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**EMOTIONS, METAPHORS AND REALITY**  
**A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO**  
**WILLIAM LYALL'S**  
***INTELLECT, THE EMOTIONS AND THE MORAL NATURE***

**A Thesis**  
**presented to the**  
**Department of Philosophy**  
**Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario**

**In partial fulfillment**  
**of the requirements for the**  
**degree of Master of Arts**

**by**  
**GABRIEL FURMUZACHI ©**

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## Abstract

In their work *The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Canada 1850-1950*, Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott consider that the Canadian way of doing philosophy uses reason in an accommodationist manner. I propose in this thesis that William Lyall's *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* represents a splendid example of the accommodationist use of reason.

The Maritimes philosopher advances the idea that emotions have a cognitive value, a claim which I support by trying to put Lyall's ideas in a modern framework offered by French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre. Latent in Lyall's work can also be found a theory of metaphor which I try to revive with the help of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur.

Thus, following Lyall, emotions and reason are always in a balance and they work together in order to give us a more consistent and fuller grasp of reality.

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## I. WILLIAM LYALL

The two extremes in philosophizing - the highly ideal and the low sensational - are equally at fault. They both equally subject the mind to a kind of necessity of action, or of being acted upon, instead of viewing it as **Being**, having laws by which it is regulated, indeed, but still possessed of a free activity, a personal existence, and an action within itself.

William Lyall  
(1811 - 1890)

This chapter aims to give a picture of William Lyall's philosophical ideas. His work *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* (1855) can be considered an example of the accommodationist theory of reason, as it is developed in Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott's study of Canadian philosophy and culture, *The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Canada (1850 - 1950)* published in 1981 (henceforth abbreviated as *Faces of Reason*). Briefly put, Armour and Trott consider that the accommodationist use of reason is (or, at least, used to be in the period of time analyzed in their work) typical of English Canadian philosophers and it implies that reason is used as a means to accommodate philosophical positions opposed to one's own in order to learn from them. However, their analysis of Lyall's work does not conclude on a very happy note. The Maritimes professor does not seem to have brought an original contribution to philosophy. Moreover, he seems, Armour and Trott consider, to be a representative of Canadian philosophy only in

name. My claim in this chapter is that contrary to the above considerations, Lyall should be taken into account in an attempt to configure a picture of philosophy as done in Canada. Lyall's particular understanding of the emotions (of the way they connect us with phenomenal world) and of their relationship with intellect in the imaginative state of mind is an original contribution which, however, is overlooked because it is not fully interpreted.

Lyall's philosophical ideas can be characterized as having an idealist streak, even though, as we will see, he rejects the sort of idealism that Berkeley, for example, or Hegel, practice. Moreover, there can be spotted in his work a tendency toward mind/body dualism which develops out of his struggle to meet the shortcomings of idealism and materialism. Following my explanation of Lyall's thought it will be easy to see that, if the sort of idealism described by Armour and Trott is indeed specific to Canadian philosophers, then Lyall's ideas fit their description very well.

Lyall's ideas are not easily accessible because of the peculiar way in which he narrows down what he thinks is worthy from the works of other philosophers regarding the issues that he analyzes. His understanding of the essential qualities of matter, where he "converses" with John Locke and Thomas Brown or the role played by emotions relative to morality, where he draws on David Hume's and Immanuel Kant's ideas illustrate this peculiarity.

Another issue that underlies Lyall's work is constituted by his proneness to using metaphorical language which is surely to be expected considering that he writes under the influence of the Romantic movement. However, this explanation is too simplistic and leaves undeveloped an important side of his work. The use of



metaphorical language marks the existence of a preoccupation with the productive capacity of language. Imagination is a key term here: the imaginative state is the place where emotions and the intellect (in its ability to create metaphors) meet, where they are under each other's influence. This represents an important issue, because although Lyall considered the intellect to be divorced from phenomenal reality and gave emotions full credit for making us a part of the world (an idea which will be analyzed in the second chapter), for connecting us with Nature, the intellect too should have been awarded this honour (this will constitute my preoccupation in the third chapter).

Therefore, in this chapter, after giving a general perspective on Lyall's *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* I will analyze the part that deals with his theory of emotions and I will look closer at how emotions are connected with the intellect in the imaginative state. I will try to emphasize some of the relevant aspects which will become the foci of further and more detailed considerations which will establish more clearly Lyall's status as a Canadian philosopher.

## AN OVERVIEW OF WILLIAM LYALL'S PHILOSOPHY

### Philosophy in Canada

Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott give an interpretation of philosophy as it was done in Canada by stressing a special use of reason which can be seen at work in the musings of most English Canadian philosophers. In the *Faces of Reason*, they state:

The single point which we would make here if we could make only one point in this book would be this: Dominantly in English Canadian philosophy, reason is used as a device to explore alternatives, to suggest ways of combining apparently contradictory ideas, to discover new ways of passing from one idea to another. Only rarely it is used as an intellectual substitute for force - as a device to defeat one's opponent, to show his ideas to be without foundation, or to discredit his claims to philosophical thought. There is, in short, a kind of philosophical federalism at work, a natural inclination to find out why one's neighbor thinks differently rather than to find out how to show him up as an idiot. (1981, 4)

Thus, for Armour and Trott, many of the early Canadian philosophers used reason in this particular accommodationist way. They shared "a willingness to attempt to understand and accommodate philosophical positions opposed to their own" (J.D. Rabb 1986, 93). In other words, the opinion of the Other counts. Dominantly, in Canada, following Armour and Trott's findings, the Other as such counts, whether it represents other human beings or Nature. It should not be dismissed

just because it asserts something different to what is expected or it assert itself - in as much as Nature is concerned - in rather unexpected ways. From the description given by Armour and Trott, one can infer that reason is not a rigid tool dividing and structuring ideas while being guided by very strict rules. Reason is the catalyst for mediating apparent confronting positions and not the tribunal where conflicting ideas meet. In their book, Armour and Trott look for "a particular way in which reason develops as it comes to be substituted for insight and intuition in order that certain kinds of conflicts might be overcome in a reasonable way" (1981, 18).

Reason, when used by Canadian philosophers, is thus seen as developing and as assuming different "faces", according to the inevitable changes that occur in either science or public awareness, or in its dialogue with faith or when different traditions are challenged. For example, John Watson saw reason as an ally in his concern to "develop and defend a kind of nationalism which would be compatible with a world order", to attenuate individualism "while maintaining a strong sense of human rights and liberties" (Ibid., 512). George John Blewett uses reason in order "to find a picture of the world in which the world is not a mere plaything of God's and not a mere machine. He wants to find a view of the world within which.. animal life comes to have a point beyond its possibilities for human food, clothing, and amusement" (Ibid., 514). Rupert Lodge is searching for "the *limits* of reason in order to establish a truce between the combatant parties so that he can create, in an educational setting, a common heritage while preserving a cultural plurality" (Ibid., 513). These examples, among many others, entitle Armour and Trott to come to the conclusion that in Canada, there is a

sort of philosophical federalism at work. Armour writes in "The Faces of Reason and Its Critics", an article in the journal *Dialogue*, that:

[I]n the period which Prof. Trott and I chose, we find the kind of philosophical federalism which one might expect under the circumstances. We found James Beaven, perhaps something of a bigot before he left England, trying to find a rational framework within which rival kinds of Christians could make common cause. We found philosophers of the Scottish common sense tradition, like William Lyall, becoming much more eclectic as their lives wore on in Canada. (1986, 76)

There is, therefore, something distinctive about Canadian philosophy and there is something which gives shape to philosophical ideas promoted by Canadian philosophers. However, it is not my purpose here to argue whether the thesis sustaining *Faces of Reason* is legitimate or not. Rather, what I am interested in is to see how William Lyall's work fits into the framework thus provided. In other words, given this matrix, I want to see how Lyall's ideas develop within it and also how they are appreciated by Armour and Trott.

### **Lyall the Philosopher, Lyall the Romantic**

What should be done now is to take a look at Lyall's philosophical background and, by surveying *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*, to sketch his philosophical stand point.

First, let us briefly consider the context in which the book was written. William Lyall taught philosophy at the Free Church

College in Halifax, which was later to become Dalhousie University.

Armour and Trott tell us that Lyall:

had been educated first at the University of Glasgow and then at Edinburgh, where he encountered the thought of Thomas Brown which was to leave a lasting mark on his philosophy. For a time he served as a clergyman and took part of the Free Church in the Great Disruption of 1843. He had a church in Linlithgow when, in 1848, he came to Ontario as a tutor at Knox College. Two years later, Paxton Young replaced him at Knox when he decided to accept a chair at the new Free Church College in Halifax. The Free Church College of Halifax had a staff of two: Lyall, who served officially as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Classical Literature, and Andrew King, who was Professor of Theology. In fact, Lyall taught all the arts subjects. (1981, 62)

Lyall was educated in Scotland where he encountered the philosophy of common sense. In Canada, after two years as a tutor at Knox College, he moved to Halifax where he taught not only philosophy of mind and ethics but all arts-related subjects as well. Lyall was, as it was written in the *Dalhousie Gazette* (20 December 1893, 136), "the whole Faculty of Arts".

The *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* is Lyall's major work. It touches upon many philosophical foci as it opens with an analysis of the intellect followed by an inquiry into the world of emotions, both of them constituting a picture of the human being in its uniqueness. The third part is made up of reflections on moral nature, where the conclusions reached in the first two parts are joined together in an attempt to explain how human beings coexist, how they come together in a community. However, according to F. Hilton Page, in *William Lyall in His Settings* (1980):

Lyall's book is very much a period piece. I do not say this to belittle it as I am myself rather partial to period-pieces, especially those of Lyall's own period...anyone reading Lyall's book now has to be aware of the conventions and attitudes of the time; otherwise his attention will be distracted from the matter to the manner of writing...There was a time when almost every Scottish professor of philosophy published his lectures. Volumes of lectures were almost as popular as volumes of sermons. To understand Lyall it is necessary to understand the peculiarities of the Scottish philosophy lecture of this period, on which his own lectures were, if unconsciously, stylistically modeled...[For Lyall,]...eloquent passages; taste, culture, moral and spiritual elevation...[were important]. (1980, 59-61)

Though I would not say that Lyall's book merely represents a collection of his public lectures, this explains, to a certain extent, why Lyall used it as a textbook for the classes he taught; for a good number of years, so did teachers in several other colleges (*Dalhousie Gazette*, 30 January, 1890). The "eloquent passages", the metaphorical language intertwined with philosophical explanations as well as the abruptness of the presentation and the multitude of ideas that unexpectedly spring up here and there leaving enough space for details in the classroom can thus be understood. But this, I think, is not the only explanation for Lyall's style.

Reading Lyall is often similar to reading from the works of a Romantic poet. In his work, quotations from poets rival with quotations from philosophers. That which cannot be explained by reason alone, by the intellect, is often characterized by Lyall as something that "defies definition" or is "unexplainable" and thus is engulfed in an aura of mystery.

When talking about the mind, for example, in an attempt to revise his ideas and his findings with regard to this issue in order

to reject the possibility that mind is merely an organic product, Lyall writes in the tone of idealist philosophy: the first idea one has is about oneself and it is followed by the one about the other than self, or "externality" which implies the existence of "matter wrapping up the mind". It follows the idea of substance, then those of space and time and power which become "the subjects of science". Science itself is something which develops, something which advances and mind's role "is not [to be] itself a mere law, but is conversant about the law"; it "is intelligent of it"; it "can unfold its own process or laws - is cognizant of itself".

But then, soon after talking about the mind employing concepts dear to the philosophy of the time, Lyall changes perspective and brings into discussion one of the faculties of mind, imagination and says that:

if we go into the region of imagination, if we mark the subtle process of that faculty, if we observe its potent sway - how it etherealizes or spiritualizes matter itself, clothes it in its own beauty, invests it in its own fair hues, scatters around its thousand spells, gives animation and meaning to every object by which we are surrounded, and to every sound that comes to us, to the lightest whisper of the breeze, and to the stillest rustling of the summer or the autumn foliage; which hears a voice in the gurgling brook, that comes from depths yet unfathomed by the mind itself, and listens in converse with the ocean as it murmurs unceasingly, and with Wordsworth, hears the sound of another ocean 'rolling evermore', when 'our souls have sight of that immortal sea which brought us hither': who will say that all this is the result of mere organization? Who would be a materialist who has ever felt the visitations of that spirit which comes to us when nature is still, which woos us in the moods and aspects of creation, who has felt - 'A presence that disturbs him with the joy of elevated thoughts', who has cultivated and cherished that presence, and is indeed hardly ever unattended by it, so that it meets him in

every pathway where the influences of nature are  
around him? (1855, 93-94)

Mind, therefore, according to Lyall, is not a product, is not "an organic result"; it is different from matter. The philosophical inquiry, guided by reason, as well as the emotions one experiences under imagination's spell bring us to the same conclusion which is that matter is not all there is and that the mind is not merely a product of it. This is, though, just an example among others.

As Lyall sees it then, metaphors and concepts work together for the benefit of a better explanation. A connection between philosophy and poetry is something which often develops in the Romantic period. Gilles Deleuze, in one of his lectures about Kant (1978), advances the radical idea that we never find those who understand philosophers among philosophers. In Kant's case, his best disciple was none other than Hölderlin. Time for Kant, to give an example, ceases to have a psychological or cosmological connotation. It becomes a pure form; it is not something that unfolds circularly but rather something that stretches itself, linearly. This kind of time is the pure and empty form in which, Deleuze claims, Hölderlin's Oedipus wanders. There is then an intimate connection between the findings of philosophy and poetic effusiveness.

But how is this related to Lyall? Is Lyall's affluence of poetic language intertwined with philosophical arguments a mere proof of his writing for the sake of an audience, for the sake of eloquent, though scholarly presentations? Is it proof of his being an incurable Romantic? Or does it imply something more than that? Can it be that his efforts were directed toward an attempt to unpack Romantic themes and common places in a philosophical milieu thus feeding the



philosophical reflection itself with meanings revealed by poetic creation? I think this question deserves an affirmative answer.

In sum, with Lyall, philosophical reason and poetic imagination meet; with Lyall, reason and emotion join hands and create a balance. This way, reason is not used as the one and only true philosophical tool, which is an idea that underlines the thesis sustaining Armour and Trott's *Faces of Reason*, that is, reason is used by English Canadian philosophers in an accommodationist manner.

### **Lyall's Method**

Let us now take a closer look at the content of the *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* in order to illustrate what I called at the beginning of this chapter Lyall's peculiar way of retaining what is useful from the works of other philosophers. Lyall's ideas were developed in close connection to the Scottish philosophy of common sense. He studied thoroughly Locke, Reid, Carlyle and, especially, Thomas Brown, as well as Descartes, Kant and Fichte. His way of dealing with things can be reduced to sorting and clarifying *intuitions*, "which are basic certainties which are given to us" (Armour/Trott 1981, 66), in order to integrate them into a coherent pattern. Once at this point, he re-examines the philosophical situation to see what other, new intuitions come to light. Lyall "tends to state a thesis, and then qualify it, qualify it some more, and then qualify it still further. After several pages of such qualifications we discover that he does not hold the original

thesis at all" (J.D.Rabb, 1990). For example, this is Lyall talking about the essential qualities of matter: he starts by saying that "we have thus, then, arrived at the essential properties of matter. These are extension, divisibility, solidity or fluidity, hardness or softness, and figure" (Lyall 1855, 47). Then, like Locke, he clearly distinguishes between these essential, or primary qualities and the secondary qualities such as color, sound, fragrance, heat or cold, sweetness or bitterness which "do not enter into our idea of matter". There is nothing surprising up to here. Other philosophers worked with this distinction in the European philosophical tradition. When one would expect that he is happy with the framework, he actually goes further, turning to the thought of his former teacher, the Scottish common sense philosopher Thomas Brown. With Brown's help, he manages to change the "bundle" of properties with which he started: "According to Dr. Brown, himself, extension and resistance are the only two qualities which can invariably be predicated about matter; for figure and magnitude are modifications of extension, - as solidity and fluidity, hardness and softness, are of resistance" (Ibid., 48). Therefore, from the original list of primary qualities - extension, divisibility, solidity or fluidity, hardness or softness, and figure, we are now down to just two - extension and resistance. At least this new qualification should satisfy Lyall. After all, how much further can he go? But he does not stop even here. "Dr. Brown has reduced the primary qualities to these two. They may be reduced still further, viz., to resistance, for extension is rather a property of space than that of matter" (Ibid., 48).

As can be seen, Lyall continuously qualifies his findings and this implies that a great deal of attention is required in order to

get the correct position that he maintains. This is Lyall's manner of presentation throughout the *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*.

### **Lyall's Understanding of the Intellect**

Now let us see what Lyall thinks about how knowledge is gained, what the role of the intellect is and that of sensation in this enterprise. Reading the first part of the *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*, one can be surprised by the struggle Lyall goes through in the attempt to explain how sensation becomes knowledge, how reality becomes idea. All this leads one further to think that he will not give up easily when it comes to the actual existence of the physical world. He cannot concede to materialism, because, on his view, materialism is "the proper spawn of too great an engrossment in mere matter, whether it be in the too exclusive devotion to the business and pursuit of life, or too entire an attention to the physical and mechanical sciences" (Ibid., 89).

On the other hand, he does not subscribe completely to idealist views either, because he continuously speaks about the world outside and the existence of both sensation and intellect. "It is a marvelous connexion which exists between the world without and the world within" (Ibid., 102). The mind cannot work without the data which sensation provides it. There are places in the first third of his book where he can be perceived as nothing but a mind/body dualist and not an idealist at all. "Mind and matter are the two

substances about which all philosophy is conversant. These two substances may be said to divide the universe" (Ibid., 13). Moreover, he repeatedly claims that:

Mind cannot be an organic result. True, sensation is partly material and the difficulty of deciding where the material part of the process or phenomenon stops, and the mental part begins, may be urged in favor of materialism; but sensation is not all the phenomena of mind, and while we confess a difficulty, we still mark the total difference between a material and a mental product. (Ibid., 92)

Hence, Lyall disapproves of both the extreme materialism of "extreme sensationalists", as he calls them, and the transcendentalism of the "extreme idealists". Rather, he finds a middle path between the two more satisfying. In order to prove his point, he distinguishes between *intellection*, which is "the action of the *mind as mind*" and *sensation* which is "partly corporeal and partly a mental function or state" (Ibid., 102). Thus, in the presence of certain sensations, the mind produces ideas like those of matter, substance, space and time, etc. Through them we gain knowledge of the external world. These ideas rest upon existing things in the phenomenal world; there is more to the world than pure ideas as there is more to it than pure sensations. The intellect provides us with scientific knowledge which develops on the presupposition that there is a material world.

However, for Lyall, the intellect is not the only source of knowledge. Let us recall Lyall's manner of presentation: he states a thesis and then qualifies it in order to find out what new intuitions come to light. The same approach is used when talking about the intellect: he assumes and acknowledges the implications of his statements and then he proclaims that the intellect is not the only

important element when it comes to explaining the way we gain knowledge. There is something else that also contributes to our understanding of the world. The intellect operates "from a distance", it is "wholly divorced from the physical world".

Lyall appears to be an idealist but not of the German kind nor of the kind professed by Berkeley since as we said earlier, he was very much against both of them. Lyall's idealism fits within the framework of a distinctive Canadian idealism which has as its most important particularity the search for a balance, for an equilibrium which will not be exclusive but rather accommodationist; in this case, a balance between reason and emotion. What I am talking about here is that Lyall finds necessary the use of another sort of reason apart from pure reason namely, practical reason.

For Lyall, practical reason is what completes our interaction with the world. It refers to our moral nature and to our emotions. Unlike the intellect, the knowledge gained through the use of practical reason is indubitable and reveals to us our true nature as moral agents and our obligations to others. Lyall writes:

There is a *practical* power in the sentiment. It has an authoritative voice within us which makes us feel our relation to being, and such relations as we dare not disregard. It is here that consciousness cannot be mistaken. There can be no discussion about the truthfulness of its intimations. The feeling within now is such that no dubiety rests upon it; it is practical, overwhelming. There is reality here if nowhere else. We have got out of the world of shadows into the world of realities - of mere consciousness into authoritative consciousness which speaks aloud, which enforces itself, which does not admit for a moment of questioning, which will not allow debate or parleying, which unites us in relations not to be broken with our fellow-beings, while it makes us realize to ourselves our own substantive existence and importance.  
(Ibid., 469)

The claim that practical reason is indubitable cannot be easily explained without first understanding how emotions work and how they work in connection to moral nature. Lyall recognizes the importance of the intellect in the process of acquiring knowledge but he still thinks that, by itself, the intellect is useless. It presents us with a picture of reality which is not different from the one Plato offers in the Cave myth, in the Republic. Lyall pictures phenomenal reality as having the same constitution as the shadows on the walls of Plato's Cave. However, unlike Plato, he considers these shadows to be the fabric from which the intellect tailors the phenomenal reality, a reality, though, which cannot be reached, which exists "out there", which can only be analyzed and dissected as a corpse in a laboratory. Lyall writes that:

[t]he intellectual part of our nature is a surpassing mystery - those processes by which the mind becomes all light, opens to idea of itself and the outer world of the universe, puts upon all that is external or internal its forms, while these forms have their counterpart without, or in the inner self, constructs science, and makes its own processes the subject of its investigation - but marvelous as this is, there are mysteries of our nature far greater than these and the intellectual part may be said to be the least wonderful of our compound being. (Ibid., 279)

The intellect, therefore, is an important constituent of our nature, but it is not the most important one. The intellect alone is not able to give us a proper account of reality. It needs the input of emotions.

Thus, we have seen that Lyall does not want to concede to either idealism or materialism. Instead, he wants to bring them to

an equilibrium and he does that by claiming that emotions should be given their due.

### **Emotions, Morality and Being**

After writing almost three hundred pages on the intellect and its functions, Lyall goes further and analyzes the emotions. The intellect loses its glamour and this is because the emotions come onto the scene. Without them, human beings would not be capable of action and action is that which make us what we really are. Actions are the way we assert ourselves in the world and become part of it. What Lyall seems to think is that the intellect has the capability to reflect upon any possible situation but without action it would not be different from what we would call today a powerful computer. Without action, human beings would live as if surrounded by a glass bubble. But actions themselves originate in the will and emotion is that which "provides us with the initial impetuous to action" (Armour/Trott 1981, 76).

Lyall claims that "emotion is a higher state than pure intellect" (Lyall 1855, 284). This is a serious affirmation and it has implications in his theory of moral nature. *Prima facie*, it looks as if he is going in the same direction as Hume on this point. "Hume and those who follow him treat emotions as essentially feelings ('affects' or 'impressions') with thoughts incidentally attached" (Neu 1977, 1). For Lyall, "[the] moral element comes from the region of duty, and may mingle with our

emotions, but the emotions themselves are distinguishable from that element, and are capable of separate consideration" (Ibid., 285). By saying that emotions are capable of separate consideration Lyall seems to reach conclusions very close to those of Hume. He says that the mind can recognize without a shade of doubt a distinction between rightness and wrongness. It does that with the same ease as it does when it has to distinguish between, say, two categories, or two numbers. But things get complicated when the question *why?* arises. "Can we explain *why* it is right, or *why* it is wrong - give any reasons for pronouncing it so? Now, it would seem that no account or explanation of this can be given, but that we perceive at once the quality of rightness or wrongness apart from any such explanation" (Ibid., 487).

Does Lyall's account of morality not sound like Hume's? After all, Hume is giving significant credit to emotions too. In his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1967) he argues that the role of reason in moral decisions is very limited and that moral approval is only a feeling in the mind of the person that makes a moral judgment. "Actions, he says, may be laudable or blamable, but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable" (Hume 1967, 458). There are several arguments which Hume brings forth to sustain his position. The first one is that reason involves only judgments about reality, but when one examines the content of a moral action, one does not have to deal with a fact. The only thing that is there is just a feeling. Moreover, moral pronouncements are closer to our way of experiencing aesthetic pronouncements, which are also feelings, and they are nowhere close to rational judgments. One could think that moral pronouncements develop in a similar manner to logical



and mathematical reasoning. But Hume argues that while in the disciplines of logic and mathematics we begin with known facts and discover a new, unknown fact, in the discipline of ethics, all the relevant facts must be known from the beginning.

Besides, according to Hume, moral actions are done with the sole purpose of happiness and, insofar as happiness is the goal, reason has to step aside. "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other" (Ibid., 470). The foregoing is a summary of what Hume has to say on this subject. But it does not exactly fit Lyall's framework. Towards the end of the second chapter of his work, where he is talking about emotions, Lyall notes that:

Man is not only a mere being, he is a moral being; has not only a place in creation, but has a part to perform in creation: he not only lives, and thinks, and feels - he wills - and not only wills, but wills according to a law of right and wrong. And this law is not arbitrary, it is eternal; it is not imposed, it is a part of his very nature. It belongs to every moral being, enters into the essence of a moral constitution. It is the law of duty, the law of right and wrong, a law of eternal and abstract propriety. (Lyall 1855, 468)

This time, it seems that Lyall moves a long way apart from Hume. But, let us not forget Lyall's manner of presentation: he states a position even though, in this case, he does not say clearly that this particular position is Hume's, and then, he qualifies it. But he does not stop there: he qualifies it again.

With this new qualification, Lyall is "talking" with Kant and his ideas about moral duty which arises out of the reverence for law. He goes further in analyzing the meaning of the word "reverence" and how it is connected with the concept of "duty" and that of "law". For Kant, an action performed out of duty "has to be done irrespective of all appetite whatsoever". Virtue is deprived of any trace of feeling and it is entirely subjected to the law. But, according to Lyall:

what I apprehend to be my law, I recognize to be so with reverence, which word denotes merely the consciousness of the immediate, unconditional, and unreserved subordination of my will to the law. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of it, is called reverence, and is regarded not as the cause but as the effect of the law upon the person. (Ibid., 509)

Thus, for Lyall, the will is determined and subordinated to the law. The same position is supported by Kant and, after what happened with Lyall's appropriation of Hume's position, first explaining it and then qualifying it, one might think that this Kantian qualification will satisfy him. But this does not seem to be the case either! Kant too is wrong. Why? According to Armour and Trott:

Lyall admires the formal aspect of Kant's moral theory. But this formal element is not, in his view, sufficient to account for morality. For we need to be impelled toward specific acts and outcomes. One can be determined to act coherently only if one is determined to act at all. And one must enjoy, amongst possible actions the choice already guaranteed by the open-textured ambiguity of the stimulus-response situation created by the nature of our emotions. Thus, a rule like Kant's categorical imperative - 'act only on a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' - is not sufficient. The gap, in part, is filled by the *original moral emotion which appears to us as a moral intuition*. (1981, 77, my italics)

Lyall accuses Kant of not admitting love to be a part of reverence. His almost instinctive reaction is to think that in all reverence there must be a certain degree of love, otherwise the reverence would be "mere fear". For Lyall,

it would seem to be necessary, in order to moral approbation being real, that there should be love as well as reverence for the law: it would be otherwise a distant reverence, not approval: there would be assent to the rightness of the law, not approbation. Distant reverence is at most a cold feeling, and it is not properly approbation till there is love. (Lyall 1855, 510)

Love is what Kant lacks in his account of morality. Lyall emphasizes greatly the concept of love. Love is the most essential emotion, love is that which connects us to the other, love is that which discovers a being for us. Love, next to sympathy, benevolence and gratitude, is one of the emotions which "*terminate on being*". Love has as its object Being but Lyall does not spend time explaining what he means by using the word "Being". It would seem that for Lyall Being expresses that which has a real existence. The world, for the Maritimes philosopher, is not a collection of sensations. It meets our gaze organized into things which stand apart, detached from their surroundings. Hence, there can be talk about love not only with regard to fellow humans but also love for Nature and everything that pertains to Nature. The only difference, Lyall thinks, is that the emotion of love increases proportionally with the purity of its object. Love of God is the absolute on the scale of which Lyall is thinking. "Moral and intellectual qualities give an immense increase to emotions", he writes (Ibid., 410). Moreover, he claims that:

we know that inanimate objects even may awaken our love, a kind of attachment, and this may be distinguished from the delight or pleasure which they give us; the one is delight *in* the object, the other is delight produced by the object. The former, then, is just love; and to say that love is delight in an object, or in the contemplation of that object, is to describe the emotion by itself. (Ibid., 392)

Such are, on Lyall's account, the implications that emotions have on morality. Now, we have seen that emotions (and more particularly the emotion of love) complete our "interaction" with what we call "the real" while the intellect could not go further than scientific understanding.

Lyall sensed that there is something left out of the scientific account of reality and only the emotions could connect us with it. Pure reason has to work together with practical reason in order to give us the complete picture of reality. Why? Because practical reason, unlike pure reason refers to the very being of what exists in Nature, of another human or of God. As J.D. Rabb explains in his Silver Jubilee lecture:

The emotion of love is a source of knowledge. Nature herself 'is animated, intelligent, full of sentiment'. This is the idealistic insight concealed from us by our narrow reliance on the intellect as our source of knowledge. Yet for Lyall the intellect is still important. It too is a source of knowledge. He devotes the first third of the book to it and to the characteristics of the material world it reveals. Unlike the Romantic poets or other ethical idealists, Lyall's idealism neither ignores nor diminishes as unimportant the findings of science. (1990)

Yet, the intellect, being "divorced" from the phenomenal world, being unrelated to the objects of the physical world, cannot build a bridge between us and the other-than-us. This is the task of emotion.

Emotion is "the atmosphere of mind; it is its vital breath" (Lyall 1855, 284). In Lyall's picture of the human mind, the emotions, "initially, are directed to objects in the world and, by reason of their connection to the secondary objects which are states of mind, they provide the background for the intellect" (Armour/Trott 1981, 76). This is why emotions are a source of knowledge and this is why we are able to see nature as "animated" and "full of sentiment". Lyall affirms that Nature, in a sense, resonates to our emotions and our emotions are in tune with Nature. In as much as we are sentient beings we resonate with Nature. The intellect does not have any means to reach the phenomenal reality with all its complexity. But, fortunately, we connect with Nature through our emotions and thus we are able to provide the intellect something with which to work, we are able to gain knowledge of reality and understand it.

In sum, we have seen that Lyall rejects the kind of idealism which stems from Berkeley's theory of ideas where the only thing that exists and that we are certain of is the mind. But this does not reflect well on Lyall. He could have criticized him by following either Hume and consequently, falling into skepticism, or Kant which he does not because he rejects part of Kant's ideas also. How then can Lyall's position be explained? The thing which might explain it is that Lyall became aware of the importance of Nature. His stay in Canada must have influenced him. He wants to say that, doubtless, Berkeley was wrong. Nature exists! Physical objects exist! This is what Lyall does: he finds out that the power of the intellect is limited but he does not desert the post. In order to have that piece of knowledge the mind needs but cannot get through the intellect, Lyall requests help from the emotions. Emotions can give us knowledge

about the world. Love is the emotion which unveils Being. Certainly, this emphasis on love and emotion would sound very strange for Berkeley and it would be strange for Kant as well. Hume would not have expected this turning point. But it seems natural to Lyall. Therefore, if there is anything that is worthwhile in Lyall's work it is his emphasis on the cognitive value of emotions which is an overlooked aspect of his philosophy because it was not fully interpreted.

William Lyall's philosophical work then is not just a "patchwork quilt" of foreign ideas, as Armour and Trott claim (*Ibid.*, 79). It is original, moreover, original in a Canadian way. J.D. Rabb recognizes that "His work is a splendid example of what Armour and Trott have called the accommodationist use of reason, of philosophical federalism" (1990). By classifying Lyall as an eclectic and by not investigating thoroughly his attitude to emotion, Armour and Trott felt entitled to accord him only a minor role in the general picture of philosophy done in Canada. It is not my intention to say that Lyall put a distinctive mark on the philosophical pantheon of ideas. But he did, most certainly, realize that in order to do philosophy at least in that part of the world, one must have open not only a rational eye, but an emotional eye as well.

The only thing lacking in Lyall, in the formulation and affirmation of his ideas, is confidence. The silent echo of a non-existent tradition springs through the chasms of the chapters of his work. He was an exile. He was supposed to feel at home, but he did not and he could not since his philosophical home was overseas in Scotland. Instead, he was in Canada trying to build his own shelter. He knew how to do it but he had to do it making use of what he was

offered there. And that, as J.D. Rabb recognizes in his Jubilee lecture, was Nature:

In so far as Lyall's idealism is concerned what is important, indeed crucial, is his claim, not merely that we can sympathize with nature, but rather that the emotion of sympathy can actually animate nature. Here he begins to sound more like a romantic poet than a rationalist philosopher: 'There is something in the voice of a brook which stirs the innermost emotions of the soul, placid, steady, deep; in the sigh of the wind; in the dash of the ocean; in the sunshine and gloom; in calm and tempest: our mind feels in all, has an emotion corresponding to each. Such is the law, such is the power of sympathy. What power does it exert in uniting society! What a bond of connection! What an amalgamating principle! And through it nature itself is animated, intelligent, full of sentiment, and the inspirer of the finest, and the most delightful, sometimes the most exalted emotions' (Lyall 1885, 461-462). (1990)

Not surprisingly, Lyall's development of ideas takes place abruptly. There is not a smooth flow of philosophical thought. He tries to set new views, but he does that in as an yet un-explored territory. The school he comes from, the school of Scottish philosophy, enjoys the richness of a tradition which did not exist in Canada, but whose existence was felt necessary. A tradition cannot come into being by using borrowed elements but only by using its own resources. A tradition is necessary because without it nothing can be labeled as new. Novel ideas cannot be recognized as new if there are no other terms to which they can be compared.

For Lyall, to use the traditional philosophical language and concepts of Western philosophy seems a seductive temptation. But they do not work any longer since the attitude toward the given of analysis has changed. This change explains the aura of eclecticism

surrounding Lyall's work. A certain philosophical tradition can only be reached when it gets to the point of finding a particular new form of communication. It finds its own identity when it develops a more free and efficient means of relating to the other traditions. It is only then that thought can follow its essential and natural questions.



### INTELLECT, EMOTIONS AND IMAGINATION

Now, after providing an outline of Lyall's work, the next thing I will do is examine more closely his ideas about the cognitive value of emotions and about their connection with the intellect in the imaginative state. Thus, understanding Lyall's classification of emotions, as well as understanding how emotions work, how they build the bridge between reality and the emotional being, will constitute my focus throughout the concluding section of this chapter. The fact that Lyall uses metaphors throughout his exposition will be emphasized in what follows because it is my contention that Lyall's understanding of emotions and metaphors as being connected and how they merge together in the imaginative state of mind are of central importance in comprehending his philosophy.

For Lyall, the intellect is "but a part of his [man's] compound being, and not [even] the most important part". Lyall talks about the mind as having two dimensions. He draws on the Cartesian conception that the mind's essence is thinking but he brings into discussion the Lockean view that thinking is the "action of the soul" and not its proper essence. This compels him to adopt a more balanced position with regard to this issue. "Thinking and feeling, however, are the two states of mind in which, if it exists in a state of consciousness at all, it must exist" (Lyall 1855, 289). They are distinct and they do not interact in the sense that one of them cannot be the master of the other. One's thought can provoke one to

have an emotion and, as well, an emotion is "the great prompter and enkindler of thought" (Ibid., 290). This means that both thinking and having emotions share the same honours, in as much as one is not the master of the other. Thoughts and emotions are bound together. The mind, as long as it is self-conscious, is also emotional. "Some one emotion or other, it may be said, is occupying or filling the mind every moment of its conscious existence" (Ibid., 290). It seems that Lyall is situated, once again, on conciliatory ground. He does not side with Plato and thus consider the intellect and the emotion as opposite with one, the intellect, being the master of the other; or with Hume where the emotion becomes the master and reason its slave. But this should not be a surprise, since we have seen that his work is a "splendid example of the accommodationist use of reason".

Lyall's definition of emotion is drawn from analogy. An emotion is a movement of the mind, consequent upon some moving cause. Regarding the emotion as a movement of the mind is an artifice based on the analogy of the mind with the body: "there is some analogy between motion of the body, or of any material substance, and this phenomenon of the mind, as there is an analogy between an act of the body and the acts of the will or the intellect" (Ibid., 286). Thus, in defining emotion as a movement of the mind, Lyall makes use of the metaphor, bringing together two remote terms ("emotion" and "movement") to try to give a description of "emotion". But he is quick to draw attention to the fact that emotion cannot be an "act" of mind because the only "active power" (again, another metaphor) of the mind is the will. This "movement" of the mind, Lyall recognizes, is something different than an act of the mind:

By an act of will, or an impulse from some foreign body, our limbs, or our whole bodies, are put in motion; and in the same way, by an act of will, or the impulse of other bodies, bodies other and foreign to ourselves are put in motion. There is impulse and motion. Now, in the phenomena of emotion, there is something like impulse, and the emotion of the mind is the consequence. An emotion is thus, more properly, any feeling of the mind suddenly inspired or produced; it is the feeling either in its first and sudden excitement, or the same feeling considered in relation to that first or sudden impulse or excitement. We call it a feeling, or, perhaps, an affection of the mind when it is not considered with relation to this impulse or excitement, but regarded in its continuous existence or exercise. Thus, love or admiration when awakened by any object, is an emotion; when continuous, it is an affection. (Ibid., 286)

Here Lyall draws a distinction between feeling (or affection) and emotion. The difference between the two is rooted in the difference between abruptness and continuous flow. When the state of an emotional person is precipitously altered by the object of emotion we are dealing with an emotion. When the altered state persists, then we are dealing with feelings. Moreover, an affect has a connotation of passivity. One is affected or being acted upon rather than acting. The common use of language corroborated with Lyall's proneness to continuously qualify his findings, compels him to disregard this distinction. He asserts that, when using the term "emotion" we also extend it to feelings because originally it regards the sudden rise of emotion. But this, by no means, should narrow the usage of the word. Thus, the emotions "take over" feelings and Lyall considers himself justified in writing that "the emotions are just the feelings" (Ibid., 287). Now is this new "qualification", this new achievement a legitimate one? On the one hand, it makes sense if one takes into account Lyall's desire to "stay in the domain of common

sense". But on the other hand, it diminishes the clarity of his exposition. Lyall is guilty of leaving things unexplained and considering that nuances are not relevant. As observed by Armour and Trott: "One would suppose that his system could, in this respect, be tidied" (1981, 74). If Lyall were concerned with the use of ordinary language and the fact that the term "emotion" got to the point where it can be used interchangeably with the term "feeling", he would have discovered that this term denotes different things in different contexts. Feeling words are not always employed in the same way, as one can see in examples like "I feel that this is the right way" and "I feel pain" or "I feel bad".

Moreover, there is another set of problems that arise when emotion is defined on the basis of an analogy with the "motion" of the body which implies that we have, more or less, an analogy with the phenomenon of sensation. This means that Lyall gives an account of emotions in terms of sense perception which does not hold very well for various reasons: in the first place, sense perception implies the existence of an organ of perception. But this is not true with regard to emotions. There is no organ for sensing the emotions. A question like "What organ do you use when you feel sad?" is nonsense. Also, the objects and state of affairs in sense perception exist independently of them being perceived. Can that be said about emotions? Can one have an emotion without knowing that one has that emotion? Can one also have an emotion without knowing which one it is, or genuinely mistaken about it? Perhaps we can as it happens when we are angry without knowing it. We seem quite readily deceived, self-deceived, and also willing and able to deceive others about it. However, Lyall does not show any interest in attacking this problem.

Moreover, sense perception involves perception of the intrinsic, non-relational properties of the objects perceived. Is that true about emotions? Warren Shibles in his book on *Emotion* (1974) distinguishes emotions from feelings on the following basis:

Because emotions involve cognition they can be shared, whereas, feelings cannot be shared. Sympathy involves having similar feelings or understanding another's feelings. Feelings do not have objects as emotions do. 'I enjoy golf' and 'I enjoy a feeling', but 'pain' in 'I feel pain' is not an object of the feeling but the feeling itself. One can enjoy a feeling but it is a category mistake to say he feels an enjoyment. If emotion were a feeling then it would seem that physical irritations and pains would have to be regarded as emotions. They are not. (1974, 143)

Thus, feelings and emotions are different. Shibles pointed out that feelings may be part of what we mean by emotion. "They may precede, coexist with or follow cognition" (Ibid., 141). But this does not imply that there is a relation of identity between feelings and emotions. Of course, one can reply to this that William James has built his theory of emotions on the supposition that emotions are feelings. For James, emotions are nothing but internal bodily sensations, that is, "the feelings or subjective sensible aspects of physiological occurrences caused by perceptions" (Lyons 1980, 14).

However, unlike James, Lyall sketches a distinction between feeling and emotion and then abandons it, leaving it undeveloped. Defining emotion by making use of the analogy with the "motion" of the body, Lyall does not raise the kind of questions asked above and thus, he fails to investigate a very rich area which would otherwise cast a brighter light on the issue he wants to analyze. But even if he does not make the distinction very clear, he does not fall into

the fallacy of ambiguity, reasoning now about emotions and then about feelings.

However, Lyall does distinguish between emotion and passion and between emotion and desire. Lyall describes emotion by comparing it to passion: "Emotion is generic. Passion is specific [...] Passion is but a stronger emotion [...] The desires are distinct states of mind. They may be accompanied with emotions, but they are not emotions" (Lyall 1855, 287). It seems that emotions are, as he said, quite generic. If any "movement of the mind" can be translated into emotion then we are under its spell for the majority of time. Indeed, if "the first essential condition of emotion would seem to be one of calm and placid enjoyment" and if this "might be taken as the first essential state of emotion" then "the balance of all the emotions would seem to require or necessitate a calm and settled state" (Ibid., 291). Anything disturbing this balance, this settled state, is an emotion but, in as much as emotion is "the movement of the mind consequent upon some moving cause" it means that there must be an impulse which acts like a cause. The cause or the impulse is represented by the feeling which, as we saw above, is the "first and sudden excitement of the mind". This excitement of the mind occurs in the presence of the object of the emotion. What then constitutes the object of the emotion?

For Lyall, emotions have two sorts of objects. There are *direct* and *indirect* objects. Thus, on one hand, when one loves somebody, when one is depressed about something, etc. we are dealing with direct objects. On the other hand, when the state of mind which "the emotion produces or the outcomes of the actions stimulated by the emotions" (Armour/Trott 1981, 75) are involved, we are dealing

with indirect objects, Armour and Trott explain. Examples of emotions awakened by a direct object are: delight, wonder, surprise and astonishment, admiration and adoration. Delight, for example, is produced by "every object that can minister to our enjoyment, that can give us happiness, that affords us pleasure" (Lyall 1855, 348). Wonder, is "that emotion which is awakened on the contemplation of something great, or by what is extraordinary, and out of the usual course of experience or observation" (Ibid., 358). A meteor in the sky, or "some phenomenon upon earth, which has never been seen before", or something that does not fit our ordinary, day to day occurrences, induces us to experience the emotion of wonder.

Melancholy, sorrow, joy etc. are emotions which do not occur as a result of the interaction with a direct object. Rather, these emotions rest on one's self awareness. Thus, in Lyall's account of emotion it is the case that:

We live in events and we are connected with objects [...] The events and circumstances that transpire daily, or that are ever arising, produce joy or sorrow, or excite fretfulness and impatience, or are lit up with the calm and the sunshine of cheerfulness, or again are steeped in the sombre shades of melancholy. The daily history of every individual is made up of these events, these circumstances and they awaken such and such emotions in the breast; and thus the tissue of life consists of those events without, and these emotions within. (Ibid., 346-347)

Sorrow, for example, arises out of our thoughts about death. "Death", writes Lyall making use of metaphorical constructions, "is the grim tyrant that shakes his sceptre over every individual of our race, and that will claim all for his dominion or his prey. We must bow our

heads in death, and the tribute of sorrow we have paid to others may be rendered to us" (Ibid., 340).

There are, however, two exceptions to the rule of emotions not occurring as a result of interaction with a direct object. The first one - if "cheerfulness is the harmony of all emotions" (Ibid., 303), as Lyall writes, then this implies that cheerfulness does not exactly have an object. It is, as it was said earlier, the condition of all emotions, their balance. It is not that, when being cheerful, one lacks emotion. For Lyall, the mind, at all times, is informed by one emotion or another. In the cheerful state, all the emotions are active but they are active in such a way that they counteract each other so they make possible a balance. Lyall writes that:

In the equilibrium of the atmosphere, all the elements seem to be at rest, and yet, they are all in harmonious action. When a balance is in equilibrium, neither of the sides seem to be in action; and yet it is because both are in action equally that the equilibrium is produced, or there is a rest on the point of equilibrium. So is it with emotions. None may be said to be in action, and yet all may be said to be in action, or capable of action, and only await the call for them at the proper time, or in their proper place. (Ibid., 303)

Thus, cheerfulness, being the harmony of all emotions actually lacks a specific object.

The second exception is represented by the emotion of love. "A thing loved", Armour and Trott explain, "is loved for its own sake. Since its ultimate sustaining object must be something which can be loved for its own sake and not for the sake of an indirect object, love, combined with intellectual understanding, must lead on to the



only thing actually capable of sustaining love for its own sake. That, in Lyall's view, is *being itself*" (1981, 75).

Since he views love as the most powerful emotion, Lyall dedicates numerous pages to it where he talks about different kinds of love: maternal love, filial love, love for country, erotic love, etc., about different degrees of it, and about love in its absoluteness. He starts in an Augustinian vein writing, more or less, that at the beginning there was love. "Love may be contemplated as an absolute emotion existing even apart from an object to exercise it or call it forth. It is a state conceivable prior to the existence of any being to call it forth. God was love in this absolute sense" (Lyall 1855, 405). Everything that exists is an object of God's love. Every human being, everything that is endowed with life, as well as every tree and every stone, every grass leaf, came to being as an exercise of God's love. Love is that which binds us all together. "We feel that we can regard with a kind of affection even inanimate objects; that our love, the absolute emotion, rests upon them" (Ibid., 406), Lyall writes. This means that love, by itself has an intrinsic value.

Through love, in Lyall's account, we are capable of rising above the limitations of immediate objects as such and see them as participating in Being. What does this mean? Armour and Trott explain:

we have then a link between thought and feeling. For only what is wholly unlimited can justify, finally, absolute allegiance. Suppose X loves Y. If X really does so, he does so unconditionally and without reservation. But, as he reflects on his situation, the limitations of Y must, in the end, become clear to him. As limitations, they suggest that they are occasions on which he should not give his unconditional allegiance to

Y, but this conflicts with his love. In the end, he can only justify the combination of the two kinds of awareness if there is an ultimate being which is inherently valuable and without limitation in itself and within which there is a special and unique place to be occupied by Y. In that case, the limitations of Y are simply part of what makes it possible for Y to occupy that place in being. But that is only comprehensible in the case that being itself does measure up to the conditions. (Ibid., 80)

Therefore, that which gives rise to love does not have much to do with particular beings but with Being itself. By realizing that we love something which is worthy of absolute value we establish a connection between our emotional side and our intellectual side.

By claiming that "love is the necessary condition of a perfect moral nature" (Ibid., 405), Lyall connects the realm of emotions and the realm of morality. Our awareness of love is an incentive for us to respond to our moral emotions. But this awareness is an act of the intellect. By itself the intellect would not be able to reach Being and it does not have the power to interact with the world. Through the emotion of love we have the possibility of conceiving that Being is intrinsically valuable and, in a more general way, through our emotions we are able to bridge the gap between the intellect and the world.

For Lyall, a human being who lacks the capacity of having emotions is not fully human. "The 'Stoic of the woods - the man without a tear', - 'impassive, fearing but the shame of fear' was yet capable of the strongest emotion - was roused to indignation - was fired with revenge - was touched with tenderness - was moved to sympathy - though he could conceal all under an appearance of indifference, or restrain all within the bounds of comparative

equanimity" (Ibid., 282). Being able to experience emotions is part of oneself and being conscious is another part. One cannot exist without the other. One's "mind warms under the sun that enlightens, kindles with emotion, and bursts into all the fruitfulness of moral and spiritual vegetation" (Ibid., 283).

Now, what is the link between intellect and emotion? The answer, Lyall thinks, lies in that faculty of mind that he calls *imagination*. Lyall's chapter on imagination is the last one in the first part of *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature* and it connects it with the second part, the one on emotions. Thus, in order to understand how it is that the intellect and the emotions are in close connection and how they interact, we have to understand what imagination is, because this faculty of mind, in Lyall's view is the meeting place of that which links us, as human beings who possess both the capacity to think and feel, with the phenomenal world and makes it possible for us to understand it. Following a Cartesian account, Lyall seems to believe that the intellect has knowledge of itself and through the emotions, has knowledge of the world, is connected with it, but only in imagination can it perceive of the human being as a whole in the world. We will insist on this issue in the next chapter.

But in the meantime, let us see what imagination is and how it works. Lyall talks about imagination after all other faculties of the mind have been looked at: conception, abstraction, judgment and reasoning. They all are faculties of the mind but, unlike imagination, they lack the peculiar state of mind which is the *imaginative state*. The ideas of the mind, where imagination is concerned, "are seen under or accompanied by a state, which gives to

them all their peculiarity; so that we have not merely ideas, but ideas of the imagination" (Ibid., 270).

Imagination is capable of bringing us into an emotional state because it filters reality in the sense that it makes us resonate with the phenomenal world. Through emotions we become attuned to aspects of reality which cannot be expressed using just the means offered by ordinary language. This is where imagination and metaphoric language come into play. Thus, due to our imaginative capacity, we are able to make sense out of verses like the ones Shakespeare wrote: "...come, sealing [sic] night,/Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day" (cited by Lyall, *idem*, 272). The eye is tender, the day pitiful and the night comes sealing them.

These words which provoke our imagination cast a different light on the real, on *what is*. By putting together words like eye and tender, day and pitiful or sealing and night, one awakens certain emotions in oneself. Lyall asks how this happens, when he writes:

Whence the power of these conceptions? or what gives them to us? It is the analogy that is couched in them? But every imaginative conception does not convey or embody analogy. And even where it is analogy - as this unquestionably is the principal source or vehicle of imaginative conception - that is the explanation of the beauty of any thought, the question is, why analogy should be such a source of beauty or produce such effects? What is there in analogy to do this, and only in some analogies and not in all? Many analogies are scientific, and have no imaginative character. It is not the analogy that will explain the imagination, neither is it imagination that gives a character to the analogy, but a certain state which we call the imaginative state, and which seems to be inexplicable, allows of certain analogies being imaginative, while others are not. (Ibid., 273)

Lyall's conclusion is that it is not the analogy that explains imagination but rather that imaginative state which, in itself, defies definition. The reason why it defies explanation is that it is partly intellectual and partly emotional.

My opinion is that, inasmuch as it is intellectual, imagination implies seizing analogies or putting together disparate terms under one name. In as much as it is emotional, imagination connects us with Being, with "what is". The intellectual part provides us with a theoretical frame, with a matrix, separate from reality which is filled up with the "flesh" of Being through the emotional part. As Lyall puts it in his own more careful language: "It is in the imaginative state that the mind is so active in perceiving analogies, 'seeking concretes', animating and personifying nature, and obtaining those figures of speech which have their element, or find their material, in resemblances and analogy" (Ibid., 274). This bit of text is one of the most important in Lyall's work on the link between the intellect, the emotions and imagination. It is true, it is located toward the end of his discussion of imagination but it is the peak whose versants are constituted by the intellect and the emotions. In the imaginative state, we discover the mind being active and perceiving analogies. In the imaginative state we find that Nature appears as animated, emotional. In this state, we are under the spell of the emotions. This seems like magic.

Now we must engage ourselves in the act of interpreting this text, and look for what each important concept means, how are they connected, how Lyall sees them intertwined. Most importantly, we must see how they will appear after employing the tools offered by a

phenomenology of emotions complemented with a hermeneutical approach to metaphor.

The bridge between the intellectual and the emotional is, as we saw before, the imagination whose most important characteristic is the imaginative state. Being able to imagine, to put ourselves in that imaginative state is what defines us as human beings, as both emotional and intellectual beings. The mind seeking "new concretes" when perceiving analogies brings to mind what Aristotle said, that "to be at inventing metaphors is to have an eye for resemblances" (Ricoeur 1976, 54).

The seeing of similarities, or analogies, as Lyall terms them, is the activity of the mind which, at its peak, creates metaphors. Thus, the active mind, in an imaginative state, which perceives analogies and personifies Nature, expressing it in a figure of speech is in fact the mind involved in the act of creating metaphors.

Moreover, in the imaginative state, personified and animated Nature is connected to us through our emotions. Thus, we have the metaphor which is a creation of our intellect and thus separated from the phenomenal reality but through emotion we are able to understand it "as if" it refers to something real.

Now that we have arrived at this point, I want to take this finding and introduce it into a new territory, whose coordinates are metaphor and emotion, this time though, viewed as they are regarded in modern philosophy. More specifically, by using Jean-Paul Sartre's existential analysis of emotions and Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. I will make emotion and metaphor the foci of the next two chapters.

## II. ON EMOTION

An emotion refers back to what it signifies. And, in effect, what it signifies is the totality of the relationships of the human reality to the world. The passage to emotion is a total modification of 'being-in-the-world' according to the very particular laws of magic.

J. P. Sartre

In this chapter I will inquire into how it is possible for the emotions to connect us with the phenomenal world and in doing so, I will explore the connection between imagination and emotion, all this, with the intention to develop Lyall's claim about the cognitive value of emotions. For Lyall the imaginative state has two parts, an intellectual one and an emotional one, and the emotional element is what connects us with reality. How does this work? How do our emotions link us to reality? And what kind of reality is that? In order to answer these questions I look for help in J.P. Sartre's theory of emotion.

For Sartre, emotion is a conscious transformation of the world, a "magical" world that is. I believe that Lyall, if offered the gift of phenomenology, would reach very similar conclusions to those of Sartre or, to put it in a different way, Lyall seems to anticipate Sartre by putting his analysis of emotions in a framework

which is not at all common to his time. However, Sartre's approach offers just a fictitious connection with the world because he was only able to see emotions "as fictive idealism", as Joseph Fell puts it in his book on the *Emotion in the Thought of Sartre* (1966, 236). Now, Lyall's assertion that emotions connect us with Being which, of course, should be understood as asserting emotion as an expression of God's existence. Thus, he avoids reaching Sartre's unhappy conclusion.

This chapter begins with a survey of four different theories which attempt to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. We need to do this survey in order to discover a framework that will best suit Lyall's views. What follows is a discussion of Sartre's theory which I consider most successful and its applicability to Lyall's, stressing their striking similarities and their important difference.

#### **FOUR THEORIES OF EMOTION**

William Lyons, in his book on *Emotion* (1980), distinguishes among four classical theories of emotion: the feeling theory, the behaviorist theory, the psychoanalytic theory and the cognitive theory. While the feeling and the cognitive theories of emotions have been the most influential and important in philosophy, the behaviorist and the psychoanalytic theories were valued the most in psychology. In what follows I will give a short description of each,



intending to emphasize their merits as well as their flaws. What I am looking for is a theory that connects emotion and imagination and involves the intellectual side as well and one that considers emotions able to create a link between the emotional person and the phenomenal world.

### **The Feeling Theory**

The feeling theory is based on the Cartesian account of emotions, as it appears in *The Passions of the Soul*. For Descartes, soul and body have different functions. The body's functions are movement and heat. All the movements of the limbs are explained by drawing on the movements of the animal spirits which are extremely small material bodies and "the most animated and subtle portions of the blood" (Descartes 1985-1991, 335). The soul's function is thought and it is of two sorts: actions or desires which either aim at something immaterial, for example God, or at moving our body; and passions which represent our reflective awareness of the disturbances occurring in the body. "Fear, for example, is the awareness of the animal spirits causing or tending to cause us, say, to turn our back and run away, and is caused by these animal spirits. That is why, for Descartes, emotions are passive or passions" (Lyons 1980, 4).

This explanation of emotion as passion implies that in experiencing an emotion we are merely aware of what our soul feels when there is something going on in the body. But the connection

between emotion and behavior thus described has a major flaw, pointed out by Lyons:

Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with Descartes' view of emotions is that it does not separate off what are commonly agreed to be emotions from what are commonly agreed not to be emotions. Given his theory, Descartes is forced to grant not merely that the subjective awareness of the bodily movements and physiological changes following on a perception of something such as a frightening animal, is an emotion, but also that the subjective awareness of the bodily movements and physiological changes following the injection of a drug or the onset of a disease, should merit the title 'emotion'. For after all the perception of the external object is not central to Descartes' account of emotion, for he does allow that some emotions, such as objectless and imaginary-object fears are caused entirely by 'temperaments of the body or [...] impressions which are fortuitously met with in the brain' (1985 - 1991, 356), and there is no rubric laid down as to how these in turn must be caused. So it seems that there is nothing against a disease or drug causing them. (Ibid., 7-8)

William James tried to straighten out Descartes' account of emotion by considering that, even though emotions are feelings, they are feelings "of the physiological changes and disturbances that went on during an emotional occurrence". According to Lyons, "[James'] hope was that, at least eventually, psychology would be able to distinguish emotions from one another, and from non-emotions, by reference to these observable changes" (Ibid., 12).

For William James, it is impossible to imagine an emotion occurring without physiological change. The emotion is our awareness or feeling of the bodily changes which themselves are ignited by the perception of the object of the emotion. This way, the only link between emotion and consciousness is the perception of the object. But it too acts only as a "causal antecedent to emotion". The idea of

an emotion dissociated from our feeling of the body is non-sense because then there is nothing left to it, James considers. If there is no increase in our heart beat making our blood rush madly through our veins, if our muscles do not contract and our hands do not become clenched into a fist, then how can we know that we are experiencing the emotion of rage? Feeling all these changes is what constitutes an emotion.

To sum it all up, even though James writes from a Cartesian perspective, "he took the feeling out of the soul and put it into a purely bodily arena, for his feeling was just the subjective side of the physiological changes involved, so that if the feeling was different for each emotion it was because the physiological changes accompanying each emotion must be different as well" (Ibid., 15). This distinction opens up the way to objective quantitative measurement in which the modern psychology of emotions is rooted. Once it had a specific given with which it could work, which could be used in experiments, psychology detached itself from philosophy and became a separate discipline. However, this approach to emotions, besides being too wide and inclusive, does not allow for any cognitive element to enter the discussion, save for the "perception of the object" which only acts as a "causal antecedent to emotion".

### **The Behaviorist Theory**

Behaviorism, roughly defined, is the theory or doctrine that human or animal psychology can be accurately studied only through the

examination and analysis of objectively observable and quantifiable behavioral events, in contrast with subjective mental states. Two of the most influential exponents of the behaviorist theory are J.B. Watson who is usually considered to be the "father" of behaviorist psychology, and B.F. Skinner, a modern representative. William Lyons observes that: "The behaviorist theory of emotions, like behaviorism itself, is a product of that period when psychology was breaking away from philosophy and seeking to establish itself as a natural science" (Ibid., 17).

Watson considered emotions to be part of the behavior patterns which are somehow inherited and not so much acquired. New-born children have these patterns unaltered and, thus, the place to look for "pure" emotions is in infants. "An emotion is an hereditary 'pattern-reaction' involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems. By pattern reaction we mean that the separate details of response appear with some constancy, with some regularity and in approximately the same sequential order each time the exciting stimulus is presented" (Watson 1919, 195). The emotion occurs when everything that concerns the stimulus and the mechanism of physiological response is *just right* so the effect produced by the stimulus is the intended one. But following this account we have to favor some stimuli over others and also we have to be able to explain why the same stimulus causes different emotional reactions in different subjects. For example, the sight and the closeness of a big dog might frighten a little child but the same big dog might be the pride of his owner. How can these different emotions be explained in these circumstances?

One way to explain emotional difference is by declaring that hereditary patterns change with one's psychological development. Acquired characteristics come onto the scene and they distort the hereditary ones. In fact, there cannot be a line drawn between what is inherited and what is not, between hereditary patterns and acquired features. This means that a very clear account of what it is to have an emotion is not really possible. For similar reasons it is not really possible to distinguish clearly among emotions. Even though Watson distinguished emotions which occur when "the adjustments called out by the stimulus are internal and confined to the subject's body", for example blushing, from instinctive reactions which happen when "the stimulus leads to adjustment of the organism as a whole to objects", for example, in defensive responses, grasping, etc., his argument is not strong enough.

Watson affirms that the hereditary pattern is thus shattered apart and it largely disappears. Lyons' assessment is that when this occurs we are left with very little to circumscribe the definition of emotion:

Watson has told us that an emotion is a 'pattern-reaction', chiefly of physiological changes, which is found in its unadulterated form only in the new-born child, though it is difficult to get clear evidence of this. Since he admits that this 'pattern-reaction' is adulterated or becomes etiolated, or both, soon after infancy, he is admitting in effect that with adults one cannot distinguish one emotion from another, or emotional reactions from other sorts of reaction, by means of a behaviorist account. Indeed, given the admitted paucity of his evidence concerning emotional reactions in the new-born, one can doubt his claim to be able to do this even with infants. (Ibid., 18)

Thus Watson's behavioral explanation of emotions is circular. He affirms that pure emotions are only experienced by new-born children and that emotional reactions alter soon after infancy to the extent that adults are no longer able to discern among different emotions. However, he brings little evidence in support of the idea that "pattern-reactions" in new-born children are pristine and therefore he fails to explain how they become altered with the passing of time. Watson's view is taken further and somehow improved by B.F. Skinner. Unlike Watson, Skinner does not stress the physiological changes nor the reflex behavior. Instead, he emphasizes the operant behavior which is that behavior whose outcome is the desired one.

What does it mean for Skinner to say the desired result is brought about by operant behavior? Suppose, for example, that X offends Y. As a result, X gets angry, clenches his fists, pounds the table, slams the door, etc. This kind of behavior will drive Y out of the way and thus, Y's offensive behavior, which started the scene will not be persisted in nor, probably, repeated. X was predisposed to emit this specific operant behavior (pounding the table and slamming the door) and the offensive behavior of Y was the promoter of it. But nothing guarantees that the above behavior is always exhibited by everyone. X might react in the way described above or might just calmly walk away and breath deeply, pretending there was no harm done. Moreover, it would be an impossible task to list all features of a specific behavior (angry) that must be present for that behavior to be considered as angry. William Lyons argues that:

Skinner's behaviorism, much more than Watson's version, is open to the difficulty that many instances of some emotions, and most instances of the others, exhibit little or no operant behavior. Grief, especially when it is about

something irretrievably lost or dead, does not lead to much, if any, operant behavior, because no behavior can bring about any desired results. For the desired result - that what is dead be brought back to life or what is irretrievably lost be found - is clearly impossible to achieve. But even angry people can be angry and not show it in operant behavior. That is, some people are just controlled, undemonstrative people. (Ibid., 22)

Simply put, Skinner's account takes away any chance for freedom we might have because there is no possibility for us to behave in a way that we consciously choose. Instead we only exhibit an operant behavior.

In the introduction to *Existential Psychoanalysis* (a translation of a major section of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, about the connection between existentialism and psychoanalysis), Rollo May gives a brief account of the exchange between Carl Rogers and B.F. Skinner at a 1960 conference. Told from Rogers' viewpoint, the exchange between them is the following:

From what I understood Dr. Skinner to say, it is his understanding that though he might have thought he chose to come to this meeting, might have thought he had a purpose in giving his speech, such thoughts are really illusory. He actually made certain marks on paper and emitted certain sounds here simply because his genetic make-up and his past environment had operantly conditioned his behavior in such a way that it was rewarding to make these sounds, and that he as a person doesn't enter into this. In fact if I get his thinking correctly, from his strictly scientific point of view, he, as a person, doesn't exist'. In his reply Dr. Skinner said that he would not go into the question of whether he had any choice in the matter (presumably because the whole issue is illusory) but stated, 'I do accept your characterization of my own presence here'. I do not need to labor the point that for Dr. Skinner the concept of 'learning to be free' would be quite meaningless. (Sartre 1966, 4)

The kind of explanation of emotions offered by the behaviorist theory takes away any conscious interaction between us, as human beings and the surrounding world. Everything happens without us participating in it. We just react, we just perform in the presence of certain stimuli. Thus, besides being too narrow and exclusive, this theory has nothing to offer in the way of a cognitive aspect underlying our emotions.

### **The Psychoanalytic Theory**

Another approach to the subject of emotions is offered by psychoanalysis. Of course, the inventor and chief exponent of this theory is Freud. Even though he did not have a specific and clear account of emotions: Freud called emotions "affects". However, because of Freud's main preoccupation with treating his emotionally disturbed patients, the only emotions that were considered were the negative emotions like fear, anxiety, etc. The emotions of this kind are resurrections of traumatic events which were repressed in the individual's unconscious. "Affective states", considers Freud in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1971), "have become incorporated in the mind as precipitates of primaevial traumatic experiences, and when a similar situation occurs they are revived like mnemonic symbols" (1971, 93). For Freud, an emotion has more to do with the individual's inherited repressed memories which themselves



are 'stored' in the unconscious. This way, an emotion occurs not primarily because there is an external cause for it but rather because it is connected with an originally traumatic and subsequently repressed memory. Lyons explains that:

Unlike the Cartesian, or the Behaviorist accounts for that matter, the Freudian account sees the external stimulus as acting only as remote cause of emotion. Events in the world cause us to react emotionally only insofar as they first stir up in us some instinctual drive or impulse, and insofar as this drive or impulse is repressed or blocked. Emotion is the safety valve that lets off psychic steam when the repression or blocking of the normal outlets becomes unbearable." (Lyons 1980, 29)

This implies that emotion is not primarily a reaction to the world but to something that is in our unconscious. "In anxiety", Lyons writes, "I am anxious, not because the situation is difficult or threatening, but because it triggers off some unconscious repressed desire which I find threatening or difficult to cope with" (Ibid., 29). But this sort of explanation would raise immediately some questions because there can be a great number of possible manifestations of anxiety, and choosing the one that fits best is a pretty difficult job.

William Lyons believes that J. P. Sartre proposes quite an interesting variation on the Freudian account of emotion. Sartre's account substitutes Freud's concept of unconscious with the concept of "magical" behavior. But the idea that emotion's significance does not consist in "ordinary perceptual consciousness" is still at work (Ibid., 28). Sartre's rejection of the unconscious is based on the fact that he observes that consciousness must always be aware of

itself. This awareness, however is not constantly made explicit in reflection; Sartre calls it a pre-reflective consciousness which does not take the self as an object. The two theories analyzed above - the feeling theory and the behaviorist theory failed to look at the body as a subject. Only treating it as an object, they failed as well at giving a pertinent account of emotions.

For Sartre, thoughts, dreams and feelings depend on consciousness, and consciousness is where one should look for explanations for them. Mental events are intentional events; they are always meaningful and they are always directed towards objects of their own. Thus, Sartre moves a long way away from Freud's perspective: "The Freudians are held to be wrong because they overlook the intentionality of mental events, and think that there can be an inductively determined causal relation between my dream, let us say, and some external object...a relation of which I, the patient, am not aware since the connection is made by me subconsciously. So the argument against bare causal explanations of mental phenomena and against the unconscious come to the same" (Sartre 1976, 9). Sartre sees emotion not as an accident, but as a "mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands (in Heidegger's sense of *Verstehen*) its Being-in-the-World" (Ibid., 91). This, I think, brings him closer to a cognitive theory of emotion, which will be discussed next.

## The Cognitive Theory

As regards the cognitive theory of emotion, Aristotle seems to be the first who took this approach among philosophers. However, he did not analyze it in *De Anima* as one would expect, but rather in the *Rhetoric*. In his book on Aristotle's concept of emotion, W. W. Fortenbaugh notes that:

In the second book of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines anger as a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of (*dia*) an apparent slight to oneself or to one's own, the slight being unjustified (1378 a 30-2) [...] Anger is not pain which happens to occur together with (*meta*) the thought of outrage. On the contrary, anger is necessarily caused by the thought of outrage, so that such a thought is mentioned in the essential definition of anger. The same is true of fear. It is caused by the thought of imminent danger, so that the appearance of future evil, destructive or painful, is mentioned in the definition of fear (1382 a 21-2). Fear is not some pain or bodily disturbance distinct from cognition. It is a complex phenomenon which necessarily involves not only painful disturbance but also the thought of danger. (1975, 12)

Lyons stresses the fact that this last theory is most likely closer to a comprehensive explanation of emotion because it explains what the theories previously analyzed did not. A person experiencing an emotion, in Aristotle's view, has a certain perception of the world. One thinks in a certain way about the people one is angry with and one thinks that way because of a certain reason. However, just this is not enough to make up an emotion. Besides the particular perception of the world one has feelings and impulses which are

triggered by what one thinks about the world. This means that the primary cause for physiological changes is constituted by one's belief. Believing that something is going to affect our physical integrity, for example, causes us to experience fear.

The cognitive theory stresses the importance of the fact that emotion is not something that rests just on feeling, or just on behavior, or is just a reaction to a traumatic event. *Au contraire*, there is an intellectual part to it also.

An emotion then is not something that has to do exclusively with the body or exclusively with the mind but rather it has to do with both of them. This happens because through emotions one becomes part of the world. Through emotions it is the body and the mind, intertwined, that participate to the world. It's not just a reaction toward an external stimulus and it is not a reaction to a suppressed trauma. Rather, it has to do with belief in a specific appreciation of the world.

#### **FROM LYALL TO SARTRE AND BACK**

How does William Lyall relate to the foregoing accounts of emotion? Under which heading should his theory of emotion be classified? Lyall's ideas about emotions seem to come very close to the cognitive view. He too believed that emotions tell us something about the fabric of the world. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, Lyall has idealist tendencies. This implies that for him the

world itself has been "poured" into a specific frame. Being so very close to the spirit of Romanticism, we can understand how he relates to nature within the idealist framework. It is an underlying theme of this period of time that, once the subject and the object, mind and nature have been separated, once an unbridgeable gap has been placed between them, one concludes that the only way the subject can know itself is through what it does to the object, and the only way the object can be known is through what it does to the subject. What can we talk about, then? The interaction between the two, the interpretational tension between mind and world. Neither the self, nor the world can be known, that is, talked about; they can only be experienced, the one in terms of the other. Reality, then, is what the mind has done to the world and what the world has done to the mind. *Spirit* is the term many Romantics used for interpreting the tension between the subject and the object or reality.

Lyall seems to regard the interaction between the subject and the object as a challenge and his account of emotions can be taken as his answer. Unlike Berkeley's idealism, for example, or Hegel's, Lyall builds his case by considering that the link between the world and the self is facilitated by the emotions. Moreover, for Lyall, imagination is of foremost importance when it comes to explaining the link between the world and the self. In the imaginative state, both emotions and the intellect meet. Emotions, in Lyall's view, reach out for reality and through them, the intellect grasps its essence. But this can not happen if we lack imagination. Imagination is both intellectual and emotional.

Now, from the foregoing theories of emotions, the one that comes very close to Lyall's particular view is the one developed by

J. P. Sartre. Sartre links consciousness and emotions and wraps them up in the veil of a "magical behavior". Being able to use our imagination is what brings us into the presence of the world as our emotions discover it.

**Sartre: Imagination and Emotions**

With regard to this issue, Sartre asks "what must be the nature of consciousness in general in order that the construction of an image should always be possible?" (1966, 259). In imagination, thought does not reach out for the object, but rather "appears as the object". Sartre tells us what it means:

If the development of an idea occurs in the form of a series of imaginative consciousnesses that are synthetically linked, it will imbue the object as an image with a sort of vitality. It will appear now under one aspect, now under another, now with this determination, now with some other. To judge that a coachman whose face one imagines vaguely had a mustache is to see his face appear as having a mustache. There is an imaginative form of the judgment which is nothing else than the addition to the object of new qualities, accompanied by the feeling of venturing, promising, or of assuming responsibilities [...] If we think imaginatively of some individual objects it will be these objects themselves that will appear to our consciousness. (Ibid., 160)

Thus, for Sartre, the images acquire the right to existence "as any other existence". The only difference between the type of existence given to us in imagination and the real existence is the way in which

we grasp them. While the real existence is perceived as forming a whole, where "my attention is co-present as an essential condition of the existence of the reality actually perceived" (Ibid., 262), we grasp the existence given to us in imagination by isolating it from the perceived reality and by positing it as empty of data. "To posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it" (Ibid., 266).

Consciousness cannot exist without imagining because this ability is consciousness' ticket for freedom. "In order to imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world" (Ibid., 269-270). Imagination is where consciousness realizes its own freedom by withdrawing from the real, by always being able, at any moment, to produce the unreal. This is how consciousness works when imagining.

Now, with regard to emotions, Sartre affirms that emotional consciousness is not reflective consciousness. An emotion does not present itself as a *state of mind* of which the one experiencing the emotion is conscious. This would be equivalent to saying that the perception of this paper is consciousness of perceiving the paper. The emotional consciousness is "primarily consciousness of the world". "In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world" (Sartre 1976, 57). The world is continuously present to the emotional subject. There is an interconnection which avoids the reflectivity of consciousness. For Sartre, emotion is "a transformation of the world". Now, the world

itself is regarded under two different aspects: the world is either "instrumental" or "difficult".

There is, first, an instrumental perspective on the world. Joseph Fell explains that in Sartre's view, "Men perceive their environment as a complex of instruments, a medium in which, provided we know certain rules or techniques, we can manipulate people and things so as to achieve certain ends... We assume this regularity every time we act" (Fell 1966, 15). As long as things happen following the same structure, as long as they are out-there, they are, at the same time, in one's *ambiance*, to use a term employed by Gabriel Marcel in his metaphysical journal. We are, more or less, comfortable with what goes on around us. We do things in a certain way because we know what to expect; we know what sort of reactions a certain action would cause as long as the world unfolds in the way we are used to it. This does not mean, however, that we merely follow habits. Sartre would react virulently against this idea. Orestes, the chief character in Sartre's play, *The Flies*, would be the most representative character with regard to this. He shouted against a manipulating and dilettante Zeus, as Sartre doubtless would do, "I am my freedom!". What Sartre means by this kind of declaration is that the world, in its instrumental pragmatic feature is an easy world. This world seems to be deterministic because it follows our expectations and we are not deceived by it, as Sartre explains:

From this point of view, the world around us - that which the Germans call the *Umwelt* - the world of our desires, our needs and of our activities, appears to be all furrowed with strait and narrow paths leading to such and such determinate ends - that is, it has the appearance of a created object. Naturally, here and there, and to some extent everywhere, there are pitfalls and traps...This world is difficult. The notion of



difficulty here is not a reflexive notion which would imply a relation to oneself. It is out there, in the world, it is a quality of the world given to perception (just as the paths to the possible goals, the possibilities themselves and the exigencies of objects - books that ought to be read, shoes to be resoled, etc.), it is the noetic correlate of the activity we have undertaken - or have only conceived. (Ibid., 63)

Therefore, the world is double-faced. There is an easy world, on the one hand, and there is a difficult world, on the other hand. This difficult world, however, is also the world in which we live and in which we must act. Sometimes it becomes unbearable but we still need to act, to continue living even though the things of the world do not follow their expected paths, even though they happen as if they are out of control.

For Sartre though, we are our freedom which implies that the world is "out of control", if the "time is out of joint", as Shakespeare said through Hamlet's voice, we cannot afford to remain immobilized and prostrate waiting for it to change and become *instrumental* again. Rather, we change the world itself by making it a magical world. What this means in Sartre's view is explained at least in part by Fell:

Emotion is a way of acting on ourselves when action in the pragmatic world is of no avail. The 'magic' consists in the fact that our action on ourselves (e.g., fainting) is intended as a transformation of the world, not of ourselves. We have remarked that in emotion attention is directed outward, on the object. To be sure, were the subject later to reflect upon his action he would recognize his failure to transform the world. Magic is not efficacious. But Sartre repeatedly emphasizes that emotional behavior is unreflective. And in the unreflective state the

subject 'lives' the magical transformation: it is the world which seems changed. (Fell 1966, 17)

There are two different ways in which consciousness can "be-in-the-world". There is, first, a perception of the world as a "complex of utilizable things" which are manipulated in order to obtain such and such results. "If one wants to produce a predetermined effect, one must act upon the determinable elements of that complex" (Sartre 1976, 90). Thus, acting, asserting one's freedom has a major significance. However, at this level, there is no absolute action, there is no possible way in which to act in order for a 'radical change' to occur. Rather, "we have to modify one particular utensil, and this by means of another which refers in its turn to yet another, and so to infinity" (Ibid., 90).

Besides the instrumentalist way of being-in-the-world, there is another one, where the world does not present itself as an utilizable whole any longer. Acting, now is set on a different perspective. This time, there is nothing at hand that can be used in order to change it, there is no intermediary between us and the world. The world loses its structure and its categories, Sartre explains when, for example, we are frightened by someone seen through a window:

the face that frightens us through the window acts upon us *without* any means; there is no need for the window to open, for a man to leap into the *room* or to walk across the *floor*). And, conversely, the consciousness tries to combat these dangers or to modify these objects at no distance and without means, by some absolute, massive modification of the world. This aspect of the world is an entirely coherent one; this is the magical world. (Ibid., 90)

This is the kind of magic that occurs when we experience an emotion. On Sartre's view, emotion is not comprehended any longer as something that comes from outside. Rather, it is something that begins with consciousness, where consciousness returns to the magical attitude which is characteristic of a magical world. "Clearly to understand the emotional process as it proceeds from consciousness, we must remember the dual nature of the body, which, on the one hand is an object in the world and on the other is immediately *lived* by the consciousness" (Ibid., 77), writes Sartre. Thus, emotional consciousness does more than merely "projecting affective meanings upon the world around it", because the body is not just an instrument.

### **The Magical World**

The human body, in Sartre's account is also something through which consciousness *lives* the world. If the world happens to be a new world, a magical world into which consciousness leaps when experiencing an emotion then, the body is also there. It is affected, it undergoes changes. The body, "considered as the point of view upon the universe immediately inherent in consciousness" alters itself in order to meet the behavioral manifestations. Sartre believes that:

the origin of emotion is a spontaneous debasement lived by consciousness in face of the world. What it is unable to endure in one way it tries to seize in another way, by going to sleep, by reducing itself to the states of consciousness in sleep, dream or hysteria. And the bodily disturbance is nothing else than the belief lived

by the consciousness, as it is seen from  
outside. (Ibid., 79)

However, the magic of the world is not only a temporary quality which is projected upon the world according to our particular emotional state.

The emotional world often presents itself to us as being magical, as breaking free from any structure and thus it provokes us to change in the following ways highlighted by Sartre:

Thus, there are two forms of emotion, according to whether it is we who constitute the magic of the world to replace a deterministic activity which cannot be realized, or whether the world itself is unrealizable and reveals itself suddenly as a magical environment. In the state of horror, we are suddenly made aware that the deterministic barriers have given way. That face which appears at the window, for instance - we do not at first take it as that of a man, who might push the door open and take twenty paces to where we are standing. On the contrary, it presents itself, motionless though it is, as acting at a distance. The face outside the window is in immediate relationship with our body; we are living and undergoing its signification; it is with our own flesh that we constitute it, but at the same time it imposes itself, annihilates the distance and enters into us. Consciousness plunged into this magic world drags the body with it in as much as the body is belief and the consciousness believes in it. (Ibid., 86-87)

But the "magic" quality of the world does not pertain exclusively to the human. "It extends to things also, in as much as they may present themselves as human (the disturbing impression of a landscape, of certain objects, or a room which retains the traces of some mysterious visitor) or bear the imprint of the psychic" (Ibid., 87). This happens, Sartre thinks, because consciousness grasps the world as having magical features and because it can perceive these magical

features as real features. It is not just one object or another, taken away from the surrounding world, that can be perceived as say, frightening or irritating.

According to Sartre, when someone experiences an emotion, the whole world is changed. The whole world transforms its structure, is altered, on Fell's account of his theory, in the following way:

We may say that in emotion consciousness perceives a world transformed by its affective projections. This 'new' world is a 'magical' one for two reasons. First, in it the orderly and regular paths which permit the achievement of ends by determinate means are obliterated by a spellbinding quality ('horrible', 'revolting', etc.). Second, consciousness falls under this spell and is deceived by its own sleight of hand. It is significant that Sartre refers to emotion as a 'degradation' of consciousness. In emotion, 'consciousness is caught in its own trap'. Sartre's catalog of emotions is a catalog of self-deceptions [...] Furthermore, for Sartre, emotional deceptions seem predominantly of a negative - even dire - sort: fear, sadness, horror, anger, disgust, and the like. (Fell 1966, 22-23)

Sartre follows the phenomenological tradition and praises Husserl for turning to the "things in themselves". "To Heidegger, to Sartre, to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl is something of a savior: the philosopher who finally has assembled the proper conceptual apparatus...for rejoining subject and world, value and fact, in a long-lost *immediate* relation. *Sartre's theory of emotion is one phase of this attempt*" (Ibid., 226). For Sartre objects are originally charged with an affective meaning. "All this comes to pass as if we come to life in a universe where feelings and acts are all charged with something material, have a substantial stuff, are really soft, dull, slimy, low, elevated, etc. and in which material substances have originally a psychic

meaning which renders them repugnant, horrifying, alluring, etc.” (1956, 605). For Sartre, the meaningfulness of a “thing” is the result of a fusion between one’s project to appropriate it and the thing’s disobedience to appropriation. There is a constant interplay between the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*.

But Sartre’s conception of the interplay of consciousness and Being whenever one experiences an emotion is a conscious self-deception. The world is a magical world, and thus the relation between it and consciousness is a fictitious relation, as Fell explains:

[Sartre] tells us that there is an *intermonde* between *pour-soi* and *en-soi* but that it is a fiction. The *intermonde* is the relation I try to establish, the relation which the object resists. There is thus a ‘midworld’ relating *pour-soi* and *en-soi*, but the relation is one of denial of relation, of antithesis. Here, as always in Sartre’s position, antithesis prevails; there can be no synthesis, no continuum. Relations are always fictions. If all relations are attempted appropriations, and if appropriation is a fiction, then all relations are fictive. This really amounts to saying (a) there is ‘projection’ but it is not unreflectively recognized as such; (b) the ‘projected meaning’ is abrogated by the recalcitrant object whose own ‘meaning’ (or ultimate ontological significance) is its resistance to ‘projective meaning’; (c) therefore recognition of the real nature of affective intentionality involves a divorce of the intentional value from its object, an abrogation of ‘naïve contact with the world’, an affirmation of the fundamental ontological disparity between subject and object. (Fell 1966, 228)

This disparity between subject and object reigned in the history of philosophy since Descartes’ split between mind and matter. What Sartre does is to build a bridge between *res cogitans* (the thinking mind) and *res extensa* (the extended body) fashioned by the new and

appealing phenomenological perspective which recognizes bodily subjectivity.

However, there is something peculiar in the way Descartes had been understood: his ideas developed in different ways in German philosophy and in French philosophy. Descartes, without the proof of God's existence can be regarded as an idealist. This, as Anthony Beavers explains, is how the Germans saw him:

Kant labels him a 'problematic idealist' for whom 'there is only one empirical assertion that is indubitably certain, namely that I am' (Critique of Pure Reason B274), suggesting that, as far as Kant is concerned, Descartes' attempt to prove the real existence of anything outside of his mind, including God, does not work. And Schopenhauer, just before claiming that 'true philosophy must at all costs be idealistic,' praises Descartes for finding the 'only correct starting point [...] of all philosophy' (World as Will and Representation II, 4). Husserl is so taken by this starting point that he will title one of his introductions to pure phenomenology, Cartesian Meditations, thus inviting his reader to repeat Descartes' Meditations, this time, without the proofs for God's existence and divine veracity. Due to the tradition in which he has been passed down to us, Descartes may be called not only the 'father of modern philosophy,' but also 'the grandfather of transcendental phenomenology'. (Beavers 1990)

However, for Descartes, practical life has a particular importance and meditating on the principles of metaphysics will not bring about its significance.

According to Descartes, imagination and the senses are to be focused upon after establishing the existence of God and of the soul. In Descartes' words:

I think that it is very necessary to have understood, once in a lifetime, the principles of metaphysics since it is by them that we come to the knowledge of God and of our soul. But I think

also that it would be very harmful to occupy one's intellect frequently in meditating upon them, since this would impede it from devoting itself to the imagination and the senses. (1970, 143)

Thus, for Descartes the epistemologist the human being is composed of two separate entities the mind and the body. Epistemology needs this distinction because this is the only way it can work. But there is something more to human nature than this.

Besides the mind and the body there is another "primitive notion" as Descartes calls it and that is "the union of soul and body":

The soul can be conceived only by pure intellect: the body (i.e., extension, shape and movement) can likewise be known by pure intellect, but much better by the intellect aided by the imagination; and finally what belongs to the union of the soul and body can be known only obscurely by pure intellect or by the intellect aided by the imagination, but it can be known very clearly by the senses. That is why people who never philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul moves the body and the body acts on the soul. (Ibid., 141)

Here imagination and the senses are given their due and it would be unfair to Descartes to categorize him hastily as "the father of *transcendental* phenomenology". Descartes holds that mind and body are both divorced and in a union. But because the intellect can see clearly the distinction and only obscurely the union it does not constitute a concern.

Descartes' idea of this union of mind and body is not a clear and distinct idea. But most certainly it is present in Descartes' philosophical letters and he makes use of it in his attempt to understand the way human beings exist in the world, in the practical



world. A person emerges in the world of everyday involvements as thought together with the body. Otherwise, the world would be merely a theoretical one which is an object of scientific investigations. I am fully aware of the ideas expressed by Descartes at the end of the second *Meditation*:

it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind. (1985-1991, 157)

I do not want to turn Descartes on his head. I just want to point out an idea that is meaningful and which has had a much greater influence later in the area of French phenomenology.

The idea of bodily subjectivity is something which will later become valuable in the hands of Merleau-Ponty, for example, and, to a certain extent, this is how Descartes is perceived in the French philosophical tradition. For Merleau-Ponty:

Being thought united with a body, it [the union] cannot, by definition, really be thought (conceived). One can practice it, and, so to speak, exist it; yet one can draw nothing from it which deserves to be called true ... The truth is that it is absurd to submit to pure understanding, the mixture of understanding and body. These would-be thoughts are the hallmarks of 'ordinary usage', mere verbalizations of this union, and can be allowed only if they are not taken to be thoughts. They are indices of an order of existence - of man and world as existing - about which we do not have to think. (1964, 176)

The Cartesian observation that once the mind is incarnate in the body and lived as a unity, it appears in the world of daily involvements,

has not only been picked up by Merleau-Ponty. It also appears in the works of Sartre and Levinas, who recognize a bodily intentionality that is directed towards an other person who exists outside of the horizons of reason or beyond the cabinet of consciousness.

In all four cases - and here I am including Descartes - affectivity is an intimate characteristic of embodiment that enables the practical connections that make up daily life. Here we are again: affectivity! We get in touch with ourselves as bodies and minds (at the same time) and with the surrounding world through affectivity.

Sartre, as noted above, did not ignore this phenomenological approach. Moreover, he tried to reassess it through his own existentialist perspective. In this regard, Fell considers Sartre to be indebted to both Kierkegaard and Hegel. Fell notes that: "Sartre himself refers to existentialism as 'this idealist protest against idealism'" (1966, 233). Thus, he is indebted to Kierkegaard because his thought has at its centre the problem of the individual and his personal or subjective existence or his existence as "inwardness" which is something that most speculative philosophies, like Hegel's, overlook. Against Hegelianism, Kierkegaard urged that the distinction between being and non-being be firmly maintained, on pain of losing the human proportion and perspective. The distinction between *Being and Nothingness*, as the title of Sartre's major work indicates, is something on which his philosophical work is based. However, praising Husserl and the phenomenological idea of "turning to the things in themselves", Sartre realized the importance of building a bridge between subject and object, between the individual and the world.

The link between human beings and the world is established, Sartre considers, through our emotions. In having an emotion we

transform the world and for this we connect with it. Moreover, an emotion is a conscious transformation of the world. Emotion, he affirms, "is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands its Being-in-the-World" (Sartre 1976, 91). But emotion is also deceptive and ineffective because it is a fictitious relation. This amounts to saying that: "If Kierkegaard was right (against Hegel) in arguing that thought does not, by any kind of historical automatism, translate itself into reality, Hegel was right (against Kierkegaard) in arguing that thought can be translated into objective change, is not limited to isolated solipsistic decision" (Fell 1966, 234). Thus, even though Sartre's project starts with Kierkegaard, he finds that consciousness cannot be truly "free" if thought cannot be translated into objective change. By saying this Sartre is paying tribute to Hegel's speculative philosophy. Fell concludes: "*Sartre is only able to see emotion as fictive idealism because he identified emotion with thought*". (Ibid., 236)

### **Lyall and Sartre**

The foregoing exposition of Sartre's theory of emotion provides us with a new framework in which Lyall's ideas about emotions can be analyzed. For Lyall the emotions and especially the emotion of love connects us with the world. Emotions are the link between our intellect and the phenomenal world. "Without emotion, in his view", Armour and Trott note, "the mind is empty, incapable of

action. [Emotion] is to be welcomed in all its richness, and the hazards it presents by way of the stimulation of rash acts are to be faced cheerfully and without regret. Indeed, without emotion we would have no connection with the objective world" (1981, 79). Lyall was interested in finding a way to bridge the gap between the subject and the object, between us, as human beings and the world. Sartre's endeavor is similar. Both wanted to produce a means for making human beings part of the world, in a more intimate and immediate way.

Both Sartre and Lyall were looking for a return to things in themselves. The only possibility through which this connection could be established is offered by the emotions. Lyall says of emotion, that:

[it] is not an idea; it is not an act of intellect, or exercise of intelligence; it is not memory; it is not imagination, although emotion accompanies every act of imagination, and is essential to it [...] An emotion is not a sensation, although it is more nearly allied to that than to what is purely mental or intellectual; while, again, it does not belong to that lower department of mind to which sensation is referable, and ranks higher than even the exercise of intelligence or intellect. Emotion is a higher state than pure intellect; not this or that emotion, but the region or susceptibility of emotion. (1855, 285)

Thus, in Lyall's view, emotion is a higher state than pure intellect because, extended into the world, it grasps Being and informs the intellect. Emotion cannot be reduced to imagination, even though imagination is "essential" when experiencing an emotion. Also, emotion is not the same as sensation, even though they present similar features.

Emotions, for Lyall, reach out into the world; they are extensions into the world of our existence as both mind and body. Let us take, for example, the case of Armour and Trott explaining what Lyall means when he writes that love is an emotion that "terminates on being":

Suppose love could be conceived without reference to being itself. Then if it needed an object it would become relative to the occurrence of that object. But if it did not need an object, then it would not motivate us to seek the good. It would be a simple abstraction. But love is not in that way relative and it does motivate us. Therefore, we are not wholly without justification in supposing that we can go beyond particular things to being itself. (1981, 81)

That love goes "beyond particular things to being itself" in Lyall's view, implies to a certain extent a transformation of the world so that the gap between the subject and particular objects vanishes when we grasp, through emotions, Being itself. When experiencing the emotion of love which Lyall calls "the absolute emotion", we do not love what is accidental in the object of our love. Actually, it is wrong to speak of objects at all, Lyall considers, because love terminates on Being. "The one state of love exists; every object, every being, shares in its exercise: it has selected no object for its exercise; but every object receives a part of its regard as it comes within its sphere. In its most absolute character, *being* is its object" (Lyall 1855, 408). Our love is directed toward something that lasts, something that is not relative, namely Being, even though it presents to us in various forms.

Another emotion that Lyall emphasizes when talking about the "most powerful emotions" is sympathy. Lyall remarks that:

We sympathize even with the aspects of nature, as these are indicative of certain feelings, whether essentially, or by arbitrary circumstances of association, and we enter into the very mood of external creation. All nature speaks to us, has a voice and an aspect that we understand [...] The air, the earth, the water, all changes, and all seasons, speak to the mind, and impress their peculiar lessons, or beget their appropriate emotions. And we communicate our feelings again to outward objects. All nature is joyous or sad as we are so ourselves. Half of its power over us is from ourselves. The internal mind is imaged on the external world. (Ibid., 461)

For Lyall, our emotions are attuned to Nature. We are sympathetic to the changes in Nature and Nature itself changes according to our emotions. A beautiful day can make us happy. However, when we are sad, the whole world looks gray. What Lyall wrote above, that the "internal mind is imaged on the external world" is something that brings him at least momentarily very close to Sartre's view on this matter. Sartre too, in *The Wall*, describes Pablo Ibbieta who is imprisoned, waiting for his execution. The hero finds himself in a world which does not have any appeal. Everything is gloomy and bleak. The people and the objects that previously were fascinating became dull, faint.

Lyall's approach, however, and this is crucial in understanding Lyall's position, differs from Sartre's in a very subtle way. Sartre stresses the dual nature of our body, first as an instrument but then also as something through which consciousness lives the world. By trying to conciliate this disparity he arrives at the idea of a magical world in which we project ourselves when experiencing an emotion as the following passage from Sartre's *Sketch for a Theory of Emotions* indicates:

All emotions have this in common, that they evoke the appearance of the same world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful, etc., but in which the relations of things to consciousness are always and exclusively magical. We have to speak of a world of emotions as we have to speak of a world of dreams or of worlds of madness. (1976, 81)

Now the whole process is an illusory process. At least this is the conclusion that we reach if we try to understand Lyall only through Sartre's contribution to the analysis of emotions.

However, for Lyall, things are a bit different. For Lyall, as we saw above, love connects us with Being itself. Particularities are unimportant. Love endures the apparent changes in the object, it goes beyond accidents. "Love *absolute*", Lyall writes, "presents no modification, and exists for no purpose but itself" (Lyall 1855, 408). He points out the "unifying" nature of love. Through love we become part of the world, an integral part, that is. Thus, when loving, the features of the world change so that the world is seen not through its differences but through its similarities. The world is that which is, it is Being itself. Now, we know that every object receives a part of love. We also know that, as Lyall, says, "It is the *soul*, and the highest properties of the *soul* that are the true objects of love. The body can be but the index of these and it is when *these* attract through the external form, that love is worthy of the name" (Ibid., 407). What this position calls to mind is that Lyall seems to be a proponent of animism.

If love brings us in contact with the world and if love rests not on what changes but on Being itself, if the body is "an index" of the soul, then Lyall manages to avoid Sartre's failure. The world in

which we dwell when experiencing an emotion is not a world made up of our projections. It is the world in its very essence.

What is fictitious in our relationship with the world when we are under the spell of emotions is not the relationship itself but the way the object is characterized. There is not and cannot be a fictitious interaction with the world but just a fictitious characterization of the object. The mundane relationship itself is a true relationship. Lyall does not see this as fictitious. It is independent of the characteristics of the objects in the world because it grasps Being, that which goes beyond particularities. The phenomenal world is not just a projection, as Sartre considers.

At this point we can see that for Lyall the Other is not really out there and that the Other is not really the other. Emotions integrate us into the world; they make us realize that we are a part of it. The Other is not "set at a distance" and there is no need to appropriate it, to make it ours. The "magical world" is magical because we find ourselves in it as identical and different from it at the same time and not because we project onto it.



### III. ON METAPHOR

In the case of metaphor, this redescription [of reality] is guided by the interplay between differences and resemblances that gives rise to the tension at the level of the utterance. It is precisely from this tensive apprehension that a new vision of reality springs forth, which ordinary vision resists because it is attached to the ordinary use of words. The eclipse of the objective, manipulable world thus makes way for the revelation of a new dimension of reality and truth.

Paul Ricoeur

We have seen that Lyall is able to provide the basis for a consistent theory of emotion, even though he did not develop it thoroughly. This is why Sartre's insight was welcomed. It offered a more advanced theoretical basis rooted in the phenomenological tradition and a more refined set of distinctions which when applied to Lyall's ideas made it possible for us to see more clearly how it is that through our emotions we are linked to the phenomenal world. However, this is not all there is in Lyall that deserves our consideration.

Besides emotions, there is the intellect which Lyall believed to be divorced from the world. This is where Lyall erred, because the intellect too brings its contribution to our interaction with the world. For Lyall, the mind in the imaginative state is composed of

two parts - the intellectual part and the emotional part. In so far as it is intellectual it creates metaphors by having the ability to perceive analogies. The description of our ability to perceive analogies, putting disparate things under a single light in order to create new meanings, is nothing less than an incipient definition of metaphor.

In this chapter I will develop the above idea of metaphor and, by making more careful use of Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, I will show that Lyall should not have sacrificed the creative power of the intellect for the inherited, Platonic view that keeps the intellect away from anything that involves it in an interplay with the phenomenal world.

This chapter begins with an exposition of various accounts of metaphor. Again, as in the previous chapter, my exposition will have as its goal the development of a theory that brings along not only a cognitive aspect but an emotional aspect as well and pays close attention to imagination. What interests me is finding a consistent relationship between metaphor and phenomenal reality.

The most suitable approach to an adequate theory of metaphor, I consider, is the one offered by Paul Ricoeur. The French philosopher considers that metaphors can be regarded as statements and thus, that we can talk about their truthfulness. Moreover, Ricoeur maintains that metaphors have the capability to reach reality, something that Lyall intuited but did not examine thoroughly.

#### FOUR THEORIES OF METAPHOR

In his article on "Metaphor" in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, vol. 5&6), Monroe C. Beardsley considers that we can talk about four distinctive theories of metaphor. They are: the emotive theory, the comparison theory, the iconic signification theory, and the verbal opposition theory. The purpose of going through this typology is to find whether there is a theory that construes metaphors in a way that is adequate to explain and expand Lyall's ideas on the subject.

##### **The Emotive Theory**

The emotive theory is based on the fact that metaphors, in virtue of their deviant meaning, cannot be verified. From Aristotle's definition of metaphor which will be discussed later in this chapter, we find out that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name that belongs to something else". This ambiguity inherent in metaphor implies that metaphorical constructions are not capable of verification and therefore, they do not bear any cognitive meaning at all. Thus, what tells a metaphor apart from a non-metaphorical construction is the emotive meaning which springs up in the "process

of relinquishing its cognitive or descriptive, meaning" (Beardsley 1972a, 285). For example, if we have the following two linguistic constructions: "Time is an uncle" and "Time is, of all modes of existence, most obsequious to the imagination" (Samuel Johnson), we can see that the first one is not a metaphor since there is no powerful emotive meaning attached to it. This is not the case with the second example which is where the emotive theory of metaphor stops. It does not go any further. It can be said that identifying metaphors is as far as it got. It does not say anything about what a metaphor is in itself. For example, the perception of time bowing to imagination, can rouse a certain emotion in ourselves on the basis of a tension between the perception of time and that of imagination. It also tells us that we can elude time by making use of our imagination, whereas seeing time as an uncle does nothing of the sort. Thus, there is knowledge to be gained through metaphor. This is what the representatives of the emotive theory overlooked, which is that metaphors have a cognitive side. They differ from nonsense constructions because they are bearers of cognitive meaning.

In sum, the emotive theory of metaphor, thus fails to provide a good basis for explaining individual metaphors. Emotions alone are not sufficient in this attempt. This theory represents a rudimentary approach "which has been broached, although never very thoroughly worked out", on Beardsley's assessment (Beardsley 1972a, 285).

### **The Comparison Theory**

This theory of metaphor, the comparison theory, is the opposite of the one above. It emphasizes the intelligibility of metaphor to the detriment of its emotional tension. Basically, in this view, metaphor does not differ very much from a simile. The only difference lies in dropping the use of words such "as" or "like" in metaphors. Thus, the metaphor "love is a red rose" can be rewritten: "love is like a red rose" and therefore, through the metaphor we compare two terms ("love" and the "red rose"). By doing this we are able to know something about "love", i.e., that it has some feature in common with the "red rose". According to Beardsley:

This comparison theory evidently makes the metaphorical attribution intelligible, but it has difficulties in explaining what is so special about it. There are two related possibilities. One is to make a distinction between, say 'close' and 'remote' comparisons, and explain the tension in terms of remoteness: the tension is present when time is compared to a river (Heraclitus) or to a child at play (or when Bergson says that 'real duration is that duration which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth'), but absent when time is compared with space. The criteria of remoteness have not proved easy to provide. A second possibility is to measure the degree of metaphoricalness (so to speak) as the inverse of relative frequency..But that, too, seems insufficient: even if one compared, for the first time, the color of a fruitcake to the color of a newly cleaned Rembrandt, a metaphor would not thereby be established. (Ibid., 285)

Usually, the comparison theory of metaphor is associated with object comparison which means that metaphor focuses on comparing objects. This implies that the connotations of the words used in metaphor derive from "what is generally true of the objects".

Now there are new difficulties that arise with this new theory which Beardsley quickly points out, this time in the essay *The Metaphorical Twist* (1972). For example, Beardsley cites from T.S. Eliot's *Four Quartets*: "frigid purgatorial fires/ Of which the flame is roses, and the smoke is briars" (Beardsley 1972b, 74). Beardsley considers that:

some of the important marginal meanings of 'briars' in the Eliot poem comes, of course, from the way the crown of thorns figures in the Christian story. And quite apart from its historical truth, the existence of that religion is sufficient to give the word that meaning. If in explicating this line we limit ourselves to what we know about briars, we would not fully understand it. (Ibid., 75)

One has to have some particular knowledge of the world in order to understand it. Not knowing what the connotation of the word "briars" is as it is used in this particular context, makes it impossible to grasp the metaphor. Another difficulty remarked upon by Beardsley is that "once we commit ourselves to finding, or supplying, an object to be compared with the subject of the metaphor we open the way for that flow of idiosyncratic imagery that is one of the serious barriers between a reader and a poem" (Ibid., 75).

These then are the flaws of the comparison theory. Just by comparing terms or objects even though sometimes we can arrive at something that is meaningful, that can be understood, we are not

necessarily producing metaphors. It leaves aside any tensional element and any emotional component as well.

### **The Iconic Signification Theory**

Out of the comparison theory grew the iconic signification theory which regards metaphor as involving a double semantic relationship. First, the modifier, which Beardsley defines as "the metaphorical predicate or term, whether noun or adjective", leads us to a specific occurrence or situation. Then, this occurrence or situation is brought forth as an iconic sign of the subject. An iconic sign should be understood in C.S. Pierce's sense, as a sign capable of signifying through its similarities to what it signifies. "The meaning of the metaphor", Beardsley explains, "is obtained by reading off the properties thus iconically attributed" (Beardsley 1972a, 285). For example, when saying that "Time is a river", the word "river" is used here so that it functions as an iconic sign for time, thus conferring on us an insight into the nature of time, namely that it is directed one-dimensionally, that it cannot be reversed, etc.

The trouble here, Beardsley thinks, is that the iconic theory imports a foreign object of a certain kind and thus it is subject to the difficulties arising with regard to what object works best in order to bring forth the full meaning of the metaphor. Moreover, the iconic signification theory, because it is based on the object comparison theory, allows for swaps between the modifier and the

modified subject. Thus, in the example above "Time is a river", we can inverse the metaphor and say "The river is time". The only difference, Paul Henle, an exponent of the iconic signification theory, thinks is that sometimes, "the feeling tone is different". Beardsley objects: "I don't believe this will do: the difference between 'this man is a lion' and 'this lion is a man' is in what the different metaphorical modifiers attribute to the subjects" (1972b, 78). The examples above are not comparable to each other since in calling men lions and lions men we are not attributing the same properties from one to the other. The properties of lions that we attribute to men are different from the properties of men that we attribute to lions and therefore, the metaphor cannot be inverted.

The iconic signification theory of metaphor presents us with a refinement of the comparison theory in that it brings in a tensive moment created by putting together remote ideas. "Time" and "river", in the example above, are two remote ideas which are metaphorically connected. However, there is not enough place for a well defined emotive component since there is a difference in the "feeling tone", as Henle considers, when a metaphor is inverted. This difference however, does not take us too far because, in Henle's view, we would be dealing with the same metaphor: "this man is a lion" and "this lion is a man" are basically expressions of the same metaphor, even though there might be a slight difference in the "feeling tone".

There is, however, another attempt to explain metaphor for which the flaws encountered here are not a concern.



### **The Verbal Opposition Theory**

The fourth theory, the verbal opposition theory of metaphor, brings together words or phrases whose central meanings collide. They enter into a logical conflict and this is an indication of a necessary shift, a shift from the central meaning to the marginal meaning. Beardsley's view of metaphor with regard to this theory is that:

In many common words and phrases, we can roughly distinguish two sorts of meaning: (1) the central meaning, or meanings - what is called designation or (in Mill's sense) connotation, and may be recorded in a dictionary as standard; and (2) the marginal meaning, consisting of those properties that the word suggests or connotes (in the literary critic's sense of this term) [...] This theory thus rests upon (1) a distinction between two levels of meaning, and (2) the principle that metaphor involves essentially a logical conflict of central meanings. (Beardsley 1972, 286)

This conflict is what alerts us to the fact that the word or phrase has to be taken metaphorically. It is what Beardsley calls "the metaphorical twist". This approach to metaphor, however, does not allow for words to acquire new meanings because words come into play with a series of meanings which are either central or marginal and as a result of the logical opposition we pick from the "repertoire of marginal meanings (and from the non-conflicting part of the central meaning) those properties that can sensibly be attributed to the subject-thing, and so read the metaphor as making that attribution"

(Beardsley 1972a, 286). Foreseeing this problem, Beardsley expanded the theory offering in his essay *The Metaphorical Twist* a revised version of the verbal opposition theory.

Metaphor, Beardsley considers, brings into play some properties of the words or phrases used in its structure that were not previously in the foreground of the meaning. He explains that there are at least three steps that make up this process:

In the first stage we have a word and properties that are definitely not part of the intension of that word. Some of those properties are eligible to become part of the intension, to join the range of connotation. In order to be eligible they have to be fairly common properties...When the word comes to be used metaphorically in a certain sort of context, then what was previously only a property is made, at least temporarily into a meaning. And widespread familiarity with that metaphor, or similar ones, can fix the property as an established part of the meaning [...] When a connotation becomes so standardized for a certain types of context, it may be shifted to a new status, where it becomes a necessary condition for applying the word in that context. It constitutes a new standard. (Beardsley 1972, 84)

Thus, at first, a word has a definite set of properties that make up the intension of that word. Then, other properties are brought forth inasmuch as they could, potentially, become part of that word's intension. Then, when that word is used metaphorically, the property actually becomes part of the word's intension and therefore a new meaning is created.

To illustrate how this works, I will borrow Beardsley's example. He writes that the word 'warm' was extrapolated from the area of sensory experience and employed in describing human personality:

I should think that the first application of 'warm' to a person had to change some accidental properties of warm things into part of a new meaning of the word, though now we easily think of these properties as connotations of 'warm' - for example, approachable, pleasurable-in-acquaintance, inviting. These qualities were part of the range of connotations of 'warm' even before they were noted in warm things, which may not have been until they were noted in people and until someone, casting about for a word that would metaphorically describe those people, hit upon the word 'warm'. But before those qualities could come to belong to the staple connotation of 'warm', it had to be discovered that they could be meant by the word when used in an appropriate metaphor. (Ibid., 85)

Thus, in order to understand the metaphor "she is a warm person", one has to think of properties of the word "warm" such as inviting, approachable, etc., which initially were not among the connotations of this particular word. Through metaphorical use, the word expanded its range of meanings and became fuller.

Now, the verbal opposition theory of metaphor, even though it does not include an emotive component, seems to be a very elaborate approach to the study of metaphor allowing for metaphor to augment the use of words in a language, allowing for new meanings to occur, allowing for surprising ideas to emerge from the juxtaposition of words. Two exponents of this view are Colin Turbayne and Philip Wheelwright, both stressing the importance of metaphor in bringing forth new meanings for words or phrases. They also represent two opposed views on the relation between metaphors and reality. This controversial relation is of foremost importance because it represents the connection with Lyall's ideas.

### TURBAYNE, WHEELWRIGHT AND METAPHORICAL REALITY

In this section, I will critically examine Turbayne and Wheelwright's approaches. Through criticism of their views I will arrive at Paul Ricoeur's theory which I consider is the most comprehensive one. Ricoeur retains what is fruitful from the above mentioned theories and tries to make them part of a very ambitious project which is represented by his monumental work *The Rule of Metaphor* (1977). In order to give a crude preliminary description of his theory it should be mentioned that he manages to open a new dimension in the analysis of metaphor by linking it through a special use of imagination to the phenomenal world, and by according it the status of a statement by redefining Frege's sense and reference polarity. The issue of emotional meaning is also an integral part of Ricoeur's work. This brings us back to the framework of William Lyall's thought. Moreover, in as much as metaphors have an intellectual dimension, they do improve our relationship with the world. They augment the world itself, an insight that Lyall failed to achieve but nonetheless one which Ricoeur rightly emphasized.

Thus, I will start with the two different views on this issue, first that of Collin Turbayne, who develops a theory of metaphor based on the "as if" prescription and thus brings the whole discussion on metaphor to the field of reflective judgment. Then there is Philip Wheelwright's theory which considers that metaphorical language, through its fluidity and tensiveness, is closely connected

to "what is", that is, to the real. Then, by using these two theories as dialectical counterparts, I will try to bring them together in an act of synthesis, arriving finally at Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor.

The goal of this chapter is to show that metaphors do "reach" reality and that Lyall, instead of referring to the imaginative state as something that defies explanation, could have gone further and thus have realized that the intellect is not completely alienated from the phenomenal world because of its ability to create metaphors. Of course, Lyall's lack of the philosophical tools necessary to achieve this task, such as those of phenomenology and theory of metaphor, hampered him from developing these ideas. This chapter thus amounts to a critique of Lyall which should also be understood as a continuation of his thought.

### **Turbayne and the Myth of Metaphor**

The classical definition of metaphor is the one given by Aristotle. For Aristotle, metaphors: "consist in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference (epi-phora) being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy" (Poetics 1457 b 6-9). For example, the expression "love is a red rose" is a metaphor. To break down Aristotle's definition, we can see that the noun "love" is the focus of the metaphor. Something happens to it: it is explained, it is made understandable by employing a less abstract and

more concrete term, the "red rose". We are dealing with a movement from an abstract concept to a term which can be grasped more easily by transferring one name onto the other. "Love", for the person experiencing this emotion is the same as a "red rose" for our experience of beauty: its rich color, its disposition of velvety petals, as well as its perfume make us want to have it as close as possible so we can enjoy its beauty. The same happens when in love - there is a state of intense longing for union with the other where the other represents everything that is beautiful and exciting. In this case, the transference happens "on the grounds of analogy" between love and the red rose.

Collin Turbayne begins his book *The Myth of Metaphor* (1970) by challenging Aristotle's definition. Turbayne is not satisfied with it because he identifies cases of metaphors that, in virtue of their existence, require that the definition be either broader or narrower. It should be broader because some metaphors do not have to be expressed in words. There can be metaphors that are expressed through painting, sculpture, dance, etc. Turbayne explains:

Michelangelo, for example, used the figure of Leda, with the swan to illustrate being lost in the rapture of physical passion, and the same figure of Leda, only this time without the swan, to illustrate being lost in the agony of dying. It will also allow the concrete physical models of applied scientists, the blackboard of teachers, the toy blocks of children that may be used to represent the battle of Trafalgar, and the raised eyebrow of the actor that may illustrate the whole situation in the state of Denmark, to be classified as metaphor. (Ibid., 13)

In order to solve this problem, Turbayne takes "name" from the above definition to mean "a sign or a collection of signs" (Turbayne 1970,

13). Thus, for Turbayne, the act of transference (epi-phora) from Aristotle's definition does not occur from genus to species, or from species to genus, etc. but from a "sort" to other "sort". A "sort" is a particular kind, class or group and he calls the transference "sort-crossing". What this means is that now, every act of transference can be perceived as a metaphor. The outcome of building the metaphor on the basis of sort-crossing is that suddenly its whole meaning becomes unstable. "If the term metaphor be let apply to every trope of language, to every result of association of ideas and analogical reasoning, to architecture, music, painting, religion, and to all the synthetic processes of art, science, and philosophy, then indeed metaphor will be warred against by metaphor [...] and how then can its meaning stand?" (Bedell 1936, 103). This would mean, as noted above, that every sort-crossing would be a metaphor and thus the definition of metaphor should be narrower. The solution, Turbayne considers, lies in the fact that every sort-crossing is just a *potential* metaphor. What makes a metaphor to be a metaphor is the "as if", the "make believe" which is inherently present in it. In the example used above, "love is a red rose" the metaphor exists in as much as the expression is taken to mean that love is "as if" it is a red rose. The "as if" prescription is implicit. It involves a certain level of awareness without which the metaphor does not occur to us. Thinking of love as being literally a red rose does not bring us into the presence of metaphor. What does, is perceiving the similarity and being aware of it, knowing that things happen "as if" they are similar.

Turbayne's theory of metaphor "represents the facts [...] as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range, or types of

categories), when they actually belong to another". (Turbayne 1970, 18). But this new definition happens to be the very definition that Gilbert Ryle gave, not for metaphor, but for the category mistake (or categorial confusion). The metaphor finds its essence in the act of sort-crossing or duality of sense, but it does that by filling up the "as if" prescription, "fusing two senses by making believe there is only one sense".

Thus, metaphor on Turbayne's account shifts from being a category confusion to a "category fusion". What Turbayne means is that there is no mistake in self-consciously crossing sorts for otherwise all metaphors will be nothing but mistakes. This does not imply that one is right in "presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms of another without awareness" (Ibid., 22). This is plain confusion of disparate senses of a sign which surely does not give birth to a metaphor. If the question is when does a metaphor occur, then Turbayne replies that:

The answer lies in the *as if* or *make-believe* feature [...] When Descartes says that the world is a machine or when I say with Seneca that man is a wolf, and neither of us intends our assertions to be taken literally but only metaphorically, both of us are aware, *first*, that we are sort-crossing, that is, re-presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms appropriate to another, or, in other words, of the duality of sense. I say 'are aware', but of course, we *must* be, otherwise there can be no metaphor. We are aware, *secondly*, that we are treating the world and man as if they belong to new sorts. We are aware of the duality of sense in 'machine' and 'wolf', but we make believe that each has only one sense - that there is no difference in kind, only in degree, between the giant clockwork of nature and the pygmy clockwork of my wrist watch, or between man-wolves and timber wolves. (Ibid., 17)



Thus there are two different ways for looking at the relationship between sorts: there is sort-crossing, which actually defines metaphor, and there is sort-trespassing which brings forth the issue of being used by the metaphor because in this case the "as if" prescription is overlooked and the metaphor is taken literally (see **Appendix**).

It follows that being able to "see" the metaphor implies an awareness without which one merely gets lost in the midst of recognizing various senses of a sign. An example would be realizing the difference between "seeing the point of a needle and seeing the point of a joke". In that moment when only one of the two different senses fused is metaphorical but is taken literally, we are dealing with sort-trespassing, as Turbayne recognizes that:

The victim of metaphor accepts one way of sorting or building or allocating the facts as the only way to sort, bundle, or allocate them. The victim not only has a special view of the world but regards it as the only view, or rather, he confuses a special view of the world with the world. He is thus a metaphysician. He has mistaken the mask for the face. Such a victim who is a metaphysician *malgré lui* is to be distinguished from that other metaphysician who is aware that his allocation of the facts is arbitrary and might have been otherwise. (Ibid., 27)

For Turbayne, the encounter with a metaphor provokes our awareness. We have to perform three operations in order to understand a metaphorical construction. We must be able, first, to spot the metaphor, to discover it in a text, in a work of art or in music. Then, we have to identify its literal interpretation and we have to point it out in order to get rid of it so that we are left with the

metaphorical interpretation. After doing that we are then able to restore the metaphor as a metaphor, as something where the process of sort-crossing happens but this time with awareness of its occurrence.

Turbayne's theory of metaphor rests upon reflective judgment. His fear of being victimized by metaphor can only be eradicated if we are constantly aware and make use of the above operations. Metaphor is something that is created by breaking patterns, and making new connections instead of preserving old associations. This must be accompanied by the "vigilance of the *as if*", as Ricoeur puts it in *The Rule of Metaphor* (1977).

To summarize, Turbayne is advocating a theory of metaphor in which every single use of sort-crossing must be very lucid and radically intellectual. He underlines this claim in *The Myth of Metaphor* as follows: "the main theme of this book is that we should constantly try to be aware of the presence of metaphor, avoiding being victimized by our own as well as by others" (Ibid., 217). But how is it possible for a metaphor to present itself in its fullness and with all its power without us believing in its descriptive and representative value? Throughout his book, Turbayne is worried that we not fall prey to "believing" that which metaphor represents which will lead us to take the metaphor literally.

However, Ricoeur asks, "can one create metaphors without believing them and without believing that, in a certain way, 'that is'?" (Ricoeur 1977, 254). Should the creative dimension of language be divorced from the creative aspect of reality itself? Turbayne's prescription for metaphor limits imagination. It subjects it to the "philosophy of the *as if*". The spark fired by the metaphor in poetry, for example, is promptly put out the moment we become "aware" that it

is just an artifice which, once spotted, cannot have the power to lift us up on reverie's summit. When thinking about the 'love is a red rose' metaphor, Turbayne would like us to enjoy the cleverness of the construction. He remarks that "the invention of a metaphor full of illustrative power is the achievement of genius" (Turbayne 1970, 57). On his account there should be nothing beyond this. The sole joy that we retrieve from metaphor should only be delivered by our capacity for reflective judgment. But there is more to metaphor than this. A lot more!

#### **Philip Wheelwright's Metaphor and Reality**

It is Philip Wheelwright's position, developed in his book *Metaphor and Reality* (1973) that there is a very strong relationship between language and phenomenal reality, and metaphor is that which illustrates it the best. Wheelwright adopts a position contrary to that of Turbayne. If Turbayne is prone to draw attention to what the metaphor is not, to make it clear that everything that pertains to metaphorical creation happens within the limits determined by the "as if", Wheelwright leans toward emphasizing what the metaphor is, how it is so very strongly intertwined with phenomenal reality. With Wheelwright, metaphor offers more than the kind of pleasure resting entirely on our capacity for reflective judgment. Through metaphor we become capable of being intimately connected with "What Is", as he writes, with what is reality and how it presents itself to us.

For Wheelwright, reality can be described as having three important features: it is presential, it is coalescent and it is perspectival. The fact that reality is presential means that there is a sense of presence which can be felt with regard to another human being, another person, and toward inanimate beings as well. The other is present for us not as an object, not as something out there, out of reach, but rather as something with which we are linked. We experience the presence of the-other-than-us and we connect with it:

Every presence has an irreducible core of mystery, so long as it retains its presential character. Explanations, theories, and specific questionings are directed toward an object in its thinghood, not in its presentness. An object in its thinghood is characterized by spatio-temporal and causal relations to other objects in their thinghood: we inquire about its name, its place, its why and whither, its status according to some system of values...When, on the other hand, two persons meet and their meeting is one of mutual presentness, the essentiality of their meeting has nothing to do with names and addresses...No multiplication of such details, however full and meticulous, can be a substitute for the real meeting...The same is true when no other human being is involved, and hence no assured mutuality. The sense of presence that occurs to one who catches a sudden glimpse of, say, a certain, contour of hills or of a red wheelbarrow in the rain, defies explanation; for when explanations are begun or sought the sheer presentness diminishes or disappears.  
(Wheelwright 1973, 158-159)

Being open to sensing the presence of the surrounding world, means that the Cartesian dualism between mind and body does not hold any longer. As a consequence, there is something more here than just the mind as perceiving subject and the body as perceived object. Both of them are blended together, both of them are united; they are nothing

but the two sides of a coin. Reality, for Wheelwright, surpasses distinctions like subject and object, or mind and body. Reality, he writes, "is That to which every [...] category tries to refer and which every philosophical statement tries to describe, always from an intellectual point of view and always with ultimate inadequacy" (Ibid., 166-167).

The aspect of reality which emphasizes its unity, Wheelwright represents by using the term "coalescent". To coalesce means to grow together or into one body; to unite, join together. What Wheelwright seems to point out is that we are part of the world and we grow together with the environment. The mind/body dichotomy, or the subject/object split have unfortunate consequences. Wheelwright considers that it:

gives undue prestige to certain aspects of experience (those which we call collectively the 'physical' aspects) at the expense of other and perhaps intrinsically more important aspects; moreover, it generates artificial questions. To ask (as philosophical aestheticians often do) whether the beauty of a rose is in the rose or in the eye and mind of the beholder is palpably an unreal question, for the concrete answer is 'Both'; and if the answer looks contradictory, so much the worse for the dualistic structure of thought that makes it look so. The I who am aware and the that of which I am aware are but two aspects of a single sure actuality, as inseparable as the convex and the concave aspects of a single geometrical curve. (Ibid., 166)

What Wheelwright means is that the world is not an inert mechanical object but a living field, an open and dynamic landscape. The world does not derive from an impersonal or objective dimension of scientific facts. It is not a collection of data "from which all subjects and subjective qualities are pared away, but it is rather an

intertwined matrix of sensations and perceptions" (Abram 1997, 39). Thus, we are not mere observers. We participate in reality.

The last feature of reality discussed by Wheelwright refers to it as being perspectival. The fact that reality possesses a perspectival and contextual character, implies that its nature is constantly problematic, it cannot be corseted within formulas or systematized. We, as complex human beings are diverse and we are also in the presence of a reality itself diverse and complex, we are part of it and thus we cannot postulate "a single type of reality as ultimate". For Wheelwright, it is evident that:

The communication of presential and coalescent reality is not possible by relying on words with inflexible meanings; if it is to be achieved at all (and the achievement is always imperfect at best) the common words must be chosen and contextualized with discriminating suitability. Much of the context is constructed in the act and by the manner of saying forth; it is not all previously given. The fresh context may be regarded as an angle of vision, a perspective, through which reality can be beheld in a certain way, a unique way, not entirely commensurate with any other way. (1973, 170)

This brings us to the issue of language and, implicitly, to metaphor. Language, Wheelwright considers, in as much as it is used to express the complexity and tensivity of the physical world and also the complexity of human nature, is itself intricate, engulfed in tensions between suitable word combinations used to "represent some aspect or other of the pervasive living tension" (Ibid., 48). On Wheelwright's approach, language is itself alive, in continuous change because those who use it try to find better and simpler ways to express themselves or to reflect their relationship with the surrounding world. Wheelwright argues that:

language that strives toward adequacy - as opposed to signs and words of practical intent or of mere habit - is characteristically tensive to some degree and in some manner or other. This is true whether the language consists of gesture, drawings, musical compositions, or (what offers by far the largest possibilities of development) verbal language consisting of words, idioms, and syntax. (Ibid., 46-47)

At the core of this strife within language is the metaphor. Quoting John Middleton Murry, Wheelwright refers to metaphor as being "as ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as thought". Metaphor is that which reflects best the tensive nature of language and, at the same time, that which provokes our thinking and imagination.

As we have seen above, where we presented Aristotle's definition, the metaphoric process implies a transfer, a movement within the semantic field of a specific sort to the semantic field of another. This transfer ("*phora*") has, as Wheelwright notes, two distinctive characteristics, a "double imaginative act of outreaching and combining that essentially marks the metaphoric process" (Ibid., 72). But these two components of metaphor appear, in the most eloquent cases as working together and thus, they should not be regarded separately but rather as two dimensions of metaphor. However, in order to better understand them, Wheelwright names and analyzes them one at a time. Their names are *epiphor*, which stands for "the outreach and extension of meaning through comparison" and *diaphor*, meaning "the creation of a new meaning by juxtaposition or synthesis".

## Epiphor

The metaphor as epiphor in its essence does nothing more than express a similarity between two different terms where one of them has a commonly known sense and is used as a *vehicle* to shed light on a more important but, at the same time, more difficult to comprehend term, the *tenor*. Thus, by easily bringing in a context, epiphoric metaphor make-believes something about something else which is usually obscurely known. For example, when Seneca said that "Man is a wolf", he did not mean that the sort "man" is included in the sort "wolf", but rather by transferring the name "wolf" to the name "man", he asserted something about human nature, namely that it shares some characteristics with the nature of the wolf. This is a metaphor because here there are two distinct ideas between which, through the act of transference, a connection is realized which is not valid in the case of "the Tasmanian wolf is a wolf" where "the Tasmanian wolf" is a sort included in a larger sort, the one of "wolf" with which it shares similar characteristics. It is in the latter instance when the word "wolf" is taken in its literal meaning while it is in the former where it is taken metaphorically.

Therefore, the epiphoric metaphor assumes a similarity between the modifier (wolf) and the modified (man) and it is primarily based on their comparison. But, as Wheelwright points out, these two elements of similarity and comparison need not be obvious, nor explicit. If they are, the tension provoked by the transference would be diminished and the metaphor would lose its depth. "A tensive vibrancy can be achieved only where an adroit choice of dissimilars is made, so that the comparison comes as a shock which is yet a shock



of recognition" (Ibid., 75). This is what gives "freshness" to the epiphoric metaphor at its best. When saying that "Time is a river", there are no obvious similarities between "time", which is an abstract notion and "river", which has a concrete, empirical experience. Connecting these two terms comes as a surprise at first but soon, when considering the flow of the river as being similar to the flow of time, we realize the depth of the metaphor.

Another source for vitality is offered by synesthesia, a term which expresses the working together of different sense organs. Synesthesia leads to creation of metaphors, Wheelwright considers, "since the comparison of one type of sense-impression with that given by a different sense-organ stirs the reader to reflective contemplation along two of his avenues of sense at once" (Ibid., 76). Examples of synesthetic expressions are "bitter colors", "gray whispers", "green smells", etc.

### **Diaphor**

Besides this kind of transference through comparison, there is another one which Wheelwright calls "diaphor" (from the Greek *dia* - through). In this case, the semantic movement takes place not by comparing, but by juxtaposing distinctive sorts. Taken alone, as parts, the elements of the metaphor do not say anything but at the moment when they are put together a whole new meaning is unveiled. As an example, let us take Descartes' rhetorical statement in *The World*, chapter VI, where he writes about the world as being a machine: "Give me extension and motion and I will construct the world" (Cited by Turbayne 1970, 67).

Descartes presents us with a relation between the world as extension and the world as motion which put together, juxtaposed and metaphorically interpreted gives us an idea about the world's essence. There can be detected a contrast between extension and motion. But only when they are put together can they give us something new. Leaving aside whether Descartes perceived this as a metaphor or not, it is obvious that by using the combination of expressions he was able to produce a new meaning for the concept "world". The world, for Descartes, is that which has not only extension but motion as well.

However, the best examples of diaphoric metaphor are to be found in an area of artistic production such as abstract painting, where combinations of colored lines or brush strokes or paint spills open up different spaces transforming canvas' bidimensional space into a four dimensional continuum, where tridimensional coordinates are enriched with the addition of an inner, personal time or music, where the juxtaposition of various instruments and voices creates an emotionally meaningful state in the listener. Thus, for Wheelwright:

[t]he essential possibility of diaphor lies in the broad ontological fact that new qualities and new meanings can emerge, simply come into being, out of some hitherto ungrouped combination of elements. If one can imagine a state of the universe, perhaps a trillion years ago, before hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms had ever come together, it may be presumed that up to that time water did not exist. Somewhere in the later vastitude of time, then, water first came into being - when just those two necessary elements came together at last under the right conditions of temperature and pressure. Analogous novelties occur in the sphere of meanings as well. As in nature new qualities may be engendered by the juxtaposition of previously un-joined words and images. (Ibid., 85-86)

However, pure diaphoric metaphor can hardly be found. It rather exists in combination with epiphoric metaphor. Together, they can bring different sorts close.

Through the comparison virtues of epiphor and through the fresh juxtaposition of "several vehicular images" of diaphor, new meanings emerge. As an example, the following text from the reflective poetry of Egyptian Pyramids can illustrate the collaboration of epiphor and diaphor:

Death is in my eyes today:  
As in a sick man beginning to recover  
From a deep illness. (Erman 1927, 10)

Thus, the phrase "death is in my eyes today" represents an epiphor. However, taking separately the rest of the verse: "As in a sick man beginning to recover/ From a deep illness" we will find that it is not a metaphor. Only in combination with the first part it can be regarded metaphorically. The whole verse is a diaphor.

The essential character of the metaphor, as Wheelwright sees it, is the ability to provoke a tension which, as Ricoeur put it, "guaranties the very transference of meaning and gives poetic language its characteristic of semantic 'plus-value', its capacity to be open towards new aspects, new dimensions, new horizons, new meanings" (Ricoeur 1977, 250). The epiphor and the diaphor are the revolving electrons around the nucleus of metaphor's meaning.

To sum up, it can be affirmed that throughout *Metaphor and Reality*, Wheelwright continuously stresses the "tensive" character of language. To illustrate this, he makes use of words like "living", "alive" or "intense" which all are meant to cast a light on the fact

that language is so similar to life, to what is real, to "What Is". Language and "What Is" have analogous ontological features and this entitles Wheelwright to think of metaphor, since it represents best these features of the tensive language, as having the power to reach reality.

However, Wheelwright's account of the connection between reality and language reflected through metaphor cannot surpass the trap of an "ontological naiveté", Ricoeur considers in *The Rule of Metaphor*. The power of the dialectic between diaphor and epiphor which started Wheelwright's analysis fades away when the "intuitionist and vitalist tendency" is disclosed toward the end of his book. Ricoeur thinks that:

Wheelwright is not wrong to speak of 'presential reality', but he neglects to distinguish poetic truth from mythic absurdity. He who does so much to have the 'tensional' character of language recognized misses the 'tensional' character of truth, by simply substituting one notion of truth for another; accordingly, he goes over to the side of abuse by approximating poetic textures simply to primitive animism. (Ibid., 255)

Thus, Ricoeur reproaches Wheelwright arguing that his account, even though bold in its attempt, is disappointing in its outcome. For Wheelwright, Ricoeur thinks, the border between language and the world is blurred to such an extent that it has almost vanished. Words and therefore, metaphors and things are essentially similar. In this respect, Wheelwright went too far, abusing the tensional use of language, overemphasizing the strong correlation between metaphor and reality and thus failing to observe the differences between the two. Now Ricoeur uses Wheelwright's approach to metaphor in opposition to Turbayne's and considers them as steps of a dialectical process. He

brings them together in order to shape his own theory of metaphor. We pointed out what he finds unsatisfactory in Wheelwright's approach. As regards Turbayne, "abuse is [...] the 'myth' of his title, in a more epistemological than ethnological sense, scarcely differing from what we just called ontological naiveté" (Ibid., 251). Turbayne's thesis, that metaphorical constructions are purely intellectual constructions, implies that they do not refer to reality differently than scientific formulas. Turbayne's approach is always concerned with truth from an epistemological perspective which makes his endeavor very similar to the positivism that he criticizes. Turbayne leaves no room for poetic language which breaks through "the very notions of fact, object, reality and truth, as delimited by epistemology. Turbayne's metaphor still belongs to the order of the manipulable. It is something we choose to use, to not use, to re-use. This power to decide, coextensive with the absolute hold of the 'as if', is without analogue on the side of poetic experience, in which imagination is 'bound'" (Ibid., 253).

Thus we have Turbayne's position on the one hand, and Wheelwright's, on the other. Turbayne stresses what metaphor *is not* by emphasizing that metaphorical constructions are purely intellectual products with no real reference whereas Wheelwright emphasizes what metaphor *is* by stressing the fact that metaphors are deeply rooted in the natural world. The former wants us to be aware of the "as if" prescription of the metaphor; the latter discovers deeper connections between metaphor and "What Is".

**ENTER RICOEUR!**

After the analyses of metaphor by writers such as Collin Turbayne, Philip Wheelwright and, as we will see, Paul Ricoeur, metaphor does not allow itself to be regarded as a simple ornament that conveys no new meaning, that has nothing to do with reality or with our relationship to it. Ricoeur breaks away from the traditional understanding of metaphor which started shortly after Aristotle and culminated with Romanticism.

Metaphor brings remote ideas together into a unity and it does that by following the guidance offered by their likeness, as we have seen above, for example, when "time" and "river" were brought together in the metaphor "Time is a river". The fact that the remote ideas are alike implies that they are, at the same time, similar and different. In a metaphor, different ideas melt and their likeness acts as a catalyst. In this way, metaphor acts like a screen or a filter in the discursive process. Finally, Ricoeur brings us face to face with a new structure of reality. This new structure made visible by the metaphor emerges on the ruins of the previous structure to which the remote ideas previously belonged, as we will see below.

**Reference: Metaphors and Reality**

Metaphors are philosophically relevant, argues Ricoeur, because they create new meanings, because they are innovative. With

Ricoeur the approach to metaphor implies a change of view inasmuch as he brings forth a new understanding of sense and of reference, of imagination, to which he adds an emotive dimension.

Ricoeur upgrades Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense and meaning (where the sense is what the proposition states; the denotation, or meaning, is that about which the sense is stated) into one between sense and reference. For Ricoeur, sense results from a largely horizontal, semantic proceeding and identifies an entry in the imaginary cultural encyclopedia constituting what can be called a metaphoric proposition. Reference is "[metaphor's] claim to reach reality" (Ricoeur 1980, 140), even if often a redefined reality. It adds to sense an emotional and imaginative and pragmatic verticality. For Ricoeur, "the literary work through the structure proper to it displays a world only under the condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is suspended. Or, to put it another way, discourse in the literary work sets out its denotation, by means of the suspension of the first level denotation of discourse" (Ricoeur 1977, 221). Thus, for Ricoeur, there are two distinct possibilities to refer to the issue of reference, or denotation with regard to metaphorical statements.

In *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur contrasts Gottlob Frege's approach, with Emile Benveniste's. He begins with the question: "What does the metaphorical statement say about reality? This question carries us across the threshold from the sense towards the reference of discourse" (Ibid., 216). In other words, in order to know how metaphors relate to reality we have to find out first to what they refer.

Following Frege's article *On Sense and Reference* (1960), we realize that the reference, as Ricoeur puts it, "is communicated from the proper name to the entire proposition, which, with respect to reference, becomes the proper name of a state of affairs" (Ibid., 218). Proper names "pick up" objects in the world, they stand for or designate their reference and, because their reference is communicated to the entire proposition, that is, the entire metaphorical statement, we cannot talk about metaphors without referring to proper names. Thus, when we use a proper name, like "the Moon", we do not refer to our idea of the moon nor to a specific mental event corresponding to it. Nor do we refer to some kind of ideal object "irreducible to any mental event" which we "presuppose besides a reference". It is Frege's understanding that:

The sentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep' obviously has a sense. But since it is doubtful whether the name 'Odysseus', occurring therein, has reference, it is also doubtful whether the whole sentence has one [...] For it is of the reference of the name that the predicate is affirmed or denied. Whoever does not admit the name has reference can neither apply nor withhold the predicate. (1960, 62=63)

Thus, once a name in a sentence has no clear reference then the whole sentence lacks reference. Frege considers that our quest for truth, our "intention on speaking and thinking" demands a reference, it demands that we "advance from sense to reference". However, this demand causes us to err, Ricoeur thinks. "This striving for truth suffuses the entire proposition, to the extent that it can be assimilated to a proper name; but it is via the proper name as intermediary that, for Frege, the proposition has reference" (Ricoeur 1977, 218). Thus, because Odysseus has no reference, the sentence



"Odysseus is a journey" or any metaphorical statement that has the word Odysseus in it, would have no reference either which means that they are mere intellectual productions. This Ricoeur considers to be a limitation of Frege's position.

However, Ricoeur brings forth Emil Benveniste's theory of reference in order to break away from these limitations. In the second volume of *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (1974), Benveniste writes: "Le sense d'un mot consistera dans sa capacité d'être l'intégrant d'un syntagme particulier et de remplir une fonction propositionnelle" (Benveniste 1974, 227). Moreover, for Benveniste, the sense of the words in a sentence "résulte précisément de la manière dont ils sont combinés" (Ibid.). What does this mean? Benveniste considers that taken in isolation, words have only a potential meaning which is only actualized when it is used in a sentence. The potential meaning is made up of all the marginal meanings that a word can have depending of the diversity of contexts in which they can be used. Then, when they are put together in a sentence this multitude of potential meanings is reduced to just the meaning functioning in the "instance of discourse", i.e., a given sentence.

It is now obvious why Benveniste's view is contrasted with Frege's. For Frege the sentence would play the role of a proper name. By this I mean that the sentence itself being composed of words with specific meaning designates its reference. On the other hand, for Benveniste, the reference of a sentence attributes meaning to the words in its composition. Ricoeur explains that:

These two conceptions of reference are complementary and reciprocal, whether one rises by synthetic composition from the proper name

towards the proposition, or whether one descends by analytic dissociation from the sentence to the semantic unit of the word. At their intersection, the two interpretations of reference make apparent the polar constitution of the reference itself, which can be called the *object* when the referent of the name is considered, or the *state of affairs* if one considers the referent of the entire statement". (1977, 218)

By bringing Benveniste's position into discussion, Ricoeur is able to distinguish between two sorts of reference - there is the first level reference, represented by Frege's approach and the second level reference recognized in Benveniste's approach. The metaphorical statement is the most adequate illustration of this split between levels of reference or denotation. Metaphors acquire their metaphorical meaning and achieve their reference on the ruins of literal meaning and literal reference. Ricoeur explains that:

If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and articulated within an interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that a second level reference, which is properly the metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first level reference. (1977, 221)

For example, if we take the metaphor "Odysseus is a journey", then we can see that, literally interpreted (i.e., following Frege), it would have no impact on the way we perceive or relate to reality because Odysseus has no reference. On the other hand, taken metaphorically, "Odysseus is a journey" describes a new way of relating to reality, a new way of looking at human beings and their struggle to arrive "home".

If metaphor is this dialectical corrective of all analytical language centered on concepts then, as all language it also refers,

among other things, to what a given culture and ideology consider as reality. This means that some conclusions to which any metaphor can lead are pertinent to or culturally "true" to given understandings of relationships in practice. Metaphor can affirm such an understanding or, in the best case, develop "the before un-apprehended relations of things" in ways at that moment not otherwise able to be formulated. For example, saying that "love is a warm feeling" we use warm in a different way than it is usually used and thus, we establish a new relation between "love" and "feeling".

Such is the split between the two kinds of reference. However, Ricoeur does not stop here. When talking about the re-descriptive power of the intellect which makes it possible to claim that metaphors do reach reality, we have to ask ourselves how do they come to light? What is it that makes it possible for the intellect to create, to bring forth novel ideas, novel meanings? In order to answer this question we have to see how Ricoeur understands imagination to work.

### **Imagination**

We have seen above that in the metaphorical use of language we come across an innovation at the level of reference. Now, metaphor relates our image of reality given to us through perception to the image of reality that is offered by language.

Ricoeur takes imagination to mean what Kant meant when he used this concept. The act of imagination is that which puts the spatial-

temporal determination of phenomena in correspondence with the conceptual determination of phenomena. Spatial-temporal determinations are blind on their own. Conceptual determination is empty when taken by itself. The act of imagination is fusing them together and thus allows us to grasp the phenomena. With Kant, imagination is no longer the faculty with which we reproduce images. It is no longer just reproductive imagination. Gilles Deleuze, discussing the process of imagination as understood by Kant, considers that "When I say: I imagine my friend Pierre, this is the reproductive imagination. I could do something else besides imagine Pierre, I could say hello to him, go to his place, I could remember him, which is not the same thing as imagining him. Imagining my friend Pierre is the reproductive imagination" (Deleuze 1978). However, Kant recognizes that imagination has another function. It is also productive, working as a kind of synthesis. Deleuze explains Kant's concept of productive imagination as:

determining a space and a time in conformity to a concept, but in such a way that this determination cannot flow from the concept itself; to make a space and a time correspond to a concept, that is the act of the productive imagination. What does a mathematician or a geometer do? Or in another way, what does an artist do? They're going to make productions of space-time. (Deleuze 1978)

Thus, in productive imagination, spatial-temporal determinations do not merely follow conceptual determinations. There is a "production of space and time", as Deleuze put it, that goes beyond the space and time of any given phenomena and that is how the imagination is productive.

Now, when Ricoeur distinguishes image as *replica* from image as *fiction*, this distinction corresponds to that between Kant's reproductive imagination and productive imagination. These two refer to different things and to mistake the one for the other is a fallacy. The image as replica, as portrait, is the image that we get through perception. It refers to a specific something that exists in the realm of reality. Thus, I can imagine my dog, the one I used to have a couple of years ago. The image I have here and now rests upon the corresponding perception of the real dog I had. The same dog whose presence used to be given in the past is now given in absence. Or, as Ricoeur puts it, "absence and presence are modes of givenness of the same reality". Now, the other sort of image, the image as fiction, does not rest upon a given model. It does not refer to anything that was already given as original. In the image as fiction, again, we deal with an absent thing, but this time the absent thing represents nothingness. We imagine the centaur but it exists nowhere. It is unreal, even though we can have an image of it. Thus, the image of my dog rests on the absence of its object, whereas the image of the centaur rests on the unreality of its object. My dog is real; the centaur is unreal. Ricoeur considers that "the nothingness of absence concerns the mode of givenness of a real thing *in absentia*, the nothingness of unreality characterizes the referent itself of the fiction" (1991, 120).

The image as fiction refers to reality in a new way. This is why we have to distinguish it from the image as replica. The image as replica "reproduces" reality, whereas the image as fiction "produces" reality. There is a productive reference at work in fiction. Ricoeur considers it to be the case that:

fiction changes reality, in the sense that it both 'invents' and 'discovers' it, [which] could not be acknowledged as long as the concept of image was merely identified with that of picture. Images could not increase reality since they add no referents other than those of their originals. The only originality of the image had thus to be found in the spontaneity characteristic of the production of the image. (Ibid., 121)

Imagination is thus productive, not only reproductive. And it is productive in as much as thought is involved, in as much as language is challenged. When I imagine my dog and reproduce his image, there is no further labor involved in the process. However, when I produce an image, when I describe an unreal object, when I tell a story, when I make a plan or make a model, I have to make use of my intellectual capacity. Imagination is productive not only of unreal objects, but also of an unexplored vision of reality. "Imagination at work - in work - produces itself as a world" (Ibid., 123).

To sum up, metaphor is that which relates reality and language, an expanded reality and a dynamic language, that is. This takes place with the help of imagination which does not reproduce images but rather produces new ones. Inasmuch as imagination is productive, it allows us to see similarities between the remote ideas that make up metaphors. "Man is a wolf", says Seneca. We can only understand what he meant not by simply having a mental picture of a wolf-like man but by emphasizing relations in a depicting mode. Moreover, imagination is helpful when it comes to putting in brackets the first level reference, the literary reference, allowing for the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world.

### LYALL AND METAPHORS

Now, let us see how Lyall fits into all this. For Lyall, a human being as a whole is both capable of intellectual effort and capable also of emotional experience. Thus it would appear that in the imaginative state one would assert one's existence in full. Why? Because in this case, one is re-affirming one's presence in the world by re-describing it and living it from within. We see that for Lyall, imagination has to do more with the production of images and less with their reproduction:

The ghosts and fairies, the gnomes and other imaginary beings of a rude state of society, owe their origin to the activity of this principle, united with the suggestions of a superstitious fear. In certain circumstances the imagination is ready enough, in the most cultivated age, to body forth these imaginary creatures, and to entertain a certain dread which it requires some effort of reason to counteract. It is in those very places where the imagination has most scope to operate, or most suggestives to its action, that we find the superstitions prevailing which are connected with the existence and the exploits of the beings of imagination. (Lyall 1855, 275)

As we can see, for Lyall, imagination is "ready enough to body forth these imaginary creatures". It is the act of producing them which is the big task of imagination. By doing that, in this particular example, it stirs our emotions and it makes us participate in a new aspect of reality. But it also "requires some effort of reason" to counteract. It involves thus our intellect in as much as it has to relate to and deal with expanded reality, a reality which was created

in the first place by the mind in its activity of perceiving analogies, of animating and personifying nature. However, Lyall does not fully analyze his findings. He is content with just exposing the difficulty of understanding the inner workings of the imagination. "Why [does imagination works as it does]? It is impossible to say", he writes (Ibid., 274).

However, it seems that Lyall, linking the intellect and the emotions in the imaginative state took a step further from the Romantic mainstream. For the Romantics, understanding rests upon the connection with the spirit that is behind any creation. Lyall embraces this attitude but, if he had developed his ideas, he could have come to the conclusion that imagination not only connects with reality but also augments it, makes it fuller, more meaningful and diverse. Through language, through the creation of metaphors, which is a feature of the intellect, one improves one's relationship with the world and not only mirrors it. Through our emotions we are intimately connected with it.

In a lecture given in 1825 at the opening of the Free Church College of Halifax later to be Dalhousie University, Lyall talks about the "philosophy of thought" and he says, when drawing on the importance of language:

What an adaptation between the mind and its modes of expression! How the one fills the other with life and meaning! - while the latter, again, suits every varying idea and emotion of the former - now rouses with energy, and now soothes with pleasure, or transports with delight. Having found such a vehicle, mind freely expatiates in every region. How much we owe to language perhaps cannot be told, for the excursiveness of mind - for the fineness of its imaginations and the subtlety of its conceptions. (Lyall 1853, 5)



Moreover, "a thought often lies in the state of a feeling till a word, or words, evoke it from its recess" (Ibid., 5). As can be seen again, emotions which connect us with phenomenal reality are also linked with thoughts.

It is Lyall's opinion that the only way for these connections among emotions, phenomenal reality and thoughts to be expressed linguistically is when we make use of our imagination:

There is a period of its history when Imagination has to do with outward forms and semblances, as expressive of inward thoughts and feelings: but there comes a time when the most subtle and evanescent feelings or conceptions are made the symbols of material objects or ideas; or, these objects or ideas are expressed or conveyed under the most subtle conceptions of the mind. Between Homer and Wordsworth, or Shelley, there seems the interval to which we have here alluded: Shakespeare may be said to unite to two periods. Terms are applied to objects or circumstances to which they could never have been suitable, but for the abstract sense that has been assigned to them, from the subtle analogies which the mind can perceive between even the most material and the most spiritual circumstances or objects. (Ibid., 6)

Poetic creations, as those of Homer, Shakespeare, Wordsworth or Shelley, built on the extensive use of metaphors are thus at the center of Lyall's attention. He is able to realize that metaphorical language, mastered by the intellect, under the spell of productive imagination has the power to creatively improve our relationship with the world.

However, Lyall does not follow up this discovery of the enormous creative capacity of imagination. He does not spend much time explaining how it works because of the limits of his exposition

and because of he considered the faculty of imagination to be incomprehensible as such. Imagination avoids a purely intellectual approach since it is a composite of both intellect and emotions. Another reason would be his presupposition that the intellect itself is divorced from reality. Therefore, instead of sacrificing the Platonic view about the intellect i.e., considering it as transcending the world which is given to us in space and time, instead of sacrificing the intellect as representing order and as being an eternal principle, he sacrifices the creative power of the intellect.

### **The Emotive Dimension**

For Lyall though, in the imaginative state, the intellect works together with the emotions. Moreover, Ricoeur, in his theory of metaphor, links the two as well. However, he talks about feelings:

To feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is to make *ours* what has been put at a distance by thought in its objectifying phase. They [feelings] are not merely inner states but interiorized thoughts... Its function is to abolish the distance between knower and known without cancelling the cognitive structure of thought and the intentional distance which it impels. Feeling is not contrary to thought. It is thought made ours. (Ricoeur 1980, 154)

Now, we have seen that Lyall does not distinguish drastically between feelings and emotions and that his basic idea at work in the theory

of emotion is that emotion is not opposite to thought. Quite the contrary, emotion is that which informs the intellect about what, for the intellect "is at a distance", i.e. the phenomenal world. Through emotion we become closer to the world.

Thus, Lyall and Ricoeur seem to be in agreement with regard to the idea that through emotion we become closer to the world, with the difference that Ricoeur develops this idea and completes his theory of metaphor. By following Ricoeur's thought I intend to expand Lyall's insight and make it more complete along the lines of Ricoeur's theory.

For Ricoeur, feelings accompany imagination by adding to the "seeing as" what Ricoeur calls the dimension of "feeling as". In imagination, as shown above, we "see" similarities in remote ideas, we grasp the "mixture of *like* and *unlike*, proper to similarity". Feeling is thus not just something that pertains exclusively to what happens to the body, or just something that rests on a state of mind. Feeling, by accompanying imagination, is part of us as knowing subjects. "We feel *like* what we see *like*" (Ibid., 154). Through feelings we are involved in the process of grasping similarities between remote ideas, we participate in the intellect's discovery of a new meaning. Without it, we would probably fall into merely appreciating the fineness of the metaphorical construction, as Turbayne would have liked us to do.

Ricoeur then recognizes that, feelings "accompany and complete imagination as *picturing relationships*" (Ibid., 155). This aspect of feeling is what Northrop Frye, in *The Anatomy of Criticism* calls "mood". The mood is the consequence of us being affected by a poem as a whole, as a unique chain of words. Thus, the mood of that poem is

the iconic representation of the poem being felt. Now, Ricoeur refers to metaphor as being a poem in miniature. If this is true, then seizing the metaphor is not a complete process without the element of feeling which is "*the iconic as felt*". (Ibid., 155)

Finally, Ricoeur talks about feelings as they bring their contribution to the split reference of poetic discourse. Through imagination thought can suspend its direct reference to reality as we have seen. Besides reproductive imagination, where thought just reproduces reality, there is productive imagination, where thought has the ability to produce something new. This way, in imagination, thought augments our possibilities to *read* reality. Correspondingly, feelings, Ricoeur says, "are ways of 'being-there', of 'finding' ourselves within the world ... Because of feelings we are 'attuned to' aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language" (Ibid., 156).

To sum it all up, Ricoeur considers that a metaphor includes, besides its cognitive dimension, an imaginative and an emotional element as well. All of them are intimately connected. The full cognitive intent of a metaphor would be incomplete without the contribution of imagination and feelings. In Ricoeur's own words: "there is a *structural analogy* between the cognitive, the imaginative, and the emotional components of the complete metaphorical act and that the metaphorical process draws its concreteness and its completeness from this structural analogy and this complementary functioning" (Ibid., 157).

Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is often referred to as a tension theory of metaphor. The reason for employing the term "tension" is obvious if we take into account the fact that Ricoeur brings forward

two levels of reference, as we saw when he analyzed the differences between Frege and Benveniste's approaches concerning this issue that make up the foundations for a split reference in which the metaphorical statement is rooted. Then, there are two different ways of looking at the concept of an image: there can be talk about the image as replica and the image as fiction and they both act together in a metaphor with one being surpassed by the other. Finally, feelings come onto the scene attached to and completing the metaphorical utterance. Moreover, the linguistic elements that enter into the makeup of a metaphor are connected by the copula "is". The copula itself should only be taken together with its correlate "is not" because a metaphor points out not only the similarities between remote ideas but also their differences, preserving the tension between them.

Through metaphor we discover a new creative dimension in language. Metaphor, as Ricoeur puts it, has an heuristic function. Metaphor relates to reality by bringing forward new aspects of it. By improving our language we are likely to discover in the world something that could not be previously described. Thus, metaphor does not mirror reality but it re-describes it, it makes it more diverse and fuller. And through that it changes our way of relating to it, it changes "our way of dwelling in the world".

Lyall did not develop his ideas on metaphor to the extent that Ricoeur did. However, as shown above, there are similarities between his thought on the subject and Ricoeur's. Unlike Ricoeur, Lyall did not have at hand the findings of phenomenology, such as the importance of subjectivity in the attempt to describe the way the world makes itself present to awareness, or the idea of the

importance of returning to the things in themselves. Thus Lyall did not have an incentive for walking in uncharted territory, preferring to stay on the path lighted by traditional European views on this matter. Nevertheless, he foresaw the importance of language and stressed the use of metaphorical language which, complemented by emotions in the imaginative state has the ability to open up new dimensions in our interaction with the world.

The same sort of connection is emphasized by David Abram in his book *The Spell of the Sensuous* (1997) where he asserts that:

At the heart of any language then, is the poetic productivity of expressive speech. A living language is continually being made and remade, woven out of the silence by those who speak... And this silence is that of our wordless participations, of our perceptual immersion in the depths of an animate, expressive world. (1997, 84)

By being immersed in the natural world we have the opportunity to improve our language, and metaphor is the best tool that we can use in order to achieve this.

The world, as Abram sees it, is animate and its "wild, participatory logic ramifies and elaborates itself in language" (Ibid., 84). We cannot pick up a single phenomenon, as John Muir once said, without "finding it hitched to everything else" in the universe. Abram continues this same line of thought:

It is this dynamic, interconnected reality that provokes and sustains all our speaking, lending something of its structure to all our various languages. The enigmatic nature of language echoes and 'prolongs unto the invisible' the wild, interpenetrating, interdependent nature of the sensible landscape itself. (Ibid., 85)

This means that everything is connected, everything is part of the immense unity which cannot be grasped by the rigid use language.

In sum, metaphor is of tremendous importance if we are to establish a relationship between human beings as language users and reality. The purpose of metaphorical language is neither to "improve communication, nor to ensure univocity in argumentation, but to shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language [...] With metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and reality" (Ricoeur 1991, 85). We do not use metaphors for the sake of communication, nor do we use them as mere ornaments. Metaphors do not help us to reduce ambiguity or to attain univocity. Instead, they break apart the structures of language by bringing together remote ideas that, at the same time, exhibit similar and different traits, as in the metaphorical assertions that "Time is a river" and "Odysseus is a journey", etc. Such assertions grasp kinship and build similarities on dissimilarities. Moreover, metaphors change our way of being-in-the-world. They do not merely describe reality any longer. The reality they bring forth is completely new and unexpected. Metaphors do not imitate reality. Rather, they redescribe it, they re-present it through words. With the metaphorical assertion "Time is a river" we are prepared to understand time in a new way, as something continuously flowing and forever changing. Thus, reality becomes novel because we changed our way of relating to it.

#### IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

An alder leaf, loosened by wind, is drifting out with the tide. As it drifts, it bumps into the slender leg of a great blue heron staring intently through the rippled surface, then drifts on. The heron raises one leg out of the water and replaces it, a single step. As I watch I, too, am drawn into the spread of silence. Slowly, a bank of clouds approaches, slipping its bulged and billowing texture over the earth, folding the heron and the alder trees and my gazing body into the depths of a vast breathing being, enfolding us all within a common flesh, a common story now bursting with rain.

David Abram

David Abram, in his much celebrated book *The Spell of the Sensuous*, seems to summarize the latent ideas present in Lyall's book *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*. For Lyall human beings are part of the world in as much as they too like the rest of "what is" participate in Being. The intellect, being the eternal principle, connects us with God but is separated from Nature. The emotions, on the other hand, put us in touch, through phenomenal reality, with Being which is another name for God, at least in what concerns Lyall. Lyall was, first and foremost a religious person and it is only natural to find him talking about God and praising him, here and there, throughout the *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*.



However, besides connecting with God through grace we can see God in His works. Regarding this alternative, Lyall, in the inaugural lecture at Free Church College, on the philosophy of mind, reminds us:

Perhaps, we are too apt to forget the claims of God in Nature, because of the superior manifestations of him in Grace. There is too great a tendency to disparage the one, because of the more overwhelming demonstrations of the other. It was not thus with the Psalmist. He looked up to the heavens which God made, to the moon and the stars which he had ordained, and he learned his lesson of piety from these. He rejoined in the poetic beauties of creation: and made them express his feelings of devotion and utter the language of the most spiritual experiences. And we believe the more scientific our acquaintance with God works, we shall see God more in them, we shall be brought more into immediate contact with the Divine Being - not with a law, or a principle, but with a personal God - we shall behold more to admire [...] God is obviously recognized both in nature and in grace. (1853, 13)

Lyall recognized the importance of seeing God through His works, in Nature. Here I have not been concerned with the other possibility of connecting with God through grace but rather with trying to make the most out of what is left, namely Nature. This is why I think that David Abram's ideas are most useful, as he offers us an insight that comes from the phenomenological tradition, imbued with considerations about language and participation in a world where human beings are neither subordinated to, nor above Nature.

Thus, I will make use of the conclusions reached in the previous chapters in order to show that Lyall intuited *avant la date* the importance of being a human being in a more-than-human world.

Looking back to Lyall's considerations on the imaginative state, we can see that is the place where he brings together both the intellect and the emotions. In the imaginative state we are able to commune with Nature because in this particular state we perceive analogies, we see beyond what is out there as an object, we "personify nature", we do not limit ourselves to just describing reality but we re-describe it through an extensive use of metaphorical language.

Moreover, Lyall would say that we empathize with Nature through our emotions, by grasping its concreteness and unity, in much the same way Abram does:

From the magician's, or phenomenologist's, perspective that which we call *imagination* is from the first an attribute of the senses themselves; imagination is not a separate mental faculty (as we often assume) but is rather a way the senses themselves have of throwing themselves beyond what is immediately given, in order to make tentative contact with the other sides of things that we do not sense directly, with the hidden or invisible aspects of the sensible. (Abram 1997, 58)

The idea that in imagination we "make contact with other sides of things" is similar to what Lyall thinks when he says that emotions and especially the emotion of love, "see" beyond particularities, beyond what is accidental and changeable, toward Being itself.

Ultimately, for Lyall as well as for Abram, "both the perceiving and the perceived being are *of the same stuff* [...] the perceiver and the perceived are interdependent and in some sense even reversible aspects of a common animate element, or Flesh, that is *at once both sensible and sensitive*" (Abram Ibid., 67). Abram takes Flesh to mean what Merleau-Ponty meant when he used this term in his

work *The Visible and the Invisible*. The Flesh is "the reciprocal presence of the sentient in the sensible and of the sensible in the sentient". It is the interconnectedness of the perceiver and of the perceivable world. These two cannot exist independently of each other because we can only sense our surroundings from a particular perspective which implies that we extend our sentience in the surroundings. Moreover, it would be impossible to imagine a sentient subject completely separated from a "field of sensed phenomena".

For Lyall, as we saw before, when he talked about love, he considered that "every object, every being, shares in its exercise: it has selected no object for its exercise; but every object receives a part of its regard as it comes within its sphere. In its most absolute character, *being is its object*" (Lyall 1855, 408). The same interconnectedness between us as sentient beings and the sensible surroundings is present here. We are capable of love and we love Being, regardless of the particularities in which it is expressed or of the changes which it might endure. Through love we are in touch with "what is", we ourselves, being part of it. Thus, Lyall's thought is not exclusively centered on God and man since this connection is established by the intellect alone. But we are only whole when the intellect and the emotions work together. Through emotions, however, we take a detour and see God expressed in personified Nature. Through imagination where the intellect and emotions meet, we have the opportunity to discover new ways of relating to Nature, by making it more complex and fuller. For St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), for example, Nature was almost void of any significance since he is said to have travelled across the most beautiful landscapes without

even noticing them as he was concerned exclusively with thoughts about his soul and God.

For Lyall, Nature cannot be avoided because we are part of it as it is part of us. Even though Lyall's work exhibits idealist features, he detaches himself from the general understanding of idealism, as he does not follow, for example, either Berkeley's or Hegel's ideas. This however, did not compel him to embrace a materialist point of view. He knew that the idealist tries to dissolve the tension between the I and the world by explaining the world as a mere projection of the mind, whereas the materialist submerges the I into the vast sea of matter.

So Lyall took a more balanced stance, asserting that both the I and the world exist but that they are connected by our emotions through which we are able to see nature as animate and as "full of life". However, Lyall does not see the world as Sartre, for example, saw it, when we are under the spell of emotions. Sartre, even though he emphasized the difference between the I and the world, stressed the tension that exists between the two, the tension that springs when the I tries to appropriate the world which, in its turn, opposes resistance. Thus, the I tries to make its own something that still remains "strange" and distant. Lyall avoids this "deception" because for him emotions grasp what is beyond the particular characteristics of the world: emotions grasp Being itself.

Ernst Breisach in his *Introduction to Modern Existentialism* writes about similar existentialist views on this matter:

Neither a denial of the reality of the world (idealist position) nor the denial of the uniqueness of man (materialist position), nor a set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine Providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of

the human condition, that no miraculous harmony exists in the world and that to resolve the enormous tension between man and his world is beyond human power. What becomes audible in this tension is the echo of man's questions reflected from 'somewhere', and human life at its best is this sounding of the depths. (1962, 203)

We can see now that Lyall's position differs from Sartre's in that he does not regard the relationship between human beings and the world as being under the sign of an unsurpassable tension. For him, both we and the world are part of Being. Emotions make this similarity visible to us.

Now, this relationship can and should be developed by augmenting and improving our language as well which gives us the chance to discover in the world something that could not be previously described. This is where Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is useful. Ricoeur does not consider metaphor to be just an ornament as it was traditionally understood. *Au contraire*, he talks about a metaphorical statement which implies that metaphors can be true, that they can refer to reality. In order to show that metaphors have the capability to reach reality, he had to reassess the issue of reference. There is a metaphorical reference, beside literal reference, Ricoeur considers, as there is a metaphorical interpretation beside literal interpretation. The reality to which metaphors refer is a richer reality. Ricoeur also had to distinguish between two types of imagination and stress the importance of the productive imagination. Imagination, for Ricoeur, produces an unexplored vision of reality. Finally, he had to draw on different ways in which the emotional element complements the metaphorical process. Imagination is always accompanied by an emotional element

which represents a way of "finding ourselves" in the world, of "being there".

These themes from Ricoeur are common to Lyall even though admittedly Lyall does not develop a theory of metaphor. However, he makes extensive use of metaphorical constructions and discusses the intricate work of imagination although he does not produce an explanation or a thorough analysis of imagination which involves both the emotions and the intellect.

Where Lyall was mistaken was in considering the intellect to be separated from reality. Ricoeur showed that this should not be the case because metaphors, which are creations of our intellect, do not merely describe reality. Instead, metaphors re-describe it. They make it more diverse and fuller and thus they improve our relationship with it.

Something similar is expressed by Abram when he writes: "Only by overlooking the sensuous, evocative dimension of human discourse, and attending solely to the denotative and conventional aspect of verbal communication, can we hold ourselves apart from, and outside of, the rest of animate nature" (Ibid., 79).

Thus, we are constantly under the "spell of the sensuous" because we ourselves are sensuous beings. The intellect is not, as Lyall believed, divorced from reality, from Nature. As Abram puts it:

our senses disclose to us a wild-flowering proliferation of entities and elements, in which humans are thoroughly immersed. While this diversity of sensuous forms certainly displays some sort of reckless order, we find ourselves in the midst of, rather than on top of, this order...Does the human intellect, or 'reason', really spring us free from our inherence in the depths of this wild proliferation of forms? Or on the contrary, is the human intellect rooted in, and secretly borne by, our forgotten contact with

the multiple nonhuman shapes that surround us?.  
(Ibid., 48-49)

The link of reason with reality goes deeper than Lyall considered. Even though he stressed the fact that our emotions have a cognitive value, that they represent the channel through which the intellect reaches the world, they are still not the only link.

Abram for one recognizes that through language, the intellect finds itself in the midst of things because:

We [...] learn our native language not mentally but bodily. We appropriate new words and phrases first through their expressive tonality and texture, through the way they feel in the mouth or roll off the tongue, and it is this direct, felt significance - the taste of a word or phrase, the way it influences or modulates the body - that provides the fertile, polyvalent source for all the more refined and rarefied meanings which that term may come to have for us... Language, then, cannot be genuinely studied or understood in isolation from the sensuous reverberation and resonance of active speech.  
(Ibid., 75)

But this reciprocity, this interdependence between language and the intellect, on the one hand, and perception and "sensuousness", on the other hand, has a downside for Lyall. If we are to place ourselves in Lyall's shoes we can see that he took the intellect to mean what it means in the Platonic tradition. It represents order and it is the eternal principle, and this forced him to define the surrounding world as a determinate set of *objects* to cut the conscious self off from the spontaneous life of Nature. "To define another being as an inert or passive object is to deny its ability to actively engage us and to provoke our senses; we thus block our perceptual reciprocity with that being" (Ibid., 56). Thus, by defining another being as a

passive object, for the intellect the phenomenal world becomes just a world of shadows.

Trying to avoid interacting with an inert world, Lyall sprinkled metaphors on the dry, abstract language that he used to explain this and that concept or idea. For the same purpose he needed the input of emotions which represent the only accessible path to the animateness of the world. Abram explains that:

If we wish to describe a particular phenomenon without repressing our direct experience, then we cannot avoid speaking of the phenomenon as an active, animate entity with which we find ourselves engaged ... *Only by affirming the animateness of perceived things do we allow our words to emerge directly from the depths of our ongoing reciprocity with the world*". (Abram, idem, p. 56)

Inasmuch as we are part of the world, inasmuch as we and the world are "of the same stuff", we cannot simply disassociate from it, we cannot regard it from a purely objective perspective.

Lyall intuited that we are emotionally involved in the world. Our emotions, Lyall considers, represent our extension in the world. Through them we discover ourselves as participants in the world. This idea is rightfully emphasized by Armour and Trott in their analysis of Lyall's major work *Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature*. The way Lyall understood the balanced relation between reason and emotions compels Armour and Trott to consider him a representative of Canadian philosophy. However, for them, his work seems to be more a patchwork quilt of foreign ideas.

It was my goal here to show that Lyall's contribution is more significant than Armour and Trott estimated. Indeed, emotions connect us with reality. But so does our intellect through its activity of



creating metaphors which Lyall uses throughout his work even though he does not offer a study of metaphor as such. However, metaphors themselves are not purely intellectual constructions. There is an emotional element that enters into their constitution as well. Thus, the link between emotions and reason becomes more evident. Their balance in Lyall's work is a strong example of the accommodationist use of reason.

## APPENDIX

### Being Used by Metaphor: The Fallacy of Taking a Metaphor Literally

Turbayne distinguishes between two sides of the metaphor which cast a Janus profile on it: on the one hand, it can be used to express the otherwise un-expressible; but, on the other hand, it can abuse its users. Metaphor abuses its users when the "make believe" is taken seriously. This is where one must be vigilant. Otherwise, the "make-believe" is transformed into "believe" and the "as if" loses its meaning and becomes "is". Thus, from enjoying the tension created by the metaphor one can easily end up, if one is not careful, dwelling in an unreal world. This is what happened to Descartes, for example.

What Descartes intended to do with his *Mathesis Universalis* was to "transfer the certainty of geometrical demonstration to the procedure of scientific discovery, that is, the certainty of synthesis to analysis" (Turbayne 1970, 38). What this means is that Descartes' quest for certainty had to take in the advantages of the mathematical method, "more geometrico".

Now, is this conjunction of scientific discovery and geometrical demonstration a valid one? According to Turbayne, it is not. Descartes engaged himself this in a sort-trespassing process. Unaware of the outcome of his quest, Descartes acted as if by saying that "man is a wolf", he actually believed that man was indeed a wolf.

Turbayne selects three cases of sort-trespassing where Descartes does not seem to comprehend the full implications of his arguments.

1. The first case of sort-trespassing "is that of the deductive relation with the relation between events. The former relation belongs to procedure [...] The latter relation belongs to the process going on in nature" (Ibid., 46). Making use of deduction, Descartes was able to work with the theorems which were deduced from principles. "Principle and theorem were necessarily connected" (Ibid., 46). Supposing the principles were true, and because the mathematical method was employed, as in a chain of reasoning, it would be expected for the theorems to be true and therefore to be put at work in the process of explaining the world. Which brings us to the next issue. "The principle of procedure that starts a demonstration is repeated in the 'active principle' that starts the causal process" (Ibid., 46). Thus, what Turbayne argues is that when Descartes thought about the fact that "physical causes produce the existence of their effects, and that the effects necessarily follow from the causes" (Ibid., 47) he was applying the procedural algorithm to the physical world or, as Turbayne metaphorically puts it "a prominent page of the recipe was mixed in with the stew" (Ibid., 47). This act of shifting what was found in one domain into the other, or of associating them until they became "necessarily connected" gave enough grounds for Descartes to affirm that nature can be subjected to the deductive method. Which, Turbayne considers, is a clear example of taking a metaphor literally.

2. The second case of the sort-trespassing detected by Turbayne in Descartes' system of thought is "the inadvertent identification of explanation with physical explanation and this with causal explanation, that is, the reduction of one to the other" (Ibid., 47). This means simply that Descartes thought the main preoccupation of physics to be that of discovering the laws governing the movement of the bodies and then, using these laws to account for their motion. And this explanation was nothing other than a causal explanation which implies that events were actually caused by the "physical laws". One should not forget Descartes was determined to make use only of distinct and clear ideas as opposed to "obscure notions". In this case, the clear and distinct ideas were offered by entities such as: "bodies moving", "bodies at rest" and "external causes" or

"resistance", where the former ones are nothing but the effects of the causes expressed by the latter ones. All along Descartes' explanation the word "principle" was used to designate both "the premise or statement of the law in the procedure and the active principle , the supposed cause in the process" (Ibid., 48). Thus, Descartes failed to see the difference between the physical explanation of phenomena and their theoretical explanation. The concept of force, used in theoretical explanations, is fallaciously ascribed to objects. "Something that belongs to persons or living things is ascribed to matter", Turbayne considers.

3. The third case of sort-trespassing involves the

unwarranted identification of deduction with computation or calculation or any other form of metrical reckoning or counting [...] Because mathematical computation is constantly used in science, we must not regard it as a defining property. Because lines and angles are used to enormous advantage in optical demonstration [...] we must not therefore succumb to the tendency to think that explanation by means of lines and angles exhaust optical explanation. We might just as well say that mechanical explanations exhaust science or that we cannot set up a deductive system without using differential equations. (Ibid., 49-50)

In Turbayne's view, the *Mathesis Universalis* need not be geometrical. What is to be taken and used from the method itself is the demonstration feature and not "the nature of the terms used in it". The "geometrical method" is valuable inasmuch as it uses demonstration, not inasmuch as it is geometrical. It does not matter if the terms pertain to the area of geometry or not, as long as the algorithm followed is the one of demonstration.

Turbayne concludes that: "If we are victimized, then we confuse devices of procedure with the actual process of nature, and thus, unknowingly insinuate metaphysics"(Ibid., 56).

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