour History, 1988.
- LaPierriere, Laurier, Jack McLeod, Charles Taylor and Walter Young, Ed. *Essays on the Left: Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971.
- MacDonald, Donald C. *The Happy Warrior: Political Memoirs*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998.
- MacPherson, Ian. *The Co-operative Movement on the Prairies, 1900-1955*. Ottawa: Canada Historical Association Books, 1979.
- McInnis, R. Marvin. *Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture, 1815-1930*. Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1992.



- McCalla, Douglas. *Planting the Province: The Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993.
- Morton, W.L. *The Progressive Party in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950.
- Patton, Harald S. *Grain Growers' Coöperation in Western Canada*. New York: AMS Press, 1928.
- Platt, D.C.M. and Guido Di Tella, Ed. *Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Rawlins, N. Omri. *Introduction to Agribusiness*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
- Rea, K.J. *The Prosperous Years: The Economic History of Ontario, 1939-1975*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Reaman, G. Elmore. *A History of Agriculture in Ontario, Volume 2*. Toronto: Saunders, 1970.
- Rennie, Bradford James. *The Rise of Agrarian Democracy: The United Farmers and Farm Women of Alberta, 1909-1921*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- Schull, Joseph. *Ontario Since 1867*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.
- Schulz, J. *Rise and Fall of Canadian Farm Organizations*. Winnipeg: J. Schulz, 1955.
- Sharp, Paul F. *The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948.
- Skogstad, Grace. *The Political of Agricultural-policy making in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- The Grain Growers Record 1906 to 1943*, Winnipeg: United Grain Growers Limited, 1944.
- Wilford, Allen. *Farm Gate Defense*. Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1984.
- Wilson, Barry. *Beyond the Harvest*. Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Farming the System: How Politics and Farmers Shape Agricultural Policy*. Saskatoon: Western Producers Prairie Books, 1990.
- Wood, Louis Aubrey. *A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.